Sam Greene
Hello there! Good morning to those of you joining us from the East Coast of the United States. Good afternoon to those of you joining us here in Europe. My name is Sam Greene. It’s my pleasure to welcome you to this on the record press briefing from CEPA, the Center for European Policy Analysis, to talk about where we are in the negotiation process between the United States, Europe, Russia and Ukraine, meant to be leading to a ceasefire or some sort of a resolution in, now, the long-running Russian invasion of Ukraine. We have an excellent panel, and it’s great to see so many of you in the room to talk about this. Together with us today from CEPA, is Nico Lange, one of our senior Fellow in the Transatlantic Defense and Security program coming to us, I think if I am not mistaken, from Berlin. Joining us in Washington, Eugeny Roshchin, a future Russia fellow, again with CEPA. And actually, I’m not sure where Hanna’s joining us from today, but Hanna Shelest is a Senior Fellow, usually based in in Kyiv, in our Transatlantic Defense and and Security program. Full bios will be available in–in the chat, where I will also invite you to to post your questions as we go along. But just to get us started, really one question for–same question for everybody on on the call, right? Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a limited ceasefire, as we’ve seen, in quite brutal fashion, Russia doesn’t seem to be terribly interested in observing that ceasefire, at least for the moment, Russia has its its own accusations towards Ukraine again, as we would expect. But the question is, you know, are we on a path to a ceasefire at the moment? Is that a place that the current process we’re seeing can lead? Nico, I might start with you.

Nico Lange
My answer is no. Following the military situation on the ground in all its granularity, I cannot see any indications that would lead to a ceasefire or even a peace, but I see many indications that see the continuation of the war. If you look at the battlefield situation, it’s a mixed picture, certainly not great from a Ukrainian perspective, but certainly also not a catastrophe. Russia has problems near Pokrovsk, near Toretsk, near Chasiv Yar, including in cities that Russia long thought it would have occupied by now. Ukraine entered into Belgorod Oblast. Russia entered into a village in Sumi Oblast. And if you see the satellite imagery that is available, you can see that Russia is building up forces, and I would expect a Russian more initiative operation, I would not say offense, because Russians possibilities for bigger offenses are very limited. But Russian initiative lasting from June to November this year, and that is what I would be expecting. And my interpretation –that’s the last sentence– initially my interpretation of the Russian spring recruitment with 160,000 new recruits, that’s the replacements for the Russian soldiers that will fall during the initiative between June and November, because Russia is losing 800 to 1000 soldiers per day, and is consideringthis as going more or less okay. So, no ceasefire, more war, and a trajectory that is on this level, I think, sustainable for both sides.

Sam Greene
Thank you Nico. I had the same question for you, are we on a route to a ceasefire?

Hanna Shelest
Thank you Sam, and greetings from Jordan today. So [inaudible] I would partially agree with Nico that we are not closer to the ceasefire that we’ve been before the start of the area of negotiations, unfortunately.There were hopes, but what we saw as a result, it didn’t bring any tangible because of the several reasons, and that’s what we see now first is definitely that both sides are still considering that by military means they still can reach something, or they still can gain something. Maybe both sides are not believing that they can reach the final goal, or the total success, but at least to get more preferable positions that where they are now. And we see that within these months, the situation on the ground been changing. It’s very flexible. So that gives the hope to both sides, depending which of the front lines they would like to see. The second is because it looks like nobody were really ready for such a sharp style of the US negotiations and for the demands of the speed. What I heard from my contacts in Saudi that the Russian delegation de facto, didn’t know what they want, except of sanctions lifting, and that the different members of the delegation were presenting the different positions, what brought surprise even to the mediators, because they didn’t know what message to deliver, like, what can be these agreements for the ceasefire, or where it is. For the Ukrainians, It’s not that Ukraine knows or doesn’t know what we want, but the situation is that we would like to understand why we are pressedfor everything while we don’t see what is demanded from the Russian Federation. So these–we are losing the political motivation compared to the situation on the ground, first. The second is that those proposals for the ceasefire, the facts are they extremely benefiting the Russian side, including, for example, on the sea, and we cannot understand what we are getting back as the shooting continues.

Sam Greene
Go ahead.

