There was something different about the November 6 summit of the US and five Central Asian countries. It was the first such event held in the White House and followed the US president’s meetings with his Uzbek and Kazakh counterparts, where big deals were signed to boost America’s manufacturing sector.
The US had a clear pre-summit agenda. It pursued two goals: to gain access to mineral resources and to develop the Middle Corridor route to reach Central Asia by skirting Russian and Iranian territory.
Another striking change was that the US approach made little mention of human rights, democracy promotion, and the transfer of the Western governance model into the region. This appeals to the Central Asian states, which have poor records on basic liberties but are eager to build partnerships with Washington and to pursue tighter integration with global markets. Under President Donald Trump, priority goes to economic, connectivity, and security deals.
This has not always been the case. The first summit held within the C5+1 framework was first established under President Barack Obama in 2015 and was less about deepening economic and trade ties and more about denying Russia and China greater influence in the region. Yet it proved impossible to achieve concrete results without meaningful economic engagement, something the Trump administration is trying to change, and with some success.
Trump’s policy toward Central Asia is transactional. For instance, a deal with Uzbekistan is supposed to see some $100bn invested in the US in the coming years. Additionally, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords and agreed deals worth some $17bn with the US. Among these was a US-financed $1bn joint U.S.-Kazakhstan tungsten mining venture.
One area of mutual interest that emerges is cooperation on rare earth materials. The US is concerned with China’s dominance and weaponization of the rare earths supply, as it controls nearly 70% of global production as well as up to 90% of processing capabilities. Central Asia has much to offer to the US to help it diversify its supply chain, and work is already underway — last year, for example, the US and Uzbekistan agreed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals.
Central Asia has not been at the forefront of US policy since the 1990s. Trade levels were meagre, and active democracy promotion did not seem to have gained the US friends in the region. This has changed, first and foremost because of Russia’s war on Ukraine, with its reminder that the Kremlin’s neighbors can never be relaxed about its ambitions. With Russia distracted, for now at least, Central Asia sees an opportunity to make deals with other big players.
Yet, while US reassertion in Central Asia is welcome, there are significant limits to what it can achieve. Russia and China remain dominant when it comes to security, trade, and infrastructure in the region, as a glance at the map underlines. Chinese companies are active in virtually every sector of Central Asia’s economy. From connectivity to green energy to extraction and minerals processing, China dominates Central Asia’s options. For instance, Chinese companies have recently signed agreements with Uzbekistan for $2.7bn of investments in copper and silver extraction.
Moreover, the US is also constrained when it comes to logistics. It will need unimpeded access to Central Asia, and this is only possible through the South Caucasus. True, the TRIPP agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in August envisions the development of a corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the US oversight, and that may be a good candidate to serve as a link to Central Asia.
But it will be years before the corridor is ready. There are also questions on how efficient the link through Armenia would be. After all, there is no sea access that would facilitate exports from Central Asia, which again leaves the US with a more traditional branch of the Middle Corridor, through Georgia.
In the end, Central Asian states are aware that there are limits to their foreign policy maneuvering. Too much of a tilt toward the US would estrange China and anger Russia. Active engagement with Washington is good as long as it does not aggravate its two large and sensitive neighbors. Moreover, it is a misconception to imagine that the Central Asian countries hope to replace their big neighbors with the US.
What they do seek is to extract better deals from big powers. It’s worth noting that following his trip to the US, the Kazakh president visited Moscow on November 11-12 and signed a treaty on comprehensive partnership with his Russian counterpart. He referred to this as his most important trip of the year.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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