Transnistria has called an extraordinary session of the Soviet of All Deputies for February 28, only the seventh in its history, with former Communications Minister Gennady Chorba claiming the result would be a formal request to unify with Russia.
In accord with the sometimes tenuous grasp of democratic norms in Russian-created mini-states, Chorba cited an 18-year-old referendum as evidence of the popular will in the illegally established breakaway state.
The Kremlin would — given its history — probably have no problem with the democratic failings of this plan. But it did have a serious problem with the former minister of a tiny entity (its official population is fewer than 400,000, or around the size of Cleveland, Ohio) deciding its next moves.
Russian forces are far from the borders of Transnistria and the local Russian-officered force of about 1,300 is not considered a serious threat. Even Warhawks in the capital predict nothing but humiliation for Russia should Transnistria formally detach itself from Moldova.
Yet the anxiety of pro-Russian leaders is palpable and well-grounded. Russia’s war has pushed Moldova further into the West’s arms while destabilizing Transnistria and upsetting its demographic balance. Transnistrian leaders therefore see a closing window to cement their ties to the Kremlin.
Despite the close ties between Transnistria and Russia, Ukrainian identity is core to Transnistria’s self-conception. Were it a state, Transnistria would be the only one in the world beyond Ukraine to recognize Ukrainian as an official language.
Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national hero, lends his name to the main thoroughfare in the capital, Tiraspol, and his profile graces the 50 ruble banknote. His bust sits outside the Ukrainian-language school, given pride of place between the State Soviet and the Presidential Palace.
Russians slightly outnumbered Ukrainians and Moldovans at the last census in 2015, but the absorption of up to 10,000 Ukrainian refugees and the emigration of ethnic Russians (ironically because they hold Russian passports and the prospects are better there) may very well have tipped the demographic balance.
Across the Dniester, Moldova’s integration with Europe seems increasingly irreversible. In December of last year, the European Council announced the opening of negotiations for Moldovan accession.
Resolving territorial disputes is not necessarily a precondition for EU membership — Cyprus joined two decades ago despite the Turkish occupation of its northern half — and the talks have given Transnistrian leadership cause for alarm.
In an interview with RIA Novosti, President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed that the Moldovan government in Chișinău is preparing units to sabotage and carry out terrorist attacks against Transnistria to lay the groundwork for a possible invasion.
Although Krasnoselsky did not affirm the upcoming session would result in a formal request for annexation, the possibility sparked widespread consternation among the Russian commentariat.
Historian and political scientist Alexei Makarkin called the provision of military support to Transnistria, which would have to pass by Odessa, “impossible.” Blogger Alexander Pylev warned that such an announcement would give Ukraine the greenlight to seize the Russian ammunition depot at Cobasna, rumored to be Europe’s largest, solving Ukraine’s ammunition shortage with Russia unable to respond.
Sources closer to the Kremlin are playing down the possibility of such a request.
The leading tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets speculated the session would only call for more economic support in light of duties imposed by Chișinău, a position echoed by Tsargard, the TV channel affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church.
This seems to be signaling to Transnistrian leadership to avoid any rash decisions that could embarrass Moscow. Transnistria is likely to hear the message. So will other regional players: Russia is in no position to protect its allies.
Ben Dubow is a Non-resident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, which tracks authoritarian influence online.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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