Catherine Sendak
Good morning, good afternoon, everyone. I hope everyone can hear me. Thank you so much for taking the time this morning to join this call. It is an absolute pleasure to be here with some of my colleagues to discuss all things Ukraine, which, as we all know, as we’re tracking, is always extremely timely. My name is Katie Sendak. I’m the director for the transatlantic defense and security team here at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and I had the pleasure of co authoring a recent report that we published with Ilya Timtchenko, who is also on the line, “Between Now and NATO: a Security Strategy for Ukraine.” As we know, with everything going on the past week or so, Ukraine and the future of Ukraine is now above the fold in every newspaper, once again, and what does long term security and stability look like for Ukraine. And we’re also going happy to touch on the readout from the Munich Security Conference, which I’m sure you all paid very, very close attention to. I wanted to give a couple of sentences on a report, welcome any and all questions on that, and then I will turn it to my colleague Elina to moderate the conversation. So just as some background, the report, which we published last month, was almost a year and a half in the making. What we did is we took five case studies of long term security assistance and cooperation: Afghanistan, Colombia, Israel, Lebanon and Taiwan. And we tried to learn the lessons from those examples of security assistance and cooperation to really define a framework for Ukraine for the future, and not just the future year or two, but the future of 5, 10, 15, 20 years down the road, while Ukraine works on getting into NATO. We all realize, even with all the conversations going on, Ukraine is going on, Ukraine is going to need the ability to defend itself and the ability to give in the space to work towards NATO membership. So that being said, a couple of the quick lessons, and again, welcome you all to take a look at the report, and we’ll make sure we post it in the chat for anyone interested. It’s so important as we looked at these case studies and we looked at the situation in Ukraine, especially over the past 11 years, since Russia’s first invasion into Ukraine. You know, things like consistent themes that we found sustained and comprehensive leadership. I will anecdotally tell you that everyone we interviewed for this report, every group that we brought together to get gain their insights, I ended the interviews and the conversations with the exact same question, which was, does the US need to lead? And resoundingly, it didn’t matter if the person was from Europe or Asia or South America or the US, the answer was yes. In some former way US leadership is absolutely tantamount to success on security and stability in Ukraine. Other themes, consistent leadership, partnership buy in, consistent messaging and resourcing are also critical in the planning process to ensure long term stability and security in Ukraine. We also delved into industrial base issues, armament issues that Ukraine needs now and in the future. And we also gave recommendations on NATO, in the EU and other international organizations in terms of funding, messaging, branding and support that’s going to be so critical for Ukraine over the next generation as they look to rebuild and defend themselves continuously. So that was a very quick run over of an 80 page report, welcome any and all questions about Munich and let me turn it over to my wonderful colleague, Elina to moderate. Thank you so much.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much for the invitation to moderate this press call. Katie and the team, you’ve done a brilliant job. I still share the report with anyone asking what Ukrainian partners need to do between now and NATO. Well, after the Munich Security Conference, of course, it’s hard not to get emotional, especially with some of the statements we heard, but I suggest to stay practical today. We can’t change the words, but together we can analyze and see what practical security steps will help Ukraine in the long term, as Katie said. So, the speakers of today’s press, who all are, Sam Greene, Director of the Democratic Resilience Program, Center for European Policy Analysis. Sam is also professor of Russian politics at King’s College London. William Monahan, Senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. William served as a council and policy director for the Senate Armed Service Committee, and has nearly three decades of experience in national security and foreign policy. Catherine Sandek, I will still introduce again, director of the transatlantic defense and security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Previously, Catherine worked as a principal deputy for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia at the US Department of Defense and as a staff member on the House Armed Service Committee. Ilya Timtchenko, co author of “Between Now and NATO: a Security Strategy for Ukraine,” Ukraine expert. Ilya is a former fellow at Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Studies, and former Ukraine based editor and journalist. We are grateful for you joining today and sharing all of your thoughts with us. We have nearly 20 representatives from media outlets with us today. Please feel free to write your questions in the chat. But, the first question to start with, live after Munich Security Conference, what are the key takeaways from this year’s MSC? What could be their implication for long term security cooperation with Ukraine? Katie, let’s start with you, and then Bill, Sam and Ilya.
Catherine Sendak
Wonderful. Thank you so much. Elina. So, you know, I will just say that the takeaways from Munich have been fast and heavy following this piece, this last weekend’s events, and obviously, as we’re all watching further conversations happening, the negotiations in Saudi Arabia, the European leaders summit on Monday, lot going on at a very rapid rate. I think the key takeaways from from Munich are, you know, how does Europe unify itself moving forward on its support for Ukraine. I think Monday was a good start, and welcome my colleagues to weigh in on this as well. But what is going to be that unified approach? I think there are many angles that you can go out to ensure Ukrainians full integration into the West. Things like speeding up, hopefully the EU accession process, looking at at funding and resourcing for Ukrainian security and reconstruction over time. But, you know, I would just highlight, as we predicted when the Trump administration was sworn in on January 20th, there’s a lot of noise, there’s a lot of sound, there’s a lot of rhetoric. And as Elina so aptly pointed out, what we are trying to do is really focus on the pragmatism and really focus on the issues are not changing. The right route still needs to be established. And I think that we’re leaving Munich understanding that there are a lot of opportunities to further the case for security and stability in Ukraine, and what shakes out from negotiations and European leaders decision making is yet to be seen, but I remain hopeful that we will get to a good place.
