Ronan Murphy
Okay, good morning, everybody. Thank you very much for joining us, and good afternoon if you’re another part of the world like one of our contributors is today, and my name is Ronan Murphy. I’m the director of the Tech Policy Program at CEPA, the Center for European Policy Analysis, and this is a press briefing call. It’s on the record. We’ll do for 45 minutes, and we’re here really to launch and discuss a bit more about a report we just published, which is the meeting China’s trade and tech challenge, and how the US and Europe can come together. And it’s available online. We’ll share the link to it, and delighted to be joined by two of the contributors to what was a year-long working group effort, that led to the compilation this report, two of our contributors have joined us today, honored to be joined by Reinhard Bütikofer, former MEP for the Green Party, and the China lead at the European Parliament. So he knows this stuff. We’re looking forward to hearing from him, and also Kaitlyn Garman, who is the Senior Vice President at Beacon Global Strategies and a former high-level official at the US Department of Defense, both of our contributors, Reinhard and Kaitlyn, are also senior fellows here at CEPA. So thank you very much for joining us today. And clearly, clearly, there’s a lot happening in this area, and it’s difficult to keep track, perhaps, so we’ve got a great attendance here today. I’ve encouraged people ask questions. I’m going to start it off with Kaitlyn and Reinhard and a fire the questions in the chat. I might ask you to read them out for the record, just so we know you’re there and listening, and we’re going to take it from there. So we’ve outlined in the paper, Kaitlyn, ways that the US and the EU could work together. But we can’t ignore what’s happened in recent days throughout this call 24 hours ago, it probably would have been a different tone to what it is today, and that that applies basically every day for the last few weeks. So do you see any hopes, any chance of it happening? Where do you see it happening? And maybe is China now back up at the top of the agenda, that there is a challenge that it’s and it is recognized.
Kaitlyn Garman
Thanks Ronan, and thanks for the opportunity to weigh in this morning and on the report, which comes at truly, truly a critical time for the transatlantic alliance. I’m gonna do my best to be brief, to leave time for questions, but sort of in response to your core question there, I think it’s fair to assess the current state of the US-EU relationship, in a precarious state, which certainly complicates our ability to meet the challenges posed by the pacing threat of China. In conversations I’ve had US tariffs were seen as truly existential, and while we’re in a pause on the retaliatory tariffs, there’s still this pervading sense of uncertainty around the threat of future tariffs, and the likely reality that higher tariffs, or at least the threat of them, will be a tool the President has at his disposal at any point of his administration, and one that he clearly isn’t afraid to use. So for Europe, you can–you see short and long term scenarios where policy decisions will need to be assessed through the lens of what is the potential that this opens up another point of confrontation with the US and risks escalating a trade war. And one particular area that we cover in the report, and that seems particularly fraught, is on the tech front. That’s where I spend a lot of my time with CEPA, and tech being obviously one that the Administration is so well-documented on, sort of pushing back on the EU approach, including for reasons that some of the policies are seen to disadvantage US leadership in tech, versus China. And so, actions taken against the US on the tech front in this environment, I think, will be seen as as particularly aggressive. One example to highlight here in the shorter term is that there’s public reporting around the Digital Market, Act’s, DMA, fines being eminent, and US tech companies kind of being the target of those. Just last week, we had the FTC Chair, Andrew Ferguson, call these fines taxes on US companies. He said he didn’t want Europe to levy taxes on American firms, no matter what the conduct is. I think European policymakers will disagree with that characterization, but it doesn’t change the fact that officials like Ferguson and the President himself see these fines as a tax on on US companies, and that these are the same US companies that the President is relying on to drive investment and maintain dominance in the competitive AI market. So we’ll definitely be watching how the EU approaches DMA fines and similar tech policy actions, and how the administration responds in this particular environment on China. And I know my colleague has a lot of thoughts here as well. You’re hearing policy makers in Europe sort of speak out more on options here and potentially deepening the relationship with China. Certainly, that’s a trend that’s notable and something to watch, I would sort of caution, though, that equally existential for Europeans as tariffs is the war in Ukraine and China has so far picked a side there, and it’s not the side of the Europeans. So while you may expect to see a continuing trend of Europe showing a heavy bias for European champions, and, you know, more in the direction of travel, of Canada, or UK, or India, over sort of US companies, perhaps when it comes to procurement, at the end of the day, when it comes to technology like AI, you know, the most cutting technology is still out of the US. I think that will still be the preference over China in Europe. And it is US technology that many European governments are still so relying on for cloud and other critical services, but ultimately to stay competitive against China, it serves both the US and Europe to find areas of cooperation. This report covers many such options. There happy to dive into those specifically, but wanted to turn it over for opening comments from from Reinhard as well. Thanks so much.
