On a recent visit to Washington, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron said that the only British “red line” in Ukraine is to avoid NATO soldiers fighting Russian soldiers.
Since last year’s full-scale Russian invasion, the UK has often been the most willing — even if not the ablest — to support Ukraine militarily, for example leading the way on decisions to supply advanced weapon systems like cruise missiles.
But Ukraine’s friends have not done everything possible short of the British red line on behalf of our ally. Timidity and fear of Putin’s red lines — none of which he has enforced — have been too much the order of the day. And the British (and NATO) red line itself has not been properly debated.
Ukraine is the frontline of freedom, but NATO has no boots on the ground. Instead, we are treating Ukrainians as in effect cheap cannon fodder.
Even Ukraine’s most supportive friends have not truly treated the war in Ukraine as “their” war. Last year President Emmanuel Macron spoke of France needing to have a “wartime economy”. But no NATO ally has come anywhere close. In Ukraine, the war requires spending 20% of GDP on defense, and in Russia 6%. Only one or two allies spend over 3% and some are still some way below 2%.
There is much talk of boosting the production of key capabilities, but little truly radical change or urgency from governments and industry. In retrospect, given the nature of Putin, we should have been planning, equipping, and stockpiling for the possibility of a major war in Europe well before 2022. But not only do those stockpiles not exist, they have been depleted by donations to Ukraine.
Over the last 10 years, the West has largely failed Ukraine. Now, there is a risk that we will do so again, with more serious consequences: political wrangling in Washington and the risk of dwindling commitment and interest in Europe threaten to fatally undermine Ukraine’s prospects. Continued financial support — totaling $111bn — is being blocked in both Washington and Brussels.
Perhaps, some argue, the position at the end of 2023 is the best that can be achieved, and now is the time to agree on a deal (although Putin shows no interest in negotiating.)
But would anyone seriously question the West’s defeat if it traded away 20% of Ukrainian territory and 30% of Ukrainian GDP? That would be a success only for the Kremlin. And, as with Hitler in the 1930s, feed Putin’s appetite for more and more territory.
Ukraine has fought for our values with far greater valor than we have so far mustered ourselves. The memorial wall at Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, plastered with the images of thousands of Ukrainians who have died fighting Russia since 2014, is a deeply moving reminder of who pays the price for confronting Russian aggression.
A billboard in Kyiv talks about the power of freedom. By contrast, Putin’s vision – much like Hitler’s – is about the power to extinguish the freedom and independence of others.
The West’s talk of “security assurances” for Ukraine, to be developed by the time of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington in July, lacks credibility. Like the hollow 1994 Budapest Memorandum, these would amount to an assurance without a guarantee and without teeth. They are likely to be essentially a vehicle to avoid true commitment to Ukraine.
What could be done if the West was really determined to help? Here are some suggestions:
- Treat the war in Ukraine as “our war”. This means an end to the treatment of Ukrainians as a sort of Afghan mujahadeen on steroids. It means supplying them with the full range of capabilities, at the speed and scale as if fighting ourselves.
- Spend and produce like it’s our war. Move to a wartime approach (using the full power of the state, as we did with the Covid pandemic) to ensure Ukraine is adequately supplied for as long as it takes, and to ensure we too are prepared for a major war at short notice.
- Provide, and send NATO personnel to work alongside Ukraine, in operating the most effective possible integrated air and missile defense system. This could include multinational air policing and an improved ability to counter Russian assets involved in launching attacks on Ukraine by missile and drone.
- Deploy significant multinational forces to help train and exercise within Ukraine. They would provide help on the ground, and build interoperability.
- Start establishing multinational bases and stockpiles in Ukraine.
- Provide direct assistance with military demining, to dismantle Russian so-called “defensive” lines in southern Ukraine.
- Provide longer-range strike systems to Ukraine to allow it to hit targets deep inside Russia and sever links to Crimea.
- Find more effective ways of attacking the producers of drones and missiles – whether in Russia or, for example, in Iran.
- Fast-track NATO and EU membership for Ukraine, with an invitation to join the alliance at next year’s Washington Summit.
None of this need mean going to war with Russia. Russian behavior is in Russian hands. Putin can order Russian forces to stop attacking Ukraine and leave the territory they have occupied.
It’s time to break our recent record of failure in the face of aggression and tyranny, and to find the vision and resolve to push Putin and his allies back.
We can choose to stand up to defend our friends, and to start winning again in 2024; but will we?
Patrick Turner was an Assistant Secretary General at NATO, first for Operations and latterly for Defence Policy and Planning, from 2015-July 2022. He worked for the UK Government for 38 years, principally on defense and security issues. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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