Hanna Shelest
Yeah, so because the big attacks continued, so even during the negotiations in which we are, we had the shooting of Kryvyi Rih, who– with 20 people killed, we had Kyiv the last two nights with the ballistics. We had other incidents, and all of them are not bringing the proof or trust, let’s sayl that is the Goodwill for the certain negotiations. So, are we–with the ceasefire, what is the perspective? I’m afraid that we are without perspective right now, even that we are with the perspective of the new rounds of the negotiations, with the reason that we don’t have trust, and we don’t see any–anything that would bring hope that this trust can be rebuilt, at least for the short period of time. And probably the last thing that I would like to say that we started to see the introduction of the new negotiator. I cannot name him, the member of the negotiating team, because we know that it was the big surprise, both in Riyadh and later that the new person is coming. But that’s, for me, a clear demonstration that now we would see not even the fog of negotiations, but the mud of negotiations, as we would have more proposals coming from different people and the idea of bringing different messages through different channels, and that would be really interesting to follow. Which of these channels would be more effective, considering also the domestic rival between them.

Sam Greene
Mud negotiations, I like that. Evgeny, same question for you, can we get through the mud to a ceasefire? Is there nothing there?

Evgeny Roshchin
That’s a good one. To start with, a ceasefire doesn’t seem to work. And from what we hear from Russia, we can tell that Russia is trying hard to show how the ceasefire, this partial ceasefire, doesn’t work. Last week, Putin held a special Security Council meeting to hear a report from his defense minister, even though that one was not published. Lavrov, Foreign Minister later explained that the defense minister reported how Ukraine violated, on numerous occasions, the informal agreement on this partial ceasefire, and then Lavrov also explained that they are sending messages to all the partners that Ukraine is not a reliable partner. So, he instructed his mission in the UN and elsewhere to use that in their work. So it looks like it’s important for Moscow to signal that Ukraine does not comply with those informal terms about the partial ceasefire. This might be interpreted in different ways. First of all, they are consistent in their strategy to try to legitimize Ukraine as a party in negotiations and any initiatives coming from Ukraine. But, at the same time, I would not rule out entirely Moscow’s ideas about a more comprehensive ceasefire. I think it’s still on the agenda, but the strategy they’re using now would be, I think, to say that in order to have a comprehensive ceasefire, we need to be able to formulate more questions as to how it could be implemented, who could control and so on, so on. So, that could be a sort of path and the stage for Moscow to bringing you know new ideas and new initiatives to somehow make themselves, even with the United States at this negotiation–negotiations table, while perhaps push Ukraine a little bit further away from the table. So I think it’s a strategy in itself, and it’s important for them to have their idea of a comprehensive ceasefire on the table.

Sam Greene
Okay, thank you for that. Hanna, you mentioned obliquely–Dmitriev, you very helpfully posted to the chat in your response to a couple of questions, but I wonder if I might come back to you just briefly to expand a little bit more on how you’re interpreting Dmitriev’s insertion into this process, what you think it indicates in terms of the competing interests at work?

Hanna Shelest
Yeah, if to say very briefly. So, Kirill Dmitriev of the business person in the par–in the past, involved with investments and innovations, married to the–one of the good friends of the Putin daughter and the last days, reported as the person close or who can have the ear or the brains of the president. So suddenly he appeared as the possible negotiator, as the liaison to travel to the US, don’t forget that he’s US educated,Ukrainian in the past. So he is perceived as the person of the same type as Witkoff, or as other special representatives from the US side. So his image is the person who can speak fluent English in the type of the language that the people in the inner circle of Trump would understand, the person without the state service background, so not seen as part of the system and at the same time, loyal and close. So that is the new image, new type that is very different to Lavrov or other people, [unintelligible] and others who’ve been present at the negotiations previousl. So we knew that he should be, or may be, part of the negotiating team. There were gossips even between meetings in Riyadh, everybody were thinking about him as possible, I mean the eye from the President, or from the Kremlin independent eye of somebody who could speak on thebusiness issues, what diplomats are usually less capable of speaking. But the information that we’ve been getting the last two days really made me questioning the real intentions of what is behind because two days ago, one of the Russian Information Agency from the opposition side leaked that the fact that he should not be present in Riyadh, that it was the big surprise to Lavrov and that Dmitriev asked to be, just at least to be present for 15 minutes, and so on and so on. I read this information, skipped it like, okay, that’s your business, doesn’t matter. Lavrov is still in charge, but then I received the insights from Saudi side that it was really a big quarrel between him and Lavrov, that it was the big shock for the protocol, for Lavrov himself, so that being a demonstrating that somebody is trying to be introduced. I started asking myself, and here is definitely the [unintelligible], but knowing the practice of the, back into the Soviet times, of the operations, of introducing the agents, let’s say to the negotiations or so actors, let’s call them, not to mix with the spies. My perception is that it is a necessity to bring two negotiation teams that would be with the very different styles that would be perceived one as an official position. So always can be blamed for something or promising something, and another one would be more in the style of the current US administration, pretending they have more access to the person in the Kremlin. And in this way, if something is not succeeding on the [unintelligible], you always can just say, oh, I didn’t have their level of responsibility. It’s not in my plate. Please discuss it with Lavrov. Or if something is succeeding, that’s always also the maneuver of promising more or having some kind of theshadow agreements that maybe Lavrov would not have. So that’s why I said its muddy, because now it looks like that is the attempts to have several levels of negotiations, and it was a necessity to legitimize the personality in these negotiations, but at the same time not to make him being seen as part of the Lavrov team, of the official team for 100%.

