Assassinations, even as part of broader military operations, do not sit comfortably with Western politicians or audiences.
They’re also an awkward issue for strategic thinkers, where there’s a very necessary debate about the efficiency of actions that might seem underhanded or immoral and can result in civilian casualties or vicious reprisals.
Writing here, my colleague Francis Harris has pinpointed the greatest concern with high-level assassination efforts is that “the consequences are unknowable.”
War is a Pandora’s Box: once opened, no belligerent can make any guarantees of the outcome. Assassination campaigns during war are a microcosm of that unpredictability, as the elimination of “devils we know” must by implication promise devils unknown.
That does not necessarily remove the tactical and morale gains that can be achieved by belligerents engaging in such campaigns. If we accept that the targets of assassination are valid in other kinetic military operations (Russia’s Lt Gen Igor Kirillov might as easily have been killed on the battlefield as assassinated by Ukraine in December), the question must be asked why it is unjustifiable to conduct these operations?
The strategic justification of reaching far beyond the battlefield to eliminate enemy personnel is married by necessity to the moral justification. Targets of exceptionally high value far from the active frontline or rear echelons, and thus outside of the reach of more conventional military tactics, do not suddenly lose their value.
Ukrainian intelligence killed Russian Kirillov and his aide de camp because of his role in Russian chemical weapon attacks against Ukraine. The US and allies like France and the UK have conducted targeted killings of Islamist terrorists. Israel has killed hundreds of senior commanders of terrorist and militia groups and has assassinated Iranian scientists in the last decade for their involvement in that country’s nuclear program and to prevent the ayatollahs from gaining weapons that could destroy the Jewish State.
The strategic case for dispatching these targets is easy to make. They contributed to the enemy war effort, and in Kirillov’s case, were uniformed members of a military aggressor and accused of war crimes.
High-level deaths cause disruption and deterrence. Reaching out through the chaos of battle to eliminate a senior enemy has appeal at any level, especially with the advent of the marksman and long-range accurate small-arms fire. Precision weapons and now unmanned systems (and all-source intelligence resources) enable militaries to strike headquarters and eradicate enemy commanders.
Covert operations beyond the battlefield take this further, killing high-value targets in enemy capitals and elsewhere. This is just an extension of the war effort itself, and when conducted with adherence to other laws of war, such as avoiding unnecessary collateral damage or the use of banned substances such as chemical or biological weapons, the ethical dilemma shrinks.
The idea of “one shot to end the war” is alluring for any military strategist, even though this is harder to achieve than it sounds. Even the sudden death of Vladimir Putin or Ayatollah Khamenei wouldn’t totally derail Russian or Iranian aggression, even though it would create chaos in Moscow and Tehran.
Equally obviously, Kirillov’s death won’t permanently disrupt Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear defense units. The military succession structure will kick in, and he will be replaced.
Iran’s nuclear program will be hard hit by the loss of top scientists, but the Islamic Republic will not simply end its efforts to train nuclear physicists and others to continue the program, as recent events have demonstrated.
The longer-term aim of assassination is to add deterrence to the disruption. Accepting a senior position that opened only because the previous occupant was blown up on his morning commute hardly provokes confidence on the career ladder. New individuals will certainly step forward, driven by their own patriotism or careerism, and even a steady campaign of eliminating such targets is unlikely to utterly collapse adversarial state agencies on its own.
At the same time, the threat of assassinations striking so deeply makes security-obsessed states look inward, obsessing about treason and the unseen enemy, rather than projecting power outward. Like all aspects of military strategy, it’s a tool to help win wars, but not a tool that wins wars alone.
The far greater issue is not whether these sorts of men deserve to die, or if there’s a value to speeding up their meetings with their makers, but the consequences that follow. As Harris argued, the assassination of SS general and Holocaust joint architect Reinhard Heydrich makes the point. Few men were more deserving of the lingering, painful death that he suffered, but his removal made no difference whatsoever to the execution of the Final Solution. Indeed, the massive reprisals against Czechoslovak civilians did not seem like a success.
These concerns are incredibly important, but prudence is only one element for any strategy. It is not the heart of the moral dilemma.
The nature of the state targeted by assassination efforts matters. Considering the increasing totalitarianism of Russia, Iran, and others, horrific retaliation must be expected. Russia adores the opportunity to justify its newest volley of missiles fired at Kyiv or other civilian targets. Iran’s capability to strike Israel directly has been limited by that country’s highly developed air defenses, but the retaliation was still attempted.
That’s because murderous regimes will murder. It’s in their nature. Caution about striking back, including with assassination operations, cannot hang on the fear of violence from violent people.
The argument for and against such operations must be evaluated primarily on whether they effectively reduce the capacity of these regimes to enact violence.
Michael C. DiCianna is a research fellow at the Center for Intermarium Studies at the Institute for World Politics, and a non-resident research assistant at the Yorktown Institute. He is a candidate for an Executive Master of Arts in National Security Affairs at the Institute for World Politics.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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