Edward Lucas
Hello, everyone from wherever you are joining us. I’m not Sam Greene, I’m Edward Lucas, because Sam has been unfortunately distracted by something else, but I am a Senior Non-resident Advisor from the Center for European Policy Analysis. So I’m not in Washington, DC, I’m in London, and we have a great panel here to discuss the German elections. We have Jessica Berlin, who’s Senior Fellow on our Transatlantic Defense and Security program, and we have Reinhard Bütikofer, who’s Senior Fellow for Tech Policy, and it’s distinguished German politician. And we also have Volodymyr Dubovyk, Senior Fellow in our Democratic Resilience program. And we have a lot to discuss, and I look forward very much to questions from this very distinguished list of attendees, but I just want to start by saying that we all obviously have in our thoughts the terrible news from Munich this morning, the terrible physical damage to those hit by that car is matched also by the mental trauma to their loved ones and really to everyone who lives in Munich, who lives in Germany, and whoever goes out in the street. These random acts of terror are terribly unsettling, and although we are lucky to live in safety and freedom most of the time, these events are a reminder of how thin that ice can be, and our discussion will inevitably be very pragmatic and focused on the electoral mechanics, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the human dimension to what we’re discussing. I’m sure everyone on this call knows an awful lot about German politics, and I suspect many will know more than me, although I am a former Germany correspondent. But the one point I want to make is that everyone else is taking interest in this election as well. It’s rather like an American election. Germany’s business is everyone’s business. We are longing for Germany to take a diplomatic, political and military lead to match its economic might. And we’re actually longing for the German economic motor to start igniting and pulling all of Europe forward. When Germany does well and acts well, we all benefit. And when Germany is in a mess, we’re all in a mess, and particularly now at a time when there are so many questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship. So that’s my really only framing comment. I’m going to go to our three commentators in turn for their thoughts on what to look out for, what the good news is, what the bad news is, and then I shall look forward to your questions. We may not run for the full hour, but I will take questions either from the if you post them in the chat, that’s fine, or if you stick your hand up electronically, I shall try to come to you that way as well, but I’m going to give to you, Jessica, first of all, give us your thoughts on a scale of one to 10, where 10 is delight and nought is panic. Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht. Where are you?
Jessica Berlin
Ich bin sehr from schlafgebrecht. I’m definitely torn from sleep. Hello, everyone, Jessica Berlin, here in Berlin, the name thing is just a coincidence, I’m afraid, but no, my ancestors were not Berliner royalty, rather the opposite. Just some quick overview of the trends and what we’re looking at here, and why, as from Edward’s referenced poetry quote, why should we be worried or not. Firstly, just the basics voter priorities in Germany. This year, we’re seeing security take a prominence as a debate of discussion like never before, it’s ranked third in terms of what German voters are concerned about and what will be informing their choices. But of course, the top two topics are the economy and migration. And when we talk about migration, we mean primarily, of course, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers who have been denied their asylum applications and what to do about the staggering numbers of migrants and refugees who have come to this country over the last 15 years. Now that’s that’s not, perhaps a huge shift, but what we see is the most concerning is, I think, the lack of an attractive potential governing coalition. Okay, there is, right now, no potential coalition constellation that people are happy or excited about, and that’s a concerning signal for German democracy. For those of you on the call who may not be familiar with how our coalitions are formed, traditionally, Germany has had two-party coalitions, either the CDU and the SPD, or the SPD and the Greens. And a couple of times we’ve had smaller parties like the FDP also forming the critical mass. The last coalition that we had the three-way traffic light coalition between the SPD, Greens, then FDP, of course, crashed and burned, and the concern is that if there is not enough of a majority between two parties to form a stable government, that the parties will be forced into trying to build on yet another three-way coalition, which would be not only unpopular but very cumbersome because of the divisions between the parties. The makeup of any of this would also be dependent on which of the smaller parties actually survives the election and manages to pass the 5% hurdle and join Parliament and be part of the coalition calculations at all. Also bearing in mind the most likely outcome, a grand coalition, a return to the CDU-SPD alliance would be really a gift to the AfD above all, because the grand coalition was the constellation we had, primarily during Angela Merkel’s era, and so a return in such short time to precisely the coalition, and in some cases, indeed, the similar same people, same rosters of parliamentarians who were responsible for Germany ending up in the state it’s currently in, and having been the creators of many of the problems German voters care about and are upset about having them come into power again would be just fuel to the fire of the AfD’s populism and their ability to undermine everyday voters faith in the traditional Democratic German parties to deliver results and make the change this country needs. So that’s a real concern. If we end up with another grand coalition, then we would need to see some real courage coming from it, and there is no indication as of yet that that would be on the cards. The other primary option for a two way coalition would be black-green or CDU-Green, a centrist alliance between center left and center right, but it remains to be seen if the Greens perform strongly enough to make that even an option. I will stop there.
