Donald Trump’s election as US president has come at a crucial time for Georgia and the South Caucasus in general. Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), won an unprecedented fourth consecutive term in the October 27 parliamentary elections.
The still-disputed outcome, the ruling party’s hostile rhetoric, and the suspicion that Georgia has taken a sharp turn back toward Russia have left US-Georgian relations at their lowest point in the past 30 years. The Biden administration had limited aid, minimized political contacts, and increased diplomatic pressure on the Georgian government.
Hardly surprising then that Georgian officials embraced the US election result with some delight. They congratulated Trump on his return as a historic moment that could potentially save US-Georgian relations. His return makes the ruling party more confident that it will be able to ride out public protests, however diminished, that the opposition describes as “stolen.”
And yet. It is not clear what exactly a second Trump administration might do to benefit Georgia. Perhaps less criticism will be leveled at the government, or there may be an acceleration of work toward a free trade agreement or visa-free regime.
But both were on the bilateral agenda last time Trump was in office and there are no guarantees that they will be settled this time. The truth may be that the second Trump administration will simply not care very much about Georgia one way or the other. The government may be illiberal, but it has nothing like the relationship enjoyed by Hungary’s Victor Orbán.
On the positive side for the government, Trump 2.0 will be more transactional, and this is where Georgia’s ruling party will feel more comfortable. Tbilisi believes talk about democratic standards, human rights and the need to help Ukraine will likely drop to a whisper, if not be completely forgotten.
It might also hope that Trump will help end the war in Ukraine. That would probably ease Western pressure to join the sanctions regime (something it has consistently refused to do) This desire not to be pulled into what it sees as a Russia-US dispute is a driving force for the administration.
But even if relations improve somewhat, Trump’s new presidency is unlikely to alter declining US involvement in Georgia and the South Caucasus more broadly. Indeed, before Trump’s return, Western influence had already hit the rocks in Azerbaijan and was only slightly expanded in Armenia, which remains firmly embedded in the Russia-led alliances.
The US is likely to think less about the South Caucasus and its mostly illiberal governments, or indeed the wider Black Sea region, including Ukraine, as it pursues its interests in East Asia with greater vigor.
This opens the way for Russia to fill in the void and once again expand its power over the South Caucasus. Despite its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, Moscow has managed to pull Azerbaijan closer, limit Armenia’s diversification of foreign policy, and build closer ties with the Georgian government, which considers stable ties with Russia as positive.
That doesn’t solve the problems South Caucasus rulers have with the European Union (EU) which has been consistently more engaged and less tolerant of those wandering off from the European path.
It should now become clear how much the bloc’s policy relied on US support. If the US walks away, the EU will have to decide either to increase its engagement or abandon the South Caucasus altogether. Not that Georgian membership is on the cards. Not after the last six months of outright hostility.
That will be pleasing for the Kremlin and very disappointing for the 85% or so of ordinary Georgians who still say they want to join the bloc.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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