Sam Greene
Gotcha, thanks. We’ve got a question in the chat from George Allison at the UK Defense journal, which Nico I might pitch to you. He asks, as the US navigates ceasefire diplomacy, how do we see Washington balancing the need to maintain transatlantic unity? I might add, do we see Washington taking on board the need to maintain transatlantic unity, particularly with partners like the UK and others who remain deeply committed to Ukraine, while also managing perceptions from the Kremlin about long term Western resolve. Is there a risk of the US emboldening Russia to test the West further, either in Ukraine or potentially elsewhere in NATO, Europe?

Nico Lange
Building on what Hanna just said, I mean, we could ask ourselves the question, what is it that is really negotiated here? Is it a ceasefire for Ukraine, or is it a normalization of the US-Russia relationship? Because I think it’s possible with people like Dmitriev present, and with rumors about talks–which are more than just rumors–with talks about a possible Russian-US led revival of pipeline based gas delivery to Europe, that we might see an attempt from the Russian side, more to normalize the relationship to the United States, and have kind of a [unintelligible] situation where they distribute against–between each other, without solving ceasefire and peace for Ukraine, which contribute, and that is the answer to the question, which could contribute to a widening transatlantic rift. If the Trump administration wants to normalize relations with Russia and Europe, is at the same time increasing defense spending and readiness to defend against Russia and to deter Russia, and maybe even to build at least with those who are willing, the European military presence in Ukraine. And I think that’s a very interesting and from my point of view, politically dangerous development, because it could lead, over time, to a situation where the Trump administration says, look, we play hockey, we reopen our embassies, we are friends now with Russia, a little bit like it’s the end of the 80s –that’s where, from my point of view, Trump seems to live mentally that we are now, we are now reviving the relationship, but Russia continues to war against Ukraine, and it’s all falling back to the Europeans to deal with this, with the security fallout, and it will be very difficult for the European decision makers to tell their populations we need to increase defense spending, we need to really get serious on defense, because Russia is the threat. If at the same time the Trump administration says, look, we are fine with Russia, and I’m just one more thing, because referring back to what I said earlier, I’m sometimes a little bit surprised by the positive interpretations of the talks, because I cannot see any intention from the Russian side to really pursue a ceasefire. It seems to enter these talks with many goals and trying to maybe have a better relationship with the US, at the expense of Ukraine and the Europeans. But I cannot really see that Russia departs from any of the maximalist goals, or from a military point of view, is needing a ceasefire or preparing a ceasefire. I think we should be careful–careful with this. The Ukrainian side seems to have decided to say yes to everything that is coming from the Trump administration, not to be in the spotlight of Trump’s rage again. So they some say now yes, we are happy, Trump is great, we do everything because they hope that Trump’s anger will be directed towards Putin. But so far, we did not see that happening. So the transatlantic rift, the transatlantic relationship, to answer this very bluntly, does not seem to be a criterium for the Trump administration to follow. They do not seem to have a problem with transatlantic cohesion going–going apart.

