As NATO leaders prepare to convene in The Hague in June they face an uncomfortable truth: the alliance’s defensive doctrine and capabilities are inadequate and require urgent reassessment.

The war in Ukraine has exposed a critical strategic divide within NATO. Central and East European members, particularly those bordering Russia, advocate for the use of defensive weapons like cluster munitions and landmines, while western European allies remain bound by two humanitarian conventions prohibiting these armaments. This divergence isn’t merely philosophical; it represents a vulnerability that seriously threatens NATO’s collective security.

On March 18, Poland and the three Baltic states jointly declared they would abrogate the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines “to provide our defense forces with flexibility and freedom of choice” of weapons systems to confront future Russian aggression. Lithuania has also withdrawn from the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Nine NATO member states, the so-called NB8 of Baltic and Nordic states plus Poland, live under the constant shadow of Russian aggression, and understand what’s at stake. Estonia’s intelligence services recently warned that Russia is actively preparing for military confrontation with the West. 

For these nations, the effectiveness, and need for these controversial defensive weapons isn’t theoretical, it’s existential. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated how such munitions can significantly impede invading forces, creating defensive advantages against numerically superior opponents, particular against numerically superior artillery. This has been borne out in NATO exercises where European armies have been forced to call on the US to use cluster munitions when “enemy” forces were poised to break through.

While drones win the headlines, artillery accounts for most casualties on both sides. Specifically, cluster artillery munitions, shells, rockets and missiles have caused over half the estimated 850,000-plus Russian casualties, according to US Department of Defense officials. Half. These are not a “nice” to have weapon for Ukraine, they are a “must” have weapon as they will be for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Poland, or any other sovereign country Russia tries to invade.

Western Europe’s commitment to humanitarian principles led to widespread ratification of the cluster munitions convention and land mine ban, when for a brief period, at the turn of this century, Europe mistakenly imagined the Russian threat had dissolved with the breakup of the Soviet Union. These agreements reflect legitimate moral concerns about civilian harm and post-conflict dangers. 

Two things have changed. On the technical front, new munitions are far more likely to detonate than older versions, and can also be made from plastic and other materials to ensure they degrade over time to become non-lethal. Secondly, of course, Russia presents an immediate danger to democratic states. When facing a numerically superior invading enemy that systematically flouts international law, such unilateral constraints risk becoming strategic liabilities rather than ethical triumphs.

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The United States had long ago recognized this dilemma. It never signed these conventions and maintained the weapons were legal and vital for strategic defense of Europe, Taiwan and South Korea. The Biden administration’s 2023 decision to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine acknowledged that battlefield necessities sometimes require difficult choices. Defense analysts widely supported this move as both strategically necessary and morally justified given the alternatives — namely, allowing Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders.

NATO’s fundamental purpose has always been deterrence. The alliance was formed specifically to counter Soviet — and now Russian — expansionism. The western European signatories of these conventions do not only impact the use of cluster munitions and land mines on their own territories. With half of NATO as signatories to these conventions, there are significant political and legal challenges for the transfer of these weapons to countries needing them the moment that Russian forces invade.

Thousands of Ukrainian lives could have been saved if they had received cluster munitions with the 155mm howitzers and HIMARS rocket launchers in the summer of 2022. And the fall battles of Kherson and Kharkiv likely would have been even more successful.

This is not a call to abandon humanitarian principles, but rather to develop a coherent, alliance-wide approach that acknowledges the current and future battlefield realities. The benefits of cluster munitions in Ukraine far outweighed the risks, which is why President Zelenskyy pleaded for them. NATO could consider frameworks for responsible deployment, strict rules of engagement, and commitments to post-conflict clearance while maintaining access to these defensive capabilities.

The summit in The Hague offers a unique opportunity to address this strategic dissonance. The alliance cannot afford to maintain policies disconnected from combat realities. 

The alliance faces a stark choice: adapt its approach to defensive weapons or risk undermining the security guarantees it was designed to provide. The nations on NATO’s eastern flank deserve a unified strategy that prioritizes their protection against genuine threats, not one hamstrung by conventions that potential aggressors openly disregard.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges, the former Commanding General of US Army Europe (2014-2017), currently serves as NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics and is a Distinguished Fellow with GLOBSEC.  

Dan Rice is President of the American University Kyiv and former Special Advisor to the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi (2022-2023).

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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