Elina Beketova
Thank you. Bill…
Bill Monahan
Yes, I’m happy to be here this morning, and thank you all for taking the time to talk to us. I would say coming out of, key takeaways coming out of Munich, and also, frankly, I think you have to kind of add into that some of President Trump’s more recent public comments vis a vis Ukraine. I think it’s we’ve heard the administration talk a lot about peace through strength, and I think that’s a rhetorical flourish that the Trump administration has embraced. But what we really have to focus on is what’s going to give you a lasting peace, and that is where I think our European allies are focused, and where Ukraine is focused. And that is going to require that we maintain and not abandon one of our strongest forms of strength, which is our ability to work with our allies and partners in coalition. And, you know, I think we’ve seen a lot of different statements from the administration, depending on which official is speaking, but I think there’s a need to get a coordinated approach that brings in our allies and partners, maintains that source of strength, and we need to make sure that that’s we have to recognize that that’s going to be critical for any kind of lasting peace in working through a deal with with the Russian counterparts. Right now, I think Putin is very happy he has been able to achieve one of his strategic goals, which is create disunion and division amongst the United States and its allies in the transatlantic relationship. But, as we go forward and define what our goals are for the for the negotiations, I think we’ll need to work very closely with our allies and with Ukraine to make that happy. So let me, let me get there.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much. We’ll definitely talk about coordinated efforts. But right now, Sam, over to you, do you think Putin is so happy right now or not?
Sam Greene
Well, I hear, I mean, I think it’s hard to see how Putin could be anything other than happy with the way that things have gone, at least in the last week or so. Although that doesn’t mean necessarily that he’s going to continue being happy. I think we can come back to that. But I mean takeaways from MSC and with Bill, I think we have to look at this also in the context of what’s happened since then and Munich now seems like itwas about a year ago. But I think what’s become clear, if it wasn’t already clear at Munich, has become clearer since then, is that nobody will secure Europe, but Europe. That’s certainly the view in Europe at the moment. And I am, I am here in in the UK, which, at least for the purposes of this conversation, you know, is, is part of Europe. I think the divisions, though, that remain, and we can see this in what came out of the European summit in Paris on on Monday and then the second summit, already just yesterday, is between those in Europe that see the US as a problematic part of the solution. In other words, yes, the US is being very difficult to work with at the moment, and is saying all kinds of things that we wish it were not saying. But it still is the route through which we’re going to achieve an acceptable end to the conflict in Ukraine. And that’s one hand, and the other hand, I think, is a group of European countries now, I think increasingly, including the UK, potentially, and France, that actually are beginning to see the US as part of the problem. And that’s what needs to happen, is the European creation of a solution that elides the process going on right now between Washington and Moscow. I think that division, though, is undermining the progress that Europe has fitfully begun to make towards putting together the framework for what I think we’re no longer calling it a peacekeeping force now the idea is to talk about it as a reassurance force that would include some elements of ground power and air power and sort of extended deterrence. I think there is a consensus that that’s the way it needs to go, but there’s very different ideas about exactly the framework in which that would happen and when that might be possible. And you know what the parameters of the mission would be, as well as that, whether that mission, in fact, would be feasible without some kind of a US backstop to it, right? So Europe is not quite there yet. But I think that, again, from a European perspective, the negotiations that matter when it comes to the end of this conflict or what happens next, in fact, is not so much the negotiations between Moscow and Washington, they may try to achieve various things. And again, we can talk about what those things might be, but that if we’re going for what Bill was just talking about long, lasting, durable peace and security for Ukraine and for the European continent, the negotiations that matter are the ones within Europe itself and the ones between Europe and Ukraine. Those are going to be the ones that have to deliver something that is better than what is likely to come out of negotiations between Washington and Moscow, right? So if the conversation in Europe is really about, at this point, how to empower Kyiv to reject a bad deal, if that is what emerges from the process that began the other day in Riyadh. That only is possible if Europe can propose a better deal. And so the key, the crucial aspect right now is for Europe to get its act together on what that deal would look like, and to work very closely with the Ukrainians in making it feasible.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Sam for sharing. We’ll definitely talk about that. Ilya, over to you. Well, I think that this MSC was like a cold shower, a cold water shower for not only Europeans, but Ukrainians too. Or how do you think? What are your takeaways?
Ilya Timtchenko
Yeah so. And thank you so much for putting this together. It’s great to be here. I fully agree with what my previous colleague said. So key takeaways, number one, I think that the message is that the alliance moved away from a traditional, sort of unified approach to a United States that is not necessarily going to provide a guarantee to Europe regarding security on the continents. So the US is basically saying, if you want a guaranteed security, Europe must beef up its commitment to that security. Two is Europe is left with two major questions. So one, will it be able to ramp up its security on its own? And then two will it have an ironclad plan to do it, and will it show commitment to that plan? So this if done quickly, can significantly strengthen Europe’s position, vis a vis not just Russia, but also when negotiating with United States. So a strengthened and more independent Europe also means a stronger Ukraine and fractures within Ally relationships can be avoided. Third main takeaway for me is that currently, the European leaders do not have a unified approach and vision in achieving Ukraine’s victory, and so such a unified plan will have to address the next, so the following things. So, one is how to swiftly boost and sustain Ukraine’s defense, with a priority given to air defense. Two is how to strengthen and solidify the bilateral security agreements. Three is how to meet production demand, both within Ukraine and Europe as a whole. So this includes how to change the military industrial base structure from being overly risk averse to being more competitive, and how to remove bureaucracy to produce military equipment and swiftly deliver it to Ukraine. And then lastly, is how to communicate the urgency to the European public. And I think that Denmark’s prime minister Mette Frederiksen, she had one of the best speeches during the Munich Security Conference where she said, you know, I’m not saying we’re at wartime, but we cannot say we’re at peacetime anymore. So I think that’s very important to point out, in terms of that’s the kind of messaging that we should be hearing more from European leaders. And also, I think as Bill and Sam pointed out, that the Kremlin seems to be pleased with the results. The question is, however, does this change in Russia’s mood also affect its actions in Ukraine, andhow does it also influence Europe’s response to the war against Ukraine? And then the other question is, how long will this US stance that, that we all described previously, how long will it endure? And, you know, will we see, sort of eventually, within this new administration, a return back to sort of the traditional us stance as well?
