Edward Lucas
Well, hello everyone, and welcome to this CEPA press briefing on the Kursk offensive. I’m Edward Lucas. I’m a senior fellow and senior advisor to CEPA, joining you from Lake Como in Italy, and it’s my great pleasure to introduce our three speakers here. We have Pavel Luzin, Elina Beketova and Nico Lange, but I also want to say that it’s a great privilege to have such an expert attendance here from the media. I see many familiar names here on the screen. Many of you know enormous amount about this, and could easily be sitting on the panel answering questions, rather than sitting in the audience asking them. So I look forward very much to pooling our expertise, and I hope enlightening us all about the extraordinary events of the last few weeks. I think, to me, the thing that really epitomized this was the picture of the Czech T 72 tank on Russian territory, which someone posted on X, formerly Twitter, along with a picture of a Russian tank, I think also T 72 invading the then Czechoslovakia in on August the 21st 1968 with the caption, what goes around, comes around. But it’s been the extraordinary few weeks, both in terms of the military capability that’s been displayed, confounding the sort of narrative of Ukraine being in an unwinnable war of attrition. It’s been extraordinary in terms of the weakness of the Russian resistance. It’s been extraordinary in terms of the way it’s changed the kind of geopolitical international landscape, giving us something completely different to talk about. And I think it’s the final point I’d make. If I go to the speakers, I don’t think it’s over yet. We’ve just seen unprecedented word I don’t like using very much, but I think these are really unprecedented wave of Russian of Ukrainian drone strikes on some of Russia’s most important airfields. So there is a second shoe that is perhaps dropping now, and maybe more shoes to drop. So on that note, I’m going to go first of all to Elina. Elina, welcome. Thank you for everything you do for CEPA and telling the world what’s going on in your in your native Ukraine. Give us your initial thoughts for a few minutes on the on the Kursk offensive, if that’s the right thing to call it,

Elina Beketova
of course. Well, hello everyone. Thanks so much for having me today. And I think that it’s amazing what we have been observing for two weeks already, as of August 20, the Ukrainian forces controlled more than 1200 60 square kilometers of territory and 93 settlements in Kursk Oblast, Russia, and probably the peculiarity of this particular Kuz Corporation is that they were No leaks or videos for the first few days. The Ukrainian soldiers, the Ukrainian general armed forces, they didn’t disclose any information, and a lot of us didn’t know what’s going on. And I know that many journalists here reached out and we tried to understand what was going on, but because there was this secret, and because basically we saw that. We that there was the advance, but no one know knew exactly what was going on. I think that if the Ukrainian Armed Forces separation continues to advance successfully, it will bring both military and foreign policy benefits. And right now, what we are seeing is that, basically it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s the operation, and we still think that the Ukrainian advance into Russian poorest region is increasing pressure on Western countries to give Ukraine long, long range weapons and also to the US to lead. This restriction on on Kyiv, using American made weapons to strike deep into Russian territory, and removing this restriction could help Ukraine secure against in Kursk. But also I told that basically the main thing, and we heard it from the Ukrainian president afterwards, the main aim and objective of the course cooperation is to create the border region so that sumo obliques was not so shelled, right as we knew before, and as we see today. I saw the message from the head of the sumo obliques military administration. He described the situation in sumo obelisk after the beginning of the course cooperation. As a result, the number of Russian attacks from tubed weapons decreased, as well as the number of casualties among civilians. It also created an opportunity to repair the power infrastructure in safer conditions and prepare it for the beginning of the heating season. So we saw that basically this opportunity to create this border region that wouldn’t be so shelled, be successful at this point, but this is just my take. I’m sure we’ll talk a lot on different things here.

Edward Lucas
Thanks so much. ElIna and I should have said the beginning I’m not giving everybody’s full affiliations to if I did, it would take about the first 10 minutes of this hour, just going through the many distinguished things that our three panelists have done. But I think everyone on the call has had the invitation, and there’s comprehensive bios there. And the second thing, which I should have said at the very beginning is this is all on the record, So do feel free to quote anybody who has given an answer here, and you will be, we’ll be we’ll be delighted to see a mention of CEPA in the press. Pavel, let’s turn to you, and what do you make of the impact of this on Russia? It’s obviously humiliating for Putin, and he’s done his usual crisis management thing of becoming almost invisible the Russian media seems unable to decide whether this shows that the what they call the puppet regime in Kyiv is totally out of control, or whether it’s doing or whether this is some kind of NATO Special Operation happening on Russian territory. So it’s produced a lot of both military and political, diplomatic and informational dilemmas for the Kremlin. What do you make of it?