Ronan Murphy
Thanks, Kaitlyn. So, Reinhard, Kaitlyn set the scene there a bit from this side of the Atlantic. You might, you might do similar from the European side, and particularly with reference to maybe the couple of things Kaitlyn raised around tech and possible aggressive, regular–further aggressive action on the regulation front in in Europe. And I think you’ve also hit upon Ukraine, Kaitlyn, which just cannot be ignored and will not be ignored. Reinhard?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, thank you, first of all, Ronan, for having me on this call. And thanks for everybody that has joined. We’ve grown so accustomed to talking about the transatlantic alliance that even though this has, for the time being, turned in to a more inimical relationship, we still keep using those old words. When I look at the coalition contract that the upcoming German government published yesterday, they talk about the trans. transatlantic relationship in exactly that well-accustomed language. And I think that reflects an attitude that I would dare say is widely shared around Europe, that whenever we can contribute to reinvigorating the transatlantic relationship, we would certainly bend over backwards to do that. So the European Union is fully aware of that, notwithstanding all the talk about so-called strategic autonomy, the facts are just the facts, and the facts are that, as Peter Rough wrote in a report recently, Europe lacks certain military capabilities that it would need to defend against a hypothetical Russian aggression against any European NATO member state. So we know quite well that, of course, we can invest more. And several countries, including my own, have decided to do so, to invest more heavily into defense, and that is supported by the population with a good level of support, but it takes a couple of years to develop those capabilities, so, and I think everybody’s aware of that. Everybody is aware of the fact that European enterprises have invested more than 10 times the amount of money in the United States than in China. So clearly, there is a very solid economic and military basis for European efforts to hold on to the relationship. And, I think it can also be said that Europe understands increasingly that we have to play a different role in that relationship, that Europe has to come up with more efforts to contribute also to the shared global goals. Having said all that, at the moment, there probably would be very few people who would dare say they know what President Trump might announce tomorrow morning, or whether his opinion of tomorrow morning might be the same by tomorrow night. And of course, it’s very hard. So in reaction to the tariff war that he has started, the European Union has begun to react with a three-pronged approach, I would say. Number one, they they signal that they’re able to hit back hard, but they don’t necessarily want to retaliate ounce for ounce, or eye for eye, or dollar for Euro, they want to have a more targeted approach, and they’re not hasty in doing that, which I think is smart. So, some of the announced retaliatory tariffs will come in place early December, so that leaves time for negotiations. There’s also clearly an offer to negotiate. President von der Leyen has picked up an offer that was made, first made in 2018 by President Juncker to President Trump then, that we should drop all industrial tariffs across the board, between the EU something that Elon Musk came out in favor of a few days ago. So that is a standing offer from the European side. And I think that the third element of this approach is that Europe will invest into robustly promoting the team, rest of the like-minded kind of approach. So work with other neighbors, with you see much more collaboration between the UK and the EU than you’ve seen in years, but also Norway, then Japan, Asian partners, India. The European Union will pursue a very active trade policy, trying to strike trade deals. There is, for the first time ever, a talk within the Commission about possibly joining the CPTPP from the European side, which had been proposed in the Parliament in the past, but had been cast aside by Commission. Now they’re coming back to that. So there, there is a certain sense of, yeah, anxiety, I cannot negate that, that obvious, but Europe does not feel so much under pressure that we cannot find a way forward, which is also important as regards the impact all of this has on our China relationship. And there, I would say that the most important recent developments have come here in Berlin, because the Christian Democratic Party and their Bavarian sister party, together with the Social Democratic Party, have agreed on a new government coalition that has set out its China policy in no uncertain terms, and I would say, by and large, that is very clear China policy as far as the document goes. I mean, there’s obviously always a gap between the document and the implementation thereof. But for instance, this document does not anymore speak of the triptych of partnership, competitor and systemic rivalry. It rather says the rivalry has come to the fore. The rivalry is the dominating factor in that relationship. We will cooperate, it says, with China, where it is in Germany’s interest and we–it mentions trade and investment as an area, a dimension of contention. And I think this is extremely relevant, because in the past, when Germany was an outlier in the European Union, much more friendly towards China than any other country, with the exception maybe of Orbán’s Hungary. The business sector had a major voice in that because a lot of business people believe that the win-win relationship between the German economy and the Chinese economy was a great bonanza: was to stay a great bonanza for them. This is not the case anymore. Am I still on? Okay? The area of the economy has become a central field of contention between the EU and Germany in particular.
