Sam Greene
Good morning to those of you who are joining us from Washington and the east coast, or really anywhere else the United States. Good afternoon to those of you who are joining us over on this side, or my side of the Atlantic. Welcome to this on the record briefing on the incoming Trump administration and prospects for Transatlantic foreign and security policy over the next four years here at the Center for European Policy Analysis, or CEPA. My name is Sam Greene. I am Director of Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA, based in London. Very happy to welcome our excellent panel of briefers for today’s conversation—we have with us from Washington, Marianna Fakhurdinova, who is an Associate Fellow at the New Europe Center in Kyiv and a visiting Fulbright Fellow at CEPA. Also in Washington, Ambassador Kurt Volker, Distinguished Fellow in the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA. Previously, from 2017 to 19, US Special Representative to Ukraine, and US Ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2009, alongside along an ongoing distinguished career in US foreign policy and diplomacy. Joining us from Sicily, Skip Davis, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Defense Investment, as well as other posts prior to that in NATO and through the US military, from which he retired as a major general. So a lot of expertise on the panel, as well as a lot to talk about. We’ve got five days to go until we enter the Trump administration officially, we’ll look back at what we can learn from the last administration, what we can learn from the preparations from this administration. Very grateful that you’re also joining us in the midst of what we’re currently learning from confirmation hearings. I think Senator Rubio has his his hearing at the moment. We saw Pete Hegseth’s hearing for Secretary of Defense yesterday, and there is much more to come. So I’ll “live” the agenda, I would also point your attention to a major paper that CEPA will be publishing tomorrow, and which we’re very happy to distribute to all of you when it comes out under the title “Between Now and NATO, a Security Strategy for Ukraine.” And really, everybody who’s on the panel, I think, has been involved in that report one way or another. And so we can delve into some of those considerations as we go, but I’ll start really with—I think the question on everybody’s mind, we have seen Trump in the White House before. We are going to see Trump in the White House again in five days. What can we learn from that first administration, and what should we expect to be different briefly in in this administration when it comes to the transatlantic relations and the US approach, there too. Mr. Volker, I want to start with you.
Kurt Volker
Great. Thank you very much, Sam. It’s great to be with you, and I think that’s a great opening question. In fact, I was jotting down a few notes for how to start, and that’s exactly how I was thinking of starting as well, which is when Trump took office in 2017, this was after two terms of President Bush and two terms of President Obama, and there was a feeling in the country that he tapped into, that we were doing too much. We were involved in too many wars. You know, Obama himself said we have to end two wars, but he wasn’t able to end them. We were losing lives abroad. We were spending money abroad. And so Trump tapped into that, and used the phrase and the idea of focusing on America first, and that meant pulling back from some of these international commitments that we had gotten into. Very different situation in the world in 2025 he’s coming in after four years of President Biden. There are more conflicts going on in the world than at any time in our—you know—recent history. We have a major—the biggest war in Europe since World War Two. We have a major war in the Middle East. Iran’s proxies have gone after Israel. Israel has gone back after them. We have growing threats from China against Taiwan and in East Asia. We have North Korea getting stronger with missile technology provided in part by Russia. So it’s a very different situation where the world is on fire, and Trump’s perception of this is that itis in part because of American weakness that we have not deterred these foreign actors. We have shown a lack of resolve, a lack of strength. He points in particular to the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan as a signal to people like Putin that it’s safe to attack. And so he comes in, in 2025, having to restore deterrence, having to show strength. And he’s made a lot of references to the Reagan phrase, peace through strength. That’s what he’s talking about in 2025 as compared with pulling America back in 2017 so I think that is one very, very big, substantive difference in where we are today, with President Trump coming in compared to 2017 Second difference is that he is now experienced. He had a term as President of the United States already, so he knows the job. He knows how the White House works. He knows what his expectations are. He’s also maintained his contacts with foreign leaders, with former foreign leaders, with staffers over the past four years, so he is well informed, and he is focused on what he can do as president, in a way that wasn’t true in 2017. And that has also meant he’s been able to hire people more quickly, and when you think about the speed with which he was able to name his cabinet choices, to name some of his White House picks, he’s already got his National Security Council team largely organized. This is far faster and far more organized than it was in 2017 when he was elected and taking office the first time. So I think you’re going to see an administration that hits the ground running, so much so that I think we are already in the transition period, seeing some of the power shift away from the Biden administration, and people are looking ahead to the Trump administration. And an illustration of that that I would give is the possible ceasefire hostage deal between Hamas and Israel. This is something that’sbeen out there for many, many months and not going anywhere. And I think the the new sauce in the mix here, if you will, is the fact that Trump isgoing to be taking office in five days, and has threatened all hell to break loose if the hostages are not released. And I think Iran heard that, and I think Hamas heard that, and I think that has given an impetus to these negotiations that otherwise wasn’t there. So we’re seeing not only a Trump team come. In and hitting the ground running. We’re seeing it hitting the ground running before it even comes in. And so those are some of the differences. I think I’ll pause there, and I’d love to hear our fellow panelists.
