2025 will be a year of dramatic political change in Central Europe. Poland will elect a new president and the pro-European Civic Platform has a chance to control both the presidency and the Sejm; parliamentary elections in Germany in February may produce a grand (but unhappy) coalition of Christian and Social Democrats; Austria may well appoint a prime minister from the extremist FPÖ; and the pro-Kremlin Slovak government may be forced into early parliamentary elections.
In addition, there will be parliamentary elections during the fall in the Czech Republic. It is widely expected — as polls overwhelmingly and steadily suggest — that the current four-member pro-Ukrainian coalition led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala of ODS will lose power. Its replacement would be a populist umbrella movement led by the ANO party of the billionaire former premier Andrej Babiš, in open or silent coalition with one or two extreme nationalist smaller parties.
Fiala’s government was doing one thing professionally, reliably, and well. It has been a supporter of Ukraine: rhetorically, financially, and militarily. The government has skillfully organized the acceptance of a huge wave of Ukrainian refugees. Fiala was among the first politicians to visit Kyiv, literally just a few days after war erupted.
Financially, the Czech Republic is the 11th-largest donor to Ukraine as a share of national wealth, and its military aid has been early, timely, and substantial. During the past year, the Czech government has organized a successful munitions initiative, collecting old (often Soviet or old Russian) shells from unnamed third countries, and then delivering it to Ukraine.
Most of these initiatives are associated with Tomáš Pojar, a former diplomat and national security adviser. He is known to be a quick decision-maker and a smart, tough operator — most of the successes of the Czech government involve him in some way. He is the guarantor that Czech government aid to Ukraine has amounted to much more than mere rhetorical exercises and empty virtual signaling.
Unfortunately, Ukraine is about the only issue where Fiala‘s government is doing well. Its domestic policies are mostly spectacular failures, its work often chaotic, and it is perceived by the public as arrogant.
The statistics are quite revealing. Real wages have still not recovered from the pre-Covid level of 2019. Energy prices are the highest in the EU both for households and companies. Windfall taxes on energy producers were implemented two years later than they should have been. Economic growth is the lowest imaginable.
All of which is compounded by the current economic travails of neighboring Germany; Czech exports are dependent on the automotive sector, which is not doing well. With real wages stagnating and public discontent rising, the government chose to raise wages for MPs and politicians, while limiting pension growth for a large chunk of the population.
It’s worth comparing the Czech situation to its northern neighbor, Poland where there have been decades of near-uninterrupted and dynamic economic growth. This only underlines the fact that Czech governments are historically masters of self-inflicted recessions, absolutely disconnected from global and European cycles.
This government typically prioritizes fiscal consolidation over economic growth, without achieving either. And while aid to Ukraine is a very positive feature of the Fiala government, it cannot succeed without providing for its own citizens. People have to feel that the government shares the proceeds of the economy with the population.
Meanwhile, Fiala’s government refuses to accept any mistakes and blames its negative polling for disinformation spread by Russia and the opposition.
Unless something fundamental changes, there will be an ANO victory and a return of Babiš as leader or eminence grise. This is seriously bad news for Ukraine.
ANO positioned itself as a reasonably moderate right-wing party in the European Parliament until June but has now joined a new faction called Patriots for Europe, led by various Kremlin-friendly and/or Ukraine-skeptical parties, including those of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders, as well as the Austrian FPÖ and the Spanish Vox group.
ANO says it does not want to leave EU or NATO, but when questioned over Ukraine says it seeks peace, blames the current government for “war mongering” and says war in Ukraine is not “our war.” Reports say it plans to end the Czech munitions initiative.
While a ceasefire or peace in Ukraine will be mainly decided elsewhere, multiple elections and their fallout in the Central European countries close to Ukraine will also have a huge impact. The loss of support from Prague would be keenly felt in Kyiv.
Jan Macháček is a visiting fellow of Globsec, president of Strategeo Institute, and member of the board of foreign policy advisors to the Czech President Petr Pavel.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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