When Vladimir Putin declared 2024 the “Year of the Family,” it was an extension of previous campaigns portraying Russia as the last bastion of Christianity against a West where nefarious elites are apparently pushing “dozens of genders or gay pride parades.”
His concept of the family unit contains little sentiment. “The main purpose of the family is to have children, about procreation, and thus, the perpetuation of our people and our centuries-old history,” he said on January 23.
But Putin, whose personal life is a notoriously tangled web of affairs, is also using “the family” to build sympathy for his regime in the West and to shore up support at home while, in reality, his policies leave Russian families bereaved, unprotected and destitute.
His war in Ukraine has shattered countless families, leaving mothers mourning sons, children orphaned, and veterans with shattered minds and bodies. More than 315,000 have been killed and wounded. At least 12,000 under-18s have been kidnapped from Ukraine, with some offered to Putin loyalists for adoption.
His piety is purely political and free of moral inspiration. Before being sanctioned by the US, the UK, and much of Europe, the Russian president’s alleged girlfriend and children basked in luxurious lives in the same “decadent West” that the Kremlin regularly condemns. So did the families, formal and informal, of his elite.
While his relatives enjoyed Parisian apartments, private jets and elite Western universities, nearly 19 million Russians lived in poverty. The children of Putin’s circle will never be sent to fight his war, the price of which is being paid entirely by ordinary families.
As a result of the war, alcoholism and violent crime are on the rise, with more than 589,000 felonies in 2023, the highest number since 2011. State resources are being diverted to the military and away from welfare, education, and healthcare.
Putin’s concern for the traditional family has often manifested itself in legislation restricting the rights of women, such as a 2017 law that decriminalized domestic violence. Now, first-time offenders usually just need to pay a fine of 5,000 rubles ($55) if they are found guilty of beating their wife, and 7,000 rubles for beating their children.
Since the regime’s language and behavior are visibly at odds, what’s its aim?
Putin’s crusade for family values is not about families, it is about power — both domestic and global. Domestically, the switch to emphasizing family values came in 2012, when it was intended to boost Putin’s declining public support and allow him to consolidate power.
Even though the March 15-17 presidential election was a farce, Putin is using the vote to play up Russia’s struggle with the West and pose once again as the guardian of conservatism and “manliness.”
Globally, his purported allegiance to family values is used to gain allies among the far-right and exploit liberal-conservative divides in democracies. Because Russia hasn’t reconciled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its loss of great power status, Putin has been trying to claim the leadership of the far-right “International.”
His claims to prioritize the “protection of children” are intended to legitimize his brutal invasion of Ukraine, painting himself as a crusader against the evils of the West. He has claimed his country is fighting to protect “our children and our grandchildren” from “sexual deviation” and “satanism,” and to ensure every child has a “mom and dad” not “parent number one, parent number two, and parent number three.”
Putin has used such culture war rhetoric to obscure his imperial ambitions and present the West as a threat to Russia. “They sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people, from within,” he said.
Claiming that only Russia can save the world from moral decay serves another of Putin’s goals: to sow discord in democracies and weaken their response to Kremlin aggression. Putin’s illiberal allies across the West are helping him to achieve his aim.
And the alliance is mutually beneficial. While Putin gained international legitimacy for his authoritarian regime and caused discord among his enemies, far-right parties gained a powerful patron and financial and media assistance.
That was often large-scale before the all-out war but has become harder since, both in political and practical terms. Marine Le Pen, an old friend of Putin whose party took a €9m ($9.8m) loan from a Russian bank linked to the Kremlin in 2014, condemned the invasion on March 14, suggesting pro-Russian positions no longer resonate with the electorate.
But the rhetoric remains a weapon common to the Russian despot and his Western political admirers.
The liberal democracies must counter the Kremlin’s false narratives by exposing their hypocrisy and highlighting the true victims: the families torn apart by war, the mothers silenced by oppression, and the children robbed of their futures. They should also amplify the voices of the authentic advocates for peace and families who stand against authoritarianism.
As for Putin, if he genuinely cared about Russian families, he would end his aggression in Ukraine and return his soldiers to their loved ones.
Dessie Zagorcheva holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University. She specializes in international security with a focus on Russia and Eastern Europe. Her current research examines NATO’s response to Russian sharp power.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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