Sam Greene
Thanks. We’ll come back, and I’m certain unpack a lot of that, but if I can, Skip—General Davis—the same question to you.
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Thanks, Sam, and again, happy to join today’s panel. I would largely endorse everything that Kurt has just said, as frankly, he’s laid out the difference that the new, the second Trump administration, is coming in with in terms of a global situation, but also its approach. And it is, I believe, you know, it’s understood that it needs to hit the ground running. And there’s also a couple other factors involved. This is his second—Trump’s second administration. He’s entering, you know, essentially, as a lame duck. He’s got one, you know, four year term to put into action what he believes are critical for, you know, America recovering its global credibility and influence, and maintaining its strength. So I think that’s key for the preparation that we see ongoing right now, why the cabinet selection processes has started so early, why he’s engaging, you know,foreign nations, and frankly, why foreign nations are seeking to prepare for Trump administration. But I also think that he realizes that the first twoyears will be extremely important, first 100 days, but first two years because, you know, his control of the Senate and House is not assured, and so he’ll have to make a difference early on to assure that the midtermelections continue to support the Republican Party and in control of thegovernment. I think the the other point is that he’s—he’s made a number of statements that imply his foreign policy objectives, which tend to focus mostly on America. You know he’s, of course, talked about ending the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, and those aren’t, you know, complete withinAmerica’s power to do, but he has—he has great influence, or America hasgreat influence, and depending on the approach, they can be successful. I’m not sure exactly how feasible the ending in Ukraine will be, but if there’s a real effort to ensure that Ukraine remains as a sovereign nation through negotiations, and that their European security architecture remains in place, then I think that that will be an overall positive effort. If itends up in a catastrophic loss, or worse, the subjugation of Ukraine, annihilation, then frankly, Trump will own that, and so I think that’s key to the new administration. I think they understand that. Certain—certainly those working for Trump understand that, and I’d—hopefully that will drive the negotiations. His other points have been on immigration, combating drug trafficking, establishing the trade policies to protect American industry and push back on unfair trade policies, primarily from China, but others as well. And then, of course, you know, focusing on, I would say, increasing energy independence and also reducing impact, our adverse impact of environmental policies. Now those are primarily domestic focus, but have international implications and will affect how he engages the rest of the world. The one thing that I haven’t quite seen is, you know, the fact that the realization by the new administration that, you know, they’re going to confront new challenges that are unforeseen at this point, there will be things that disrupt this plan. And so if they prioritize what’s the most important first, that might—might give them thebreathing room and the flexibility to address what will come next, becausecertainly there are surprises out there, either from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea that we don’t foresee this point, but we can expect in the—in the months and years to come.
Sam Greene
Thank you for that. Marianna, same—same question to you, what would you expect to be different this time around?
Marianna Fakhurdinova
Thank you, Sam, and thanks, CEPA, for inviting and organizing this event. I think I would concentrate just on three basic points, which I think are important when expecting this administration coming to office. First of all, I agree with both panelists that, on the one hand, it seems very obvious that by voicing his desire to end conflicts around the world, to concentratemore on—to making America great again (yes, it is Trump’s slogan). He is trying, and the new administration will be trying, to concentrate more on the US and on the internal affairs and on making the US stronger. But alsogiven in the light of the recent announcements on the recent discussions about Greenland or US presence in Antarctica, we can see that this administration is also trying to maintain or to re-establish US global powerand global stance. And therefore I see that there is this two approaches towards concentrating on the US affairs, but also maintaining this global leadership in terms of foreign policy priorities. In my view, I think which is believed and which is feared in many European capitals, is the US switching more towards China and Indo-Pacific, and I think the new administration being less transatlanticist and less connected to European partners, I think that is something we should be expecting and looking forward to. And also in terms of not only regions, but also features of this, of the new administration, I think it will be important to mention that the Trump administration, in comparison to Biden’s administration, will be less less concentrated on US soft power. It will be less concentrated on, for example, establishing rule of law reforms or anti-corruption reforms. In Ukraine, on the contrary, it will be more concentrated on the realpolitik approaches. It will be looking more towards, how will US and Trump personally benefit from this-or-that steps in foreign policy, for example. How will US benefit from keeping supporting Ukraine further? How will US benefit from making the biggest investment into the NATO security? Therefore, I think this changes both in terms of geographic focus, but also in terms of features of the—of the new administration, is something that we should be taking a closer look at in the nearest years.