Edward Lucas
Right. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for cheering us up. You say that we are going into the German kitchen, and from the ingredients available, there is no dish which we can cook that the customers are going to want, which is one way of looking at it. I wonder if Reinhard, can you be a bit more cheerful? You know all about German elections, having fought a few in your time. And it’s certainly true that the Greens are, I’m not sure how badly the Greens are doing about as well as they did at the last election. It’s just they’ve gone down lot from the in the meantime. But anyway.
Jessica Berlin
Edward, I don’t know if it’s just me, but it’s very hard to hear you.
Edward Lucas
I am talking. I’m not muted. I’m using the best. Maybe it’s your audio, the others are hearing me. Let’s try it like that, right?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Yes, well, Edward, I’m not sure I can cheer you all up. Maybe before I try to get there, I would add a couple of points to what Jessica said that that describe a rather troubling trajectory. On which we are. For instance, if you compare how much the leading candidates of all the centrist, mainstream parties are trusted by voters, if you compare today’s numbers with the numbers of three years ago, none of the centrist parties does better than they did three years ago. Merz has less trust than his predecessor had. Same for Scholz, same for the Greens, same for the Liberals. Another element is that recently, the antagonism on some of the issues, in particular on the migration issue between the centrist parties, center-left and center-right, has been stronger than it’s been over at least a couple of decades. So the the centrifugal forces within the democratic camp have increased. Third, there is a perennial debate within Germany has been for many years about a so-called firewall against the extreme right, the so called Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) and all the major parties, all the democratic parties, have insisted that they want to stick to that principle of not aligning themselves with AfD, but that is increasingly being undermined from below. Mr. Merz, the leader of the Conservatives, has been accused of breaking the firewall. I would not necessarily agree with the very heavy criticisms that you’ve heard from certain Democrats, for instance, but I would and I believe him when he says he does not want to work with the extreme right, and I think most Germans do believe him. But from below, from the local level, from the länder level, there might be an undermining of that firewall. And so together, I would say that there’s more volatility with regards to the democratic system altogether than we’ve seen in many years. To try to add a few, maybe more positive notes, I think it’s a fact that basically everybody agrees that there are three main challenges that any government has to deal with, namely the challenge of dealing with migration, the challenge of reforming the economy and getting it going more strongly again, and of course, the security challenge. And that is at least positive in the way that there’s not going to be a debate over what are the prior–what should be the priorities? Of course, that does not necessarily include that it would be easy to come up with a good, negotiated solutions or ways of dealing with these issues. I would expect that the most probable coalition after February 23rd, and after the negotiations with which Mr. Merz has said he would want to conclude within eight weeks, would be a coalition, which Jessica called the “Grand Coalition.” I mean, it would not be that grand, not even from the numbers, but that is much more probable. The other alternative, which might include the Greens, might not be possible numbers-wise, but red and black, that’s the colors of the Socialists and the Conservatives. A black and red coalition is not guaranteed either. If things develop in a very difficult direction, then you might have eight parties represented in the next German Bundestag, CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Greens, Left, AfD and Sahra Wagenknecht, and that might force Mr. Merz to form a tripartite coalition. So a lot is up for grabs, and a lot is still very unclear. However, the one thing that I would say is clear is the next leader of Germany will be Mr. Merz, and judging from his way of dealing with some of the more recent European issues, I’m not completely optimistic, but I would think he will be a better ally, for instance, vis-a-vis Poland, vis-a-vis France, also vis-a-vis the United States, and then Scholz has been.
Edward Lucas
Well, that’s something to look forward to. I think we should go straight home to you, Volodymyr, are you in Odesa at the moment? Tell us where you’re speaking from. I could see Reinhard seemed to be on a train or plane, which is very impressive. Where are you, Volodymyr, and how does it look from your point of view?
