For those following the conflict closely, it has been obvious since the failed Ukrainian offensive of summer 2023 and the stalemate that followed that Russia has been waiting until the US presidential election before making its next move. And as Europe headed toward the now-realised possibility of a return to Trump’s America, it became clear the West’s strategy of waiting for Russia’s collapse was not working.
Russia’s economy has withstood unprecedented sanctions and international pressure while continuing to trade oil and pursue its offensive elsewhere in Europe.
At the start of the conflict, the Biden administration clearly signaled to Moscow what it would defend and its red lines. But it has since failed to deter Russia effectively because its officials let it be known they feared “escalation” of the war in Ukraine.
It is hard to imagine how one escalates a conflict that already involves the mass kidnapping of children and the targeting of critical civilian infrastructure.
While Biden stumbled over signals, Europe has also failed to deliver enough military support. It took the UK six months to even start ordering more ammunition following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. It was a dereliction of the duty of the government to keep its population safe.
Trump’s election presents both an inflection point and a wake-up call to the strategic reality that Europe must massively increase its military preparedness to confront Russian activity around the continent.
Europe’s complacency has encouraged Moscow to be increasingly antagonistic. In the years since its full-scale invasion, Russia has disrupted elections in Georgia, overtly interfered in the Moldovan referendum, and sent its submarines on adventures to the Irish coast.
To the South, Wagner Group, the Russian state-owned mercenaries, have been involved in coups in Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali. To the North, Russia continues to assert itself at the North Pole and along the Arctic Circle. Plotted on a map, these activities surround Europe.
Britain must be absolutely clear that winning, not settling, in Ukraine is the primary strategic priority for the UK and Europe.
The alternative would be catastrophic and must be spelled out: If the territorial integrity of a European state like Ukraine is eroded, NATO’s mutual defense agreement — Article 5 — will be the next boundary tested by Russia.
Nuclear proliferation would become a growing problem as states learn from Putin that they can face down the West as long as they threaten to use nuclear weapons. And defeat in Ukraine would give a green light to China to escalate its aggression in Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Ukraine winning — that is, holding on to its sovereign territory — is the strategic key to preventing those events from becoming a reality. Put simply, losing Ukraine is not an option.
We’ve yet to see a concrete strategy from the UK’s new government on Britain’s place in the world and what it wishes to achieve with its military. The next six months will be spent conducting a Strategic Defence Review, but those are six months when the UK will become less secure.
The strategic context is obvious — the UK should get on with it.
Mike Martin is a Member of Parliament for Tunbridge Wells and a member of the UK’s Defence Select Committee. A former army officer, he is a Senior Fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