Sam Greene
Yeah, and I think that may be an answer, George, to your follow on question about, you know, how Washington is thinking about maintaining long term security commitments in Europe at the moment, I might suggest that that it’s it’s something not thinking about that, or at least not thinking about it openly. Although if members of the panel want to…

Nico Lange
Can I say one thing, Sam, just one thing to this? It was very interesting to observe Marco Rubio at the NATO defense ministerial, where he tried to give a kind of reassurance that the US is still committed to European security. It seemed that the Trump administration was surprised that after the Munich Security Conference, now a consensus is building in Europe to spend more on defense, but not to spendthe money American anymore. And now US defense industry somehow is unhappy about this development, but I think this is the new European consensus, do more for defense, but do it without Americans.

Sam Greene
Thanks. We have a question from Jorge Liboreiro in Brussels, who asks, you know, whether it’s possible that Trump will eventually get tired of of Putin dragging his feet. We’ve seen some headlines about that with threats of sanctions or other sorts of pressure, right? Do we think that that Trump might eventually also deliver more weapons to Ukraine, including air defense systems? And I might add to that, the question of how do you think, do we think that Putin takes that possibility seriously, and is it likely to affect the way that he approaches these, these talks? Evgeny, I might start with you on that one.

Evgeny Roshchin
Yeah. Again, this is an interesting one, and it looks like Moscow does care about these signals coming in from Washington. When last week, Dmitriev was here, he gave a brief press conference outside of the White House, I believe. And he was asked about how they perceive these kind of threats. And it was interesting how he reacted. He tried to downplay the whole idea by saying that, well, it’s probably fake news. So it looks like the recent indication that Moscow heard this signal, but tries to play down a little bit. If you look at the last weekend’s propaganda shows on the Russian TV. You would again notice, interestingly enough, that this is one part that they didn’t cover. They covered the entire, you know, news scene of the last week, but they try to hide the fact that there was a single signal from Washington that we might, you know, become tougher on the sanctions front, on the stick policy, as opposed to, you know, the carrot policy. So, at the moment, Moscow is quite perceptive of the signals coming in from from Washington. But as long as it can, it will be trying to, you know, play this maximalist strategy to show strength and confidence in what they do. And, in fact, what they’ve been trying to do lately was that they tried again to undermine Ukraine’s agency and try to outsmart Trump in the game that he was trying to play with all these carrots and sticks, because Putin is in–a in a difficult situation right now, even if he is willing to negotiate –which I’m not confident about– he doesn’t want to be in the position of accepting terms, of what is being negotiated. He would like to be the one who is dictating the terms, and therefore he doesn’t want Trump to be in the in the role of an arbitrator who stays above the situation of the war where Russia and Ukraine, the two parties, and Trump is arbitrating between them. Putin wants to be in the same situation, negotiating directly with Trump. Therefore–therefore, I think they will try to keep that idea of sanctions on the rudder, but they will not be emphasizing this policy up until the very last moment, the moment when Trump administration will be ready to put it ahead, an ultimatum of some sort.

Sam Greene
Thanks. Hanna, I might come really with a version of the same question to you, does this Kyiv think that it’s possible, or even likely, that the Trump administration might at some point grow frustrated and and decide to ramp up the pressure on Moscow?

Hanna Shelest
I would say that the most here are confused about this, because partially we understand that, yes, Mr. Trump is emotional so he can take this very personal and these first statements about the possible sanctions or his dissatisfaction are the first sign. The question is, will he act because of this satisfaction or not? Or he would find certain explanations why it is still acceptable? And his last statement after Kryvyi Rih, for example, stating that, yes, Russians are shooting, it’s not too good, but our negotiations are still happening, is the signal for me. That, as for now, at least, he is ready to excuse some of these as soon as he has the perception that negotiations takes place. If Russians are getting out from the negotiations, or if Russia is starting to demand something that would be considered more personal for the US, that can influence much more. But, if it would be just violation of the ceasefire or all the shooting against Ukraine, that’s not enough, it seems to me. And here is demonstration of the general approach. Trump also don’t want to be seen as somebody manipulates him. So, for example, how it’s happened with the Waltz, including the Atlantic editor, he was not that much eager to fire him because that was the big pressure from outside. So yes, he can be angry, yes, that can have some internal implications, but he would not fire –not because he should or should not– but because he doesn’t want–he’d been seen weak that media can manipulate and make him too the same can be with the Russian Federation and with this negotiation. So, as soon as somebody is coming, as soon as the dialog is happening, as soon as Russia is not saying that they disagree, he can find the explanations why to continue with this sort of status quo, but with this, let’s say, slow cooked process.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Nico, there’s a question coming in from Jonathan Beale at the BBC, pointing out, reminding us that later this week, members of what’s becoming known as the Coalition of the Willing will meet in Brussels, led by the UK and France, he asks, can this coalition influence the negotiating process, or is this simply a sideshow?