Sam Greene
Thank you. Um, we’re going to stick with you for a second, because I’m curious about how this is all being read in Kyiv in particular, right? So, we—as we’ve already heard, we’ve heard about the priority on ending the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Senator King in yesterday’s confirmation hearing for Pete Hegseth, asked specifically about, you know,how the administration and how Mr. Hegseth himself sees the end of the war, he said, you know, it’s clear who the good guy and who the bad guy is, but that one way or another, this war needs to end as quickly as possible, without committing himself to a particular avenue. There we’ve seen both the incoming, putative at least, National Security Advisor, Mr. Waltz and Mr. Kellogg, the Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, talk about this in terms of of peace through strength, right—to come back to something that Kurt was talking about. Earlier, we’ve also seen, you know, announcements that there would be a conversation at some point between Trump and Vladimir Putin, but what we have actually seen occur is conversations between Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. So is Kyiv seeing this as—as an opportunity, as a risk, or as something in between?
Marianna Fakhurdinova
I think it’s something in between, to be honest, because on the one hand, there is clear understanding that things will be different under Trump administration from Biden’s administration, and it is seen in two different ways. On the one hand, general population, I would say, are more are having high expectations from the Trump administration. And interestingly, New Europe Center was commissioning the poll right before the new year, asking, how is the Ukrainian population perceiving different foreign leaders? And actually, the level of trust towards President Trump isvery high. It’s over 40% if I’m not mistaken, which is interesting because I think—it’s one of the reasons is that the Ukrainian population, Ukrainian government, to be honest, is—was very frustrated and dissatisfied with cautiousness, in many cases, on the US side, in terms of providing weapons to Ukraine, in terms of allowing or not allowing strikes to Russia, and so on and so forth. So on the one hand, there is this hope, the hope for change in terms of the Trump administration, but on the other hand, there is a big fear that quick negotiation will not be as beneficial and as good for Ukraine as we expect it to be, because it’s obvious that Ukrainians are willing to establish peace more than everyone else. But we we want it to be just peace, and we want to to know that all of those atrocities and all of those losses have not been in vain after three years of fighting, almost three years of fighting. Therefore, I think there is precious optimism in Ukraine, on the one hand, but also a lot of frustrations that those—that willingness to negotiate. It may it may not be that beneficial for Ukraine as we expect it to be.
Sam Greene
Thanks for that. Kurt, Skip, you’ve both served in Brussels, and I’m wondering how you see Brussels data in particular reading the—reading the tea leaves coming up from both Washington and Mar-a-Lago at the moment.
Kurt Volker
Skip, do you want to go first?
Sam Greene
Please.
Kurt Volker
Or I can go first. Either—
Sam Greene
Go ahead, go ahead, Kurt. Yeah.
Kurt Volker
So, look, to be—I think Marianna was very accurate in her description of Ukraine. People are relatively optimistic that Trump is going to be decisive. Kellogg is a very good choice: he’s known to people in Ukraine, his daughter works there, he knows the issues very well, he’s a serious military guy. So people are a little bit upbeat that instead of the slow drip, drip, drip we’ve had for the past couple of years, something more meaningful will happen, but it will be difficult to get Putin to the table. Thecontrast is Brussels, as you say. In Brussels, people are freaking out; our West European allies just—they can’t get their minds around Donald Trump and having to deal with Donald Trump. They are afraid of him pulling out of NATO, they’re afraid of pressure on defense spending, they’re afraid of tariffs, they’re afraid even some of the relationships, they are looking at him meeting with right-wing politicians from European countries and maybe supporting them against established governments inEurope. There’s just an incredible level of freak-out. Now, I think in some ways that’s, you know, of course—it is what it is, people are going to react that way. I do think it is a little bit over the top. I think that, for instance, there is zero chance that Trump is going to try to pull out of NATO. Everything he has done has been to try to strengthen NATO, by getting our European defense allies to spend more. He recently suggested that the2% cap, which—when he took office, only 3 European allies were meeting,now it’s about 23—but he’s saying that’s now too low because of the threats that we face in Europe—Europe needs to spend more, and he suggested 5%. Now, President Trump’s a negotiator, so 5% is probably thetop end of a negotiating position, but pushing for Europe to do more to strengthen NATO. Second, I think that he’s expecting Europe to do more on Ukraine. We have done over half of the military support for Ukraine. Europe has done a lot on the economic side, but I think he’s hoping that NATO and European allies will do more on the military side for Ukraine, including if there is a ceasefire and there’s going to be a Western troop presence in Ukraine, for that to be a European troop presence. I want to come back to tariffs, because I think that is the—that is the wild card, and that is something people are very much concerned about. They see the Trump administration talking about the use of tariffs as a—as a means of leverage against countries on policies that they want to see changed. And in some cases, it is about actual economic issues like tariffs on China, on electronic vehicles or other electronic components. That’s one area and okay, that’s maybe more reasonable. But then using tariffs against Mexico if they don’t help on the border, or tariffs against Canada, or tariffs against Denmark if they don’t give up Greenland—and those are things that would make our European allies worry very, very much. Again, I don’t think that those are real threats. I don’t think they’re really going to happen. I don’t expect any tariffs against Denmark at all, because we actually can work together with our allies and reach agreement on the things that we want to do. So there’s no need for that. But, to your question, though, the level of anxiety in Western Europe is very, very high.
