Photo: Short remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Lloyd J. Austin.. Credit: US Secretary of Defense https://flic.kr/p/2p8GJ4w

The Long History of US Irritation at European NATO’s Freeloading

Donald Trump is just the latest iteration of US concern at European allies whose stated affection for the alliance is not matched by sufficient funding.

By Peter Huessy

February 21, 2024

Mike Rogers the former head of the National Security Agency and David Petraeus the former Director of Central Intelligence, both argued at the Munich Security Conference this month that the most critical issue being discussed was the short-term question of the forthcoming US support for Ukraine.

But they added the rider that this must be considered as part of a debate on the long-run future role of the United States as the leader of NATO.

This issue has caused a great deal of discussion, with Europeans openly worrying that the security blanket of US military support may be lost if Donald Trump returns to the White House. Yet there is a 50-year history of senior figures in both political parties questioning why the US should endlessly bear the burden of defense spending when so many allies fail to carry their weight.

Two examples will suffice. Senator Mike Mansfield, the Senate Democrat majority leader, proposed in 1971 that half of all US forces in Europe — 150,000 — be unilaterally withdrawn. The Nixon administration opposed the Mansfield amendment while urging support for a resolution offered by Senator “Mac” Mathias of Maryland, “supporting the necessary level of US armed forces in Europe.”

The administration argued US large‐scale involvement in Europe was “the essential ingredient of the cohesion of the West, which has set the stage for the effort to negotiate a reduction of tension.” Further, any sudden reduction of the United States’ military presence in Europe, the administration argued, would not only weaken the NATO defenses and force a basic NATO strategic review but also would affect political “credibility.”

In June 1984, a similar proposal was put forward by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) of the Armed Services Committee. It echoed previous legislation pushed by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) of the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee.

Stevens wanted to significantly reduce American forces in Europe, noting that the two most notable post-World War II conflicts were in Korea and Vietnam, not Europe. Nunn’s proposal was to reduce US military forces in Europe unless the European NATO allies increased their contribution to NATO’s defense.

At the time US military spending had grown 7.6%, in acknowledgement of the NATO pledge to raise outlays by inflation plus 3%. Britain managed 3%, but France, West Germany, and Italy were far behind that figure.

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Nunn also explained the US planned to bring 1,500 combat airplanes to the theater, but Europe could only handle 300. The US had a 40-day supply of ammunition but Europe had less than two weeks. Said the Georgia Senator: “If we do not have allies that are going to do their part, there is no need for the American taxpayer to continue to spend billions of dollars.”

President Reagan’s Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, lectured Senate Republicans on the dangers of helping Moscow drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. European leaders claimed to have increased defense spending by 44% versus the US increase of 27% since 1970, although the number was misleading — the post-1970 period included substantial US reductions as the Vietnam war ended.

Senator William S. Cohen, a moderate Maine Republican, agreed with ”the essence” of the Nunn position but not ”the action.” John G. Tower of Texas, the conservative Republican chairman of the Armed Services Committee, called the proposal ”a kick in the teeth” for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had brooked domestic opposition to deploy short-range American nuclear missiles.

He translated the Nunn message as: ”’Zap! Take that! Get off your duff and do what you are supposed to do!’ That is the way we treat them. What kind of signal does that send? What is it going to do to the efforts of the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between the United States and our European allies?”

In the end, NATO supporters, largely Republicans, prevailed 55-41, but Senator Nunn warned that the issue would not be going away until and unless the European NATO allies pulled their weight.

In the period since then, the Cold War ended and the US has engaged in 20-year-long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the latter conflicts started with impressive and rapid victories, these were not sustained, and now have received the moniker of failed, endless wars.

Ukraine now also looks like a stalemate as the US and its allies were apparently not prepared for the 2022 Russian invasion, as we were not prepared for the initial Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the similar Russian aggression against Moldova and Georgia.

Whether we spend 2% on defense within NATO or not (once again, too many European allies have failed to meet that target 10 years after it was made), the nation has to decide that whatever military conflict we embrace, we figure out — upfront — what we need to do to win.

That would significantly increase the solidarity of the NATO alliance and American public support for NATO.

Peter Huessy, senior fellow, National Institute for Deterrent Studies and President of GeoStrategic Analysis, Potomac, Maryland.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.