Nico Lange
As I said before, I think that is the big danger that we are focusing on the alleged negotiation process, while there might not be a negotiation process at all, and while we are doing this, Russia is continuing the war. So, I would agree that this can be a destruction if everybody forgets that we should support Ukraine in its war effort, with many, many things that the Europeans can do. When it comes to this Coalition of the willing, I think, the origin of this is the meeting Macron had with Trump in Notre Dame, where Trump said, look, we will work towards a ceasefire, but long term security is–has to be done by the Europeans. And if you remember, Macron traveled to Warsaw after and he showed to Trump, look, I’m really active here, I’m trying to build a European coalition. I think the real leader of this effort now is the United Kingdom with making very concrete suggestions and building out ideas how a European military presence in Ukraine could look like after a ceasefire. This is not peacekeepers. This is not European troops on an imaginary contact line. I think it’s an idea to support the armed forces of Ukraine by a military presence by European nations that are willing to do this and with with a certain maneuverable force and with airplanes and help with air defense and with some maritime elements. France and UK have been planning this out in credentiality, they have been having certain discussions. There’s also a group of smaller countries that would be willing to take part in this. But I think the British are very clearly saying this is only possible to deploy if there is a security backup by the United States. And as we have said before, this is absolutely unclear at this point. So, armed forces of Ukraine, European military presence and US backup that can come even from outside of Ukraine. That could be the configuration that gives enough security to Zelenskyy and Ukraine to negotiate in confidence that there is a security guarantee after. But it’s questionable if it’s doable for the Europeans without US backup on certain military capabilities. And the British for now are saying, without US back up, we will not be able to deploy. That’s where this stands. I still think it’s a very, very good initiative to push the discussion on European security forward into a concrete commitment to support Ukraine in case of a ceasefire, even if the ceasefire might be far away, because it pushes a discussion about concrete capabilities. It’s moving away from abstract all peacekeepers and some cloudy understanding into very concrete things, what needs to be done, what kind of capabilities? What is the capabilities the Ukrainians do not have where they need most support, and that makes it much easier to have a sober discussion about those things. So that that’s, I think that’s the use of this effort, and it also helps the Europeans to come from this abstract –we have to provide for our own security– into more concrete terms, what kind of capabilities do we need? In what time do we need them? What does it mean for procurement? What does it mean for industry and tech–Technology? I think that’s all very helpful. And the last point, the key to this moving forward, will be how European nations are deciding the question: is security of Ukraine and European security the same thing? Or are those two different questions? Some countries like Denmark or the Czech Republic or Estonia, they have decided this long time ago. For them, it’s the same. But for example, Germany still, in every wording you get from the German government, makes a difference between security support for Ukraine and European security like there is, I don’t know, an Iron Curtain somewhere, somewhere west of Ukraine where European security is defended. So, that’s the key question that needs to be politically debated and decided in key European nations. First and foremost in the new German government is Ukrainian security and European security. Without that, I think this cannot go much more forward than it is now.

Sam Greene
Thanks for that. Since you mentioned the new German government, what should we expect? We’ve seen obviously, already differences in the German approach internally, including the fiscal approach. How would you expect a Friedrich [unintelligible] government to change the dynamic in Europe more broadly?