Pavel Luzin
Thank you, Edward, to for the questions, and good morning everyone. So I have several points. First of all, Edward, you’re completely right that all this narrative which Russia tried to sell to the western audience, that guys, any foreign soldier, who one day will come on our soil, will be eliminated and we are always ready to use nuclear weapons against this foreign soldier and so and so on. This narrative currently is a pointless because Ukrainian Armed Forces demonstrated very well that Russia can hardly do you know some radical steps against this? Secondly, we do see dysfunctional nature of Russian institutions of power, and we do see this at the third time during the last 14 for during the last 14 months. Firstly, we saw this in June 2023 during the precautions muting. Then we saw the same dysfunction in March 2024 during the terroristic attack near Moscow in Krasnodar. Now, we do see this dysfunction today. And what does it mean? That means that the Russian authoritarian regime is not so strong, is not so sustainable, like we could imagine, I don’t know, in spring 2023 so this is very interesting fact, and this unsustainability and stability of the Russian authoritarianism, we do see this in how the Kremlin reacts on the invasion, because we. We see that there are a lot of troubles with inter agency coordination, inter agency communication. We do see that the Kremlin is trying to maintain the balance between the different military and security institutions on the one hand. Hand, the Kremlin proclaims counter terroristic operation in Kursk region and in bransk and Belgrade regions as well. So the counter terroristic operation is headed by bortnikov, the head of FSB. On the other hand, the Russian Armed Forces are responsible for counter attacks against Ukrainian UK against Ukrainian troops. On the third hand, the Russian National Guard is responsible for combat support of Ministry of Defense and counter terrorist, counter insurgency, support of FSB and so and so and so on, and also Alexey Duman, the former Putin’s bodyguard and current Putin’s advisor is responsible for supervising all these activities, yes, so check and balance assistant, yes. And one more point, just briefly, yeah, is a complete indifference of the Russian society towards this attack. What does it mean for for us? What does it mean for Ukraine? That means that if Russians do not care about Kursk, they will never care about Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk and other occupied territories of Ukraine. That’s

Edward Lucas
fascinating. See, it kind of changes the weathers in terms of what Russia’s negotiating position might be perceived to be, if the if the conflict moves into that stage. So Nico, it’s great to see you here again, not for the first time, one of these press briefings. And I’d be particularly interested in knowing your view of how this changes views in European capitals, there’s been a kind of what one might call a drumbeat of despair in recent months, with people saying, particularly in some of the countries that know less about Ukraine, that this is it’s just a question of trying to get to peace talks, and this is unwinnable and and the usual sort of voices and the usual suspects, so that’s clearly changed a bit. Tell us what you think this has done to the diplomatic landscape around the conflict.

Nico Lange
You for having me, I will be happy to do that. But if you allow Edward a few words just on the military state of things. Yes, I talk about the European political reactions. I think we have to give ourselves a note of caution and everything that is reported from kosk oblast, because most of the news that are out there, they are originating from reports of Russian military bloggers, there is a lot of rumor intelligence, the Ukrainian operational security, as Elina said, is very tired, so we are very likely behind time in what we are saying, seeing. But we always have to be aware there is every day there is what the Ukrainians are attacking in the south now, the Ukrainians are going into beyond Oblast. Now it’s all coming from Russian military bloggers. Let’s be careful with that. That said, I believe that the map and 1267 or what square kilometers presented by General zersky are more a part of psychological warfare than the real state of affairs on the ground, Ukraine is in Bosk Oblast, and is also, I think, over the most critical phase of the first 72 hours, which means that it now can consolidate positions and has options on how to proceed. But I’m very careful with this. Ukraine is controlling territory because I’m not sure what it means. If a couple of infancy fighting vehicles with a few soldiers are driving into a Russian village, are they controlling that village. Now it’s and from a military point of view, for the military involved, the longer this goes on, the more questions will be there, what to do with the local population, how to organize the continued work? Of the villages and cities that are now in the Ukrainian military sphere of influence, because the city administrations, by and large, ran away. The Russians plundered their own shops. This will last for a few days, but what will come after? I just want to say there are from the for the Ukrainian military. There are difficult questions to be answered. The longer this goes in Kosovo’s Ukraine has options now. The options depend on how Russia will react. Will Russia move forces from other sections of the frontline to Kos Oblast? Will this give opportunity to Ukraine, maybe, to open another vector of attack, somewhere else in the south, or wherever, Russia is thinning out resources, because I believe we are still at the beginning of a bigger operation. This is not it. Something else will follow. And last remark on the military situation, Russia is very keen on continuing the attacks towards prokofsk and not you taking resources away from prokofsk to kosk. That’s why, I think Putin set the goal of liberating Kursk Oblast on first of October. He basically said, We can do nothing now. We solve this later, but let’s push for prokofsk. We will see how this continues on the political reactions, unfortunately, or maybe in that case, fortunately, some main European players are absolutely busy with themselves, so Germany is not able to form a budget. Has elections in two federal states in the east, the bandwidth to deal with this on in the political sphere is limited. I think similar things can be said for France. What is clear is it encourages those who are advocating from Ukraine on the European stage to make their case. That’s the Scandinavians, the Central Eastern Europeans. If you saw what Peter Pavel said very forward leaning the last days. I think that’s all very helpful, because the Ukrainians are supporting the arguments that Russia can be beaten. Russia can be put under the pressure militarily. I think this is a good development, because it will help to have sustainable military support and inflow of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, and also Ukraine seizing the initiative in the information space in general. I think that’s the biggest success of this offensive so far. So far. It changes everything. Because in German media, like in other European media, it’s about cost. Now. It’s about Russia bombing its own cities. It’s about Ukraine putting pressure and creating problems for Putin. I think that’s all good and encouraging, but still, I would end again with this note of caution. We don’t know if we are at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of this military operation, and many questions we only will on the military side will only be understood over time. And to be honest, the resource gamble by zyrsky to put the resources, including capable fighting troops from Donbas, to put the resources on korsk and not have the resources in pokovsk at the same time, if this is a success, we will only know in a couple of months. It’s difficult to say right now.

