Lauren Speranza
All right. Well, good morning and good afternoon for anyone who is across the pond, delighted to be with you all today. I’m Lauren Speranza. I’m a fellow here at the Center for European Policy Analysis or CEPA, and formerly a policy advisor to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Great to be here to talk about the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, Netherlands on June 24 and 25th as you know, we have an excellent panel of experts with us to unpack what the summit will produce, why it matters, and kind of where we’re going going forward. And if I could just ask everyone to mute if you are not speaking just to minimize the background noise, that would be great. So just before we get started, I’ll just do a very quick round of introductions. We have with us Lieutenant General retired Lance Landrum, who’s a Senior Fellow here at CEPA, and most recently served as former deputy chair of NATO’s military committee. We have Ambassador Deborah McCarthy, who’s also a Senior Fellow here at CEPA and was former US negotiator to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on cybercrime, as well as former Ambassador to Lithuania. We have Jan Techau, who is Senior Fellow here at CEPA and Director of Europe at the Eurasia Group. And he formerly served as the head of speech writing for three German ministers of defense, and is joining us from Berlin. We have Ambassador Kurt Volker, who is a Distinguished Fellow here at CEPA and former US representative for Ukraine negotiations, as well as a former US Ambassador to NATO and Jason Israel, who is our Auterion Senior Fellow in the Defense Tech Initiative here at CEPA, and most recently served as Senior Director for Defense Health Strategy at the National Security Council. So really, all star lineup here, and think great perspectives from across the Atlantic. Just a few kind of scene setting words to get us started here. I think, as all of us Europe watchers know, you know, the NATO Summit is coming at a very precarious moment for the transatlantic relationship, marked by uncertainty about the US commitment to Europe, a relative stalemate in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and ongoing tensions over transatlantic trade as the first NATO summit of President Trump’s second term, I do think The meeting will offer us some insight into how the administration will approach the alliance going forward, following some of the previous criticisms we’ve heard of NATO and calls for Europe to do more, to take greater responsibility for its own defense. Now, the summit is also the first held under the leadership of NATO’s new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, and it will be hosted in his home country, of course. And I think despite what began as sort of a bolder agenda for the summit, the scope has really been narrowed. And I think that’s come in response to both a US push to focus more on defense spending, but also a desire from allied capitals to minimize potential clashes with with President Trump. So now with the program short and sweet, perhaps a key measure of success will simply be getting through the summit without any major feuds and agreeing on a short summit declaration that will provide a sort of baseline common agenda for the coming months. But I really look forward to the thoughts of our panel on all of this. So, I will start with just a couple of key questions for our panelists, and then I am very keen to open up the line to all of you joined here on the line, and you can ask your questions directly, either via the chat or through the raise your hand function. So please feel free to already start raising your hands or putting things in the chat, and I will make sure we get to as many of you as possible. And then just a quick reminder that, of course, we’re on the record today, so feel free to use this information from our discussion. So with that, I would love to dive in and Ambassador Volker, if I can put you on the spot to sort of start us off with some some of your thoughts. I know you just got back from a trip to Europe, and it would be great to hear a little bit about the mood in allied capitals from your perspective, and acknowledging we’ve got time constraints here, just perhaps you could offer us, like three to five sort of things to watch, or, you know, key takeaways that you sort of see coming down the agenda as we think about what’s going to come out of the summit. And I think, of course, given your experience, and one of the big questions is, is, what will we see, if anything on Ukraine? So welcome your thoughts.
Kurt Volker
Thank you so much, Lauren. It is great to see everybody, a lot of friends, here on screen. And I, as you said, I was in Europe for most of the last month and in a variety of places, at the GLOBESEC Forum in Prague, the Lennart Meri Conference in Estonia. I did visit NATO headquarters, met with many of the perm. reps. in the Secretary General’s Office and the US Ambassador there, Spain, Greece, Denmark. A lot of talks about Greenland there. So, a lot of fresh take of things and a couple of observations. One, as you said, this is going to be a short and sweet summit. There is a social dinner hosted by the royal family in the Netherlands the evening of, and then a three hour NAC meeting, and then that’s it. This is, as you say, to focus on the deliverable of 5% of GDP as the new target for defense spending within NATO. And the emphasis that the US is looking for is everybody to say, Yeah, we mean it. We have a plan. 5% is real. We’re going to get there. We have a real threat in Europe. We have to do more. We have to do our share. I am a little concerned if you’re watching like number one thing to watch for: is the messaging actually on point. Because I think some of the messaging from some of our European allies, at least when they backbrief their own media and their own parliaments is, “yeah, 5%”, but like, it’s really, it’s really three and a half and one and a half, and one and a half can be pretty much anything. And, we have to see what, you know, there are a lot of things that we might be able to count as part of our three and a half even. So, there’s going to be a whittling down almost immediately, and if that is over emphasized, you’re going to have a clash with the US. So that’s one thing to watch. Second, is how Ukraine is handled at the summit, and generally. In terms of the logistics, Zelensky is being invited to the dinner, but not to the NATO meeting itself. It’s only NATO allies. There will be some side meetings with Zelensky, including a European leaders meeting. So, Rutte, and Van der Leyen, and Costa, and maybe one other will all meet with Zelensky. This is all going to take place prior to the dinner and the NATO Summit, so that when the NATO Summit’s over, everybody just leaves town in terms of the substance, there is not going to be much said about Ukraine by NATO. AT least as I see it. I think there is a fundamental difference, and if you are writing interesting analytical pieces, like I’m looking at Anton’s labeling here on the screen. The real, is that the US does not see Ukrainian security as essential to European security, and our European allies do. So, they feel that if Putin is allowed to prevail in Ukraine, or if Ukraine does not survive as a sovereign, independent state, they are at risk, and that is a big security threat for Europe and NATO. So, they see the need to support Ukraine as integral to our security through NATO, the US simply doesn’t see it that way. They think NATO is NATO. You do Article 5 protection for NATO members, and the more that is done by our European allies themselves the better, and Ukraine, it’s unfortunate. It’s a war. It’s two kids in the playground, as President Trump has said. So, that is a big difference, and because of that, I don’t think you’re going to see much coming out of NATO itself about Ukraine. There are, you asked, the third thing you asked about is the mood, and I do want to comment on that. Throughout Europe, no matter where you go, there is a very deep and emotional reaction and frustration towards the Trump administration. They say that this is a, you know, they can no longer trust the United States. They can’t rely on the United States. They need to develop their own strategic autonomy. This is going to take time. And they claim that it’s not only about Trump, but it’s the fact that the US is unreliable. If we can elect somebody like Trump twice, and if we, you know, want to hand off Europe to them, they’re going to have to go their own ways. You get a lot of that kind of emotional response. I don’t buy it. I think it is just emotions talking, that the fundamental interests of the US and Europe, fundamental values the US and Europe, will keep us stitched together. And actually, what the Trump administration is doing is ending up strengthening NATO, which is intentional, by the way too. The Trump administration has made it a point to make it better balanced, therefore more politically sustainable, and with a much higher degree of defense spending, so that there is greater deterrence of Russia in Europe. And I think that is, that is what we are seeing. So, when you get out of the European capitals, and all of that moaning that you hear there, and you actually go to NATO headquarters, and you sit down with the the European perm. reps. there, the mood there is actually pretty good. They’re saying, “yeah, you know what, we needed to do this. It’s unfortunate that it took such a kick in the pants for us to do this, but now we are doing it. It is essential. We’re happy about it. The relationships, especially with the US mbassador, Matt Whitaker, we have a good dialog with him. It’s a core, you know, a friendly atmosphere. He listens. He translates the Trump world for us. He can convey messages back.” So at NATO, the mood is actually pretty good, and I also think that that is reflected through the personality of Mark Rutte, the Secretary General. He has developed a very close relationship with President Trump. They have met several times. They call each other. President Trump calls him out of the blue just to vent on something sometimes. So, it’s a very good relationship with the Secretary General. Those are the high points and the things to watch as I see them, I’ll pause here. I know there are some good questions that people will ask, and we’ll come back to them.
