President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a landmark security agreement with the UK in January as Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced £2.5bn ($3.2bn) of military funding for the next financial year.
The money and agreement marked the first bilateral security commitment made to Ukraine by one of the G7 nations at a time when support for Kyiv is stuck in a legislative–bureaucratic snarl-up in both the EU and the US.
The Ukraine-UK agreement is “a real mechanism for enhancing security . . . which includes cooperation in the event of a repeated full-scale attack by Russia,” according to StratCom Ukraine, a communications organization that works in partnership with the Ukrainian and UK governments.
Zelenskyy described the deal as “unprecedented” and as “the basis of working with other partners” in the hope that more countries will follow the British lead and answer Ukraine’s increasingly urgent calls for help.
While Sunak’s accord with Zelenskyy marked a key milestone in international assistance efforts, the UK should also consider formalizing and deepening its foreign policy relationship with the EU to bolster Ukrainian defense capabilities and end Russia’s cycle of aggression.
The macroeconomic and democratic stability provided by the EU’s financial support and enlargement process makes the bloc a critical security partner for Ukraine. Yet, despite the UK’s interest in Ukraine’s successful European integration, the war has failed to translate into tangible cross-Channel cooperation.
The Brexit vote of 2016 and Britain’s ultimate departure from the bloc in 2020 are still fresh in the memory and have had a damaging impact on its ability to shape foreign and security policy in Europe. When the treaty that governs EU-UK post-Brexit relations was being ratified, the British government chose not to negotiate on the issue even though the EU expressed interest.
As a result, collaboration on international issues has been conducted purely on an ad-hoc basis. So while the UK has taken recent steps to improve defense and security cooperation with France, that is the exception rather than the rule.
NATO covers some of the gaps between Europe and the UK but by no means all. While the UK attends — and will this year host — the fourth European Political Community summit, this community has no home or secretariat. Likewise, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) of 10 North European nations is interesting and useful, but partial.
None of which might matter much in normal times, but these are abnormal times. Europe is witnessing its biggest conflict since World War II, its support to Ukraine is stuttering and there is immense nervousness across the continent about an end or reduction in US aid, which might hand victory to Russia.
If the United States effectively pulls back or dilutes its guarantees to European democracies, the continent will be on its own for the first time since 1948. This issue, rarely discussed by politicians with their voters, would represent a sea change in European security and would require immediate steps to rearm and reorganize.
This outcome may not be the most likely scenario for 2024-2025, but it is clearly possible. And Europe currently lacks the mechanisms to respond and engage one of its top-tier, nuclear-armed powers.
Examples of this problem are so far relatively benign, but they are telling. In 2022, two months after the full-scale invasion, the EU imposed sanctions on Belarusian trade. It was only a year later that the UK introduced similar restrictions, including on access to UK financial markets. For a year, it had effectively enabled trade to continue with Russia via Belarus.
In its Integrated Review of Foreign Policy in 2023, the UK indicated its intention to “work closely” with the EU in “areas of mutual benefit.” It also decided to join the EU’s Military Mobility project on a case-by-case basis under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
So what more is needed? In light of the rapidly changing international landscape, the UK should go further and make geopolitical cooperation with the EU a priority.
This might include a small joint security secretariat to improve the links between London and Brussels.
It could also enable a better assessment of sanctions and their implementation, aiding work to stop Russia from rerouting supplies and financial flows through third countries to circumvent restrictions.
Under the European Peace Facility, the EU has already allocated more than €5bn ($5.4bn) in ammunition and missiles for Ukraine, but joint procurement efforts have been hampered by restricted access to one of Europe’s largest ammunition manufacturers, Britain’s BAE Systems.
The UK should look to overcome such Brexit hurdles by developing its participation in EU defense projects under PESCO. Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Ukraine’s commander of operations in the south-east, said in December that Ukrainian troops were forced to scale back their operations along the 1,000km (620 mile) frontline because of artillery shell shortages.
EU-UK coordination also has an important role to play in Ukraine’s successful reconstruction and preparation for EU accession. Kyiv has complained that the G7 and international financial institutions are not delivering on reconstruction pledges. Further cross-Channel cooperation could help support Ukraine’s planning and capital management reform.
The EU’s struggle to maintain consensus on continued support for Ukraine has heightened the importance of Britain’s voice as an unflinching ally of Ukraine and as one of its biggest military backers. Some of this is believed to involve highly secret operations, few of which have so far been hinted at (like the presence of UK special forces units on the ground.)
Whatever the residual irritations of Brexit, it is time to put them aside and create an EU-UK relationship to meet the Russian threat.
Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a Non-Resident Associate Research Fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Ukraine 2036
How Today’s Investments Will Shape Tomorrow’s Security
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