Edward Lucas
Well, well, thank you, Nico, for making that point, because I wanted to say at the beginning that nobody here knows what’s really happening in military terms, nor should we. And you’re absolutely right. We have fantastic operational security from the Ukrainians, and a whole range of more or less truthful reactions from more or less reliable, or less reliable Russian sources. So this is, really, is the fog of war. But I think you’re absolutely right that this is, we’re just at the beginning. As Churchill might have said, it may it’s not the beginning of the end. This may be the end of the beginning. And so we shall have plenty more to learn and to talk about on the military side, but what we can talk about is the effect in Ukraine, the effect in Russia, and the effect on the rest of the world. So let’s have some questions. You’re welcome to put a question in the chat, or you can raise your raise a hand using the zoom raise hand feature. And I will try, if I know you, I will try and give you affiliation straight off. Or you can just announce it when you when you do we, I see some many familiar faces here on the on the call. But I suppose the one that the question that I would like to ask is to you, Nico, where are the other weak points? From your point of view to for Russia, we’ve seen the loss of pressure on. Crimea. And of course, the big thing about Crimea is there are no caveats on the use of Western weapons, because the West doesn’t regard that as Russian territory. And so I’m wondering, and obviously we’re only guessing here, whether perhaps the next thing is to increase pressure on Crimea so it stops being a sort of trophy for Putin and starts being a hostage. And I know Elena, you are originally from Crimea, I think so you may have a view on that. And when you’ve answered that, then we’ll go to Ryan Robertson, who’s asked, made an interesting point that Russia seems to be sending radar operators to Kursk as frontline troops, because presumably they’re so short of troops. But let’s talk about the broader military opportunities. First of all, Nico, you go first, and then Elena, if you want to say anything about Crimea, I’d be happy to hear that. And then I shall go. Then we’ll have the question from Ryan, and then we’ll have Mark Trevelyan from Reuters,

Nico Lange
As I said in expansion, what we what we discussed before, Ukraine has options now, because it was successful in the initial phase of this incursion into Costco, does it has options in coast and elsewhere on the front lines? And that’s the big change of the war, that Ukraine has worked itself into a position where it has options. So now that depends on the Russian reaction with which option to pull. And I’m sure one of the options the Ukrainian have, Ukrainians have in mind, is if Russia is pulling troops out of the south to support the course direction, to maybe have another attempt going further south, putting Crimea under pressure, and using Crimea, which is seen by the Ukrainian General Staff, as the center of gravity for the Russians, as a pressure point to change also the political discussion in Moscow. But we are early in this. We don’t know yet if this, if this is happening on the Russian side, there are also options, because it’s an option to continue to push into bucharsk, I think they are like 12 kilometers away now, where Ukraine does not have succeeded to build the fortifications fast enough, or to go to defend Kos Oblast. I think what we can say is Russia is trying everything possible to avoid taking the pressure off the Ukrainian frontline. That’s the reason why they have all sorts of radar troops, conscripts, troops that belong to the Ministry of Interior, interior now in Coast Oblast, the problem with them is that they are not faced with light Ukrainian units. This is Ukrainian brigades, mechanized, some of them heavily combat experienced. So the Russians very often we see them surrendering because this is something they are not able to deal with, especially not conscripts. And that is, I think, very clever by Ukraine to create a local, a local, overwhelming element that is very difficult for Russia to tackle. The last point I want to say on the military. We don’t know yet how Ukraine can sustain in Kursk Oblast, when Russia is really turning its air force around, that’s a big problem for the Ukrainians. We have seen. I mean, that considered that is with drones, Russia will bring the better drone operators. Now to post Oblast protection against drones is difficult on the Ukrainian side, also, Russia will use glide bombs and other instruments. The Russian system is very hierarchical and stiff, so it always takes them a significant amount of time to adapt to a new situation, but we will have to see how Ukraine can sustain there once Russia has adapted and comes with full force, especially with Air Force, because that’s the biggest problem the Ukrainians are having, also on the front line, to have the glide bombs on their heads, and then they have to retreat slowly. It’s an open question for now, but I think the biggest option for Ukraine is because if you counter Ukrainian forces, and you see what they had at strike brigades before the counter offensive 23 started, there is more so, and they have the inner lines. So it’s always for Ukraine is able to move faster across the inner lines Russia has to go around. So if Ukraine strikes somewhere else, I think then it, then it will begin to be very interesting for and more difficult for the Russians.