Lauren Speranza
That’s super great scene setter. Thank you so much for sharing that and fully agree with your point on Ukraine. And, you know, if anything, hopefully we’ll see something in the declaration that sort of mirrors us language from the Ukraine US minerals deal in terms of talking about the need for peace and a prosperous Ukraine. Maybe that’s best case scenario. Super, let me turn now to Jason Israel because Jason Ambassador Volker mentioned this sort of two-tiered approach to 5% the 3.5 for kind of core defense, the 1.5 for broader things. How do you see the opportunities that come from that 1.5? I mean, I think there’s risk, as the Ambassador pointed out, but potentially opportunities for new things that fall more in the digital space or technology. So, how do you see that playing out? And then, do you think that Europe is also preparing to sort of ramp up production and the defense industrial side of things, to actually deliver these capabilities, noting that there’s a little bit of tension between Washington calling for Europe to buy American equipment. So how are they thinking about those things?
Jason Israel
Yeah, no. Thank you very much, Lauren, and thanks everybody. It’s great to be here today, and I will be at the NATO summit next week, and look forward to also catching up afterwards on reflection. So great question, and as both you and Kurt have noted, there will be a lot of press about the number itself, and that’s what we expect, and I expect you all to report on that. So I’d just love to, as Lauren asked, provide just a few sort of some food for thought when you look at those numbers. First of all, I mean, it is a target. And then, every single country, and this is both from sitting back and looking at how it’s happened over the last couple decades, but also particularly as somebody who helped co-lead the NATO 75 summit last week, in the planning that each one of the countries was working as they are now in their European capitals, trying to figure out how they’re going to thread that needle of being able to make the commitment, but also make the accounting work when every single nation has to make trade offs against what is generally unpopular, massive increases in defense spending. So that’s that’s something to look out for from each country and [unintelligible]. That said, you know, however it happened, the Trump administration deserves credit for these massive increases in commitments and targets that we’ll see. I mean, it was a different, a very different method, and there’s questions about whether or not that method needed to be used to see these numbers. But, you do hear those that have been asking for and for larger for increases in defense spending in European capitals praising, at least the numbers,and the numbers that they’re going up. To your specific question on the one and a half percent, as Kurt said, the bad news is it is very undefined. I mean, you can basically, whether you’re talking about cyber security and infrastructure, you can almost put telecom spending into that. You know, for me, who was very interested in defense technology and the future of it, I’m inspired by it because it does show there’s so much commercial and dual use in technology that can be used for defense spending. And, that needs to be where we go in order to get to scale, commercially available dual use components are going to have to be used. And then, on a side note, we can get to this in questioning how export controls are reformed, which the Trump administration in one of its several executive orders that it released on April 9, is working toward to try to get it so that’s easier to share technology across the alliance. So that’s something to look for. Finally, the big point is, I guess so just just to one, is a long way from commitments next week to actual capability. And whenever we talk about deterrence, which is a key the key word here, right? We look at what is President Putin and the adversaries that are aligning with President Putin, what do they really view as a concern? They do not view announcements as a concern. They wouldn’t view capabilities that are rolled out, maybe even contracts, massive contracts, that are rolled out to produce as a concern. So, I always try to flip it and look at what is, what is the adversary concerned about here, and the announcements themselves may be a little bit concerning, but ultimately, what we should be looking out is for contracts. I’ve written in a recent piece that there was a recent contract with Palantir that they sold Maven technology to NATO itself to a NATO contract, not just an individual country that will perform part of NATO. So I’m looking for those types of things. And I think it was just today or yesterday we saw Rheinmetall and Anduril in a joint venture to build UAVs as well. And of course Auterion, who’s a partner of ours here at CEPA, is working software across many of the pieces of hardware. So, I would look out also for what of those joint ventures co-production are being spent? Because European Union has recently and in its white paper, incentivized production to be done in the European Union. So how the money will be spent? Will it be interoperable? What is the timeline? Those are all things of great interest, and I should mention finally, that on Monday there is a NATO Summit Sefense Forum that is separate from the NATO Industry Forum that has happened for years. That’s in November in Bucharest this year, there is a event on Monday that will have 400 companies and defense ministries in The Hague that will try to discuss some of these issues. That’s the second one, the first, the first one we did last year at NATO 75 to actually have a NATO industry event on the margins of the summit. So that’s something to look out for as well. I’ll leave it there and look forward to your questions.