Nico Lange
Yeah, it’s speculative, because we do not have a new government yet, and the honest impression from the coalition talks as they are going on now, is it’s extremely difficult, and there is very much unhappiness in both parties internally, and it’s growing. So it will be a difficult process, and I would not be too optimistic about the timeline. We might have a German government maybe by mid-May, but yeah, it will take some time to get together. What I think is credible, if you look into Friedrich Merz and his likely European and foreign policy, I think he will bring German European and foreign policy making closer to Northern Europe and Central Eastern Europe. And that is, I think, a departure from the Scholz government, and it will lead to greater cohesion when it comes to Russia policy and Ukraine policy. And it will make it more difficult for countries like Italy and Spain, but also partly France, who are reluctant when it comes to this. I mean, France is changing, I think as we speak now, with Ukraine becoming more of a top priority, let’s see what this really means, indeed. But so I think that will be changing. Europe will become more Northern European and Central Eastern European. From my point of view, that’s a good development, but that is where Friedrich Merz is at. The second when it comes to defense. I think Germany will, over the next two years, with now the exception made in the Constitution about the debt break bring its defense budget into the area of 100 billion euro per year –that’s roughly 2.5% of GDP. And of course, that would make a big difference to European defense procurement and European defense readiness, if a big country such as Germany is finally moving on this, so European capabilities will grow because of this, there are some hurdles to overcome, like the conscription discussion in Germany. So it will not be a linear, it will be a bumpy ride, but clearly, clearly, this will change the situation significantly to a more ready in defense matters Europe. And I think Friedrich Merz, he has a very European compass. So it will not be a national defense buildup of Germany, it will be embedded in European initiatives, or initiatives of groups of countries developing capabilities together.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Hanna, going back to you if I might. We’ve talked about shifting approaches in in the US and uncertainty about what American intentions are. We’ve, as just heard from Nico, about growing consolidation and commitment in Europe, if slow and fitful in some cases. How does that change the strategy for–from Ukraine in terms of negotiating, not just its adversary in Russia, but its partners to the West?

Hanna Shelest
I would say that the Ukrainian strategy changed not now, not in February 2025 but in April 2024, and it builds the background to the changes that we have now in terms of our relations with the partners. When the Congress been hesitating with the delivering to Ukraine that package of support that been promised, all those hesitation delays, situation on the ground that made Ukraine to think twice, both about the military munition that we are receiving from the US and what alternatives do we have. And about the level of the political supports from the US side, considering that, if they are ready in the mid of the very important operation, the fact to delay the support that been promised, can we rely only to their security commitments? That’s when Ukraine started signing, on the political level, the 28 espionage security agreements with other countries, including Japan. And all of them include the military technical cooperation, the military training, some of them include the very particular money allocation for this support, some are more general, definitely. There are, in almost all of them, the support to enter NATO is stated, and many of them what is really interesting, they are not only about what these countries can give to Ukraine, but also about what Ukraine can give to them, not only experience, but also with Lithuania, for example, it is the fact that the military pacts, that we will support them in case of any war or conflict or insurgency happening. So that was at the political level, a diplomatic level, at the practical level, Ukraine started to invest more in the production, self production, and not only of the small ammunition like 155 that’s been already in the process at that time, and which extremely needed. Here the Danish model appeared. That’s when the countries who don’t have enough in their stockpiles of ammunitions, but who have money started to pay for buying this money from the Ukrainian producers or invest in the production of the Ukrainian companies. So now we have the Nordic companies–Nordic countries already following this model. But at the same time, Ukraine started also to develop the long range missiles, and we had the testing of the two first already quite successful, in addition to the production of the [unintelligible] and others. So Ukraine is trying to diversify what we have homemade and how it can influence the situation. So that’s why our–I can’t say that all of these are influencing the negotiations that much, but that’s definitely made the bond between Ukraine and our European partners closer and better. That’s made them to think about their capabilities, but also to think what we can do together. And that is really important, because previously we were thinking about Ukraine as only security consumer, and now it is more about the Ukraine-European partnership, when we are speaking about the military development, intelligence sharing, or something like this. One additional interesting moment that happened because of all these transatlantic issues, but also connected with Syria, we finally see Turkey back. And that would be another issue to follow, because for Turkey, the Russian presence In Syria always was the huge challenge. So, as soon as they assumed that Russia is out of Syria, so there is less risks from the south, we immediately started to see stronger statements from Ankara. We saw the high level representatives at the meetings in London and in Brussels. So, definitely with the domestic issues now in Turkey that would be really important to understand. Will they still be acceptable by the European partners on this? But for Ukraine, it is the huge way ahead that, because of all these mess and cows that has been happening, the turkey chose the side of Europe and the allies in Europe and in this way, are also trying to understand how they can be a more reliable partner for the Black Sea region.

Sam Greene
Thank you to all of you in the room, please do keep your questions coming, either by posting them to the chat or using the raise hand function here in in zoom. But while you’re doing that, Evgeny, again, I’m wondering how this is looking from Moscow. If Europe is consolidating, as Nico is saying, and if, as Hanna was describing, you know, there is ever closer coordination and ever closer integration of European support into Ukraine’s defensive efforts. Does that mean that maybe time is running out for Putin to get the kind of a ceasefire that he might like, and thus that he might change his approach to these negotiations?