Volodymyr Dubovyk
Yeah, I’m outside of Ukraine. I’m in Paris right now, so not on train or plane, but in my hotel. Yeah, I have a little fellowship here with a National Center for Scientific Research, two weeks fellowship here in Paris.
Edward Lucas
Good. And from a Ukrainian point of view, when you look at Germany, do you want to weep, shout, or cry?
Volodymyr Dubovyk
Yeah, well, I mean, we should actually, most of us are now glued to what is coming from across the ocean. But having said that, I actually think that there’ll be a lot of role to be played by European powers, there should be, regardless of what Trump and his team come up with for Ukraine in terms of their negotiation progress, process, or whatever. In terms of Germany, I am primarily, of course, interested in the role that Germany can play to continue to assist Ukraine. So obviously, will there be more assistance? What kind of assistance, just financial assistance for the government to be running, or energy, or, you know, the medicine, healthcare in Ukraine and stuff like that. Or would there continue to be the arms supply as well? Or both, you know, so for the for the government, of course, of Germany, we’ve had a very loud statements earlier in the full-scale war on ’22 about the Zeitenwende, about the dramatic turn and shift of German policy, but we didn’t see such a dramatic turn as such. We’ve had some changes. We’ve seen some changes. So I understand when Chancellor Scholz is sometimes is saying that we’ve implemented so much that we haven’t been doing before, and we are assisting Ukraine. If you take the US out of the picture, then Germany is clearly a leader in total numbers in help to Ukraine. So why are you being critical about us not doing enough. But then, of course, the expectations have changed. I think most people have really expected a dramatic shift, you know, in in understanding by German government of its potential and potential role. And here comes the problem, because there is no leadership. You know, a lot of people expected Germany to be one of the leaders, at least in Europe. And instead, Europe is leaderless in some ways. There are certain initiatives coming out of Paris, where I am right now, or Berlin, or London, or other places, but the level of consolidation, and coordination, and cohesion is not as we would like to have it, and Germany is basically consciously, deliberately avoiding stepping into the leadership role. So that’s worries us, you know? That’s one of those cases when people, historically speaking, were often worried about Germany being too active. But right now, people are worried about the opposite, Germany being led, and Germany being following only and not contributing enough in terms of a strategic vision for what needs to happen next, because it is a huge player. The current economic situation is a problem which limits Germany in many ways, but then, of course, still, it’s a formidable economy. So it’s probably temporary event, or at least, even if not temporary, then still, it should not preclude Germany from playing a big role. And I regret, of course, that in the course of this election campaign, it came to some politicians basically saying, we either support Ukraine or we support German pensioners, retirees or social sector or educations. Here in Germany, it shouldn’t be either or; it should be both, and Germany is perfectly capable of doing both. So that’s unfortunate. And of course, immigration, I conclude here, the focus on immigration might actually impact Ukrainians, many of them, at least 1.2 million under temporary protection in Germany. I’m afraid that there will be changes, negative changes to them and maybe eventually, because the public opinion is turning sour on the whole idea of immigrants.
Edward Lucas
Well, thanks. You put your finger on one of the big paradoxes that we both want Germany to be strong, and yet people say, “Oh, my goodness, can Europe cope with a strong Germany?” And sometimes German saying that and sometimes others. There’s another one with you put your finger on, which is Germany saying, “we’ve done so much, this is so totally unusual for us,” and yet the rest of the world says you haven’t done nearly enough. And the third is that we’re all sitting here wondering what to do about America when we’re sitting on in a European economy, including Britain and Norway, of 20 trillion euros in GDP, we can actually afford to do all this ourselves. It’s really a question of political willpower. The questions are beginning to come in, and I’m very pleased to see one from James Crisp, who’s asking about, what will Germany’s influence in the EU be? Obviously, von der Leyen comes from the same party family as Merz. So I don’t know if anyone wants to comment on what their relationship is. What’s going to happen to German industry in an era of Trump tariffs? That would be another interesting question. So let me try. Let’s try that. First of all, on you Jessica, and then on Reinhard and, meanwhile, do please stick your hands up or put a question into the into the chat to follow up on that. Go ahead, Jessica.
Jessica Berlin
I turned off my camera because I’m having difficulties sometimes hearing you guys. I hope you can hear me clearly.