Lauren Speranza
That’s great. Thanks so much, Jason. While we’re on this, this line of questioning sort of about defense spending, let me go to Lieutenant General Landrum, because in terms of what all this money is going towards, you know, NATO is driving a lot of that conversation through the NATO Defense Planning Process, these capability targets that will be endorsed by leaders at the summit. So can you talk a little bit about the capability gaps? You know, in terms of deterrence, what does, what does? What do European capitals really need to be prioritizing in terms of these capabilities to make sure we hear a lot of this language about trying to make NATO more lethal. So what are the capabilities that we need there and and what do you expect to see coming out, especially as, and I will loop in a question here from the chat already, but especially as we think about the US potentially considering force posture changes on the continent. You know, some of these capabilities would be designed to backfill what the US currently provides. So how are you thinking about those issues?
Lance Landrum
Yeah, thanks, Lauren. I appreciate it. I it’s hard to expand on the really good, really good overviews from Ambassador Volker and also from Jason Israel there, I think I would just second a couple of things on emotion. The description of the emotion by Ambassador Volker, I think, is right on at least, that’s what I am hearing. And there’s a bit of a difference between the public rhetoric of the administration and what is said behind closed doors, and it seems that there, there’s a level of commitment that is really there from the administration, but there is also a significant expectation. And, that’s how we see this manifesting itself, in this 5% commitment that’s coming up. I know that the militaries of the nations are also very much in favor of a focused spending effort on defense capabilities. So, when we break down the three and a half and the one and a half percent, the one and a half percent is a bit vague. It is intended to be focused on national infrastructure, the defense industry base, and things that help with national resilience. If we think about the resilience that Ukraine has shown as a society, both in their human potential of a society, but also their infrastructure, this one and a half percent can’t be understated. But, it is broad and it is pretty vague, and there is no doubt, as Ambassador Volker, said that the nations will maneuver in that space. We’ve seen this many, many times. The three and a half percent is intended to be toward core military capabilities, and as you alluded to we are just now finishing step three of the five-step, five-year NATO Defense Planning Process. It starts with political guidance. It goes and defines minimum capability requirements, and then it levies capability targets on the nations. That was just agreed in the defense ministerial just a few weeks ago. And so the nations have the capability targets, which is essentially NATO giving them their homework to go do. The next step is capability target roadmaps that will be worked in conjunction with the nations in NATO. And then, of course, an assessment the capability targets are based on the requirements defined and in what is sort of known as an umbrella term known as the “family of plans.” The family of plans, where it really starts to define the requirements, all relate to SACEUR’s concept for deterrence and defense of the Euro Atlantic area. And from that, there are strategic subordinate plans across the entire alliance, and then there are regional plans across the entire alliance that bring the level of fidelity of military planning to help define those requirements, which the alliance did in in step two of the NATO Defense Panning Process. So what does it really mean? In reality, it’s hard to write the capability targets are secret, so we don’t really know, okay, but it’s really hard to imagine that it wouldn’t be heavily emphasizing integrated air and missile defense. It’s we cannot ignore the drone missile, cruise missile, in all layers, that attacks that Russia is levying upon Ukraine, and then some of the Ukraine back into into Russia, of course. So, we have to believe it’s a lot on air and missile defense. In fact, Secretary Rutte’s speech at the Chatham House – it was on June 9 or 10th – he was very clear that he’s expecting a 400% increase in air and missile defense. And then broadly, he talked about some other things, 1000s of pieces of armor, millions of artillery shells. He talked very broadly and vaguely about warships and aircraft, and even mentioned 700 F 30 fives, which, okay, the 700 F 30 fives in Europe had been on the books for many, many years. That’s okay, but there’s going to be a huge increase in spending, and where the nations put that for the best effect is going to be the real trick. And how they answer the capability targets, which lend directly to the military requirements defined in those plans, is going to be something that’s very important. And then we have to think about the umbrella of command and control over all of this. The resilience of command and control, the connectivity to feel that forces, the connectivity to head headquarters, and the resilience of that, the ability to disaggregate for survival in today’s modern warfare, with precision, long range, strike re-aggregate at the time and place that it’s needed, and then disaggregate again, both in fielded forces and C2 structures. So let me stop there. That’s just an overview of it, and happy to get into more questions later.
Lauren Speranza
Terrific. That was really helpful. Thank you so much. Jan, if I can come to you next to sort of offer a little bit of a European perspective on some of this. You know, we’ve been talking about how a big goal of this summit is, you know, to show that Europe is stepping up to do more for its own defense, and Germany is certainly doing a lot of things to that end, the EU, as Jason mentioned, is playing a stronger role in terms of providing funding and incentives for allies to spend more. But how do you assess the political will in these capitals to really implement some of these decisions? I mean, I think to pull in one of the questions from the chat, there’s this kind of ongoing struggle of how to keep the alliance politically relevant for future US administrations when we are seeing a bit of oscillation in terms of Washington’s approach to NATO. So how, how is Europe thinking about that? Is there, are they hedging their bets to see if a future administration takes a different approach? Or are folks really all in in terms of moving out on this?