Elina Beketova
And, yeah. Thank you so much. About the US stance, I have a question right now, but just like a quickly, a quick reminder that we have more than 20 media representatives here with us on the press call. Please, you can raise the hand function or put your question in the chat and we will ask. And Please add your affiliation. Yeah. But right now, about the US stance, I have a question for Katie and Bill, because we heard from the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, who stated that Ukraine succession into NATO was not a realistic as part of negotiations to end Russia’s invasion. Then though, the Secretary of Defense said that everything is on the table. So why? Why do we see this ambiguity, and what does it mean? And can the US continue to be a reliable security partner, even without native membership or like, even in these current circumstances? Katie and Bill.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you. And you know, I’m going turn to Bill for his insights as well. You know, it’s really interesting. I think Sam really summed it up that, you know, in our talk about takeaways from Munich, it does feel like a year ago, and so much has happened since then that it’s almost hard to think about at the beginning of last week, which was Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, coming out and making these statements about Ukraine and NATO membership. I do think it’s really interesting. There seems to be a word smithing game going on. You know, Ukraine’s NATO membership should not be a negotiation tactic, because we don’t want Russia to have, you know, de facto veto power over who joins NATO. That’s not the role and any country that meets its standards and meets its requirements should be open to a conversation about NATO membership. So I agree in that sense. But pulling something off of a table as some sort of negotiating lever, I think the perception was that that put us in a lower position of leverage at the negotiating table. So the wordsmithing of how this is going to move forward is very, very interesting, and I’m not sure what the sum up is going to be. I think we’ve seen a lot of statements put out there from the administration on Ukraine, on European security over the past 10 days or so, and then within a couple of days, a lot of tweaks to those statements, a lot of alterations to the interpretations, somewhat. I think that’s going to continue. I think that gets to my earlier point, the sound and the noise and the sound bites and the headlines are going to continue to dominate. But if we solely focus on those things and not on all the work that still has to get done, we will, we will spin into something that’s unproductive. I think, to Sam’s point, I think what’s really, really critical here is that it’s not it cannot just be a deal between US and Russia and not having Ukraine. Itcan’t just be a deal. It has to be a good deal, and that good deal entails having Ukraine at the table, having European leaders buy in. That is what it’s going to be successful, that’s going to be sustainable. And I think the Trump administration cannot just seek a deal. They cannot look at a future where, in 12 months, something is happening again that will fall under their watch, that will fall under their clock, and they will have to address it in an even more robust way. So, you know, I believe that the negotiations have to be one from the greatest point of leverage and strength. That’s how you sit down at a table like this, and to a full understanding of the person, the people sitting across from the table from you. And third, it has to be sustainable and comprehensive. And you know, given everyone’s comments from the administration over the past 10 days, I think we’re all seeking clarity on what that position is going to be.
Bill Monahan
Yeah, I would concur with Katie’s assessment here. I would hope that the issue of Ukraine membership in NATO would not be part of the negotiation, in that it should be something that is reserved as the right of a sovereign nation to determine who the nation will associate itself with. And in that sense, I feel like you know, it’d be good for the administration to take a pause and a deep breath now that we’ve gotten past the meeting in Riyadh, and to figure out exactly what its strategic goals are and what concessions it would be looking for from Russia. So far, we’ve heard that the administration is interested in bringing peace to Ukraine and to, you know, restart our relations with Russia. We need a better articulation of what our strategic goals are for negotiations over the security architecture in Europe, and to be able to answer questions, including, you know, whether there will be some kind of troop presence and to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. I’m sure that we, I think we have to understand also Russia have may have a very different definition of whatsecurity guarantees are given its history and its desire to see, you know, limited NATO deployments on its border or other or to be able to maintain its ability to apply coercive power to against its neighbors. So we need to have a very clear understanding of what our strategic goals are in for these negotiations and what we see as key elements of a longer term peace arrangement. And in that sense, we may be looking to Europe to play a much larger role than it has in the past. That doesn’t seem you know, out of out of the realm of what ought to happen. But, so far, you know, we I have to kind of be careful about over interpreting statements by administration officials up to this point.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Bill. Thank you so much. Katie Sam, over to you because I want to return to your point about like, what are, what they are trying to achieve in these negotiations, and they want to empower Kyiv in a bad deal Europe needs to come up with their plan, right? And what we have seen after MSC and like all these negotiations and Macron flying to Washington. We have, like, some movement so the the power of pressure, as you have said. And also in your piece, Europe must think long and move fast Euro that only deep foundational obligation to Ukraine can ensure that Ukraine and Europe itself are defended against further or renewed aggression. So how do you see the EU adapting its support for Ukraine with everything that we’re hearing right now from the crimes administration? And how do you think Russia will react to changes in security assistance?