Ronan Murphy
No, no, no, you’re on mute. You were on mute. You just click on mute there, Reinhard. There you go. I can hear you.
Reinhard Bütikofer
And this is being made more dangerous by the fact that President Trump is pushing back so hard against Chinese over capacities, because the Chinese regime relies to a great the deal on exporting the industrial over capacities that they are building still and if the US market is going to get closed down, and this might happen with with 125% of tariffs, that might wipe out $500 billion of exports for the Chinese. They have to put it somewhere else, and chances are they would try to push that down our throats. And of course, that could lead to a situation where there could be de-industrialization of Europe made in China because of unfair, subsidized trading, and investment practices. And Europe is aware that the business community is increasingly aware of that that is a very important basis for a more not just more tough worded, but also a more self-confident policy vis-a-vis the Chinese regime, and they are following in the foot the new government is following in the footsteps of the previous government with a German China strategy, but they are trying to make that more practical. For instance, they will create an expert commission that will publish annual reports about German dependencies; where we have failed to attain resilience and make that a permanent public topic, in that way. I think that’s a very good way of making the public aware, and the government clearly says that we want to be a partner in a joint European effort vis-a-vis China, having lauded the new government to which my party is will be in opposition, I would still say that Europe is not completely uncomplicated. I would say there are basically, roughly speaking, three camps. The one camp is the the Nordic-Baltic countries, plus Poland, maybe the Czech Republic. And they know how much their security vis-a-vis Russia, depends on the United States, and they are under more threat than anybody else around Europe, so they don’t want to get on the wrong side of Trump. So even the Lithuanian government, which is more leftwing than their predecessors, that came out announcing that they would try to repair the relationship with Beijing somewhat, have not dared to take very significant steps in that regard because they don’t want to create any question marks about their loyalty vis-a-vis the US, because they’re so dependent. And I think that’s one camp where you will not have to expect a lot of leeway for the Chinese lure. Then there is the German–the Brussels-dominated camp, led by President von der Leyen. And of course, the Germans are now joining that camp, I would say. And then there’s the Western European camp, which is more difficult. The Spanish and the Portuguese are, I would say, a bit more difficult. And there are indeed different voices, different voices. For instance, the President of the Council, Mr. Costa, from Portugal, has come out praising the concept of multi-polarity that did not used to be the hymn that we would sing in in Europe. So there are–but overall, I think in particular, because of the economic dimension, if I would have to predict, is the European relationship going to be closer to China or more combative, I would expect the latter. And let me stop here.
Ronan Murphy
Okay, Reinhard, no, thank you. Thank you very much. I think you’ve you’ve given us a wall-to-wall, bumper-to-bumper view of what’s, happening in Europe there. And Kaitlyn, I think Reinhard, has said that there has been a a little bit of a swing, and if the German coalition’s documents are to be a to be believed towards the what might, what might be called the US position on China, that it is more of a threat than anything else, and while still acknowledging other aspects of the relationship. And at this point, is there, do you see any evidence that there’s hope of acknowledgement that the EU can play a role in that competition with China? Is that something we can hope for out of the the coming 90 days of incredibly busy activity on the trade front and on the the tech front, we didn’t hear from right now that there is a plan to do anything there. So is there any more there? You’re on mute. Thank you.
