In late June, 14 members of the Sacred Struggle organization were detained and accused of attempting to seize power. Among those held were two archbishops of the Apostolic Church, the country’s largest, and an Armenian-Russian billionaire, who had spoken in their support.
Investigators claimed to have discovered a number of items they said proved the involvement of the detainees in preparing a coup d’état, including weapons and ammunition, drones, firecrackers, smoke bombs, military equipment, and radio communications equipment.
Foremost among those detained was Archbishop Bagrat (Bagrat Galstanyan), head of the Tavush for the Motherland movement, another name for the Sacred Struggle, which was established in 2024 during a series of protests and marches following an agreement with neighboring Azerbaijan on delimitation of the border. Archbishop Mikael Ajapayan was also arrested.
Armenia’s ruling party, Civil Contract, hints at an anti-government insurgency allegedly linked to Russia. The argument is simple: given the fact that the Armenian church has long been critical of the ruling party and supports the idea of closer ties with Russia, it, therefore, favors the opposition, which in turn seeks a re-establishment of now-compromised alliance with the Kremlin. Things were further exacerbated in June, when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has been the church’s most vocal critic, even demanded the resignation of the Apostolic Church’s leader, the Catholicos of All Armenians, Garegin II.
The Armenian church has evolved into a major source of political opposition to the present government. And this worries the ruling party, given its low popularity. This is especially problematic given parliamentary elections, which are scheduled to be held in June next year. Indeed, there have already been signs that the opposition is winning increasing popular support. Earlier this year, Civil Contract failed to secure a majority of votes in Gyumri, Armenia’s second biggest city.
The billionaire Karapetyan, who owns companies in Armenia and Russia and, therefore, was always seen as a potentially powerful political player, has been issuing statements from detention hinting at his future political involvement while speaking in support of the hierarchs of the Apostolic Church.
For Russia, these developments deeply matter. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary announced that the Kremlin is monitoring Karapetyan’s case. He added: “We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia. But we, of course, are most closely monitoring everything that is connected with the Russian citizen.” In response, Armenia’s government threatened to limit Russian state media, which could include restrictions on its terrestrial and online platforms. So far, major Russian channels such as Channel One, RTR-Planeta (“Russia 1”), and “Culture” continue to broadcast in Armenia.
Restricting Russian online media is not an entirely new measure. The Armenian authorities had previously suspended broadcasts by the leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.
So what’s at stake? Should the ruling party remain in power after the 2026 parliamentary elections, it would put Moscow at a considerable disadvantage. Relations between Armenia and Russia, though officially an alliance, have been fracturing. Yerevan has railed against Russia’s inaction since 2020, when the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War concluded with Armenia’s defeat, and especially in September 2023 when Russian peacekeepers stood by during the Azerbaijani offensive to recapture the entire enclave and expel its 100,000-strong Armenian population.
Since then, Armenia has diversified its foreign policy as well as military links. Dependence on Russian weaponry decreased, and closer ties were established with the EU — especially France — and the US. Even stalled relations with Turkey have been revived, as evidenced by Pashinyan’s recent visit to Ankara to discuss the opening of the long-closed border and the potential establishment of diplomatic contacts.
In parallel, Armenia’s participation within the Russian-dominated, six-nation Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has been reduced to a minimum. Should Civil Contract win another election, Armenia’s drift away from Russia to build a more balanced foreign policy would only accelerate.
Russia clearly opposes this, but it can do little given its difficult relations with Azerbaijan. Increasingly, it is Turkey that has best managed the situation and now positions itself as a mediator between Baku and Yerevan.
The stakes are likewise high for the EU and the US. Both have long considered Georgia as a cherished partner in the region. But given the falling out between its ruling party and most Western states, there has been a notable shift in Brussels and Washington toward Yerevan. Whether the West can capitalize on this without Georgia is a different matter, given the latter’s role as a geographical bridge between Armenia and the EU.
Nevertheless, there has been significant progress in relations, even as visa liberalization and deeper economic and political ties are discussed between Armenia and the EU. Seeing Civil Contract lose the elections would constrain Western ambitions and, in turn, entrench Russian influence.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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