Bill Monahan
Oh, so easy questions. First of all, I start by saying it’s not just the EU, it’s Europe as a whole, and we are seeing the UK playing a very important role in this [unintelligible] Norway potentially playing an important role in this. And in fact, we’re beginning to see interest from the Canadians as well, right? So I think that there is a broader coalition that may come that overlaps the various boundaries of Europe and NATO. It’s been referred to as a coalition of the willing, which, which may be a problematic metaphor, but, but it’s it’s a coalition of the committed. It’s a coalition of people who understand countries and governments that who understand what’s at stake, which, as Katie was outlining, is not just stopping the fighting now, but ensuring that we don’t end up having to fight a much bigger war and to spend much more to deter Russia at some point down the road. It is, I think, not a question of of whether or not Russia is deterred. It’s a question of whether Russia is deterred now or whether Russia is deterred later. One at some point is going to have to, have to happen and and the Europeans, I think, are becoming increasingly clear about the fact that it’s that they are going to have to do the heavy lifting on this. And honestly, I think that that was becoming clear to the Europeans, really ever since the 5th of November of last year, after the US election. And so that’s when we started having these conversations about, you know, what the shape of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine would look like, what the opportunities were to to spend more money. We are, you know, waiting to see what happens in the German elections, and that will have something to say about about that we’ll also be waiting to see what happens in the Polish elections, and that will also affect the size and shape of all of this. We’ve also seen the commission move to move its position on unfreezing some of the unspent COVID relief funds. And we’re talking about excess of 90 billion euros, I think, in that, in that pot right, that could be available. We’ve already seen a 6 billion euro commitment just in the last couple of days. And again, you know, despite some early setbacks early this week on this idea of a peacekeeping force or a reassurance force, we’re actually seeing it take more shape and become clearer in its mission, and not, not less right? So I think that the task for Europe really is, is to stay the course and work very closely with the Ukrainians. Because at the end of the day, the first thing that this has to do is to do is to create confidence in Ukraine that in fact, they are secure. The second thing that it has to do, of course, is to create deterrence in Moscow, and that means making it clear to Putin and to the Kremlin that, you know, once a ceasefire is in place, that any violation of that ceasefire will put him at war, not just with Ukraine, but at war with Europe. That is a risk, obviously, that European leaders are going to have to explain to themselves and to each other and to their citizens, but there is likely no route to security without doing that. The Russians have been as clear as it’s possible to be that this is something they don’t want to see, they do not want European troops in any form in Ukraine. And in fact, that’s probably the one thing I can put my finger on where Washington and Moscow disagree at the moment, because Washington has been adamant there will need to be European troops on the ground in Ukraine. I think we should take this as a signal of exactly what Moscow’s interests are in these in these negotiations, and what Moscow was afraid of. In other words, European troops in Ukraine would be a deterrent. They would create real consequence for the eventuality, when, not if, when Moscow violates a ceasefire. Moscow has violated every ceasefire thus far in Ukraine and in Georgia. And, you know, could go on anything I can think about, right? So that becomes a question, right, of, how does, how does that get forced on Russia. I don’t want to speculate on the modalities there. I know that that’s a conversation that the Europeans and the Ukrainians are having. I know that that’s also why, you know, we have seen the Europeans not just up the amount of military aid that they are providing to Ukraine right now, but in fact, they are poised to approve another round of sanctions, including more financial sector and oil sanctions on the anniversary of the of the full scale invasion in a couple of days time, right? So even if the US isn’t going to play the maximum pressure game, the Europeans seem likely to pick up the baton and run with it at least as far as they can.
Elina Beketova
Yeah. Thank you so much, Sam, just I will have a question to Ilya at first, and then to Bill, and we have a question in the chat about China. But at first to Ilya, because if we’re talking about national defense capabilities, and you were talking about the homework to Ukraine, what do you think Ukraine needs to do right now in terms of national defense capabilities? Because everyone says that regardless the help that Ukrainians will be given from Europe, from the US, Ukraine needs to build a very strong army. And right now we’re seeing that the 1 million army is deterring the Russian aggression, a bigger army. But what needs to be still done, like in your assessment.
Ilya Timtchenko
So what needs to be done on the Ukrainian side?
Elina Beketova
On the Ukrainian side, yeah.