Sam Greene
Skip, same question to you, can our allies—can our allies sleep soundly?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Well—well Sam, first of all, I think that despite the high level of anxiety from a number of the the allies, I think that right now what we’ve seen—certainly from a very active new Secretary General—Mark Rutte has made a number of—not necessarily pleas, but pushes to the Allies—specifically prepare them for the next administration. And very much along the lines that I think that he has already gotten in terms of cues from from president-elect Trump himself, and we’ve seen him talking about encouraging the allies to spend more. Now he hasn’t talked about 5% but I think, as Kurt says, that could be a, you know, a negotiating tactic to vastly increase the amount of defense spending, and defense spending needs to be increased. Not just to meet the floor of the 2% as agreed, but frankly, to deliver the capabilities that allies have agreed to provide. So I think that that’s one point that he is—the new Secretary General is pushing increased spending, increased fielding of forces to meet the readiness requirements that NATO has set for itself, the new strategic concept, the new NATO force model, the family of plans that, frankly, they haven’t done yet. And this could lead to an opportunity. The second thing that the Sec. Gen. has been pushing forward is to increase, specifically, thesupport that European allies in Canada are providing to Ukraine—directly along the lines of Trump’s solicitation for allies to do more. And that means doing more than just greater than 50% of the economic and financial assistance that they are already doing, but in the military and security assistance already, which means they’ve got to spend more on production and delivery at an accelerated timeline than they’re currently doing. And then he’s also talked about the importance of NATO unity to, you know, basically not just confront Russia, but global adversaries—which again, is along the lines of what the Trump administration was first pushing on from, you know, 2018 and on, specifically with the importance of confronting the security threats to NATO’s interests from China. And so I think those are all good. That, I think, presents an opportunity for the newadministration, in terms of demands they can make to prepare for the upcoming summit—I can perhaps save that discussion for a future question.
Sam Greene
Okay, but let’s—I want to pick up on something you mentioned there in terms of, you know, the pressure for increased defense spending and ally contributions. So George Allison, who joins us from the UK defense journal, asks about the policy that seems to be emerging from London. In other words, to commit to 2.5% of GDP on defense, but not to commit to a date.Is this likely to be interpreted in Washington as slow walking or evading the issue, and is that, in turn, likely to bring some kind of consequence in terms of how Washington relates to London going forward? If, George, if I’m interpreting your question correctly—I don’t know—Skip, Kirk, do either of you want to take that?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
I could say a few quick words and I’ll pass it to—pass to Kurt. I mean, I think that the—think the bottom line is it would be welcome, but not seen as necessarily enough. We’re not seeing the kinds of defense spending programs for UK to, frankly, provide the forces and the capabilities that they’ve signed up to in the NATO defense planning process, in the family of plans, etc., so I’d have to see a real plan to field the forces that the UK would be expected by it—based on its historical capabilities, but also its GDP and real potential.
Sam Greene
Kurt, do you want to add anything to that?
Kurt Volker
Yeah, I just basically agree with Skip on that. I think that that is true. It would be seen as a positive step, but not enough. And I think that Trump, I think he’s going to recognize it takes time for people to adjust defense spending, to effectively deploy resources at a higher level, but he’s going to want to see that movement, he’s going to want to see that trend. And I suspect that he will expect countries to set a target around three-and-a-half percent of GDP on defense, and get realistic plans to get there.
