It’s true that Hungary’s premier blocked the European Union (EU) €50bn ($55bn) aid package for Ukraine on December 15 and it’s true that he has previously blocked sanctions packages to punish Russia’s war of aggression. It’s true that he has no love for liberal democracy.
But it’s not true, and indeed it’s unhelpful, to dismiss Orbán as a mere Russian puppet slavishly doing the bidding of his pal, Vladimir Putin.
Ties are nonetheless close. The Hungarian government’s interventions have included removing Patriarch Kirill, an avid war supporter and former KGB agent, as well as several Russian businessmen from EU sanctions lists.
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (and before), Orbán’s domestic media has broadcast narratives familiar from Russian propaganda. His foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, calls his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, a friend. And there is plenty more that is deeply problematic about Hungary’s Russia policy, like its continuing energy imports.
Still, the simplistic interpretation that Hungary acts merely as Russia’s cat’s paw fails to consider the Hungarian leader’s own motivation: namely his decision to strengthen his position in what he considers a European Council increasingly hostile towards his illiberal political designs, and the corruption that has made his country the most graft-ridden in the EU, according to Transparency International.
Not that his reasoning is clear. Orbán’s motives for blocking Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration are opaque, as were his motives in leaving the European Council on December 14 to allow Ukraine’s EU membership bid to advance.
For years, and as recently as September, Orbán had claimed his government was blocking Ukraine’s embrace with NATO and the EU, and its coolness toward Ukraine’s war effort, as linked to restrictive minority rights legislation, which it believed oppressed the approximately 150,000 Hungarians living in the Transcarpathia region.
But earlier this month the Ukrainian parliament adopted legislative changes that address Hungary’s concerns. Even the organizations and leaders of Transcarpathian Hungarians — that is, Orbán ’s own allies — asked the European Council to open accession talks with Ukraine. Yet, Orbán openly refused to support his Ukrainian Hungarian allies, now simply claiming that the decision was “not timely”, before doing a volte-face again in Brussels.
Delaying decisions in the European Council to strengthen his bargaining position has long been part of Orbán’s toolbox, and indeed of most European leaders. What differentiates Orbán from his peers is that he has made quite clear that he was ready to rope Ukraine into disputes linked to domestic concerns; disputes led by his demand that all €30bn in ear-marked EU funds be released to his cash-starved government of money.
In the past, Orbán’s tactics in EU disputes were pragmatic, if manipulative. He knew which battles were worth fighting and when it was better to back down. This may explain why French President Emmanuel Macron invited Orbán to talks just before the European Council meeting.
Lo and behold, just before the summit, the European Commission decided to release €10.2bn of previously blocked EU funds linked to the Hungarian parliament’s judicial reforms.
Grave doubts remain about the sincerity of these amendments and especially their eventual implementation. This month, parliament adopted a law on the “protection of sovereignty”, seemingly inspired by restrictive Russian and Polish legislation, and which establishes a new organization to investigate vaguely defined “foreign political interference” without meaningful legal recourse.
In the meantime, as Orbán himself stressed after the Ukraine talks decision, his government retains the ability to block Ukraine’s EU accession talks at various stages down the line during what will be many years of talks.
So what did Orbán really want to achieve? Perhaps, as an aide suggested, to unblock the full package of funds, which amount to an additional €20bn.
Or even to get assurances that his government will not be sanctioned in the future? Perhaps to raise the stakes next year’s re-election of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who is currently depicted as a malicious foreign meddler allied with the son of the Jewish financier, George Soros, in pro-government propaganda?
Was this political muscle-flexing in reaction to the inauguration of Donald Tusk’s government in Poland, which weakened Orbán’s position in the EU? Or performative politics to ingratiate himself with the far-right wing of the Republican Party, which he hopes will gain power in 2024? All of the above are plausible.
We should also consider that Orbán, who likes to regard himself as a political visionary, is actually convinced that Russia will eventually win the war in Ukraine, as this fits his greater vision of the end of a world order dominated by liberal democracies and their institutions. War fatigue in the West is certainly an issue, as the problems agreeing $111bn in US and EU aid show.
Exasperated, some have called on the Council to initiate so-called Article 7 proceedings against Hungary. This lengthy procedure could theoretically culminate in the suspension of the country’s voting rights for breaching the EU’s fundamental values.
While the launch of this procedure would likely be justified, given Orbán’s open disregard of liberal democratic norms and its illiberal redesign of Hungary’s political system, it would make little practical difference for the budget review and the vote on Ukraine’s aid package.
As became painfully obvious when such procedures were launched against Poland and Hungary in 2017 and 2018, due to the unanimity threshold in the second stage of the procedure and the high thresholds of proof, there are ample opportunities for member states to stall the procedure. While his more powerful Polish illiberal allies were voted out of government, Orbán might count on the support of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and potentially others.
For now, a better plan would be to circumvent Orbán’s opposition by providing Ukraine aid. Planning for this is reportedly underway.
For the future: EU leaders can find a long-term solution both to this – and to Orbán ’s increasingly reckless use of vetoes – by taking a principled stance and handling the issue as a problem requiring a practical solution rather than a bargaining chip with a government intent to diminish the EU’s norms. But they need to recognize the challenge first.
Andras Toth-Czifra is a political analyst based in New York. He is a former CEPA non-resident fellow and currently a fellow with the Eurasia Program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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