Edward Lucas
We’ve got several more military questions coming up. But Elina, I just wondered if you wanted to add anything to what? What are you hearing from? From. And correct from, from from Crimea, in terms of life there and the Russian ability to defend itself.

Elina Beketova
Edward, thank you so much. I don’t think that I have any information from Crimea, any military information from Crimea, that might be sustainable. But I agree with everything what Nika has just said. And in terms of, like the military operation, we don’t know where we are at this point in the beginning, in the middle or in the end. I mean, we probably know that it’s somewhere in the beginning. But I just wanted to bring the information from the official sources that they basically said that the Russian Federation has withdrawn some troops from the Kherson and zebrigi regions to defend the Kursk region, which is important. But for instance, the spokesperson for the tavri operational strategic group of forces stated that Russia has redeployed a relatively small number of soldiers, but didn’t specify the exact number. And at this point, Ukrainians, whenever I speak with them, they all understand that, like in the first days, everyone was happy and optimistic, but right now, we have the restraint optimism, because everyone understand that well, Russia might, you know, redeploy its troops, but we don’t know the exact number, and even though there was, it provided a much needed moral boost to The Ukrainian people and soldiers it. It has also challenged the assumption that future peace negotiations will only focus on how much territory Ukraine sits to Russia. Now the conversation is about mutual force withdrawals. And I just wanted to share one really important point of view of the Ukrainian soldier who took part in the course cooperation. He said that right now, everyone is celebrating great our troops broke through. Our troops are advancing, but perhaps not everyone understands the potential consequences for Suma and the border regions. The Russians might start destroying everything to the ground. They could simply bombard the five kilometer zone with guided aerial bombs. Now, it’s not the time to celebrate, he basically reached out to people asking to donate more to help with electronic warfare systems, FPV drones and mavics. But also he said that it might turn like it was in Belgrade when the Russian Volunteer Corp centered the velikaplicity of everything was great, but then the Russians level both the checkpoint and velikaplicitivka itself, meaning that at this point, everyone should be ready. And I agree with Nika how Russia will react and how they will redeploy their troops, but it’s important how the Western Allies and partners will help Ukraine at this particular very urgent moment, with the weapons, with all the needed equipment, because also from the person who took part in the Kursk Corporation, he said that they are fortifying Kursk, and they will face maximum resistance. We have challenging times ahead, and basically everyone told that they felt like someone who wants to sacrifice something for the sake of peace on their land, it’s like in chess, I move more pieces onto the open end site to gain an advantage on my own. I think we want to make a trade, and to do that, we need to establish a strong position. Right now, what we’re observing Ukrainians are trying to establish this strong position, and a lot will depend on how much Western supports Ukraine will get at this particular moment, Ukrainians can win the war, and we see it, and they, well, definitely took an initiative.

Edward Lucas
I want to come to mark in a moment. But John, just a quick word from you, Pavel about manpower in Russia that Putin has always avoided the sort of general mobilization, but in this Facebook conflict, he’s now sending conscripts into the defense line in Kursk, and we’ve also just had that question about sending radar operators. So what are you picking up about the kind of the manpower shortage and the personnel issues in the Russian Armed Forces, where they’ve tried conscripts, they’ve tried paying enormous amounts of money to people to go. What do they do next?