Edward Lucas
We hear you fine.
Jessica Berlin
Yeah? Okay, glad to hear it. Then it’s just the problem on my side, as Germany, unfortunately, including in Berlin, has terrible ICT infrastructure, and my Wi-Fi is apparently not up to the task. But thankfully, I can read this question. So yes, so Merz and von der Leyen on hand, of course, they are both from the CDU. They are party allies, but that’s not to say that they are BFFs. They certainly have had tensions in the past. They are the two most powerful figures in the CDU, and so, especially with an eye to Friedrich Merz’s, kind of notorious ego, they’re almost set up to have the occasional friction that being said, they–I do think that this will be a natural space for them to seek collaboration and consensus between Brussels and Berlin. They can and should use that relationship, but a lot of it will depend on who is Merz’s coalition partner or partners even. This won’t just be for him to decide. And von der Leyen said she is very keen, of course, always to be standing clearly for Europe, and not only, and certainly not preferentially, for Germans interests. So in inverse situation, it would be my hope that as a fellow German and fellow CDUer, that if Germany would be dragging her feet, I would be interested to see a soft power she can exert to try to bring her party colleagues in line more with European unity and solidarity.
Edward Lucas
Super. Reinhard, you actually were a member of the European Parliament for quite a few years. So you know, the European institutions. How do you see Germany fitting into the EU in the era of von der Leyen?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, I would dare say that probably von der Leyen is the best leader we have around Europe these days. But on the other hand, I know of no single national capital that really likes being led from Brussels. That’s a very stark contradiction, and I’m not sure everything will go smooth between Merz and von der Leyen. Take as an example, the EV tariffs that wonderline pushed through under the pressure of many sectors of German industry, only German automotive industry was opposed. All the other sectors were in favor. Merz opposed her on that count as the choice, and he said he would have done everything like Scholz did that’s not so promising. On the other hand, there has been talk that maybe the present German Ambassador to the EU, Michael Clauss, could be the Europe guy the Chancellery. That would be a great prospect, because Clauss is not just a smooth operator, he’s also a guy with a very clear orientation. He served in Beijing. He knows the challenges coming from there, that’ll be [unintelligible]. And also a third example, when Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister, called the Baltic Sea Summit recently, Scholz was not there and he didn’t try to get an invitation. That would not have happened to Merz. I think Merz would not have stand on this–stood on the sidelines, idle while the NB8 and Poland and the UK and even France got together to try to coordinate. So I would be cautiously optimistic that there will be some improvement, but not across the board.
Edward Lucas
Very good. Let’s go to a voice from Paris, albeit a Ukrainian voice, Volodymyr. How do you think the rather divided and distracted French political class is going to look at the outcome of the general elections, and Chancellor Merz?
Volodymyr Dubovyk
I think that here in Paris and France, they actually prepare to work with whoever emerges as the leader, as part of the government, as a new chancellor. So there is understanding that there is a need to work with Germany, and there is some regret, I think, about Germany not coming up stronger, with a bigger role within Europe and European Union and the French-German alliance, I would say, but definitely partnership has been a definitive staple in the future of European order for decades, really, and it should be even more so the case in these times of ongoing Russian full-scale invasion, which is the biggest threat and challenge for an entire European security, but it’s not–but it’s lacking. It’s lacking. So that’s that’s a problem. You know, the Germany is still trying to lead by soft power, mostly. But in the times when it’s not enough, you know, when Germany has been known for a long time as a soft power player, mostly. But now more is needed, more production of military facilities, more procurement of weapons and so on. And this is not forthcoming, and not because it’s not supported by German public, by the way. It is primarily the problem on the level of political elites, because if you see the sociological polls in Germany, a lot of German support actually, the armament of the country in spending war on defense and actually supporting Ukraine as well, but politicians always find a way to find some elements of, you know, that they can point to and say, “No, no, Germans are not supporting this.” Like even more or less, reasonably recent, relatively recent results in three large lands in the East. They are also not very representative of the entire German but if you look at the nationwide sociological polls, Germans understand that the situation around Germany has changed. European security is under stress, under duress, major threat, and therefore things need to be done, but instead, it just kicking the can down the road. So, so that is a problem, I think, with Germany, that’s a lack of this strategic vision. We’ve heard some criticism about the former US Biden Administration, about not having enough of a vision, you know, limiting themselves to phrases like, “we’ll stand with Ukraine as long as it takes,” and being afraid of concluding that sentence and like and saying, “as long as it takes to do what exactly?” And but here in Germany, it’s even more so. It’s almost like a pride is not having a strategic vision, which is wrong. For the country of this size and the public of this country is also demands that the Germany plays bigger role.