Ilya Timtchenko
Right. Well, so I think that you know on… Well, I think it’s important to look at the history of A) the Ukrainian army and then Ukraine’s industrial military base infrastructure. And traditionally, both have been neglected since 1991 and also the, you know, state owned industrial conglomerate Ukroboronprom was formed under the Ukrainian president/Russian ally, Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, so therefore that structure was plagued with non transparency, corruption, and also a lot of military components were produced in Russia. So despite all this, though, Ukraine was exporting over a billion dollars in arms annually, primarily to African and Asian markets. Things started to significantly change once the external threat pressure was increased. So that said, the first wave of significant systemic reforms of UkrOboronProm started in 2019 and in the years that followed this process slow down, however, picked up again since the full-scale invasion. So Ukraine still struggles with challenges related to context, culture and capacity in terms of its military and military production. And we have all seen this since 2022 that this has been changing in a dynamic and also drastic pace. So for example, in March 2023 Ukraine’s government initiated the transformation of UkrOboronProm into a joint stock company. Ukraine also has a highly educated workforce and abundant natural resources, and despite Russia’s ongoing attacks, Ukraine’s defense industrial base is expanding. So Ukraine also has developed a strategy in terms of domestic defense production, and it’s also has been increasing its co-production agreements with Western manufacturers, such as Germany’s Rheinmetall, and also Ukraine government is funding a lot of its military R and D and increasing spending on domestically produced weapons as well as procurement. So the next steps for Ukraine, just to summarize, and I’m happy to speak more on this. But Ukraine needs to continue stepping away from a Soviet inherited infrastructure, continue with Western oriented reforms, and figure out ways how to maximize the output of its current workforce and bring in additional workforce. It will also have to expand on its partnerships, similar to Rheinmetall or Turkey’s drone maker, Baykar, and all this will prepare Ukraine better for EU membership andeventual NATO membership. But I wanted to emphasize on those two last parts that despite whatever sort of the agreements are, Ukraine should persistently be going for an EU membership and for a NATO membership and doing the homework that it needs to do in order to make that a much easier process.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much. Yeah, and I see the question about China, I will quickly ask it. But at first the question to bill, because I wanted to go back to the European force, European troops in Ukraine. Well, just given your extensive experience advising on key security issues, including the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars. And US military posture for the US European command on NATO, how would you assess the proposed European Reassurance force led by Britain and France, which aims to protect Ukraine in the event of the of the deal? With the force consisting of under 30,000 troops focused on air and maritime defense, do you think the strategy will be effective in deterring future Russian aggression and what challenges could arise from its minimal ground presence near the front lines? Bill, if I can ask you this question.
Bill Monahan
Yeah, thank you for that question. Um. I, you know, I, I think the question would come down to what, what would be seen as the purpose of having the force there in the first place. And if purpose is essentially to kind of create a line of defense that would, then, you know, allow for backup support to come from outside of Ukraine or outside of a conflict zone, then this, you know, a force could be kind of kept to kind of a minimum.But I think that one of the key elements of any force is, what would be the role of the United States in such a force? In the past, we’ve had the United States play a role, at a minimum, in providing key enablers or key capabilities that our European allies have not necessarily had the ability to bring to the table, or at least not in the at scale that would be necessary for a force of that size. You know, many, many European nations just have not had any experience in leading a force of that size. So, you know that determining what where the US could be providing key enablers, I think, would be an essential element of any force, and it’s in determining its credibility and deterrence capability.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Bill. Now I think I offer answering this question about China. Stefan Castle from German news weekly Stern is asking if anyone from the panelists would comment on the possible future role of China in Ukraine. President Zelenskyy has previously said China could have a role in a solution for Ukraine. Now, both in Davos and in Munich, there has been talks of possible deployment of Chinese troops in Ukrain to secure a ceasefire. Is there a risk or an opportunity for China to fill the void that the current US administration might leave behind? So a question open. Who wants to chime in? Maybe Katie or Bill?
Ilya, go ahead.
Ilya Timtchenko
Katie, did you want to jump in or? I’m just going to add a few thoughts here. So I think that the West needs to be very careful when it comes to doing any sort of coordination with China. Know that there have been sort of thoughts even, you know, since the very beginning of the full scale invasion, in terms of having China involved within reconstruction initiatives, etc. However, Ukraine and China’s relationship traditionally has been sort of on a any particular relationship, where China has been trying to extract both human capital when it comes to the defense industry and aerospace industry. And so we all know about, sort of the Motor Sich case, and in terms of where Ukraine first sold Motor Sich to China and then had to back away. And now it’s dealing with legal issues on that. And then, in addition to that, China has traditionally been interested in Ukrainian ports. So when it comes to Ukraine’s agriculture, it has been eyeing some opportunities there, and then also looking at being able to get some deals when it comes to Ukraine’s energy sector as well. So all that to say is, when we’re looking at the worrisome increase of collaboration between Russia and China, I think that any involvement of of China within Ukraine’s peace negotiations have to be sort of viewed through that prism and it has to be done with great care on the western side and understanding that it’s not a way to disbalance their positioning within those negotiations.
Catherine Sendak
If I can, Elina, if I can just go really quickly sure on that? I think Ilya laid it out really, really well. The only thing I would add is, you know, it’s a point that I don’t think it’s made enough, which is any perceived victory for Russia in this conflict is a victory for China and its and its future ambitions and objectives, the amount that China as a government is learning from this conflict over the past three years, and not just about, you know, man for man, or platforms, or, you know, intelligence or things like that, but how the West reacts, what the West does to act in a situation like this, you know, the largest conflict on the European continent since World War II. China is learning huge lessons about this. And I think rightly so. President Zelenskyy and Ukrainian government, from the start, said, we’ll listen to anyone who proposes creative ideas on how to obtain peace and get to resolution. I think that was wise. But I think that as this has transpired and evolved, and we’ve seen China’s role and support to Russia in this conflict. I think we have to, Ilya point, take that into major in consideration before involving China in any kind of post conflict Ukraine.
Elina Beketova
Thank you. Katie. Sam?