Sam Greene
Okay, we have a question also in the chat from Didi Tang from the Associated Press, who asked us to look not just forward, right, but to look back: the Biden administration put a lot of effort into strengthening alliances, partnerships and relationships, both transatlantically and elsewhere. And so part of the question is, you know, whether you think that has brought dividends, and maybe given the new administration coming in, you know, a good foundation on which to to build, but you’re sort of pushing in the other direction, right? We have seen Rachel Reeves, the US—sorry, the UK Chancellor, was just in Beijing. We saw Olaf Scholz go to Beijing. Don’t know what his position will be in Germany in in a few weeks time, right? But we see a lot of hedging, particularly from European allies when it comes to the relationship on China, and would you expect that to be a bone of contention with Washington? Kurt, I’m going to stick with you.
Kurt Volker
Sure. Yeah, I think that’s exactly right. I think that the relationship with allies generally is actually going to be fine. There has been good cooperation during the Biden administration, and I think allies, having worked with Trump before, they know what—a little bit more what to expect, and they are prepared to step up and do what they can. As an example, I know that Denmark is looking at what Trump is saying about Greenland, and is saying, Look, we’re prepared to invest more. We’re prepared to do more in the Arctic, so they are ready to step up. I think all that’s going to be good. You raise the right question, though, about China. I think there will be a much tougher approach on China coming out of the Trump administration, they’re going to impose tariffs of some kind. They’regoing to want to restrict technologies so that we advantage ourselves anddisadvantage China in a technology race. And they are going to expect our European allies to be in lockstep with that. They want them to be restricting China on Belt and Road, on technology, and so forth. And it’s going to be interesting, because I think some European countries are very much on board with that, such as Sweden, for example; I think the UK is increasingly that way. But then you have others like Germany or like Italy and especially Hungary that are really interested in doing business with China, and they’re going to have to make some adjustments. I should say, Italy has already made adjustments as well. I think that compared to where they were a couple of years ago, they have already started to ratchet down on China, and that’s going to be the trend that I think we’re going to expect European allies to be doing in the future.
Sam Greene
Sure. Skip, do you want to come in on that?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Yes, thanks, Sam. A couple things I would add on to, you know, what Kurt’s just said. First off, to answer kind of the question on the Biden legacy, I think that the one thing that the Trump administration should certainly recognize coming in is that the NATO of 2025 is not the NATO of early 2021 that they left. And the Biden support for a united front against Russia,in support of Ukraine, you know, as well as the very positive response by allies and the European Union, has led to a much more unified NATO, amuch stronger NATO in terms of its commitments to its own defense and security, increased defense investment commitments, but also much greater coherence in terms of its defense planning. And I mean the actual plans for the defense of Europe, not the defense planning for future capabilities required to meet the, you know, the security needs of NATO, but also in the capabilities required, the forward defense stance, the 2022 strategic concept, and a focus on deterrence by denial versus deterrence by punishment, which is cheaper in the short term and costlier in the long term. And those are things that have changed since early 2021 obviously, you know, the Russian aggression in Ukraine was the impetus there, but without the US leadership and the positive allies’ response, wouldn’t be where we are today. Now, I fully am in line and support, you know, the Ukrainian people’s frustration with the cautiousness that the US, Germany, and some other allies have taken in terms of providing the combat equipment and support that they need, and, you know, posing restrictions that have hindered the ability of Ukrainian forces to fight, and it probably led to greatly increased casualties and also greater territorial gains by Russia. So there’s a legacy with positive aspects, but not necessarily what the optimum response could have been, and secondly, with respect to China, we’re in a very different place from, you know, from 2018, 2017, when the Trump administration came in, they came in hard, pushing on the threats that China—China posed to the Western world. And really, I think, helped NATO open its eyes to the threats from all aspects of China:involvement, investment, and, you know, presence, and in the NATO area of responsibility. And that has led to a gradual but very positive step change towards recognizing that the threat that China poses to NATO’s interests so much—to put that in writing, since 2022. And there are a lot of efforts ongoing in terms of cyber security support for hybrid threats, countering strategic information aspects, but also in sharing intelligence on what China is doing, and then leading to, I think, both a greater European Union reluctance to support investment and recognize the threats that China poses to our European allies. Not there where we need to be yet, because they don’t yet necessarily see eye to eye, but we’re closer than we certainly were five years ago.