Kaitlyn Garman
Thanks, Ronan. Yeah, I certainly hope for for more coordination with–between the US and the EU pushing back on China. Normally, we would look to multilateral forums for some easy wins on on this front in general, let’s say there’s sort of a shift in influence from forums like G7 or UNGA, and more, and sort of deal-making at a bilateral level. And so in this report, for example, we talk about what a reformatted Trade and Tech Council might look like, which is an idea that was formed during the first Trump administration, and that President Biden then implemented as a means to coordinate more closely with Europe. I don’t find many people in Washington or Brussels who argue that TTC had a perfect track record, but arguably one of the major successes was the amount of work and strengthening the US and EU alliance against the threat of China, and sort of seeing each of the statements out of that become increasingly hawkish, pushing back and trying to stay more aligned on the tech and trade front. So that might be, kind of like, one shorter term effort to just be coordinated closely. But you know, in this current environment, seems it might be hard to get going here.
Ronan Murphy
Yeah, yeah. And we, at CEPA, we wrote a report on the TTC and how it could be improved. I’m not sure anyone would bet on the revival of that particular format at this point, said on Reinhard, you’d probably say, yes, no.
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, I know that the European Commission would be more than happy if they could continue in one way or another with TTC, because they’re proud to say this was a European offer to the United States that was conceived in order to deal with President Trump. They didn’t devise it to deal with Biden. They thought they might have to deal with Trump, and that was a way in which they wanted to bridge some of the gaps. And I would not completely agree that it was utterly unsuccessful. No, no. On the trade front, certainly there was not much movement, not much positive move. On the tech front, we have had some minor successes that could be built upon. But of course, whether we can indeed build on that depends also on the attitude that we will have to come up with–we will have to counter or to deal with, from the Silicon Valley folks. I mean, if every European regulation, whatever the reasoning behind it, is being denounced as unfair taxes on Silicon Valley. That’s not a basis for a conversation. And indeed, if the trade aggression that President Trump has pursued and now put on hold to some degree, not completely, but to some degree, for 90 days. If that would be revitalized, I would assume that the European Union would not hesitate to hit back in the services sector, because we have a trade plus on goods, but on services, the US has a trade plus. So if we want to hit back hard, the services would be the area of choice. And yeah, I I would assume that this has to be taken into account, and the fact that our regulation is not being dealt with as regulation where you can argue what is–what is to be said in favor, or what the–what valid criticism that there might be, but just sort of cast aside nobody is sovereign enough to rein in Elon Musk, that’s not a rule that the European Union will live by, and on that basis, there’s not going to be tech cooperation.
Ronan Murphy
But that’s a good point. Thank you very much, Reinhard. We’ve got a question, I think, from James Rundle. You might state your affiliation at the top as well, James.
James Rundle
Yeah. Hi, good morning. Thanks for doing this. James Rundle from the Wall Street Journal. I want to ask a question about security cooperation as it pertains to China policy, specifically around cyber security, which has traditionally been a closer cooperation in terms of activities, enforcement, intelligence sharing, and everything else. How important do you feel it is for the EU and the US to be in lockstep moving forward regarding security cooperation against, well, against China, as it relates to China. And do you think it should, and can it be insulated from, kind of, the wider frictions that are occurring in the economy and everything else?
Ronan Murphy
A great question. Kaitlyn, this is sort of in your area, a bit. What do you think?
Kaitlyn Garman
Yes, I think incredibly important to stay close-aligned. And I’m hearing that those conversations are continuing, especially this vis-a-vis China. I think we’re all watching kind of, you know, if that might shift, but I think too, that’s why we’re talking about sort of creating these avenues for continued cooperation, and especially on the AI front, making sure we’re well aligned, so that we can, sort of, continue this close cooperation.
Ronan Murphy
Do you expect that, Reinhard? In fairness, it’s not necessarily an EU competency and so security cooperation, a lot of it’s nation state, nearly all of its nation state.
Reinhard Bütikofer
That’s more NATO’s business, and I think NATO would be the perfect path for where we should continue to work together also on these issues. Whether it can be completely insulated from the trade issues, I’m not sure. I’ve heard Vice President JD Vance making public statements, if I’m not mistaken, where he said, “Well, why would we defend the Europeans if they tax unfairly our Silicon Valley donors?” Well, if that’s the attitude, then it cannot be insulated. Of course, the European side would would prefer to keep the two dimensions apart, knowing full well that we owe our American partners not just collaboration, but also respect, because of what they do for us with regard to European security, but if everything would be bundled together, that would make it much more difficult.
Ronan Murphy
Yeah, yeah, of course. And I’d encourage anyone else who’s got questions, please, please, do raise your hand. We do want to hear from you. Oh, here we go. Annika, excuse me. Gonna go ahead.