Pavel Luzin
So firstly, I would like to remind that on june 14, so a little bit more than two months ago, Vladimir Putin told publicly, told that there are 700,000 Russian troops, which which are engaged into the war against Ukraine. Oh, he told about special, special military operation, 700,000 troops, and now they’re trying to find several 1000 troops to counteract Ukraine Ukrainian forces in Kursk Region. What does it mean? That means that this 700,000 troops do not exist and. And that means Russia faces lack of manpower. And for SIPA, I wrote a paper in March 2024, where I tried to assess the amount of Russian forces, combat capable forces, which I engaged into the war, and I concluded in my papers that lately, this year, Russia will need to solve either to send conscripts, drafted soldiers, into the war, or to conduct another wave of mobilization. And now we do see concrete conscripts on the battleground, and still, we don’t know whether or not Russia will be ready to conduct another way for mobilization or to send more conscripts. Or in October, in October 1, there will be another conscription campaign in Russia for conscription campaign, and we will see how much soldiers Russia will try to recruit for for the armed forces during this campaign. So the situation is unstable, but definitely Russia Don’t, don’t have enough of manpower and and now Ukrainian army forces, with using asymmetric approach in the war the Ukrainian army forces, they are forcing Russia to spread This limited manpower across the longer, longer front line.

Edward Lucas
Good. Okay, let’s mark Sorry to keep you waiting. Mark is been covering Russia for, I think, even longer than I have, which is quite long. So let’s have your question, Mark.

Mark Trevelyan
Thank you very much. Can you hear me? Okay, yeah. Thank thanks. Thank you all for this briefing. If I could just follow up directly from from where Pavel just just just finished. I’m very interested in the subject of the conscript, and I wondered if Pavel could say a little bit more about just how badly they are sort of mismatched against the Ukrainian forces. What, what level of actual combat skills do these conscripts have who are being sent into into the Kursk Region and and do you think that Russian public opinion, which seems to have you know, swallowed the fact of heavy casualties among contract soldiers, will be Just as ready to accept the reality of of deaths among conscripts, if, if that starts, if those casualties among those units starts to rise quickly,

Edward Lucas
I’ll send that to Pavel, and Nico might have a thought on that as well, with your military hat on. And there’s also a question that might be interesting for you, Nico, about the significance of blowing the bridges up, and whether we’re going to see the Russian soldiers with their in, what I think is in most for most soldiers, the nightmare situation having the enemy on one side advancing in a river behind you with no bridges. But let’s go to you first of all, Pavel.

Pavel Luzin
Thank you very much. Mark for for your question. So what do we know? We do know that some of the conscripts who were captured by Ukrainian forces, they were drafted just in May, June this year. And according to the Russian law, according to the Russian law, the drafted soldier can be sent into the war after four months of military service. So the Russian Armed Forces violated their own laws. But even even if the conscripted, the conscripts, served more than four four months in the armed forces, they still have poor train, poor level of capabilities. They’re poorly trained soldiers? Why? Because the typical training period is just 4045 days. The same is true, not only for conscripts. The same is true even for contracted soldiers, even for all those. Prisoners who were recruited to the war since 2023 so the most of the Russian soldiers are poorly trained. The most of the conscripts are poorly trained, even even those I don’t know, motor rifle battalions of aerospace forces which have been sent to the Kursk Region. They, they they are not ready to participate in combat operations because their responsibility is protection of their air force bases, or, I don’t know, space launch sites and so and so on. So even if they are trained, their specialization is not, is not good for the Joint Force combat, combat operations,

Edward Lucas
Okay. Nico, any thoughts? There was a very, very good question came in about the pontoon bridges from Daria, from Kyiv independence. Ukrainians managed to destroy first the bridges and then the pontoon bridges over the same river, leaving the Russian troops in the glushkovsky district in a pretty difficult position. Does anything strike as a former German senior German general staff guide is what strikes you about that?