Edward Lucas
I remember Helmut Schmidt back in the early 80s saying, if you have visions, see a doctor. So this antipathy towards having vision strategic otherwise, goes back some way. Of course, Schmidt actually had quite a powerful vision. There’s an excellent question from Anupriya from Euractiv–strongly recommend subscribing to your Euractive if you don’t, it’s absolutely indispensable–and she’s asking about foreign interference. The social media interference doppelganger network, and of course, that’s from from Russia, and then Elon Musk using X to promote AfD. Jessica, you know an awful lot about this. Don’t feel any need to turn your sound on–your picture on, happy sound. But how perhaps has it been? Yeah, any countermeasures?
Jessica Berlin
Yes, I’ll take yeah on the disinformation. Excellent question. So the long and short of it is, Russian disinformation networks basically have open season on targeting German voters with disinformation the federal government, neither the federal government nor the individual parties have the resources or knowledge to actively combat this issue. They have more or less admitted this to me openly as well, when I’ve discussed it with them. On the other hand, they also, thus far, have not accepted offers of assistance or sought support from countries and organizations from our allies further east, who are very experienced and skillful in combating and tracking Russian disinformation. So that’s the bad news. The good news I can give only with a wry smile that you cannot see is that the the leading parties, the communications and campaigns, have been so wrought with missteps for communications that they’re running jokes…
Edward Lucas
We’re losing you. I’m so sorry, Jessica, we are–your broadband, possibly not sabotaged just bad infrastructure has betrayed you. So I’m going to just mute you until we get back onto a different, better circuit, and ask Reinhard, do you have any thoughts about foreign interference?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, there certainly is some foreign interference, particularly from Russians [unintelligible] that has been demonstrated, and it goes particularly against the Green’s party, because that the one party that is being considered probably the staunchest supporter of Ukraine in the German political landscape, and the staunchest opponent of Russian imperialism, might surprise a number of countries, a number of people, also, a number of pundits, but for instance, only the Green Party leaders have during this campaign publicly said that they support spending 3.5% of GDP on defense. Nobody else says that. So maybe that’s one of the reasons why there are Russian attacks. But I would not overplay this element of the conversation. The distrust is not infused from abroad, the distrust against political parties that we encounter is domestically grown, and we have to address that.
Edward Lucas
Thanks so much. I’m sorry Jessica has now had to drop off the call altogether. I hope we can get her back, and I do recommend reading her Substack and other materials where she’s written about this a lot. Volodymyr, a quick thought from you on disinformation. Ukraine, of course, if there’s an Olympic Games category for countering disinformation, the Ukrainians would be winning the gold medals year after year, because you are so used to this. But when you look at Germany, what do you see as the most troubling forms of disinformation? Does it come from the East or from the West?
Volodymyr Dubovyk
Well, it’s coming from all sides. I mean, the plenty of it is actually coming, as you said, just as said, from the West, because there is a plenty of right-wing, alt-right disinformation as well, you know. And there is a definitely kinship or brothership of alt-right people across the ocean, and they’ve been very active in Germany. Unsurprisingly, the Robert Kennedy Jr, for instance, has been a rock star among some Germans during the COVID times, and coming often to Berlin for various demonstrations against vaccination and so on. Or say, QAnon is having chapters, very active chapters in Germany, who would have think that this offshoot, typically American, you know, is having its presence shown in Germany. So actually, from the right-wing, extreme right-wing, far-right, there’s also a lot of influence. But currently, Russia is actually, surprisingly for me, is not doing that much. Maybe they’re saving something, I’m hoping not, but maybe they’re saving something for the last days, because we still have, like, 10 days or so until the election. They’ve been more active, I think, several times in the past than they are now. Maybe they’re satisfied with what’s going on in Germany anyway. The economy is in trouble. There is a political disarray and confusion and things like that. And then there is more and more voices among political elites in Germany, basically calling for business as usual, returning to some dialog with Russia, you know, offering not to exclude Russia from talks about European security, and these kind of voices are now becoming more and more legitimate in a debate, in a discourse in Germany. That’s unfortunate. And then even there is a discussion now about maybe North Stream pipeline being reinstated or working and things like that. So what was absolutely unacceptable views on a very, very far fringe back three years ago is now different. So Russia perhaps thinks that things are moving slowly, naturally in the right direction for them, so there is no particular need to interfere.