Annika Patel
Thank you, Ronan. Hi, thank you very much for your presentations. I’m Annika Patel, working at Carbon Brief. I wanted to ask specifically about clean energy technologies and the threat that they might pose to EU deindustrialization. How will the EU achieve its carbon goals? Because effectively, if US trade policy continues to weigh on the global economy…
Kaitlyn Garman
Happy to get back to you, but nothing on my end.
Reinhard Bütikofer
I didn’t hear the question fully.
Ronan Murphy
We lost you a bit in the middle there, Annika.
Annika Patel
Sorry, my internet’s a little bit unstable. My question was, how will the EU achieve its carbon goals cost effectively, without Chinese clean tech? And will taxpayers accept a higher cost transition, especially if US trade policy continues to affect the global economy.
Ronan Murphy
Reinhard?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, I’m tempted to quote Hemingway, who said, How’s change coming about? Gradually, gradually, and then all of a sudden. I mean we’ve been at it, and until 2023 the Europeans exported more green tech to the Global South than the Chinese. It was also only last year that the Chinese overtook Europe in that regard. So we have a strong clean tech industry, and we, in that regard, we are lagging behind on batteries. We’re lagging behind on EVs, but not on wind, for instance, and on hydrogen. I think our technological level is pretty good. So the European Union is, at the moment, trying to reshape its transitioning towards a greener economy. The policy that President von der Leyen initiated five years ago was called the European Green Deal, and this is now being reframed and the the the guiding idea is that facilitating industrial strength, manufacturing strength in Europe should be a major goal, and some of the provisions that me and my friends endeavored to put into the regulation are now being dropped because the argument goes, that might impede a stronger economic upscaling of these transformative industries. But we’re well assured, well aware the fact that Xi Jinping has announced publicly that China wants to own the commanding heights. That’s his words, the commanding heights of those transformative technologies. And that means we have to fight for the strong industrial future of our own continent. So relying on China is not the way to get to where we want to be. That is being reflected in the fact that the European Commission proposed tariffs on EVs. A lot of people criticize that move, saying, “well, if you allow all those cheap Chinese, relatively cheap, highly subsidized Chinese EVs into the European market, that helps the transformation.” Well, maybe it does, but only as long as it takes to wipe out our industry and then what? So I believe this is a complicated issue, but we know that India, for instance, also refuses to be 100% dependent on Chinese technologies in this regard. So I see ample options of collaborating with Asian partners. Europe has made some efforts to collaborate with Japan on hydrogen technology, because both countries want to promote that. We can do that with Australia. So I would say it takes some balancing. Obviously, because you can fail on two sides of the issue. But so far, I think the ambition to–is not just environmentally motivated ambition; it’s an industrially motivated ambition. The future industry of Europe will be greener or it won’t be. That’s that’s what a lot of people are convinced and that’s what will inform policy making.
Ronan Murphy
Okay. So, you see that the green climate agenda, Green Deal, may not be top of the list. Draghi supersedes it, but it’s still there. It’s still in the background. It’s still going to influence the longer term.
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, it’s being looked at from an industrial policy angle. And I think that’s good.
Ronan Murphy
Good. Philip. I think you’re on mute. There you go,
Philip Blenkinsop
Philip, going for Reuters here, obviously you’re talking kind of predominantly about sort of cooperative relations. But clearly, at the moment, at least in terms of EU, US and, I guess, China also US, you know, we’re in the tariff space. You Reinhard, you mentioned that when it came to kind of some sort of retaliation with regard to the cars and the reciprocals, that the EU might have to kind of look into services. And I just wondered, and obviously, anybody else can answer this, or at least, you know, Kaitlyn can answer, you know, where, where do you see those? You know, how would that actually work? Because obviously, you know, you can’t really sort of stick a tariff on a Google search. I just wondered how you could imagine those restrictions, however they are on services working, and also maybe you have a kind of a view on obviously, there is this pause, so-called pause, a 90-day pause that the EU–sorry, the US initiated. Let’s say it’s a pause still, 10% duty, you know. Is it the right approach for the EU to have paused? You know, is it? How strong does it have to be and how, you know, flexible at the same time.
