Sam Greene
Hello and welcome to the Center for European Policy Analysis. My name is Sam green. I’m director of the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA. And it’s my honor today to welcome the Honorable Reinhard Buetikofer. Joining us today from Brussels for a conversation about China influence and the transatlantic community. Our guest today is one of Europe’s most prominent voices, both on the risks posed by our failure to understand analyze and respond to China’s influence campaigns and on the importance of the transatlantic relationship, Mr. Political for chairs the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China and is a member of the delegation for relations with the United States as well as the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Buetikofer, welcome to CEPA. And thank you for being with us today.
Reinhard Buetikofer
Thanks for having me, Mr. Green.
Sam Greene
So CEPA has recently published a major series of reports country audits and a data dashboard exploring the avenues through which the Chinese Communist Party has sought and in some cases achieved influence in central and southeastern Europe in particular. Among the findings has been that regional governments and civil societies often feel somewhat abandoned and alone in their struggle to impose transparency, accountability and, and good governance when it comes to relations with China. What in your view, does the European Union need to do to help countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans manage Beijing’s growing power in the region?
Reinhard Buetikofer
Well, probably would not start with first identifying the EU’s responsibility, I would start with focusing first of all on the member state level, and emphasize that member states have made more or less strenuous efforts to really tackle the concerns that have arisen across the board. So when you look at Sweden, for instance, they have created our China Competency Center, trying to deal with those issues, or the DOJ have done made similar efforts, whereas others have not invested all that much into creating more China competency. And I do not believe that the EU as such can substitute that it should support that it should help coordinating that it should help giving that those efforts visibility. And it should also provide the financing if if needed. But the the understanding that in dealing with an actor like the PRC, where policies are coordinated, under the guidance of a very small group of people that exert overall control, we call it, I think we should call it a dictatorship. In dealing with such an actor, we have to learn that we will be on the on the losing side of the of the relationship, if we don’t create an all of society response. This is not just for the government. That’s not just for parliamentarians. This is not just for institutions. It’s for all of us. It’s for for local government, for instance, when they have twinning relationships, it’s for civic groups, and so on and so on. Having said that, of course, there is a responsibility also fought for the European Union. And I believe that the European Parliament in particular, has lived up to that responsibility by investing heavily into raising these issues that that we all should look at together, like Chinese efforts to externalize their oppressive system through different means through policing, illegal policing in European countries or persecuting expats in European countries or whatever, what have you. I think it’s a very prominent role. For for parliamentarians of and for political institutions, to create the awareness and to, to give major support to developing a common understanding. And indeed, We have made a lot of progress. In that regard, I would cite to two dimensions where I think we have made considerable progress over the last six or three years, depending on which you look at on the economic front. Since 2016, the European Union has step by step developed new trade defense instruments to counter unfair trading and investment practices from the Chinese side. And on the overall shaping of the conversation. In 2019, the European Union came up with a new understanding of what the relationship consists of. Up to that point, most people have focused exclusively on the cooperative side of the relationship, talking a lot about so called Win win. And since that time, we have identified that the relationship is also strongly imbued by competition and systemic rivalry. And what we’ve seen over the recent time is that the the focus has shifted from cooperation, it’s more difficult today to find areas of cooperation towards more competition, and also more systemic rivalry, I would say, fundamentally, the systemic rivalry is the core characteristic of the relationship which does not preclude that we also try to cooperate, but not as between friendly partners, but as between rivals. So I think we have supported in that regard. And there’s more that can be done. But I’m pretty, pretty happy about the development that I’ve seen over the recent couple of years.
Sam Greene
Thank you, there’s a lot to work to unpack there. So I’d like to delve into a couple of points that you mentioned, kind of this as a whole of society. Issue, something that everybody needs to be focusing on and on this balance between competition and and collaboration, we try to, of course, is inevitable part of the landscape globally and regionally. It’s a country with which a lot of European economies and societies will and probably shouldn’t want to interact at the same time. Citizens and civil societies in the region, and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, I think worry about the threats that undue Chinese influence might pose for democratic governance for transparency and accountability, particularly in places where civil societies and governments might not always be on the same page. What in your view, should citizens be demanding of their elected officials when it comes to China?
Reinhard Buetikofer
First and foremost, citizens should demand transparency in all dimensions of the relationship. When you look at the financing of Confucius Institutes, for instance, it’s all in a lot of cases, it’s not clear what indeed is being financed from the Chinese side, and what strings are attached there. Also, there are lobby groups that lobby on behalf of the Chinese government, like in Berlin, a so called China bridge group of industrialists and called guard politicians. There is no transparency as to whether they’re financed partly or fully. There is not even transparency of who belongs. I think we should learn from the Australians that a couple of years ago have put in place the so called Sunshine policy that focuses on the necessity to create transparency that creates the space for public conversation and for public scrutiny.
Sam Greene
You also mentioned it I want to dig into this issue of of for learning when it comes to strategic competition. Europe is currently paying a heavy price as as much of the rest of the world in the United States to disentangle itself from certain dependencies on on Russia. Is there a danger of ending up in a similar situation with China? And is the continent well prepared to deal with that to avoid that?