Jan Techau
Yeah, I think. Thank you, Lauren, and thanks to everybody for joining. Of course, it’s always difficult to speak about Europe, Europe per se, as it is not one, you know, entity, one unified thing. But, you know, if I were just, you know, to start perhaps with the generalism that you know, I think the overall level of ambition in Europe has pretty massively increase over the last couple of years, thanks to Vladimir Putin’s actions that he’s taking, they’re much more seriously. It’s much more serious defense debates in almost all capitals. Not everybody’s equally ambitious, obviously, and that is quite natural. You can see that on the map, the closer to Russia you are, the more ambitious you are also. But the main reason for that is that the fiscal situation in Europe and individual countries is actually quite difficult, and many, including some of the big ones on which much of the strategic weight, you know, alas. You know, France has a very, very difficult time putting together a budget. Was close to a budget crisis last year. The UK, despite the announcements that were made by the Prime Minister, is in a very, very difficult spot to get all of that money scraped together for all of these ambitious announcements. Germany is in a slightly different spot. Germany still has room to maneuver in terms of going into more debt. The debt-to-GDP ratio is still, you know, fairly on the healthy side, and that’s what Germany has done. This is where that new leadership sense from the new chancellor is actually coming from. He’s visibly ambitious. He wants to be there. He’s engaged. He has a level of energy that he brings to the issues that I think Olaf Scholz never had. And that is there, you know, he created the fiscal instruments to go into – at least theoretically – unlimited borrowing for defense in Germany. So you can sense there’s an ambition there. There are two bottlenecks in the German case. One is the coalition partner, the Social Democrats are a lot less hot on these issues, as they have traditionally been. And then turning money into assets, is now, for the most part, actually less of an industrial capacity issue than it is a bureaucratic issue. You know, processing all of these things, turning money into contracts and then into actual purchases, is not as easy as people think it is. Basically, you know, when you look at the way Europeans have organized their militaries over the last 2530 years, you know, not only have they changed the structure of their armed forces, but also everything behind it is now basically still in a structure that was built for small scale expeditionary and not large scale territorial defense of NATO. Including procurement and recruitment and training. The whole structure basically needs to be reinvented. I think some countries have covered a lot of ground over the last three years, but reinventing this proves much more difficult, including in Germany, than people I think had anticipated. I think, you know, this is this is the issue. I think the implementation of 5% is one of the big tail risks coming out of this summit. The summit itself is a bit of a nothing burger. Actually, they’ve gotten everything out, including the Russia strategy that was supposed to be written and then will not be written, that was, you know, to keep the peace. essentially. Ukraine is almost, as Kurt said, almost exclusively, almost completely out of this summit, you know, and no big announcements will be made. I think this is the one big tail risk. The second big tail risk is what happens after the American military aid programs run out in the summer. For the Europeans, that’s huge signaling coming from the US side. As Kurt said, you know, for the Europeans, there’s a connection between Ukraine security and their own. And if this support does not continue, perhaps including intel sharing, then the Europeans will also see this as a sign. Not just Zelensky, will see this as a sign. And the third big tail risk, of course, is Posture Review. We mentioned that already briefly, the global Posture Review, as far as I’m concerned, is supposed to produce results by the fall. This is when real numbers will be announced. What will go where? How much of a drawdown can we see. The Europeans were lulled into into being slightly more optimistic about Trump by the fact that he didn’t make big announcements up front when he got into office again in January, there was almost complete silence by him on NATO. And so they started to think that maybe it’s not going to be as bad as we thought it would be, but it could very well be that with these two or three tail risks, the whole thing you know, can turn sour later on. I think all of the risks that the Europeans tried to eliminate from this summit successfully, actually, for the most part, you know, will pop up later again. None of this is resolved, and the uncertainty about what Trump might do, you know, I’m slightly less optimistic than than Kurt, who says, you know, there is this ironclad rule that you know the overlap of interest will keep the US engaged in Europe for the for the long run. I think there’s an element of uncertainty here that the Europeans feel quite strongly, and not least because. Because they find it very different, separate the very aggressive trade agenda from the defense agenda. That’s where a lot of trust also was destroyed. I just wanted to toss that in because we can’t I think look at this in an isolated way. I’ll stop here, and of course, happy to take questions
Kurt Volker
To clarify what, what Jan and I seem to differ on. I was talking post Trump that you know, the relationship with the United States will reset post Trump, not, not with Trump, where tariffs will still be that problem.
Jan Techau
Thanks, got it.
Lauren Speranza
Makes a lot of sense. Thank you, Jan, so much. Really helpful to hear your perspective. Let me go to Ambassador (ret.) McCarthy here, and I will, again, kind of incorporate a question from from folks in the chat here. But Ambassador, you spend a lot of time thinking about sort of below threshold threats, you know, things that fall below the Article 5 armed-attack line and kind of hybrid attacks, if you will, things like critical infrastructure protection, those sorts of things. There’s a question in the chat of you know, how would the US respond if a NATO ally, you know, is affected by a hybrid attack that reaches potentially an Article 5 level, and the alliance has come out and said that, you know, hybrid attack can trigger Article 5. And I know the alliance is starting to think through, kind of, what are those measures that NATO can take to both increase resilience against those kind of attacks, but also increasingly respond to them. I mean, we saw recently this Russian shadow fleet tanker in the Baltic Sea and sort of you know, allies scrambling to figure out how to respond to something like that. So, how do you think the alliance is doing on its strategy to counter hybrid threats? Do you expect to see anything at the summit on these issues?
Ambassador Deborah McCarthy
Well, thanks for the question, Lauren, and thank you all for your statements as we go into the summit, I thought I’d bring the perspective not just of addressing the question, but also of what is happening amongst the NB8. And that’s where, to Kurt’s opening remarks, I think that one of the good things that will happen is it will clearly be said that they do mean it in terms of contributing more. And both in terms of addressing specific threats, I think there will also be a reminder from the NB8 about what is taking place in the Arctic, in the High North and what they’re contributing and plan to contribute – they’re obviously not the only ones – and I think that’s a that’s an important point. And, this is where contributions to the, you know, the 3.5% we’ve seen what’s been happening since all the sabotage attempts that have taken place in the last two years, etc, and the stand up of Baltic century. And then in terms of, you know, the gray zone below the level of Article 5, I think the two points that Jason and even Lance was mentioning, which is, this is where the 1.5% will play a major role, both in terms of opportunities for companies, for demonstration by certain key countries, and certainly the NB8 are, you know, have specialty in these areas. And, so I think this is where, though it’s obviously not on the agenda. More needs to be done, beyond the NB8 and others that I think will make be able to contribute to the 1.5%. Of concern, obviously, to a number of countries, is on a separate issue, which is the Posture Review. Having spent my time in the Baltics, I can assure that that is causing a lot of ‘nervous-nellies’ up there, as any additional soldier that is even present in any rotation is critical to their sense of, you know, protection and deterrence. So I think that’s another element that we need to take into account.
Lauren Speranza
That’s really helpful. Thank you. And to your point, I think you know these frontline countries, whether it’s on NATO’s Northern flank or the Eastern flank, bring so much to the table in terms of countering those types of hybrid threats, and are really leading the charge in developing those capabilities. So great to see these initiatives, you know, of those regional countries coming together to really bolster security, for instance, in the Baltic Sea. That’s great. Well, we’ve got about half our time left here, and I want to be sure I’ve already incorporated some questions that I’ve seen come in the chat that the tie to our themes we were covering, but I want to give folks an opportunity to ask their questions directly. And, perhaps I can go to folks and ask them to unmute and ask their question if folks are still on the line here, can I go to Zarina Zabrisky, who had a question for Jason Israel about NATO’s innovation strategy? Zarina, if you’re still here, can you unmute?