Nico Lange
One word about conscripts, the best thing the Russian conscripts can do is to turn themselves in to the Ukrainians immediately, because conscripts like this, as Pavel said, on their training level, faced with battle hardened Ukrainian grim mechanized forces, they survived this so on. And by the way, there’s also a payment issue. Russia pays the contract soldiers who are in Ukraine on the front line, very highly. And Russians are thinking, Okay, if I get a small fraction of that payment, why should I go into a fight in Kors goblers on the bridges? First of all, I think it’s we have to note, and I think it’s already publicly reported now, how the bridges are destroyed, because it’s the Ukrainian Air Force with MIG 29 and French made aerial glide bombs. So that means two things. That means the MiG 29 can fly in the area. So where’s the Russian air defense, where are the Russian radars? It’s very interesting question. And France does not have to seem a problem with Ukraine using the French made light bombs for that. And I think both of it is good, because if there is room for maneuver for Ukrainian planes, and Russian air defense is for now, not so strong in that area, that gives a lot of options, and seeing French glide bombs going into those bridges in Russia makes the argument easier for what Irina alluded to in the beginning, to put pressure on European governments to say nothing now, just to let Ukrainians Do what they have to do, and not comment on Western equipment being used for that. And so far, to be honest, I mean, I think, I mean, there are a lot of discussions in Germany that we do not need. But on this one, the government is just saying, this is within what we have agreed with the Ukrainians. It’s within international law, they can do whatever they find necessary. So that’s good on the territory itself, it is difficult for Russia now, because this the same river, gives a natural shield for the Ukrainians, and I think it reveals us a little bit more about operational goals the Ukrainians might have, because you can see on the map how the same river would form a border of a kind of a buffer zone. So that is maybe the area that Ukraine can hold for a very long time, or can make it very costly for the Russians. If the Ukrainians decide to make a delay operation out of this, it will be very costly for Russia, and it has to use a lot of resources to cross that river again to come back. So that’s that’s all good developments. I would expect the Ukrainians to find some few more choke points for Russian logistics and infrastructure, not necessarily only bridges, and take them under control. Build fortifications around them or destroy them. And it’s more like a selective approach. That’s how it looks to me, destroying bridges, building fortifications on selected places, creating choke points. So it’s not necessarily holding the whole area. It’s more like. Building those points that will be very costly for Russia to cross. And one last point on that, the precision, the deep strike, precision fire, will become of even more importance once Russian troops are on the march, Russian troops will be vulnerable when they are moving around. And I think it’s very important now that the Western partners allow Ukraine to use deep strike precision fires to hit the Russian troops on the march. That’s best for everybody, if they never even arrive on the battlefield, and you can hit them while they are moving around somewhere. But for that, I think the White House, first and foremost, has to come out of its very shy approach when it comes to this, because with attack EMS and HIMARS, that’s a large part of the instruments that Ukraine could use to hit the Russian troops on The March.

Edward Lucas
Now, yes, thanks, Nikki. All the questions are piling in, and we’ve got just under 20 minutes left, so I’m going to ask people to give shorter rather than longer answers. We’ve got a very good question here from Howard Altman, from the war zone, and we’ve answered the first part, which is whether Russia have the necessary deserves to push Ukrainian back, Ukraine back. And there’s the question of how long Ukraine can sustain this operation. So I think we might deal with that second one, and perhaps Edina, you might have some thoughts on this. It’s been the biggest question in Ukraine, really has been conscription mobilization, where the troops are coming from, a bit of an East West Division, with people in Western Ukraine saying all our young men have gone to fight in Kyiv. They’re all in nightclubs. So it’s put a lot of social as well as economic and political strain on Ukraine generating these forces. And there’s big questions about rotation and people getting breaks in the front line and and exhaustion and so on. Um, so what’s, what’s your, what’s your thought about what this does to morale and the ability to generate the next 1000, 10,000 100,000 soldiers that Ukraine’s going to need to win.

Elina Beketova
Thank you so much, Edward for the question, and thank you everyone for the questions. I think that, well, definitely, as you have just said, and I said it already, that it boosted the morale of all Ukrainians and Ukrainian soldiers, because Ukraine can still win, can take the initiative, can have this operational surprise. But everyone understands that in long term, Ukrainians need more to, you know, hold this territory right? Because we heard that Ukraine doesn’t need to capture, doesn’t need to occupy this land. It was done to create this border area, to create this border area to kind of to reduce the amount of casualties, to reduce amount of shellings there, and to make it possible to fix the infrastructure over there, but also to redeploy some of the troops from the Kharkiv and Donetsk, France, right? But it’s very hard to say at this point. You know whether, how it will be in several weeks, in several months. But to my point is that as far as I understand, and I agree with Nika, basically, Ukrainians have three options right now. They can continue the advance, they can consolidate on captured territory. But for that, it depends on the forces Russia deploys, and also Ukrainian forces would face new challenges. Nika, correct me if I’m wrong, but Starlink is not operating in Russia, so artillery and drones have more difficulty operating from the border, and there are no reliable fortifications in the region, as you have said. But I think that with the necessary equipment and weapons, Ukraine can still do it. But for that, I agree with you, if Ukrainians, if the US, will leave the restriction to, you know, shoot long range weapons, it might help the situation. But at this particular point, I feel Ukrainians understand that this is the word. That is why we do have people, and that’s the the like Russian narrative right now, I see it everywhere in the US that Ukrainians don’t have people. It’s not true. Ukrainians do have a lot of people. And what we see right now with the Kursk Corporation, how many people were involved there, it also shows that Ukrainians do have people. But of course, it’s we can say it will depend on multiple factors and on the weapons and the Western aid that Ukraine will have after this particular operation, because if Ukrainians will feel that, you know, they will have enough of everything to hold this territory and then potentially use it as the argument in the future negotiation. And then, of course, it will boost the morale, and more people will be joining the army and will want to help the Ukraine win. Right now,

