In Brussels, seasoned observers call indecisiveness “the German vote.” On European Union tech bills, Berlin often abstains. Chancellor Angela Merkel made indecisiveness her trademark. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is continuing the tradition with an embarrassing, never-ending dance around the issue of banning and phasing out China’s dangerous Huawei technology from core German telephone networks.
A quick refresher underlines the sensitivity of Huawei’s role. In 2017, China introduced its National Intelligence Act, which obliges all Chinese companies to share any information and customer data with national intelligence agencies. Australia responded by raising the issue of a lack of trustworthiness of Chinese telecom providers.
In Germany, a debate arose in 2018, even before Washington voiced concerns against Huawei. German legislators began advocating a ban due to China’s surveillance legislation and Huawei’s character as a state-subsidized and state-guided entity.
Shortly before the 2019 European elections, the European Commission published a 5G cybersecurity toolbox. It carried a clear warning of “high-risk” suppliers from “state-backed actors,” which clearly meant China. Five years on, according to the toolbox’s second status report, a vast majority of EU member states have acted, led by Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The UK issued an outright ban on Huawei in 2020.
One country stands out for being unable to make up its mind: Germany. Huawei accounts for 59% of Germany’s 5G Radio Access Networks, according to a Strand Consult report.
Angela Merkel bears responsibility. She fought hard to avoid making Beijing unhappy over Huawei. Beijing’s ambassador to Berlin, sensing weakness, threatened that his government might, just hypothetically, retaliate against the German automotive industry.
But Merkel’s indecisiveness failed to bury the Huawei issue. A coalition of members of the German Bundestag from different political camps — some Christian Democratic Union members, some Social Democrats, plus some Greens — put up an energetic opposition. Several ministries inside Merkel’s own government including the security services also opposed the Chancellor’s line. At a CDU party conference, Merkel only narrowly escaped a defeat on this issue by agreeing to a compromise.
It was the first time in recent German politics that national security concerns bested mercantilist sentiments. Or so it seemed. In reality, the legislative compromise allowed the executive to delay. German telecom companies led by Deutsche Telekom hoped that they could get around the Huawei phase-out by creating facts on the ground.
Although Merkel’s term ended in 2021, the new coalition government between the SPD, Greens, and the Free Democrats failed to see an imminent need to act. Other major challenges intervened, the pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Today, Huawei’s share of the market is larger in Berlin than it is in Beijing.
It remains imperative to wean Germany off its Huawei dependency. Unfortunately, if this happens, it will come later than sooner. A Ministry of the Interior roadmap published last year aimed at reducing dependency on Chinese vendors by 2026, and in critical regions such as Berlin or industrial powerhouses such as the Rhine Valley, slashing it to 0%.
A new draft compromise now is under discussion. It would set a final cut-off either by 2026 or 2029 when the built-in Chinese technology would hit the 10-year mark and would need to be replaced anyway. The Ministry of the Interior, the Greens and the opposition party CDU favor 2026. The Chancellor, the Liberals, and the telecoms industry want three years later, arguing that the speedy rip out of Chinese technology would be costly and jeopardize digital connectivity objectives. A decision is still pending.
The Huawei-5G-saga reflects a continuing debate in Germany over whether the country can afford a proposed “Zeitenwende” U-turn. We have cut the cord with Russian gas. We promise increased military spending. Some voices, particularly from German multinationals, hope that Germany returns instead to the infamous “Wandel durch Handel” strategy, relying on China as our favorite market and the US as our dear security provider.
This is a pipe dream. While at the European level, the new dictum of “de-risking” (instead of decoupling) has gained ground, German Chancellor Scholz parrots the words of Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang who warns against “politicizing” de-risking — what a curious position for a Communist cadre! — and wants business and business alone — to handle “de-risking.”
Germany will have to adapt to new geopolitical realities. It is no longer the question of whether to de-risk, including divestment and diversification, but rather how quickly and efficiently. This is not a purely economic question or a mere business decision, but a question of national and European economic security. Germany does not have a spoon long enough to eat from the same bowl as China. Either it builds the right partnerships or it will go a bit hungry. The Huawei debacle underlines this threat. In the end, Germany will get it right, but only after dithering and delay.
Reinhard Bütikofer has served as an Alliance 90/The Greens member of the European Parliament since 2009. He was the co-chair of the European Green Party from 2012 to 2019.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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