Sam Greene
Yeah, really just very briefly, I wouldn’t disagree with anything that my colleagues have said. But just to add a little bit of complexity in addition to the complexity that’s already there. I think, you know, there is an argument, and Kyiv has been reasonably clear about this, for involving China, to a certain extent, at least Chinese enterprise in post war reconstruction, right? First of all, there’s a lot of money there. And Ukraine is going to need, you know, something on the order of a trillion dollars over a period of time in in post post war reconstruction and investment. And you know, to the extent that China is interested, for example, in ports and infrastructure, right? That means that to a certain extent, they’re not interested in seeing Russia blow upthat infrastructure and those ports and interfere with freedom of navigation. So there is some deterrent capacity, in fact, in there, if it is managed, and if it doesn’t, in fact, give China outsize weight in the post war Ukrainian structure. But I think that we’re a long way from being able to talk about that, and to be honest, again, the US administration is not making things easier. Kellogg, I think, just the other day in Warsaw or wherever he was, said that the object here in the negotiations with the Russians is to try to split them and become an ally of the US against China. First of all, that’s a pipe dream. It’s not going to happen. And second of all, that sends all the signals that China needs, right, to make sure that they do not allow themselves to be split from the Russians in the course of this negotiating process, right? So looking at China as part of the solution to the current phase, I think is is a harmful distraction.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much for your insights, and thank you Stefan for your question. Just a reminder to everyone we have. We still have more than 20 media organizations and media outlets here. If you have a question, please write or just raise your hand. I just wanted to kind of going back to what is going on in Kyiv today, because we know that Keith Kellogg US President Donald Trump’s Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, arrived in Kyiv yesterday, and he has already met with Andrii Sybiha, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs ofUkraine. And commenting on his visit to Kyiv, calog said that this is a chance to have good potential talks. What might his role be in the next four years? if we just look at it, because he basically said before, previously, we are listening. We understand the need for security guarantees, and part of my mission is to sit and listen, then go back to the United States, talk to President Trump, Secretary Rubio and the rest of the team, just to ensure that we get this one right, he said earlier. So my question is, what is the role of special anyways right now? If I can probably pass it over to Katie or Bill, please feel free to answer.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Elina. Let me go ahead and just say that you know, one of the recommendations in the report that we released last month was consideration of a Special Envoy, or representative for Ukrainian security and defense. When I heard of General Kellogg’s appointment to this position before the inauguration, what I wanted to understand further was the parameters of his role as Special Envoy to Ukraine and Russia, and what kind of support he was going to receive from the administration. I think as we look back again at these case studies of security cooperation and assistance, we’ve had some very successful examples of special envoys from the US to really lead efforts of negotiation, really lead efforts of ending conflict and sustaining security. But we also have some pretty poor examples too. And we looked at the differences between those about what really gets a special envoy in a good place to be successful. And those things require, you know, a really robust team that is able to do that research, you know, Elina to your point, we are listening, I’m really happy he’s using those words. You know, the US really needs to demonstrate that we are understanding the situation on the ground. I hope General Kellogg has an opportunity to visit the front, to visit Odessa, to visit the west of Ukraine, to really understand fully the umbrella of what Ukraine is dealing with right now in Russia’s full-scale invasion. Second, a special envoy needs resources. It needs to have the position, needs to have funding, it needs to have authority, to be able to go into a room and say, I am speaking for the United States. I am speaking on behalf of the President of the United States. Here is what we are going to do. Here is the decision, and here’s how we’re going to do it. And I think that’s extremely important, because it’s that top cover from the President that allows a special envoy to go into a room of people who may not agree, who have very, very different perspectives on how to handle a conflict or how to handle a problem set, and they have that top cover necessary to be successful. So far, General Kellogg did not participate earlier this week in Riyadh. He was at the Munich Security Conference and meeting with partners and allies, and I know he did a swing through other European capitals. I am hopeful that he and his team are taking those lessons that he says he really wants to learn and having those really difficult conversations. And if he is to come back to DC and report on his findings, that it will be a very fulsome perspective and insight on how do we approach some of this in Ukraine, which will then further educate how do we go to the table with Russia. So I’m hopeful, though I haven’t seen some of the empowering that I would hope to see with a special envoy in this particular role. But, I think there could be an evolution, hopefully, in terms of his ability to really inform the discussion.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Katie, for your insights, and I want to just ask Bill. Taking into account your experience, because you served as a council and policy director for the Senate Armed Services Committee overseeing DoD security assistant authorities for building the capabilities of foreign security forces. So from your past experiences, how successful could the bilateral agreements be? Because you talked a little bit about bilateral agreements, we know as of February 2025, 28…29 allies and partners have signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. And last fall, Senators Graham and Blumenthal attempted to codify parts of the US bilateral security agreement with Ukraine. How should the new Congress approach the US-Ukraine relationship?
Bill Monahan
Thank you. Yes, I think there’s a very important role for Congress to be playing on Ukraine’s security assistance. You know, Congress has actually been often in the lead on building the security relationship with Ukraine. You can trace that back to Senator McCain’s efforts in standing up the Ukraine security assistance initiative, going back to 20 after the 2014 conflict. That was became turned out to be a very critical source of support for Ukraine, not only financially and in terms of dollar amounts, but also in terms of the defense reforms that it initiated, and that were, I think, an important contribution to Ukraine’s success militarily in the early days of the conflict in 2022. So, having Congress going on the record and reaffirming US support for Ukraine could be absolutely critical at this point. We’ve had, as you mentioned, an effort by Senators Graham and Blumenthal at the end of last year to essentially codify the bilateral security agreement. I think it would be helpful if that effort could be renewed and maybe expanded to include other key players. I think of Senator Shaheen as chairman, as a ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and she’s worked closely with Senator Tillis in the past. So demonstrating Congress’s commitment over a longer term to the bilateral relationship, I think would send a very important signal, both to Russia and also, frankly, to the White House. You know, having a steady source of support for Ukraine also would be critical, both in the the near term of the negotiations to provide some leverage so that we we go into the negotiations with a stronger hand. But also over the longer term to to build those capabilities that Ukraine needs most to maintain its sovereignty, whether that’s defense of its air or or its ability to defend its coastal waters and be able to conduct commerce through the Black Sea. So I think, you know, hopefully we’ll see. I think you’re beginning to hear voices in Congress speak up on this, and hopefully that trend will continue.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Bill. I think I will ask two more questions, and they’re going to be for Sam and Ilya. And then I kind of wanted to wrap it up with your predictions. I know that everyone hates predictions, but we have many journalists here, and this is something that everyone want to ask, like, what’s next? You know? But before Sam, to your point, because I, like in your article, I also read a very interesting thing about like, Russia sees the European Union and its values as a bigger threat than NATO. So given this, do you think that European leaders should fast track Ukraine’s succession to the European Union, while this might escalate tensions with Russia, could it also empower Ukraine?