Edward Lucas
There’s a question from Andreas from Rigzone about the what’s the effect on European and US gas prices. And I’m just putting, I think we can look this up. I was putting in the chat a picture, and you’ll see that European gas prices absolutely spiked on this very day. But two years ago, in 20 August, the 22nd 2022 there was an absolute record. But now they are down to pretty much their a little bit above their pre war levels, and I didn’t know any anyone from the panel wants to talk about that, but I feel that this is it’s a bit like Russia’s nuclear weapons. It’s the dog that didn’t bark, and people thought that Russia would be able to turn all the lights off all over Europe by cutting its gas and oil exports. In fact, this hasn’t happened partly because Europeans are still buying Russian gas, which is a source of great shame. I think I might get, in essence, wants to jump in on that. I think I gave to go, to go straight on to the next question, which is from Alberto Escotia, from a site that specializes in technology and disinformation called Loki sigue. Did I pronounce that right up there? And he’s asking, What about electronic warfare? What’s been this? And I guess you mean both electronic warfare in the military sense, but also in in cybersec, in case of information and so on. You’ve asked about Iranian videos, propaganda operations, use of x. So I didn’t perhaps Pavel, what have you noticed on the information and electronic Battlefield, where Russia continues to deploy some pretty substantial capabilities, and all too many people in the West believe them.

Pavel Luzin
So thanks for the question Alberto. Since June 2023, since the first Ukrainian major counter events, Ukrainian troops have been focused on elimination of the Russian artillery, air defense systems and electronic workplace systems. So since the time Russia lost 10s or even hundreds of different electronic graph systems on the battleground deployed across all the pipe territories of the frame, and now to restore these systems, it will take, it will take years for Russia, considering that all the systems dependent are dependent from imported electronic and electric components. And now we do see that this effort gave the results because Ukrainian drones currently they operate, not only across uh, occupied territories, but also across the all European part of Russia, Yesterday, yesterday, uh Ukrainian long range, long range drones have been intercepted in mum’s region, intercepted not by electronic warfare, but by, you know, kinetic kinetic systems, and also Ukrainians invested a lot of efforts into the electronic sustainability of their drones, and currently for the Russian troops, even if these troops have electronic welfare systems for them, it is much harder to to use the systems against Ukrainian drones. So at the same time, don’t expect, you know, miracles. Don’t expect fast success. It’s a long game. And currently I do see that Ukrainian armed forces are successful in this long distance, but we will see what will be next. What will be in next several months and in 2025

Edward Lucas
There was a question from from Ken Silverstein, but. Very distinguished investigative journalist, Ken, it’s good to have you on the on the call, which is about how much political space has Putin got. We we see the all the difficulties it’s causing him terms of public perception. But it seems to me, he’s responding to this by cracking down on the internet within Russia, and they slowing down YouTube and telegram and possibly pushing Russia in a more sort of Chinese direction. But Ken asked, at what point do the Russian people protest their government’s accent? And could this be a new Afghanistan for Putin Elena or Pavel? Do you want to jump in on on that I feel that we’ve been waiting rather a long time for the Russians to overthrow the regime with mass protests, and I think we’ll continue to wait rather a long time. And I suspect you may be as similarly pessimistic about this as I am, but do you think there will be any political blowback for Putin as a result of this?

Elina Beketova
Well, Edward, I agree with you. I don’t, yeah. And Ken, thank you so much for the question. I just think that Bible please do correct me if I’m wrong. But I think that Russia can afford many, many death at this particular moment, because Russia doesn’t value people who it’s sending to the to the war, to the to the invasion in Ukraine. And I was struck because I read a few media, independent Russian media outlets, and there was a story how the person in Kursk, obliz, tried to evacuate his mom from sudra, and he took part in in the war against Ukraine in 2023 on the hierarchy front. And basically he told I was sure that Russians will regain control very fast in Suja, and that is why he didn’t even evacuate his mom. And then afterwards, 2000 people are without any network right now, any connection, and people don’t know what happened with them, like civilians, right? Well, because it’s a war, so no one knows. But I was struck by this like he’s he’s absolute. He was absolutely confident that the Russian soldiers will regain control over that territory, and he himself took part in in the war against Ukraine in 2023 on the Kharkiv front, which which Ukrainians then regained control of. But I think that Putin can send many, many people there. And I believe that for those, it’s unlikely that those who were in favor of the so called special military operation will change their minds after the course cooperation. And those who were, you know, who were against of the war, they are against of the war, and who have the power to protest or help the Ukrainians, somehow, they will be for Ukraine. But those who were, you know, in favor of the special military operation. I don’t think that this particular situation will change their minds, but it’s just, you know, Ukraine is not to blame for the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently capturing Russian territory. This is the direct consequence of the Russian attack, and it’s understandable that Ukraine will be seeking any means to reclaim what is truly theirs and what might be the potential future exchange of territories as a completely, you know, like predictable plan, if it happens in the future?