Reinhard BuetikoferI’m afraid that asking the question implies answering it in the negative, we’re not prepared to deal with it. China’s Putin is much more power, sorry, China’s Xi Jinping is much more powerful than Russia is Putin will ever be or has ever been. Our dependency on China is much more widespread than our dependency on Russia, has been so far. Again, take the German example. We relied heavily on Russian energy supplies. When Mrs. Merkel left office 55% of all German gas consumption was based on Russian imports into Germany. When you look at China, the dependencies are, I would say, more threatening look at China’s quasi Monopoly with regard to the processing capacity of industrial raw materials, starting from Rare earth and not ending their look at some basic products for our health system. Look at the face masks, for instance, we didn’t have any, to any productive capacity when, when the pandemic struck. So I believe there is indeed a lesson to be learned. But at the moment, there is also a certain, I should say, reluctancy, to learn that lesson. Now, a lot of people say look, as we have all that hassle on our hands with him Russians, why take on the Chinese at the same time, ignoring that we cannot, sort of continues sliding into a role of dependency. I’m not saying that Europe is in a position where it cannot reverse that trend. Some companies some even some multinationals, have put too many eggs into that one Chinese basket, take Volkswagen as an example. They do 40% of their turnover, and rake 50% of their profits from China alone. They’re clearly dependent on that economic partner. But that is not the case for the wider economy of Europe, not even the wider economy of Germany. And the one thing that we should shun the most would be a technology dependency, where China would control the most modern, most advanced, most future oriented production technologies that are being are being developed. I believe there is no time to spare. But of course, at the same time, you cannot expect a major corporation to turn on the Hill within 24 hours or even within a year probably. So we’d learn that when we tried to wean ourselves of the Russian energy dependency that did take some time and weaning ourselves from the raw materials dependency on Russia might take longer, because you have to, to build production capacity, you have to build processing capacity elsewhere, before you become less dependent. But that is why I would argue without trying to be hasty. We should step by step and with a very clear and determined approach, start now reducing the over dependencies that we have allowed to develop. Imagine China would, which I hope we can prevent. Opt for attacking Taiwan. Would we be in a position to respond as we respond? Due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, I’m afraid not. So reducing our dependencies is important for saving and protecting our decision making space politically, which is not just to be dealt with in the bilateral relationship with China, becoming less dependent on China means cooperating more with other partners, partners like Japan, like the ASEAN countries like India, like African countries. So China policy is not just a bilateral relationships, it’s the overall perspective that we pursue.
Sam Greene
Picking up on that, very politicians particularly, have often accused Europeans of having a certain lack of vision to use the term used over here when it comes to China, sometimes cajoling even European peers into a more confrontational relationship with with Beijing. Do you think that Washington fundamentally understands how China look from the European perspective? And the reasons why there there may remain differences of opinion in the transatlantic community on how to structure the relationship with China? And can those differences be bridged?
Reinhard Buetikofer
Well, Washington, as we just saw the other day, when they tried to elect the speaker in the house, is not always singing from the same hymn book. Nor are we. And probably it’s just as merited to say not everybody in Washington understands the European perspective, and to say, not everybody around Europe understands the American perspective. But between those that make a valiant effort to bring partners together, I think there, there is a large space for collaboration. And you see that practically being pursued, for instance, in the context of the trade and Technology Council, that on the initiative of the European Union has been working over the last year or so. There are other elements of that partnership. Also, I recall that a former American Secretary of Defense Secretary Carter, at the Shangri La dialogue forum a number of years ago, positions the US as saying, We do not oppose the rise of China. We oppose any effort on the Chinese part to rise in a way that comes at the expense of everybody else? I think that’s a smart approach. I think that’s an approach that we could adhere to. From the European side, that includes the pairing China, where necessary, that includes setting limits, that does not include a decoupling strategy. Overall, I think the decoupling conversation is misguided. The only successful decoupling policy that I’ve seen has been from the Chinese side so far. I think we should talk about de risking. And when you look at the 5g, for instance, it’s to greater risk to allow a company that is ultimately controlled by the CCP, into the backbone of our communication system of the 21st century so far away has to stay out. I think we agree on that. And there are other examples. Maybe it’s really not a good idea to allow China to benefit of the progress of the semiconductor industry in America or Taiwan or the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, other countries in order to prevent them from using that to build a more powerful PLA, the People’s Liberation Army, and we know that every technological progress through the policy of strong in linkage of civil and military usage, the fusion policy that they pursue every single technological progress will also benefit the PLA. So there are elements where I think we can come together, I would not think it’s a smart idea to propose that the wall should completely isolate China. That’s not going to fly. I think China is the major trading partner of maybe 120 countries in the world. If we say everybody who doesn’t shun China completely is on the other side of the Dubai. We might be more lonely than we would want to be. So I think we should rather offer alternatives to what China offers. And the conversations that we’re having between the Biden administration and the European Commission, over shared efforts to create connectivity policies to pursue the Global Gateway initiative or the global infrastructure investment project. That is stuff that we that we should, should do together. And we’ve always had some differences between Washington and Europe. But so far, we’ve managed and I think that the basics are very solid.
Sam Greene
Well, this has been a fascinating conversation, and one that I’m certain will continue long into the future. I’m afraid though, that’s all the time that we have for today. So Mr. Buetikofer and to all of you out there watching. Thank you and good luck.
Reinhard Buetikofer
Thank you for having me again.