Sam Greene
I think that Ukrainian accession to the EU is, is is vital. I think that fast tracking is a little bit of a red herring. What we should make sure we don’t do is slow track it right? Fast tracking doesn’t do anybody any favors. It will create problems both for Ukraine and for the EU down the road. Ukrainian integration into the EU is going to be incredibly complicated. And it’s not to say that it can’t be done. And Europe is particularly when it comes to integration in its own institutions is actually very, very good at doing very, very complicated things. It almost does complicated things better than it does simple things. But the key is not to let these questions about about the war and the outcome of the war get in the way of that process, right? What Europe needs is is, is long term planning and long term thinking, right? So that means saying that where we want to be down the road, not in some pie in the sky future, but in the foreseeable future, is, is Ukraine in Europe? Is Ukraine and NATO? Right? And again, you know, the Prime Minister Starmer, other European leaders, unlike the Trump administration, have been very clear that that Ukraine’s future remains in NATO. And so, okay, so what do we need to do in the framework of these negotiations, and what happens after these negotiations to to achieve that? That’s the ball that I think the Europeans are very much trying to keep their eyes on. Will the Russians be happy with that? No. Will the Russians be happy with the European force in Ukraine that makes that possible. And by the way, having a European force in Ukraine makes a lot of other things possible. Because Europeans are going to want to bring that force home at some point. They will only be able to bring that force home when Ukraine can start, can stand on its own two feet, versus Russia, which means they need to invest in Ukrainian and Ukraine’s own security capacity, which is what youknow. The report that Katie, Ilya and Bill were part of, you know, has suggested they ought to be doing anyway, right? So there’s, there’s a lot of virtuous circles, I think, in this, in this process, which, again, is exactly why the Russians won’t be happy about it. But the Russians haven’t been happy with a lot of things that Europe and the US and the Ukrainians have done in the last three years. And while they have punished the Ukrainians mightily for it. They found themselves unable to punish the Europeans for it, or at least unwilling to punish the Europeans for it, right? So we’ve seen increasing attacks on Ukraine, but those have not made it impossible for European aid to reach Ukraine. What has prevented Western aid from reaching Ukraine has been Western bottlenecks, not anything that Russia has done. In terms of military retaliation, it has been limited to sub threshold kinetic attacks, sort of shadow warfare, hybrid warfare attacks in Europe, specifically designed to avoid escalation. But in the process, they haven’t actually done a whole lot of actual damage. Could Russia decide that it wants to do more damage? Yes, but it also could have made that decision a lot, a lot of points over the last three years, and has decided not to. So I think that we need to not underestimate the amount of deterrence that Europe and the West in general actually do exercise over Russia, and to see that as part of the equation for what comes next.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Sam. So yeah, over to you. Regardless of the outcome of Russia’s invasion, as you have said, Ukraine will need to provide for its own defense in the long term. But how has Ukraine evolved to become a reliable security partner to NATO and the US since independence? I will ask probably for briefer commentaries right now, because we have only seven minutes left.
Ilya Timtchenko
Sure, I’ll try to be very quick. And I think it’s an excellent question, because it reminds us of the importance that Ukraine has, both for NATO as a whole as well as for its individual members. So Ukraine has went through, has gone through an impressive list of changes since independence. So the first takeaway from our report is that it’s evident that from the very beginning of Ukraine’s independence, whatever treaties we look at, Ukraine sought some form of security that would counter Russia’s influence. So this means that Ukraine saw Russia, in one way or another, as a threat, whether this was finding a balance of power with other. Neighboring states or EU integration Ukraine sought to push away Russia’s influence. The second important takeaway from the report is the strong and growing NATO-Ukraine relationship. So A) NATO countries have significantly invested an exchange of information with Ukraine and training Ukrainian troops, especially since 2014. And then B) Ukraine has built relations with NATO for over 3 decades, so basically since the beginning of its independence and has been falling on a committed NATO trajectory. The third and most obvious lesson is that Ukraine has over 10 years of experience of fighting against an enemy that is considered to be NATO’s number one threat. Ukraine, being the largest country within Europe and with the pre the 2022 invasion population, which was around 42 million, has just incredible military experience to offer to NATO and to the United States. And then the fourth takeaway, I would say, is that it’s important to emphasize that the Ukrainian army is somewhat of a hybrid. So on one hand, it inherited the Soviet educated workforce, sorry, force and military culture that has been reforming ever since the country’s independence. And on the other hand, Ukraine has been becoming more Western oriented, which is a unique place to be at for Ukraine, again, with such a significant population. So when you combine all these four takeaways, you have a Western trained Ukrainian military that knows how the Russian military operates, a country that has shown resistance against Russia, not only since 2014 or 2022 but since the beginning of its independence. So this is a country that has aspired to become part of the Western democratic institutional framework for a very long time. And I think that’s important for all NATO members to take into consideration when they’re looking at the value of Ukraine. Because if Ukraine succeeds in defeating Russia’s brutal, full-scale invasion, it not only helps Ukraine, but helps so many other countries within the so-called post Soviet space, in terms of for them to have hope and understanding how to resist Russia’s imperial ambitions within the region.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Ilya. And we have only four minutes left. So very brief commentaries to wrap it up. Katie, what will happen next?