Sam Greene
Point taken. Marianna, I want to turn back to you. We’ve heard a number of things through this and from the incoming Trump administration. There is a lot of uncertainty, but what seems to be fairly certain at this point is that, you know, the days of “as long as it takes,” are behind us, and that this administration will take a much harder nosed approach to thinking about the efficacy of whatever further aid does come through. We also know that the Europeans, for all the rhetorical commitment, don’t have the physical capacity to replace whatever might be drawn down in terms of US military support, to say nothing of the of the political and the fiscal capacity to provide that, which probably means a bit more prioritization from the Ukrainian side in terms of what it can and would like to receive inaid from the West, broadly. Do you have a sense of what those priorities might be in in the near term, and how Kyiv is restrategizing in its relations with the West, looking at this shifting picture now?
Marianna Fakhurdinova
Thank you. I think there is still a lot of uncertainty in terms of how Trump administration will be approaching the future military support to Ukraine, and therefore, I don’t think there is one particular plan on the Ukrainian side at this point. I think much will depend on what strategy Trump administration will choose towards the negotiations, with establishing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and therefore the levels and thetempo of support will depend on that. We’ve heard those—those plans to put pressure both on Kyiv and Russia in terms of negotiations by providingor cutting off aid, should both sides disagree to go to the negotiating tables. I think depending on how things will develop with negotiations, anddepending on what strategy Trump administration chooses to pursue, the levels of aid to Ukraine will depend on that highly. Therefore, of course Ukraine would be interested in us pursuing the maximum pressure strategytowards Russia, and providing more military support to Ukraine at this point, to put Ukraine to this position of strength where we can start negotiations. However, there were questions on, how should this position of strength look like, and then, when do we achieve that? But in—but I think there is still this fear or consciousness in Ukraine that—as you said—there will be no more days of “as long as it takes,” and the the aid, military aid to Ukraine will be cut down on the US side. Honestly, I don’t think it willbe cut off immediately into day one, but I think we will see the decrease ofthe—of the military support Ukraine on the US side. And I think this, this cannot be obviously compensated by by the Europeans, because the amount of aid the EU and US has been supplying to Ukraine has been fairly equal in terms of military aid. And I think one of the possible solutions to that is Europeans increasing—increasing economic support and humanitarian support, and US still keeping providing some of the military aid. We don’t, don’t know yet whether there will be any further supplemental funding for Ukraine under the new administration, under thenew Congress. However, we have still around $4 billion of authority, of PDA authority left after the Biden administration, which Trump administration can use and send to Ukraine, which I think is positive sign. Because even though—even if the new administration or the new Congress will not pass further supplemental funding for Ukraine, there will be still this authority to provide more toUkraine. So I think it remains to beseen, like, how things will develop with military support to Ukraine, but definitely Europeans will have to step up. I think it is expected, and everyone was preparing to that. There have been a lot of discussion in Europe towards Trump-proofing aid to Ukraine, and I think we’ve saw thatin terms of coordinating aid to Ukraine, we saw the transition from Ramstein format, or the the process of transitioning from non-Ramstein format to NATO taking leading role in coordinating aid. But I think in any case, if US administration will will keep supporting Ukraine militarily, the administration will have to face and will have to deal with the problems on—on more technical level which existed under the Biden administration. And here I mean bureaucratic problems, slow acquisition process, slow replenishment process, of US stocks. So I think both on the technical level and on the political level, there will be a lot of work to be done in US by partners in NATO and and I think the the only way the Ukraine is trying to prepare to that at this point is just trying to increase its—increase its own military production, and trying to engage partners to invest more in Ukrainian military production. Think that’s one of the potential ways out ofgetting more weapons instead of those that partners will not be supplying.
Sam Greene
Yeah. We’ve got a couple of questions to sort of broaden the geography out a little bit, we’ve been very transatlantic on this, and for—for good reason. US foreign policy, I suppose, is always a global foreign policy. But this has been in the Biden administration, a very Eurocentric, particularly Eurocentric administration driven, of course, by the that this—the facts that history handed the administration in terms of the war in Ukraine, in particular, right? But we expect this administration, as we’ve said, to have a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific. So George Allison, again from UK Defense Journal, asks, you know, to what extent we would expect the administration to be concerned about the the risks involved if—if the UK transfers sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, which, of course, are host toDiego Garcia, an important installation for for the US in that part of the world. We also have a question from Phil Gursky about, you know, what we’d expect to be the administration’s Western Hemisphere and Americancontinental priorities. But more broadly, I guess, what I’m curious is bringing those questions together, how you would expect to see the position of Europe in the broader universe of US foreign policy making shift in this administration. Kurt?