Evgeny Roshchin
I think Moscow does watch closely the development in Europe, and it reflects in how they speak about it. And now you can tell that the emphasis changed. The US is now sort of whitewashed for the Russian publics, while Europe is represented, as you know, the evil on earth. Of course, Lavrov says that all the problems have been coming historically from Europe, Europe is the cause of the issues that the world has to deal with, and so on, so on. So, you can tell that they’re trying to shift all the blame on Europe. At the same time, I think throughout Putin’s presidency, they have never been serious about Europe and its integration and particularly its military capability. So whatever happens in Europe now would not be taken seriously in the context of the ongoing negotiations. So I don’t think European commitments would be impacting directly on Moscow–Moscow’s calculations about any prospective ceasefire or peace settlement. But, I do think they might have a longer term impact, because, after all, European economy is much greater than Russia’s, and if Europe does commit to the spending they announced and would follow its words, then you will have a European defense spending be much bigger than Russia’s. And that would constitute a problem in the long run. Therefore, I think Moscow strategy would be to keep as long as they can the United States at the table. Give the United States all kinds of promises or questions, but never show any, you know, reluctance to negotiate with the United States and then try to shift all the blame to Europe. Therefore, I think they will be trying to play on the possible rift between the US and Europe, and try to stick to this strategy, because for them, it’s important that the drift emerges. Because ultimately, I would perhaps agree with Nico, it’s up to the US Nuclear umbrella. What Moscow wants to see in the long run is this umbrella disappear. Because for them, nuclear deterrence is the end game, and they see that Europe simply doesn’t have the same capability as compared to the US. So, when US deterrence evaporates from Europe, then Moscow believes it will have all the cards in the security architecture game.

Sam Greene
Great, thank you very much. We have one more question coming in from Clara Lipkowski, actually a two part question, and I think I’m going to use this probably to round out our conversation, so I will put it to each of the of the panelists. The first part, which you can take or leave is, is on the Black Sea, right? Should we see the focus–should we expect to see the Black Sea focus continue? Or is that a passing fancy? But I think the broader question for everybody is, what’s your prediction? What’s this going to look like by the time we get to Easter? I’ll go in the order that we started. So Nico, you’re up first.

Nico Lange
I expressed my prediction already. I see nothing happening on the ceasefire or peace front until Easter. I see Russia preparing for a new offensive operation in the limited possibilities it has, and I see Ukraine systematically and static–steadily, also improving what they are working on. I mean, Ukraine has achieved two things that will play out on the battlefield that make a difference. One is extending the range of glass fiber drones, drones with glass fiber cables, which will–has the effect that Ukraine is more successful now in taking out Russian artillery guns at the front lines. And if you see the reports from Pokrovsk area, Russia is really having difficulties there. Ukrainian soldiers are saying, look, we did not see a Russian tank tank for weeks now, they are very far away. So, Ukraine will continue what they are doing successfully. And I would also expect Ukraine to expand on their deep strike program into Russia further, because this is the only thing that led to some form, at least verbal commitment, to some kind of ceasefire, because Putin feels pressure on this front, because Ukraine can hit refineries and other targets in Russia. So from a Ukrainian point of view, it makes absolute sense to build this out further. On the dimension, I mean, maybe the others, others are more qualified to comment. But my impression was Russia was trying to give something that costs nothing. Ukraine was able to organize a corridor from for exports from Odessa a long time before, Ukraine scared away the Black Sea Fleet, parts of the Black Sea Fleet are on the ground of the sea now. So Russia is trying to sell something to the US that is not is not costing anything for the Russian side, but might be the US might be, I will not say stupid, but might be uninformed enough to sell this as a big success. I think there’s not much there when it comes to the Black Sea dimension. But what I know for a long term solution, and that’s my last point, for a long term solution in this maritime dimension, the Europeans need Turkey. And it will be very interesting to see, while we will see maybe more negotiations ongoing, including about the European military presence in the future in Ukraine, how Turkey can be included into the maritime dimension of this, because I think it’s impossible to solve this without Turkey on the side of the Europeans. And now with the domestic developments in Turkey, that might be more difficult for the Europeans than it was before.

Sam Greene
Indeed. Hanna?