Catherine Sendak
Thank you for the question. And I do see, I don’t know if there’s an extra question in the chat. Elina, just flagging for you. I’ll be very brief. You know, that’s, if anyone has the answer of what happens next, you’ll, you’ll be a very wealthy person here shortly. You know, this is going to be a time of turmoil, and this is going to be a time of a lot of different angles and a lot of different perspectives, and as I said in the beginning, a lot of noise. Um, let our actions speak louder than our words. Let the system and the perspectives come together, and hopefully Europe and the West and all Ukraine’s partners and allies will see the strength and unity to bring security back to the European continent. And that’s what we can hope for over the long term. So we shall see how this all shakes out, but the right work is still there to be done. The right things still need to be done to ensure that stability, and we’ll keep working on that.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much Katie. Bill?
Bill Monahan
In terms of predictions, I would say, the sooner we get a deal, the worse the deal will most likely be. Just, I feel like we need to get we need the administration needs time to do its homework and to figure out exactly where it needs to draw its key strategic objectives. I hope that it will be listening to the perspectives that it gets from General Kellogg’s consultations with our European allies along the way, and his military perspective. And I hope that there’ll be an appreciation for the importance of the US presence in Europe as a deterrent force and for the importance of security architecture going forward. But I think if at this point we take time to do our homework, we will be better off in dealing with Russia over the long term.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much. Ilya?
Ilya Timtchenko
yeah, I completely agree. I think doing one’s homework in terms of when it comes to negotiating, especially with Russia, I think that is probably the number one lesson that we can take from our report, is that it’s a very complicated issue, and that a lot of work has to be done. So I’ll only just focus on, sort of my predictionsfor the early stages of negotiations. And I, you know, depending on how that goes, and it could go either way, will sort of result in the US and the West learning either the easy way or the hard way. And I think, I think that the early stage, in the early stage of negotiations, they will basically pan out between the United States and Russia, resulting in the new administration understanding that Russia is a much larger problem, not just for Ukraine, but for the US and for the for the negotiations to be successful, the US will have to involve all stakeholders. That’s just negotiations, 101, and I’m sure that the US administration understands this. So Russia is a US enemy and will stab the US in the back as soon as it can. And when that happens, the US administration will have to reassess this approach and respond decisively. So for the Kremlin, the main enemy is not even Ukraine or Europe, but it is the United States, since it has a KGB operated Kremlin, that still can sort of forgive the United States for defeating the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And so also, on the other hand, I would say that the Kremlin was surprised, in a sense, to receive such a quick reciprocal acknowledgement from the United States, where the US sort of views them, sort of almost as equals and so well, this was to the surprise of the Kremlin, since it always sought sort of us acknowledgement and recognition, and this acknowledgement and recognition on the US and could also be used as a negotiation point in itself, and should not be given freely. So again, I think that there’s a lot sort of that can go either way, but it’s important, and that there’s a lot of homework to do here.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much. Sam, the last commentary for today.
Sam Greene
Well, look, I mean, the first rule of political analysis is no big predictions, especially about the future, right? But I’m going to do it anyway. I’m going to break the rule. I look it’s possible that the Trump administration decides to keep pushing everything that they want, that he wants, right? I don’t think it’s likely, because I think that, frankly, the Kremlin does not trust the Trump administration and is, as a result, likely to ask for too much, and at some point, the Trump administration will balk and things will bog down. So my prediction is that we’re not going to get to a deal by the 20th of April, which is the deadline that Trump has set himself, that will create a slowdown, that will create opportunities for the Ukrainians and the Europeans to reinsert themselves in a more concerted manner into this process, and indeed, to steer it in a direction that is hopefully more productive for everybody involved except the Russians.
Elina Beketova
Thank you so much. Thank you so much for all the journalists who joined our press call, and thank you so much for all our wonderful speakers who gave us insights, and hopefully our only hope now is that Europe acts quickly and both continents can work together. And I wanted to finish it with the words of the Ukrainian diplomat, Dmytro Kuleba, who said there are still many, many battles ahead. It’s very important not to fall before the shot, but it’s even more important not to fall after the shot. So hopefully we’re just in the beginning, and everything can be designed as we wantedto design. So thank you so much for joining us, and I’m passing it over to Sarah.
Sarah Krajewski
Thank you, Elina, and to all of our experts today, and of course, the press for your fabulous questions. We will be in touch with a recording and a rough, auto generated transcript following the event. We will have a proper transcript on our website in the coming weeks, so keep your eyes peeled for that. If you’re interested in getting in touch with any of the experts on the call today, reach out to me or press@cepa.org and I’d be happy to connect you. Thanks so much. Enjoy the rest of your day, wherever it may take you.