Edward Lucas
You know, yes, we’re having a we’re coming close to the end of our R and there’s a tough question from Ryan Robertson of straight arrow who asked a question earlier. He says, Which country will have a harder time this winter? And this is very much on my mind, because, as some of you may have seen, there’s an appeal gone out for the Kyiv botanical garden, which is one of the great glories of the Ukrainian capital, and someone I’ve always enjoyed visiting, and they’re having a dreadful time because of the damage the energy infrastructure and the broken glass and so on, and the staff are very worried that this extraordinary collection of plants is going to die during the winter. And of course, people matter even more than plants, and we’ve got very difficult time ahead with the damage the energy infrastructure. So I might just ask all three of the panelists, what they think about how the infrastructure and energy system damage is going to bite this winter. Of course, it’s biting in Russia as well. We see serious problems with the energy infrastructure in Russia as a result of Ukrainian special operations Nico, you go first.

Nico Lange
I think on the battlefield, Russia will have a harder time in winter than Ukraine, and if the situation goes continues to go along the lines that we are seeing now, I think it’s very likely that a large Russian contingent will be outside of pokhovsk and outside of Tourette’s. On the open field, while the Ukrainians, they might the cities might be in ruins and inhabitants evacuated, but they will be in the city. And that makes in winter, that makes a decisive difference if you have to be out there, or if you are in a place that is urban. So Russia will have the harder time on the battlefields. And I think there are more indications for that on the society, I think there will be an extremely hard time for everybody in Ukraine, for reasons that have already been mentioned. I think many people will be leaving in fall. The electricity situation will improve slightly, but not enough, and it will be, from my point of view, for Ukrainian society, maybe the most challenging winter since the full scale aggression started. But this will also spill over into Europe, with more Ukrainians leaving, while migration is already a very heavily strained issue, especially in Germany, where most of the Ukrainians are now, so that it will be very, very difficult from that, from that point of view.

Edward Lucas
Elina, do You agree with that?

Elina, let’s go to Pavel. Elina just dropped, I think there may be a connection problem.

Elina Beketova
Yeah, I’m trying just to reconnect. Yeah. Sorry. I agree with Nico, and I think Ukraine will have a very hard winter, but Ukrainians are already preparing for it, because it’s going to be the third winter under the Russian shelling. And people say that they all understand that, you know, the cruise cooperation gave this restraint optimism. People are happy that it’s going on, that, you know, Ukraine can still win, can take the initiative, but everyone understands that Ukrainians have to prepare for the very hard winter and but this particular cruise cooperation, as we have seen, it helps it because situation, the number of Russian attacks from tubed weapons decreased and as well as the number of casualties among civilians, and it gives this moment time to actually prepare the to repair the power infrastructure in safer conditions and prepare it for the beginning of the heating season. So hopefully, Ukrainians will be able to hold this territory or advance. It will help to, you know, repair more infrastructure, and, you know, have a safer heating season.

Edward Lucas
Super. Final minute from you, Pavel.

Pavel Luzin
Yes, I think this winter, the upcoming winter, can be the first winter when people on the Russian side will feel more harder times than people in Ukrainian side, because currently, Russia lost the biggest fuel storage facility in Rostov on Don region. Ukrainians started to hit Russian electric substations, not the biggest electric power facilities, but electric network connectors and so and so on. And the Russian long term problem is that the system of electric network is very fragile, and it is not so, you know, substantial, it is vulnerable. And maybe some regions in in Russia, especially in the Russian south, will face, will face a lack of electricity this winter.

Edward Lucas
Well, thanks so much, Pavel, I my final point really is that we’ve all taken it for granted that the Ukrainians are doing the fighting and the Ukrainians are doing the suffering. And I feel that every word spoken during this past hour has underlined the burden on the western countries who do not have to worry about power cuts and are not having that assistance killed to get a move on and send Ukraine the weapons and the other support they need this. This is a time when these long range precision strikes would be absolutely crucial in preventing Russia counter attacking and driving the advantage. So I hope that our decision makers are listening, because at least we had our opinion formers, the journalists on the call. So thank you very much. And I’m now going to there’s a beautiful sign of thumbs up floating past Elina space. You know how to do this on Zoom, which I did. I’m now going to hand back to to my CEPA colleagues.

Sarah Krajewski
Thank you so so much for joining everyone and your questions, and as always, our panelists for their insightful answers. If you have any follow up questions, feel free to reach out to me. I can connect to you with any of these guys. I’m very happy to a recording and a rough auto generated transcript will be sent out following this call. And as always, Keep in touch for any other super experts that you’re interested in speaking with, and stay tuned for more questions through things like this. Thank you, everyone.