Zarina Zabrisky
Yes, hi, yes. Thank you for that. Very informative Byline Times here. And the question is about technology: what steps is NATO taking to adapt its defense innovative strategy in response to rapid proliferation of drone technologies. And here we’re talking not just about on battlefield, which is developing very quickly. I work in Ukraine as a war correspondent, so I see both the production on sides and the use of these drones, including fiber optic and the frequency wars and so forth, but also the drones are being used for psychological operations. I spent a lot of time in Kherson, where recently Human Rights Watch and United Nations both came to the conclusion that so-called “human safari”, the FPV drones used to terrorize the civilians, qualify as war crimes and the crime against humanity. So, is this being incorporated in the NATO approach? Thank you.
Jason Israel
Thank you so much, Zarina, and thank you for your important work. I’d like to talk about the Ukraine aspect of this and how we’re seeing lessons learned from Ukraine move into the needs for innovation and the requirement. And I’d love to ask Lance to come in, maybe on the NATO portion, because there’s there are elements innovation, funds, Diana, that are a network of pieces that are NATO’s approach to innovation. I’ll also note that I mention, Monday there will be a NATO industry defense Summit. Defense Industry summit on Monday. One of the three pillars of that event is innovation. So we’ll discuss innovation financing and then collective procurement. Those are the three main areas for that on Monday. But, to your question, I’d like to approach it broadly, which is, we’re all trying to gain lessons learned from Ukraine and those incredible fighters in the battlefield, innovating every single day. And as you know and has been reported on quite a bit, how quickly software and hardware can be integrated to turn around to defeat counter UAS is really one of the most remarkable things to watch right now. And those that we know companies that are, we’re in touch with many companies within CEPA that are, that are working that particular problem, where the analogy falls away, unfortunately, is that I mean, Ukraine is primarily fighting, you know, with its own forces and not come in a combined way. Russia is the same. I mean, there’s a bit of North Korea, but no real combined operations there. So when you look at what NATO has to do, is it has to be able to do to catch those lessons learned, but also do it in an interoperable way. And this is where I get back to contracts and how, over the next week, how you see joint ventures created and standards for interoperability set across NATO. And unfortunately, the European Union has generally deferred to NATO for interoperability standards, to be able to make sure that, as they innovate, they do it, they do it separately. I mean, so they do it separately, but in a way that I think Lance put in a way that would see disaggregates and then re-aggregates as well. So, I’d love to turn it to Lance for maybe the NATO piece, and then would love to go back to you to see if that if we answered your question.
Lance Landrum
Yeah, thanks, Jason. You know when I mentioned a priority for the capability targets and for defense spending in the section speech on air and missile defense, I intended to include counter, UAS counter, drone counter, UAS counter, small UAS counter, everything UAS in there. In fact, it is part of his speech. We can’t ignore it. Your comments are exactly right in the and I think the key is, how does NATO as an alliance incorporate the lessons being learned by Ukraine’s defense against drone technology and Ukraine’s ability to create offensive operations from drone technology. That is going to be really, really important for the alliance to capture and put as part of Its learning, and put as part of its operational planning. But remember, the capabilities are all from the nations. Right? The NATO alliance can only do so much. The alliance itself does not buy weapons, per se. There’s a couple of small examples, right? The nations have to do this. The nations have. Be motivated by it, and that is where the alliance role is right. Military plans, I talked about the family of plans, regional plans, etc, creating requirements, and then the process by which those requirements are made clear to the nations in capability targets, the nations have to deliver on that. Jason’s comments about interoperability are right on the nation and combined operations, the alliance among the nations, have to be able to interoperate. They have to be able to integrate, communicate, share data seamlessly across nations and across technical systems. NATO has numerous standards associated with interoperability, communication standards, etc. There’s literally 1000s the nations who have signed up to them have to enforce them and abide by them. We see a lot of nations who have signed up for them, and then they stray away from the agreement. And the nation’s defense industry stray away from those standards. The United States is a big culprit in this as well, right? So, the United States is not a shining example. So, the nations have to motivate the defense industry to come back to these interoperability standards.
Lauren Speranza
Thank you both. That’s really helpful. I’d like to go to Carl from Brussels Signal now, and if I can ask you, I think your second question, particularly on Taiwan and China, is very interesting in this context. Would you be able to ask your question?
Carl Deconinck
Can you, Yes? Can you hear me?
Lauren Speranza
Yes? Perfect.
Carl Deconinck
Yes, so it was mentioned before that NATO is NATO, and that Ukraine was more of a local European scene. So does the US expect Europe to act if Taiwan is attacked by China? Yeah,
Lauren Speranza
Great question. And maybe Ambassador McCarthy, if I could come to you, if you have thoughts on this. I mean, a lot of the countries on the Eastern flank, you know, the Baltics in particular, are watching this, you know, what if similar scenarios, one could argue, you know, they see themselves as vulnerable in the way that that Taiwan might be. Thoughts from you on that
Ambassador Deborah McCarthy
the question is an excellent one, unfortunately, in the context of this upcoming slim and trim NATO Summit, some of the underlying contradictions between positions in one part of the world will not necessarily be addressed. But, certainly as the new administration ramps up its own planning in case of etc, in separate for this is being addressed on, on working more in concert with some of our allies, But your point is very well taken in terms of the underlying contradiction fundamentally as perceived not only by you, but others in the general public.
Lauren Speranza
Yeah, great point. And I think we’re seeing more and more this guidance from from the US administration now to have Europe sort of focus on its backyard and the China threat in Europe, while the US sort of focuses on the Indo-Pacific and relies on its regional partners there to focus on China in the region. Super I would like to come and recognizing we are pressed for time. Just wanted to take a couple of questions together. If I can go to George Allison from UK Defense Journal, you’ve got a good question on kind of the specific capabilities that the Americans provide, and how would Europe make up for those? So George, can I go to you?
George Allison
Hello. Can you hear me?
Lauren Speranza
Yes, perfect.
George Allison
Hi there. So yeah. George Allison from the UK Defense Journal here, my question is twofold, away from frontline combat capabilities, is the Trump administration looking for European allies to replicate capabilities that are currently American dominated, such as logistics or aerial refueling, for example. In order to enable a significantly reduced American logistics presence on the continent, and is 5% enough to achieve this.
Lauren Speranza
Great. Thank you. And can I take a related question about the industry side of this and how we produce those capabilities. Can I go to Ryan Robertson please with Straight Arrow News?
Ryan Robertson
Yeah, hi, I assume everyone can hear me. I was at a Navy League event earlier this year, and there was a an admiral from NATO who said, you know, a lot of these countries want to spend more, but the US companies that make these weapons can’t produce them fast enough, so they’re getting dinged for not spending, but what they want to spend their money on is not available. Are there going to be, like… Is that going to be included exceptions made for those companies who want to buy Patriot interceptors they want to buy HIMARS, but you know, they’re fourth in line and can’t get them quick enough?