Hanna Shelest
Good question. I mean, it’s difficult to predict what we would have for the next even month, let’s not speak about the longer term perspective. The problem is that in most of the discussions that we currently have it is the short term solutions, or at least perceived solutions, without the understanding of their long term consequences. And that is the general feeling that for everybody now, the PR of the idea that we negotiated something is much more important than the substance or the viability of those agreements reached. That if the ceasefire is signed, the main negotiators or mediators would stop be interesting is what is on the ground and about reaching the final agreement, and because of these, the fact that we would have just the more complicated threats and consequences, rather than the start for the real peace negotiations, because it would be comfortable just to have our imagined ceasefire. Because unfortunately, I’m not so optimistic about the real ceasefire on the ground as we had nine years of Minsk agreement and 35 different ceasefires, and how it was. And that conflict been much easier, and the frontline was much shorter, so easier to control what is happening on the ground. That’s why, definitely nothing before the Easter is just 10 days, and I understand that at the same time we would see the several attempts to push in the near days. The good signal is that the statements from Washington are more and more that they understand that there is no quick solution. So finally, it is coming the understanding, they tried, they tested, they understood that it was not Ukrainians who were crazy to say them it is impossible. But now they experience this. They experience the Russian style of negotiations. So that gives a hope that they will try to reconsider their positions. The question is that, how long Mr.Trump himself would be interested in this case, or his attention would jump to another issue in some other part of the world? And for this situation, I don’t know. Is it good or bad for us? It can have both consequences, because it can be bad as the US is not interesting, and they are withdrawing. So we are returning back to where we were, or it can be good that he would delegate this from his personal ideas and posts to the professional negotiating team and mediators from the US who would consider more thoroughly the proposals that are put on the ground.

Sam Greene
Thank you. And Evgeny…

Evgeny Roshchin
yeah, I think I see two big scenarios on the table. The first one is a protracted negotiation game. Putin simply cannot stop the war right now. It’s important for him to sell the idea of victory to domestic publics. At the moment, they can be content with their territorial claims, and I think they indicated to the Russian people that this is what they achieved, and this is already a lot. But they haven’t seen from their coverage that they are ready to back down on all the other claims they put forward at the beginning of this invasion, including the regime change in Ukraine, and which is still very much on the agenda. Putin himself indicated that at his notorious talk on board of the nuclear submarine, and then it was all reiterated in the Sunday night propaganda shows. So, for those claims to be settled, I think they will be trying to play all kinds of games and tricks with the American negotiating team. That’s why it will drag for for some time. The second scenario might be different, because, after all, the American administration indicated that the ball is in Russia’s yard, and that was said very clearly. And when it comes to Russia, US deals or possible trade relations, I wouldn’t overstate Russia’s value in this respect. This is a small economy. The volume of trade with the US has been very minimal, and it doesn’t look like Russia has much to offer in the short term, and all those joint you know, explorations in the Arctic are still very much remote prospect which cannot be taken into account seriously at this time. And the momentum might not be also in Putin’s favor, now that all the countries will be considering whether they need to cut the deals with Washington, it might just transpire from those negotiations that Washington might use leverage against the countries, and in the process, they might actually bend the countries not to sell the equipment and materials Russia needs to continue its war. So, this economic storm unfolding at the moment might play out not in Russia’s favor, but might give the Washington administration a new card that Russia didn’t explain didn’t expect to be enacted in this kind of game. And after all, Trump, in all these chaos that unfolded, Trump needs to show a victory somewhere, and he might indeed get irritated by how protracted the whole process is. And in this scenario, Trump might get a card he needs to actually push Russia to negotiate the ceasefire.

Sam Greene
Okay, so in addition to watching the negotiations and the war, we will watch the economic weather. Thank you very much to our panel today. Please join me in thanking Nico, Hanna and Evgeny. I am going to hand over to my colleague Sarah to walk us through some logistics, but it’s been great to be with you today. Thank you for coming and stay in touch.

Sarah Krajewski
Great. Thank you everyone. Thanks for all your wonderful questions, and of course, to our panelists for their expertise this morning or wherever you may be. I will be sending out a recording and auto generated transcript following the call, full transcript will be available on our website in the coming days. If you have any other questions for our experts, please feel free to reach out to me at press@cepa.org, be happy to connect you and enjoy the rest of your day wherever it may take you. Thanks, guys.