Reinhard Bütikofer
I would not dare describing hypothetical measures that the commission is looking into, because neither am I privy to all their internal deliberations, and they keep their cards well-protected, nor am I an expert there, but I do know that there have been a lot of people looking into what could be done in the permitting area, for instance. And, ECFR published a report on that, authored by Mr. Gehrke, who looked at all the hypothetical options that that somebody could could think of. I’m sure that the Commission will, out-of-hand, reject some of those, but I have heard from high officials from the European Commission saying all the issues are on the table. And, I mean, if you look at the balance, the trade balance, you cannot out-tariff your opponent if you have a positive trade balance, but if you put the pressure on them where they have a positive trade balance, which is the services sector, then that might hurt. And for the first time, I think, the European Union is willing to look into that and make it known that they look into that, and that nobody should feel completely sure. I think the European Union is happy with a pause. Don’t take my word for it, that’s just my assumption because the European Union, from its own side, did not go for a hasty approach. The European approach was quite different from the Chinese approach. When President Trump announced that there would be an additional surcharge of 34% for China, the Chinese shot back with 34% the European Union has taken a much more considerate, moderate approach, signaling that we want to have a negotiation. We have, other than the Chinese, we have signaled with that proposal on tariffs on industrial products, that there are ways forward. The Chinese are trying to portray the European reaction as similar to theirs. That is what the Chinese media say, probably in order to to create the impression that they’re not as isolated as they might seem to be, but I would make a very clear distinction there has not been voices from the European Union saying all these problems in the trade sector originate in Washington, DC. We know full well that these problems originate in China, in China’s exploitation of WTO rules. We have issues with the way in which the US president is responding to that, and we have issues with a way in which he seems to be putting friends and allies and enemies into the same basket and hitting everybody as if there was no distinction to be made between friend and foe, or treating the European Union as a foe, that that’s his language. But apart from that, we do understand, and that is because of our own experience, that the problems originate with Beijing’s industrial policy, and there, I think there is, therefore, a good basis for transatlantic negotiations.
Ronan Murphy
Thanks Reinhard and Kate, do you want to come back in on this and maybe your wrap up for where you see things? EU-US-China, because we are running out of time.
Kaitlyn Garman
And, Philip, I really like the question. I think it sort of gets to the heart of the matter here, and sort of like the interconnectedness between the US and EU, especially on tech front. And sort of, like, the tension there, given, you know, different approaches to things like regulation, privacy, security, and would say, sort of like the tension that we’re seeing between the US and the EU. And in some ways, it’s not new. It’s just more out in the open. And so I think the next couple weeks will be really interesting here, especially kind of, you know, the approach that Europe takes, and whether it sort of makes overtures to be more collaborative with the US on tech, given it’s such a priority for this administration, or, you know, to your question on sort of certain other approaches, whether to kind of push back and be more aggressive on US tech because it’s such a priority to the administration. I think ultimately, at the end of the day, in escalating trade war between the US and in Europe, especially, one in which Europe targets the US tech sector doesn’t help either of us. It ultimately benefits China. And I think that’s sort of like the core premise of the report here. And encourage everyone to read it.
Ronan Murphy
Thank you, Kaitlyn. And I think a distinction maybe to make is that tech and services. Tech is just one part of services. This like the retaliation might be far broader if it does indeed come and but Reinhard’s your your conclusion here on what’s the future right now? I know ask me in 89 days maybe, but what’s the future on the EU-US versus China as you see it right now? Quick wrap up.
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, as Chairman Mao said, The future is bright, just the way towards the future is complicated.
Ronan Murphy
Okay, Chairman Mao, great. Hemingway to Chairman Mao, I love it. And thank you very much everyone for joining. This has been a press briefing on our latest report on and you can find it on cepa.org and encourage you to check out Center for European Policy Analysis. cepa.org. Sarah is going to just come in there with some logistical bits and bobs on what comes after this for all of you. Thank you. Thanks. Reinhard, thanks Kaitlyn. Sarah,
Sarah Krajewski
Thanks, Ronan, and thank you to our experts and to all the great questions this morning, I will be following up with a recording and a rough auto-generated transcript of this. The full transcript will be on our website in the about week. But if you have any other questions for CEPA experts or the experts on this call, please reach out to press@cepa.org and I will happily get back to you. I hope you found this a useful resource, and enjoy your day wherever it may take you. Thanks, guys.