Kurt Volker
Yeah, well, first off, just quickly on the Chagos islands, I think you’re going to see the Trump administration try to reverse this. They’re going to oppose handing them back. But I don’t think no matter how that goes, it’s going to impact strategic cooperation between the US and the UK. I think that cooperation is going to be very closely aligned. It’s just that we may have a difference of view over—over the Chagos islands and what’s happening there, and, you know—unfortunate, but it’s not going to have abigger impact. Overall, in terms of—your question is very good. I think the Trump administration’s general orientation is that they want Europe to do more to take care of Europe so we can focus elsewhere, and we want support from Europe on things like pushing back on China. But this is where the administration is prepared to lead, whereas in Europe, they want Europe to lead more and Europe to take care of security and things on the continent, including the UK, helping with that. So I think that’s more the division of labor that they see. And I would add we left out of that equation the Middle East. I think they’re going to expect Europe to put more pressure on Iran. The Trump administration’s philosophy is that mostof the problems we are seeing in the Middle East are caused by Iran funding and supporting its proxies who then undermine Lebanon, Israel, try to, you know—Yemen, undermine Saudi Arabia, launch missile attacks and other things against Israel. And so he wants to hold Iran accountable for all of that. And I think he’s going to expect Europe, likewise, to hold Iran more accountable. So I think those are some of the things that, in terms of positioning that I would expect from the administration.
Sam Greene
Okay. Skip, building on that—first of all, if you want to come in on that question, please do—but you mentioned the NATO summit in passing, andI wonder if Secretary General Rutte were to come to you and say, what should the agenda be for that summit? What would your suggestions be?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Thanks, Sam. Well, I think I’ve intimated a bit, you know, what I think the the allies should be focusing on, but I think the opportunity for the Trump administration in engaging the NATO leadership early on, is an opportunity to seek more concrete commitments and real visible progress on defense spending. So a significantly increased defense investment objective, but more importantly, a commitment to feel the capabilities with some real timelines to—to see the visible progress in the, you know, months and years to come. For NATO allies to feel the forces required to source the plans they’ve approved and the NATO force model that they’veagreed to source, you know, now some two-and-a-half years ago. And they’re not there yet, and they’re not discussing the shortfalls, certainly notopenly, and they’re not basically shaming, you know, they—the allies that need to do more, and even the big allies need to do more. We’re talking UK, France and Germany, and they’ve also talked about, you know, increasing the forward presence from battalions to brigades in the eight locations where they are, all across the north, central and southeast. And yet, we’ve only got plans for a couple of those battalions to stand up. We don’t have standing organizations to defend Europe. We have headquarters, but not necessarily the forces. So what I see is a an opportunity to require some real, hard defense structure targets that can be filled in the, you know, certainly within Trump’s administration’s lifespan, to show real progress in NATO Allies organizing and assuming greater responsibility for the defense and security of Europe. That’s one set of objectives. The other is—is coming up with a very concrete, you know, follow-on to the NATO assumption of the security assistance and training aspect of support to Ukraine, in terms of actually increasing production, fielding capabilities that they can supply Ukraine and support Ukraine Armed Forces with. And perhaps even if they can’t do that, then at least provide the financial assistance that Marianna was alluding to, that can be used to purchase the munitions and forces or capabilities that theyneed, or help in country production meet the demands of the Ukraine Armed Forces. So there’s some concrete things that they can do to help Europe share greater burden in security assistance to Ukraine, and certainly in—to do more to meet the security needs of Europe itself—with respect to commitments they’ve already made, but not necessarily followed through with real, concrete plans to do so
Sam Greene
okay, I’m going to do one last question just to wrap this up, and I’ll go in reverse order. So Marianna, start with you, but it’s the same question for everybody, which is, which is this: Henry Kissinger famously asked who youcall in Europe when you want to talk about politics and policy. Who will America’s partners be calling when they want to talk about US foreign policy after the 20th of January? Is it Marco Rubio, Mike, Waltz, Pete Hegseth, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, or somebody entirely different? Marianna?
Marianna Fakhurdinova
That’s a very good question, Sam. I think at least on Ukrainian side, there is still a big—not expectation, but a big understanding that Trump is still the—the only one in the room who will be deciding on everything, and he is the one to talk to, and therefore he is the one to adjust our messages to.And we’ve seen that already in President Zelenskyy being the first one, oneof the first leaders to congratulate Donald Trump with—with a victory over election, we saw some of the Ukrainian messages being already tailored to the—to President Trump, saying that we expect you, personally, to take leadership. We expect you to have this, to establish peace and to make Ukraine victorious. So I think in Ukraine there will be a lot of communication, a lot of expectations towards President Trump, personally. But of course, I think Rubio is—Rubio taking office is also seen as one of the cautiously positive signs in Ukraine, but still, I think Ukrainians will be talking to President directly as he’s the one, he’s the last one taking decisions, and he’s the one changing them in the very last minute.