Jessica Berlin
I’d just like to underscore that point from Volodymyr, and I’m sorry I had to leave and rejoin out. If you could hear my last point previously…
Edward Lucas
Jessica, we really aren’t hearing you at all. Jessica, I’m afraid this is not working. We’re just hearing clack; little clicks and scratches. Let’s see if we can-I think the way you could try dialing into the Zoom call on an old-fashioned landline. I think our staff might be able to send you the the dial-in details, and then at least we’d get you on the in good audio. In the meantime, let’s go to Laura from Catalonia. I think you are from Barcelona, if I’m not mistaken, where you raise a very good point, Laura, about what happens when Germany tries to control immigration. And Merz has said, on his very first day, he’s going to take control of all Germany’s borders and turn back all attempts at illegal entry, without exception. Will this be the end of Schengen? Reinhard, what do you think?
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, that’s what some of the critics of Merz from the progressive camp, mainly the certain Democrats and the Greens have been saying, that we should not risk ruining Schengen. But, as a matter of fact, I think the European Union has quite some experience with violating its own principles without abandoning them, and I think that’s probably the way of operation. I think nobody in Germany really wants to kill Schengen, and they will try to find a way of work around pretending to avoid violating the Schengen principles while practically doing it, like other countries also have in the past. And I, I believe that we should not focus on trying to rub Merz this way by accusing him of being anti-European, or risking to lead Germany in an anti-European camp, I don’t think that’s his intention. I really believe the democratic parties have to come together, and that means that the parties of the progressive camp have to be willing to do more than they have done in the past, and only on that basis can we keep the Conservatives from going to the extremes. I think it’s not just one side’s fault if we don’t come up with practical solutions. And we should not sort of just continue the blame game. We should try to start the solutions game and that would force everybody to move a little bit.
Edward Lucas
I’ve sent Jessica the dial-in number, which I hope will give us the benefit of her insights on this. We’ve got another question from James. Just before I come to you, James, anyone who hasn’t asked a question yet want to jump in, because this will probably our last question. So I’m just looking to see if anyone else has anything. We have the Washington Post on the line. We have NPR other distinguished journalists, but I don’t see that. So James has asked a second one from James at the Daily Telegraph. Should we be worried about the next general elections rather than this one? I think that’s a kind of rhetorical question, but there’s also quite a follow up, which is how will Scholz be remembered. He’s looked very hapless, or at least lacking in communication skills. Let’s ask Volodymyr first when the Ukrainian history books are written, what would be the chapter about Scholz give us your thoughts on that, and perhaps, and also, do you worry more about the next German elections than this one?
Volodymyr Dubovyk
Yeah, well, we worry about a lot of things all the time. I mean, we Ukrainians, and often in the previous years, we were often accused like worrying too much. But now, of course, in the last three years, a lot of people around the world understand that Ukrainians have their reasons for worry so. But Scholz is not going to be remembered fondly or kindly by Ukrainians. I mean, even if the President Joe Biden, the previous president, is now heavily criticized by Ukrainians, and has been for some time, and Ukrainians have been very critical of the spoon-feeding approach of the previous administration to the extent that they’re trying and willing to see what Trump can do; maybe Trump can be better. I personally have a different opinion: I don’t think so, but many Ukrainians are. So, let alone Mr. Scholz, who has been saying all sorts of things, and coming actually to Ukraine, more or less recently, to support Ukraine and providing some assistance, but being adamant about certain things, including the provision of Taurus missiles, and making a lot of statements of a negative character or nature in recent months, coming to elections, which would disappoint Ukrainians. And of course, there is a gap in what people expect from Germany, and what Germany can deliver, in our opinion, and what Germany actually delivers, which is a lot, I mean, it delivers a lot of assistance to Ukraine, you know, not to mention hosting all of Ukrainian refugees, which I mentioned briefly before, but helping Ukraine as such. You know, there’s hardly any area or sphere in which Germany is not providing pivotal key assistance to Ukraine. But still, people think that this is not enough, and Scholz will be an embodiment, and for a good reason, of this policy. And if we have change of guard, most probably, if it happens to be Friedrich Merz, then yes, the expectations are of a positive character. But then again, it probably will be a coalition government, so we’ll see how that works out, and also on the Schengen. That would be a terrible shame if Schengen falls victim to these developments. But for right now, I’m not necessarily worried about increased border controls by German police. You know, I often go through that control and it’s very, you know, something which is not hurtful or painful or it’s not border guards, as we understand, it’s just Bundespolizei, German police, who are always very polite and everything. So there is no, you know, there’s no reason to worry that this in itself would be an end to Schengen, but other countries are beginning to announce similar things, like France, where I’m now, also later in the last year, they’ve announced their own control and checks on the border. So we’ll see where it goes. But for now, you know we are not necessarily worried that AfD is always a constant threat for number of years now, and in general, right-wing, well, the populist parties are very much on the rise now, across the board, and very much emboldened by Trump returning to the White House too.
