Armenia is on the verge of ditching membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military and security grouping.
The decision has been threatened since 2020 when Azerbaijan decisively defeated Armenia in war. It worsened in September 2023 when the Azeris fully retook what remained of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Russia, Armenia’s ally, responded with shoulder-shrugging.
The scars left by Armenia’s sense of betrayal are widespread in Yerevan and the public mood is now deeply anti-Russian (the number of Armenians believing bilateral relations are bad has risen to 66% from 49%.) This realization was especially stinging for Armenia since it has allied with Moscow since the 1990s and its main purpose is to defend its member states’ security.
Disenchantment has spurred Armenia to diversify its foreign policy. The pace of the shift is indeed staggering. If before 2020, Russian arms made up around 90% of Armenia’s defense capabilities, have now fallen to no more than 15%. Instead, Armenia has bought significant amounts of armaments from India and France.
And it is not only about quantity but also about quality, including advanced radars and missiles. On June 18, it was announced that France will sell Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Armenia. Two days later, the French newspaper Le Figaro reported that 36 of the howitzers will be dispatched to Armenia in the next 15 months. Caesars can hit targets up to 40km (25 miles) away and have been heavily used on the battlefields of Ukraine.
Yet, the most serious challenge Armenia posed to Russia was in the operation of CSTO. Yerevan has abstained from participating in major meetings and exercises of the grouping, and hints in the media circulate about its potential withdrawal.
The pace of disengagement has only accelerated since it was revealed in a slate of confidential documents that Putin’s client state, the Belarus dictatorship and another supposed ally of Armenia, was covertly arming Azerbaijan from 2018-2022. Belarus reportedly helped to modernize Azerbaijan’s artillery and sold electronic warfare and drone parts.
The Armenians responded with fury, recalling the country’s ambassador from Belarus and, on June 20, organized a meeting between Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan then stated that he will never visit Belarus as long as Lukashenka is in power. The Lukashenka regime responded in kind by summoning home its ambassador from Yerevan.
Belarus’ help could hardly have been offered without Russia’s tacit participation. Although Lukashenka had greater freedom of maneuver at the start of this period, by 2020 he was wholly reliant on the Kremlin for money and support, as he stole the election and cracked down on the opposition. For Armenians, this represents clear evidence that CSTO is of no further use.
How far Armenia is prepared to go in rejecting Russia is unclear, but given the present atmosphere, it is evident that Yerevan has created the basis for eventual CSTO withdrawal.
Armenia is not in a strong position, It has lost two wars and seen the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave erased, its military is outclassed by Azerbaijan, which continues to exert pressure diplomatically and politically, most of its neighbors are unfriendly and it suffers acute domestic political discord.
The country’s leadership has so far tried to rebalance relations with Russia so that its dependence is lessened. But downgrading or revoking its CSTO membership would not suffice. This is where the expansion of Armenia’s ties with the West comes in.
In early April, Pashinyan met the US and EU officials in what seemed like an unofficial summit, so setting the tone for a more comprehensive engagement with the West. This includes greater cooperation with the EU; from institutionalizing visa-free travel to more active trade and investment ties.
The US too has upped its engagement. A number of meetings have been held; on June 18, senior US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Verma visited Yerevan for discussions. Days earlier, James O’Brien, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, visited Yerevan where the two sides signed a Customs Cooperation Agreement.
The two dies also agreed on steps to expand bilateral trade ties and establish a platform for high-level discussions on issues such as energy, defense, and cybersecurity. Washington intends to move beyond the present strategic dialogue into a full-scale strategic partnership with Armenia.
If Armenia is struggling to talk to Russia, it can at least try to improve relations with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey. On June 20, Pashinyan ordered work on a new constitution to begin soon. This is partly a response to the Azeri desire to remove a clause in the present Armenian constitution that calls for unification with Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is hoped that this might be its last big demand. Given recent progress on border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it seems there will be few obstacles to a peace agreement between the two.
Armenia also pursues rapprochement with Turkey, which in an ideal scenario would “open up” the country (their mutual border has been shut for more than three decades) and thereby pave the way for a more diversified foreign policy.
That would allow a more balance in Armenia’s foreign relations, making it less dependent on any single major state.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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