Sam Greene
Okay, Skip?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Sam, I would certainly agree with Marianna that, you know, Trump will be the major decision-maker here, and the most important person to convince, you know, of the kind of support that Ukraine needs to stay in the fight, remain an independent country, and certainly come out in the—in the end, as a surviving nation. But that said, we’ve seen the picks that Trump has announced that will likely make it through Congress, in terms of, at least the Senate, in terms of, you know, nominations, Rubio and and Whitaker as the ambassador. You know the appointments of Mike Waltz and of course, Kellogg—is a special interlocutor with with Ukraine—I think are all good. And, you know, a bit of mixed messaging in the past in terms of support to Ukraine, but I think that they will be solid interlocutors with their Ukrainian and NATO allies and partners, and be the ones that will be carrying the message back and forth between Ukraine allies and, of course, Trump. I think those are fairly good picks, and I think we—Ukraine can feel assured, allies can feel assured that there’s a fairly competent team coming on. I think maybe perhaps, you know, Matt Whitaker has the has the least amount of, you know, foreign policy experience amongst them, but we’ll assume that he will assume the role early on, having been nominated early on, and be a competent interlocutor, carrying the message and also helping advise Trump on the way forward with NATO. So, you know, we’ll see where this takes us. I would say that the Trump administration needs to recognize there’s a different NATO now than that they came on, you know, that they left back in ’21 as I said before, and thatthe stakes are extremely high, with respect to Ukraine. This is not something that can be closed and forgotten. This will leave a lasting legacy for European security, for our allies, but for US, reputation, credibility and global influence.
Sam Greene
Okay. Kurt, last word.
Kurt Volker
Yep. Well, Sam, that’s already been said, so I’ll just repeat it that Trump is the decision-maker. Trump is the person who’s going to call all the shots, and he’s the one that all our European allies and others have to focus on. Now, to add a little bit of nuance to that, up until now, the White House has basically been Mar-a-Lago. It has been Trump running the show in a fairly casual—maybe is a nice word—a casual way from Florida, having big dinners, and people showing up at dinner and waving and talking to whomever he talks to, and Trump likes to hear from lots of different people, likes to hear different opinions, and he just, he just loves that—that environment, and he’s ultimately the decider. I think what you will see is, when he moves into the White House, there’s going to be an imposition of a little bit of order. His Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles will be a more effective organizer of who is getting to the President and when and about what. I think there’s going to be a division of roles a little bit, so I don’t think Marco Rubio is going to be the Ukraine person. I think Kellogg will be the Ukraine person, and Kellogg is going to work closely with Mike Waltz and the President directly. So, I think we’re going to start to see some of these roles shake out. I think somebody like Ric Grinnell is going to get some of these oddball, troubling issues like North Korea or the Sahel, as President Trump mentioned. I think Rubio is likely to focus more on Latin America, Venezuela, Cuba. Middle East to be seen, I think Trump’s going to play play a direct role in the Middle East, particularly working with Netanyahu and then making some pressure on Iran, a policy of maximum pressure. That’ll probably be the State Department that takes the lead again on developing that maximum pressure policy. So there’ll be a lot of shifting of, you know, or assignment of roles for people who have the lead going inone direction or another. But again, it is ultimately Trump who’s making the—making the decisions.
Sam Greene
Okay, well, we’re gonna need to leave it there, but this will not be the last time we’re talking about these issues. Please do stay with us, please, again, also look out for our paper coming out tomorrow, “Between Now and NATO, a Security Strategy for Ukraine,” which goes into much more depth on a lot of the issues we’ve talked about. Today, I’m gonna invite my colleague Sarah Krajewski to come back and give us some housekeeping notes, how you can get transcripts and other information collateral from this but thank you very much for being with us today. Goodluck, and stay well.
Sarah Krajewski
Thanks, Sam and to all our experts. Thank you and the questions as well, I will get in touch later today with a recording and rough Otter-generated transcript from this call and the report you can find on our website and will be shared across our social channels tomorrow. If you have any other questions, feel free to reach out to me at press@cepa.org, and I’d be happy to connect you with any of the experts from today or any of the other experts that can be found on our website. Thanks so much, everyone.
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Thanks, Sarah, Sam.