Edward Lucas
Thanks so much for that. And we’ve just had another question in from Julia Tar, which, given the difficulties we’ve haven’t had in getting Jessica to connect, may seem a touch ironic, but it’s about the digital policy. Germany’s working on implementing the NIS2 Directive and other digital regulations, and there’s been a discussion about the creation of a Digital Ministry. What impact will that have? I might give that to Reinhard, because there’s a real issue here with the transatlantic sort of digital imperialism of America. We see the American empire in terms of values and security guarantees in retreat. The American empire in terms of digital hegemony, oddly advanced, crushing other countries attempts to have their own copyright or privacy or anti-monopoly effort, at least in the views of those companies, in the view of those countries. So any quick thoughts from you, Reinhard on the next government’s digital policy. And then I see this, Kate Brady from the Washington Post has got her hand up.
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, digital policy, tech policy, altogether, is not very much debated during the campaign. I think that’s one of the shortcomings of the conversation, that a lot of topics that are really important, including health or education, or, as you say, digital, don’t play much of a role. So it’s hard to predict. I would hope that the next German government would stick to the European guns, stick to the line that the European Union has developed, and not be intimidated across the pond through some kind of tech imperialism. But going back, if I may, to the earlier question about sort of worrying about the next election. I mean, I’m not sure it’s smart to worry about crossing the third, fifth or seventh bridge ahead. Rather, we should focus on where we are now. And it’s not even a given that the Parliament would only be that the Parliament would would really be able to hold the whole period if, if a coalition cannot come up with practical achievements in the three fields of migration and economy and security, if there’s a stalemate where the parties in government block each other, then I would probably expect another snap election and a lot of instability, and anything could then happen, but it’s in our hands to come up with a better solution.
Edward Lucas
Right, I’m sure they said that in the 1920s and 30s as well, not wishing to overstate the historical analogy. Um, Kate from the Washington Post, I’m your last subscriber here in London. Did you have your hand up?
Kate Brady, The Washington Post
I did. Hi. Thank you so much again for this briefing. Um, if possible, I’d love to just get a little bit more into your thoughts on kind of the differences that we could expect from from Merz on defense. I know we talked about that a little bit already, but you know, what we hear in the debate and what you see in the manifestos is very similar. Maybe a point that might soon be less relevant was, of course, the demand for to send the Taurus missiles that seems to have very much disappeared from the campaign. But you know, we’ll see whether that conversation is even restarted given other developments. But, where do you see the biggest differences between Merz and Scholz when it comes to not only Germany’s defense, but what we could expect, if you know, support for Ukrainians continue to be needed.
Edward Lucas
Thanks so much for that. Jessica, what I suggest is that you write your answer in the chat, where we can see it. And if you want to reach out directly to Kate and send her your phone number by direct message, she can follow up with you over the phone, assuming that works, and if not, perhaps we can find some carrier pigeons, which I believe is still quite reliable. So let’s go. This will be our final remarks. Let’s go to Volodymyr first, and then Reinhard for thoughts on the, on the future of German defense policy and what we might expect as no question from Kate Volodymyr, you go first.
