The European Union (EU) is about to adopt its 19th package of sanctions on Russia over its aggression against Ukraine. Although member states adopted 10 packages in the first year after the full-scale invasion, the momentum and scope of measures in subsequent years were weaker, with only three sanctions packages a year in 2023 and 2024, and few effective restrictions on Russia’s cash-generating energy sector.
The bloc has imposed an embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude and oil products, put price caps on the transfer of crude and oil products to third countries, banned new investments in Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) projects, and blocked the use of EU facilities in re-exporting Russian LNG to third countries.
Yet the import of Russian LNG into the bloc has not been sanctioned — and has even risen compared to pre-invasion levels. Deliveries of oil and gas also continue to flow through pipelines to some EU member states (step forward, Hungary and Slovakia), although volumes have significantly decreased.
With less sanctions pressure from Washington, the EU has been spurred to take further measures against Russian energy revenues. The latest sanctions package — the fourth of 2025 — will reportedly bring forward a ban on importing Russian LNG to 2027.
Brussels has already closed a loophole that allowed EU member states to import refined oil products from third countries made using Russian crude. The 18th sanctions package, adopted in July, banned these back-door imports from next year.
That package also cut the price cap for Russian crude oil to $47.60 a barrel from $60, the G7-wide price that was agreed in 2022. Although the price was meant to be constantly reviewed, it was only in summer 2025 that the EU and the UK decided to cut it. Canada and Japan followed suit, making the US the only G7 member to stick with a higher price for Russian crude.
The EU and the UK have also taken the lead in sanctioning inadequately insured tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet, which continue to fill the Kremlin’s war chest by shipping Russian oil in huge quantities.
Further action is being taken against the broader shadow fleet system, with financial penalties for operators involved in servicing sanctioned vessels.
In July, the EU sanctioned India’s Nayara Energy, which operates a major refinery for Russian crude. The designation has had a clear impact on Nayara’s operations and serves as a cautionary example for other companies.
Several Chinese refineries are reportedly on the radar for further designations, which would be an important step against Beijing, Russia’s most important and consistent supporter.
It would also be a significant message from Brussels to Washington, which has called on the bloc to be tougher on Russia and its enablers. US criticism is particularly justified when it comes to continued energy imports and the billions of dollars some EU member states continue to pay for Russian oil and gas. Many in the bloc — particularly countries on its eastern flank — have called for many years for an end to such dependency, and the rhetoric from Washington has pushed Brussels in the right direction.
Most importantly, it has also helped persuade Hungary and Slovakia, the two most sanctions-sceptical member states, to agree to further restrictions on Russian energy imports.
The European Commission is reported to be preparing a proposal for tariffs on Russian oil imports, a move which would particularly affect those two countries, the only ones continuing such imports via the Druzhba pipeline. Although leaders in Budapest and Bratislava have signalled opposition to a “premature” phase-out of Russian energy, strong messaging from the US has made it harder for them to block the proposals.
The newfound momentum in support of sanctions is helping the EU move faster to end its remaining dependence on Russian gas and oil, and it took critical messaging from Washington to get there.
But if the restrictions on Russian energy are to be as impactful as possible, the US should join the EU in imposing the new measures it did so much to help put in place.
Mihkel Märtens is a visiting fellow at CEPA, supported by a research scholarship from the Baltic-American Freedom Foundation (BAFF). He is an expert on international sanctions against Russia.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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