Lauren Speranza
Great. Thank you, Ambassador Volker, I saw you nodding your head, but I also so I’d like to get your thoughts, and also Lieutenant Lance Landrum and maybe Jason,
Kurt Volker
Yeah, first off, on replacing the high-end enablers that the US does, I don’t think they’re planning to do that right now. Those are very expensive items, and they have a lot more local – or whatever you would call it – more modest needs that still need to be filled before they would consider something like that, and they, I think they’re going to hold off on the air to air refueling, or more satellites, things like that. On the availability of US kit there. On the one hand, there’s some truth to that, that the backlog is significant on certain things coming from the US. But of course, the answer to that is for Europe to produce its own defense industrial capability, to produce stuff that it needs, and it can do that by itself, and it can also do that in joint ventures with American companies that are ready to invest in Europe, if they know they have offtake. So, I think that if people are making that as an excuse, so we can’t spend the money because the US can’t make it, not a good excuse,
Lauren Speranza
That’s great. And actually, Jan, you might have thoughts on this from a European production perspective, and then Lieutenant John, later, I’ll come back to you.
Jan Techau
Yeah, on the first part of the question, I think there’s a willingness, on behalf of the Europeans, to replicate at least some of these capabilities. Air Defense was mentioned earlier. That’s one thing you know that is now so key, and you know where the US will probably withdraw assets from Europe at some point in the future, because it’s needed elsewhere, quite urgently. Already, production of interceptors is re-channeled away from Ukraine, you know, towards the Middle East, so that we see a shortage there. This is where the Europeans really need to build their capacity. We have an existing industry for these kinds of things scaling them up is key. I mentioned bottlenecks earlier. You know, there’s the I think money in the short term is not the bottleneck. There’s a lot of fresh money in the market. Money is a medium and long term concern for Europeans that are cash strapped. They’re not cash strapped at the moment, the problem now is get your procurement bureaucracy, you know, up to speed, and then come up with long-term contracts so that the industry has a foundation on which and can build. Then, you know, also making these massive investments in production capacity. We see, we saw how long it took for the Europeans, you know, to ramp up their artillery ammunition production. It’s now no longer a problem, but it took them two and a half years, basically, to get there. And, that is the relatively low tech thing we’re talking about. We’re not talking about, you know, the very sophisticated machinery and software that you need for modern, you know, air defense systems like IRIS-T, where we have production, but, you know, very slow production. So, this will remain a problem. This is where the Europeans fear of that gap comes from, that, you know, yes, we are going to build this up. Yes, we are ready to spend, but it will take time. And and this is where this idea comes from, that that gap could perhaps be closed by what they call a managed kind of, you know, manage draw down, or manage withdrawal that you know, the assets that will be taken out of Europe by the Americans can slowly be replaced in a process that is not an abrupt one, but a planned one. So, I think this is one of the key political tasks, also of the future to come, kind of come up with that scheme so that at no time there is a gaping hole in deterrence in Europe. And then finally, of course, there are a few things that the Europeans will not be able to replace, the intelligence infrastructure, the satellite infrastructure, ISR command and control stuff. All of this, you know, is so sophisticated and so far away from what the Europeans have that it cannot be replaced very quickly, and probably not even in 10 years. Depends on who you ask. And then, you know, the one thing that can certainly not be replaced is nuclear. I think this is the one big thing that the elephant in the room that very few people really seriously talk about, the fact that European security depends to a large extent on American nuclear deterrence, and this has luckily, perhaps not been discussed, meaning that it’s not, you know, imminently at risk. But if we were, you know, completely serious about the question how to keep Europe safe, then nuclear needs to be part of the debate as well. This is where the Europeans will not go anywhere near what might be needed if the American deterrent completely fell away, I’ll stop here. Yeah, great points
Lauren Speranza
General, thank you.
Lance Landrum
Really good, robust conversation here. Let me see if I can just hit some points. I’m going to differ a little bit from Ambassador Volker and Jan. On the question regarding the logistical capabilities and enablers from the United States. So I don’t have an insight on exactly where this is going, but I feel that the European nations and Canada, we can’t let Canada off the hook on any of this have, at least have created a foundation that they can build on, on some certain capabilities. So, for example, the European Air Transport Command is a framework where there’s a sharing of transport aircraft and air refueling aircraft. I do think that that could be beefed up, particularly with Airbus made tankers, right?So, the air refueling fleet of the United States is stretched thin every single day. It is a hugely important enabler for the United States, and will be consumed in the Indo-Pacific if there’s a crisis there. So I think that there really is a foundation that Europe can grow on. That regarding things, there is some exquisite capability, I get it. But when we talk about space and satellites, I think that we need to not talk about decades old mindset of a trillion dollar exquisite system that is government owned and up in space. And we have to switch our thinking into modern, commercially available space architecture and infrastructure that is available for purchase. There are some small, very wealthy European nations with very small, normal, traditional capability, land forces and equipment, but have bank accounts that can purchase this type of capability for the NATO alliance. And what is currently resident through commercial space and growing is really, really good right now, and only getting better. And so I think that there is an opportunity for those types of things. On the defense industrial base, I couldn’t agree more with the comments about, “hey, you know thecompanies cannot deliver.” Secretary [unintelligible] used this in his speech, “it takes 10 years to get a Patriot.” Okay, great, I agree with all of that. We all have to get after this partnership between government requirements and the industrial base and being able to deliver and motivate industry to do whatever they need to do in order to deliver at scale. But industry has a rightful mindset of business and profit, so somebody has to get in the room and really hammer this out. There are cases where there are very important defense industrial base that are working one shift a week, one shift a day, one eight or 10 hour shift a day. And it’s pretty important stuff that they’re making and they’re missing two other shifts over a 24 hour period. I’m going to say one last thing. When nations or military forces are saying that they can’t spend their money because the the industry won’t deliver, ask them how they’re spending their money on operations and maintenance and readiness. Okay, it’s not a perfect match. It’s not a perfect match. But how much are you spending on training, exercising, sending your forces to NATO exercises? I’ll give you an example. There’s NATO Fleet Forces that were trying to use some levels of funding from the nations in common, funding in order to just operations and maintenance, fuel inside the warships, right, port visits, etc, and this meets with resistance. So, I think that there’s a lot of O and M money for readiness of equipment and forces that where this money can be spent, and the nations have to sign up for that and do it.