Volodymyr Dubovyk
So, I mean, we know better than to expect that Merz will actually do exactly, word by word, what he’s saying now. And of course, it is always a dynamic of the election campaign, and there is maneuvering and balancing and things like that. And he did his gamble on immigration issue, which fails spectacularly. He learned that thing. He’ll be more cautious in the coming days. But on defense, he is promising to do more. But then again, Scholz sounded in the first days and weeks of Russian full scale invasion against Ukraine, very confident, basically announcing a new era for Germany, specifically in this direction of making more weapons on a more urgent timeline and everything, but that didn’t happen. Is Merz gonna be following up on what he’s saying now about Germany needing to become a bigger player in that domain? That remains to be seen. And again, he will be, most probably, as we understand, restricted, somehow restrained by other members, other parties in a coalition government. So, it might not be necessarily up to him entirely what happens next with German defense. But, I think there is still an acknowledgement even among German public, which I mentioned already before, that Germany is not ready for whatever is coming. That the current three years have shown that there are certain very serious threats for which Germany should prepare and can prepare, and that should be just moving in the right direction. And on that account, I do think that Friedrich Merz is better prepared. Will he push for giving Tauruses to Ukraine? We’ll see. I think there is a lot of reasons to believe that Berlin and other European capitals will try to coordinate with Washington now and not to do much to unravel the American effort or while at the same time trying to offer their own position on the issues. But, we’ll see where it goes. And of course, the process will be an extended one of forming the government coalition, coalition government, and that might go all the way into the end of the stream. So by that time, of course, we might hear some news about the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia’s war on Ukraine. And Merz still seems a preferred candidate from Ukrainian standpoint. But again, you know I shouldn’t rush. I don’t think we should rush with judgments.
Edward Lucas
Thanks so much for that. Reinhard, final word from you. Just, are you on a train or a plane? Either is impressive.
Reinhard Bütikofer
I’m on a train to the Munich Security Conference in fact.
Edward Lucas
Fantastic. Well, I wish, we wish you a very productive meeting there. And I’m amazed that the onboard Wi Fi is so good. We should all take the German trains. But give us your final thoughts on what Merz will mean for defense, and then we’ll wrap up,
Reinhard Bütikofer
Well, the future of German defense, that’s as I said before, one of the three decisive issues. And the difference between Merz and Scholz, in my opinion, is the following. Scholz himself, with his Zeitenwende speech, has shown that he understands the challenge. But, his party has not followed him very eagerly, and there’s strong reluctancy, within a certain Democratic Party, to really spend more on defense, as much as would be needed. On the other hand, Scholz knows how to pay for what he would want to spend. Namely by getting rid of some provisions of the famous, infamous debt break to allow public debt to finance defense expenditure. Merz, on the other side, has been more explicit and more proactive in advocating spending, defense spending. He has said, just in recent days, that he would have delivered the Taurus missiles.But he has never said how he would want to pay for it. And just imagining, in a normal budget year, to attain the 2% GDP line, Germany would have to spend 30 billion beyond what we’re spending from the budget today. If we go beyond 2% like [unintelligible] said, possibly 3.5%, that would be even more thanthat. And Merz has to take with a financial policy dogma of his party, which is to defend the so called debt break tooth and nail in order to be able to pursue his ambition with more and adequate defense spending. And that’s the real challenge he will be confronted with.
Edward Lucas
Well, thanks so much for that very useful springboard for the rest of the campaign. We certainly I wish your your landing in Munich would be a dramatic one, with these ideas spreading out hard and fast. I’ve just popped in the chat my own contribution, which is that we need a new bank, a Europe, an EBRD style bank to finance defense spending, which gets us round these debt break and the Growth and Stability Pact problems. Anyone who wants to follow up with me on that is welcome too. I’m now going to hand over to my friend and CEPA colleague, Sarah Krajewski, for a couple of logistical announcements, you’re going to promise us the audio transcript, and we haven’t had much audio, that may be quite a challenge, but over to you, Sarah.
Sarah Krajewski
Thanks Edward and thank you all for joining today and giving your your time in light of the events that have happened. We will be sending out a recording and an auto generated transcript tomorrow with all of the information from today’s briefing. If you’re interested in getting in touch with any of our panelists today, or Edward who has kind of shown his own expertise, let me know, and you can email press@cepa.org or follow up on one of the threads that I’ve been in touch with you guys on. Thank you and have a great rest of your day wherever it may take you.
Edward Lucas
Thanks so much, Sarah, goodbye see you all again soon.