Lauren Speranza
Great. Ambassador Volker, please.
Kurt Volker
Yeah, thanks. I thought it might be useful. There’s some really good questions in the chat, just to maybe quickly, just run through a couple of those. Would that be okay?
Lauren Speranza
Sure, that sounds good. And when you’re finished, Jan, I know you have to jump right at 10:30 so I’ll come back to you for any final thoughts.
Kurt Volker
Unfortunately, similar situation. So, US troop withdrawals. There is a lot of anxiety about US troop withdrawals in Europe. There isn’t any basis to that at the moment, but it is, of course, something the Trump administration wants to do. If you think about this, we were down around 30,000 or so during the Obama administration. We are up between 80 and 100,000 now, because of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the natural level is going to be lower than that, especially if Europeans do pick up defense spending and defense capabilities the US can draw down and focus elsewhere. So, that is something that will happen at some point. But, I wouldn’t look at this with great alarm, and I wouldn’t look at this as something evil that Trump is doing compared to anybody else this is the natural flow concerning would the US defend NATO countries under Article 5 scenario? This is a really hard question. Again, I would de trumpify it. If you had a creeping border issue with Russia and Estonia during the Obama or Biden administration, I would not think they would go to war with Russia over that. I hate to say it. But, I just don’t think that anyone you know Obama, Biden Trump, is going to want to get into a large war with Russia when they think it can be de-escalated, and so that is a concern. If it’s a major conventional attack, if you have an invasion to take over one of our NATO allies, or it’s a major military operation, yes, I think there would be a response to that. But what I think is much more likely is the amplification of what are already hybrid attacks by Russia against NATO, which we tend to play down. And I could just see they’re already moving the border on the river between Russia and Estonia. And I can see them saying, “nope. Now it’s going to be the whole river.” And now they’re going to say, “and actually, this portion of the bank is ours.” And how are we going to respond to that? And I would also, in addition to de trumpifying it, I would de Americanize it, because I would also think we would have a lot of pressure from West European allies also not to launch into a war with Russia over something that is perceived to be minor and can be de-escalated, managed, negotiated. I think that that is it’s a vulnerability that we have to talk more about, and we should be doing more about hybrid attacks against NATO allies already, in order to prepare a way in which we know how to respond to these things. One more that I… Yes, about the Carl from the Brussels signal, this debate on 5% is pretty much already over. Everyone has agreed to it. They’re going to do it and do they mean it? You know, we can debate that, but they’re all going to say that they mean it.
Lauren Speranza
Thanks, Ambassador. That’s really helpful. I know we have two questions, kind of focused on, on the Arctic, which I want to come to, but Jan, I know you have to jump, so just any last word from you on kind of something you think might not get the attention it deserves on the summit agenda.
Jan Techau
I mentioned the the the NATO Russia strategy that was scrapped in order to make this a diplomatically less dangerous kind of summit. You know, for a number of European countries, such a document at some point down the road would be quite useful, because it would make selling the additional defense spending easier domestically. But the fear is, my fear is, that the Russia file actually in NATO with this summit, starting with the summit is dead for a few years to come, and that we will not really seriously and structurally talk about the posture and the medium to long-term strategy that NATO needs to embrace vis-a-vis Russia. I think that’s one thing to perhaps revisit and see how much we can squeeze out of this without making it an explosive issue between the two sides. And then just one macro point, you know, the I think the Americans want from the summit that the Europeans are finally getting serious about the burden shift, and the and the Europeans are at a peak level of willingness to do that, I think. But at the same time, they need time, because this, this shift takes longer, even with the best of will. And I think the secret to success for NATO over the next 5-10, years will be to handle this kind of mismatch, that there’s an urgency for the shift, and at the same time, a need for time. We somehow need to square that circle, and I think that’s where the sweet spot of the alliance will be over the next couple of years. Thank you for your great opportunity. Thanks a lot.
Lauren Speranza
Great. Thank you so much. And I know, as folks have to drop please feel free to do so. I’m going to keep the conversation going just for a few more minutes to make sure we get through our questions. But thank you so much to all of our panelists. Saeed, let me come to you. I know I think we’ve covered your second question about sort of the political dynamics, but you noted a question on the Arctic, and I’ll combine that with Catherine’s question on Canada too. So please go ahead.
Saeed Minhas
Thank you, Lauren, and it’s wonderful to listen to all the panelists, great insights, but it’s a very slim, smart NATO Summit, which is going to be happening, and we might not be seeing many of the things not discussed there, except for 5% 2% or one and a half percent. But, my question is that the now related to this also is, and I have attended several summits, especially during the Afghan war. And my question at that time was also that with so much a big coalition partners there, there is hardly any R&D going on to learn from the mistakes which NATO is making while doing the operational things, whether it was Afghanistan, whether it was Iraq, whether it was any other operation which they had jointly done inside or outside the UN per views, there is hardly anything which I am not hearing still now. So, do you hear – any of the panelists can enlighten us – that is there any seriousness on to look into, not only the operational and the logistical side of it, but also the research side of it, that what worked and what did not work, and how it can work. Because right now I can see, and it was always the case that the top big force Germany, maybe Italy and France and the US and UK, top five, you can say. They are making the decisions, and rest of them are standby, they are there to follow it up in whatever capacity they can, including Canada. Now Canada is also looking in that term, and that what can be done about the Arctic thing, because it’s also a serious thing from on which the Russians are really pushing hard. And is NATO serious to look into that direction, also only focusing on Indo-Pacific and the Middle East right now, is the option or is that a priority anymore for the NATO alliance forward? Thank you.
Lauren Speranza
Thank you so much. And if I can just pile on with one more question from Catherine Morrison here on the Arctic angle. You know, she’s, Catherine’s based in Canada, and was wondering, sort of, how do we see the summit through the lens of Canada? Lots of discussion going on about the US-Canada relationship right now. Of course, Canada hosts the G7, so why don’t I come to Ambassador McCarthy for the sort of Arctic Canada question, and then I will loop back to Jason and to Lieutenant General Landrum.
Ambassador Deborah McCarthy
Sure. Thank you. I think it’s important to recognize that of the five founding members, the five countries who are Arctic nations, the commitment to the Arctic, though waning and going up and down over the years, the attention is certainly increased with, you know, Arctic strategies developed by by each nation. And, then when you have Finland and Sweden joining, you’ve got pretty much a formidable seven that are obviously focusing on the area. And, though not incorporated formally in other than in a regional plan, the activities that are being undertaken as the oceans melt and more commercial activity takes place, let alone militarization, that’s taken place and continues to take place. So, it’s a it’s an area of vast interest. And this is where, I think, even though the United States, you know, is pulling back to some extent, in terms of Europe, it cannot pull back from being an Arctic nation because of its physical location, and in that sense, in partnership with Canada and others. And we’ve seen a number of ramp-up of NATO activities in in the area. And you know, whether it’s regional, you’ve got, you know, the Nordic Defense Concept that was signed by some of them. I mentioned Baltic Century, but that’s a little bit separate, and then also other other elements that are taking place. So, because the governance structure of the area is quite weak, the Arctic Council, does not have security within its mandate. And obviously now Russia is not participating. The gap is is being filled by security measures, whether regional and increasingly on the NATO level. So again, because of the very physical nature of the area, it is not one where you can toss the ‘hot-potato’ to, you know, one of the seven, and expect them to carry the burden. So, there will be cooperation and increased cooperation amongst the, at least the seven, then beyond to NATO, in the area as Russia China continue their activities. With China, with, you know, near Arctic nation, but Russia definitely intent on defending its ever expanding concept of Its frontier along the Arctic, and I’ll stop there.
Lauren Speranza
Excellent. Thank you, Jason, I saw you nodding your head during Saeed’s question about lessons learned for NATO, maybe you want to pick up on that and then offer any final thoughts?
Jason Israel
Yeah, no. Thanks. Thanks so much. Saeed, great question. I love how you integrated the regions and how they interact with one another in this, in your question. So, the first big point when you ask about is our research and development happening, is: what is it that incentivizes a company to do research and development? That’s the that’s the question we constantly asked ourselves in the White House these last few years, because some people would say, “Well, why don’t they invest in research and development?” And then I go back to what I said in my opening comments, which is, this is about contracts. Whether you know, there’s a lot of people that love to quote Freedom’s Forge and what happened in World War Two and the US being able to rapidly industrialize. But part of that was, it was all based on contracts that were made to stand up and do research and development. So what I’d say is, you’re starting to see companies put in their own capital to research and development to create something that does not yet have a requirement that comes from governments, but that they believe is something that those governments will want to buy. And that’s a very different thing. So I’d watch those companies and those dynamics and as… My big question for next week is not just how much everybody’s going to many are going to many are going to focus on the 5%, but how will that money be spent? Is it going to go to companies that are creating something and development so that trying to stay a step ahead of what requirements might be needed. So the good news about that, whether it’s the Arctic or you mentioned the Indo-Pacific, is that these capabilities can be used, you know, broadly. I try to remind, if you’ll notice when they look at the map, is that Russia is also a Pacific nation. And as the United States looks to hold or put more in the Indo-Pacific and more there, there’s a big overlap between what things can hold Russia at risk in the Indo-Pacific, and I would say the same for the Arctic. When you look at Russia’s national security strategy, they look at the Arctic as second only to the near abroad when it comes to their interests. And whereas there’s a lot of news about the adversaries aligning –China, North Korea, Iran and Russia – that is not an alliance. They are. They do not trust one another. They look at individual things that they can work together on, and China would love to become a Arctic nation by proxy through Russia, and Russia does not want China to be involved in the Arctic, so that ‘No Lmits’ partnership that you’ll see certainly has limits, but you’ll start to see more dual-use technology be used in the Arctic. And it’s an opportunity. It’s really an opportunity that’s something we track closely at closely at CEPA, we’re doing some Arctic work. We’ll do a field study later this summer as well on that, and would love to stay in touch as we do so.
Lauren Speranza
Thanks so much, Jason. General, I’ll come to you to kind of any any final thoughts on any of these issues.
Lance Landrum
Yeah, I just wanted to maybe address Saeed’s question about lessons learned a little bit. I think if I caught you correctly said you were asking about incorporating lessons learned from like Afghanistan, you may have related it to logistics. Let me just hit on that a little bit. The alliance’s ability to codify the lessons learned and act in the lessons learned could be better. I’ll just put it that way, right. The alliance needs to agree at unanimous consensus on the lessons identified and the lessons learned, and sometimes this is a very difficult process. So, it was a frustrating bureaucracy associated with reports that are associated with that type of topic, and then getting the alliance to agree, and then getting the alliance to codify that in doctrine. So, it could be better. Now let me spin-off of that. The alliance is shifting to a completely new mindset of major force-on-force theater warfare against peer competitors, that is a much different problem set from the operations in Afghanistan. I still think there would be appropriate lessons from command and control, integration of coalition forces, command relationships, etc, etc. And then let me close by just kind of then going a little bit further into logistics, and also this 1.5%. I think that there really could be an opportunity, right? I’m trying to be an optimist, instead of what I saw often was political maneuvering. But, the 1.5% associated with infrastructure, defense, industrial base, etc, could really be used in a way that is positive with the citizens of the nations to build infrastructure that is both a benefit to the citizens society and commercial operations, as well as beefing up the ability to project forces in power and rapid reinforcement. The United States and Canada are not the only nations that need to project forces. The nations of Western Europe will need to project forces to the North and the Arctic, to the South and to the East, and the infrastructure through road systems, bridge systems, rail systems, aerial ports and seaports is really, really important for that. And I could see, I can see in my optimistic moments, where a government with society and industry could all work together to make this work for everybody.
Lauren Speranza
Great points. Thank you all so much for the really thoughtful comments, perspectives, concrete examples, really helpful to steer folks in terms of what to watch coming out of the summit here. Thanks so much all of our participants for their really good questions. I think we had a great discussion that span the gamut, and I think we got to almost all of the questions. So thank you all so so much. And I. I really appreciate everyone’s time, and I’ll hand it back to Sarah to close us out and just give a big thanks to CEPA for hosting us today.
Sarah Krajewski
Thanks, Lauren. As always, thank you to all of our experts for providing just wonderful expertise and insights, and to everyone who joined the call today for their fabulous questions. Great to hear from all of you. I will be sending a recording and auto-generated transcript your way following this call. A full edited transcript will be on our website in the coming weeks. If you have any more questions or want to get in touch individually with some of our experts, feel free to reach out to me at press@cepa.org, and I will get back to you as soon as I can.
