Catherine Sendak
Welcome, and thank you for joining us in North America, Europe and across the world. My name is Catherine Sendak and I’m the Director for Transatlantic Security and Defense at the Center for European Policy Analysis, headquartered here in Washington, DC. I’m delighted to welcome you to this rapid reaction discussion on the outcomes and implications of the NATO Summit that took place in Vilnius earlier this week. The Summit sought to strengthen the alliances defense and deterrence, and deliver on commitments made in Madrid last year, allies agreed to move 2% defense spending to the floor not to the ceiling, and approved a set of multidomain regional plans which will address issues concerning planning, command and control for structure requirements and resourcing. Although did the decisions on Ukraine’s future in NATO did not offer clarity in terms of a roadmap or timeline. The Allies did agree on a multi year program of assistance, upgraded political ties with Ukraine, establishing the NATO Ukraine Council, and removed the Membership Action Plan requirement in the process of Ukraine joining NATO. To help us understand the implications of the summit for the future of NATO’s defense and deterrence, and Ukraine’s long term security. We are joined today by two incredible panelists. With expertise on these issues, and experience leading critical work at NATO. Let me first introduce Camille Grand, who is a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Camille served as the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment at NATO from 2016 to 2022.
And has held senior positions at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, Camille, welcome. We’re also joined this morning by Scott Kindsvater. He’s a Distinguished Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security team here at CEPA. Scott is a retired Lieutenant General in the US Air Force with over 32 years experience in service. He previously served as the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 2019 to 2021, and served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, from 2017 to 2019. Scott, thank you so much for joining us. Before we get started a little housekeeping. For those who are joining us online and live, you can ask questions, there should be a link on your screen to the Slido tool. You can go to sli.do/CEPA to ask questions, and we’re going to try to get as many of those in as we can. So let’s get started. So happy to have you both here. Thank you again, it’s now been a couple of days since the close of the summit in Vilnius, and the reviews amongst the Euro-Atlantic community have been a mixed bag on the successes and potential failures of the summit. Let’s start off broadly, I would love to hear both of you, from both of you on what you view the successes and failures the summit to be. Scott, why don’t we start with you?
Scott Kindsvater
Thanks, Katie. And it’s great to be with my teammate, Camille, it was great to be with him as his wingman and flight lead for our four years at NATO together. So Camille it’s great to see you. So overall, I’m not going to get into the daily drama stuff, you know, who didn’t say thank you or who didn’t I won’t even touch that. I think it was successful, multiple levels politically and militarily. My personal perspective, I honestly think NATO is moving faster to adjust to the 21st century security environment than the US is and then the other big nations are, which is a huge twist for the last three and a half decades. So I think that’s good news. And I think the third thing probably is Turkey’s pivot and turn a little bit to the west, I think that’s also a big deal for the Alliance. And a lot of goodness there. My big five takeaways, or we can talk about these in the Q&A are Sweden, deterrence and defense, the forward movement on Ukraine forward movement on partners and in this in this to 2.5% deal that we can talk about also in Q&A.
Catherine Sendak
Wonderful, thank you, Camille.
Camille Grand
Great to be to be with you and great to be with Scott. The, I’m very much on the thing, assessment, you know, I, I would say, if I were to rate the summit, I would be at 3.5 out of 4. I think that on a number of issues that were identified, including identified as problematic before the summit, things have moved forward on the Swedish membership, you know, it was not a given , Erdoğan waited to the last minute and took it in the right direction, which lifted not on only Turkey’s ratification in, in principle, but also Hungary’s, which was a bit also holding out the ratification process. So we can now expect Sweden to join, which is really important for for NATO for Sweden, for the Nordic and Baltic region. And that’s a very significant change and very happy that we could see actual change on that one. Second thing, which is good. And we I’m sure we’re going to dive into this is the deterrence and defense package, the fact that the plans put forward were approved by the leaders. Again, that was not a given that can always be that’s been, you know, we’ve experienced last minute own doubts on such military guidance for the endorsement at the political level. And here, it was crystal clear that the allies approved the way and the plans put forward by secure there was not highly visible because of course, these plans are classified. But the communique is crystal clear on the fact that we’re moving on to regional plans, which are going to enable the defense of Europe for every contingency. Thirdly, I was positively surprised by the language of down the 2%. And the sustained investment in defense, again, not a given they are they are still about a third of the countries that are a bit lagging behind. Some of them might have said, you know, too early to commit to sustain this effort. And now it’s very clear in the language of the communique of the summit, that 2% is the minimum and that so there is no walking out of that commitment. Even if there are some countries that need to do additional efforts.
Where I do not give a full terms up as on the Ukraine front. Where I think the language is a bit of convoluted, could have been much better honestly, I get the point that it was not nobody expected a an immediate membership in Vilnius, you know, there was a bit of a push to get Ukraine, this invitee status by the Baltic states. And that’s probably what President Zelenskyy was hoping for. But short of that, and I see the point, because it’s really that noemally when you get invited status, the only thing you wait for is ratification by all allies.
I think it could have been better than the sort of things which seems to say, first of all, it’s not Bucharest, but there’s a sentence that says, as we said, in Bucharest, so so if you want to do better than Bucharest, you don’t say as we said in Bucharest, a second, this notion of “You’re Welcome” when we agree. And when the conditions are met, without being very precise, neither on the conditions No, on the terms of agreement is a bit odd. So I think we could we could have sent a more powerful signal both to Ukraine, and to the Russia as well, on this point. And there I you know, it’s only a, you know, some progress but not as much as they would have. Right.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. Thank you so much. Let’s pick up on on that last point. Camille, you know, given some of the reviews of the communique language, and the run up to the communique on day, one of this summit, and even some of President Zelenskyy’s comments in the run up to the summit, where we are now with no map requirement anymore, with further assistance with the council. What does Ukraine’s path to NATO look like in practice to this point, Scott, over to you.
Scott Kindsvater
Okay, great. Thanks, Katie. I do completely in the line there with Camille on his on his thoughts on the on the overall assessment. So with Ukraine, you know, obviously we got strong commitments from the G7. I would call those strong commitments and not security guarantees even though that word was thrown around quite a bit, and I think we expected that. I think the F 16 training and that language was strong. And I think that’s a movement in the right direction. Although being an old fighter pilot, you know, F 16s are not going to solve world hunger, but it is a good step in the right direction. I like the simple path post conflict. And, you know, wars only end a few ways, a capitulation by one side, a ceasefire that leads to something in a negotiated settlement. That’s it. They always happen faster than we think. So I like this simple path. Camille mentioned the council, I think that’s a great step, because that’s going to build political trust. And it’s so vital to the alliance. So President Zelenskyy can call call a meeting anytime other members of the alliance can call a meeting anytime, the Sec Gen can call a meeting anytime so and nobody can say no. So I think it’s going to build some political trust. You the strategy is still I would call it Ukraine not lose. Because if you said the strategy was Ukraine win, and we would do a little bit more, but and I’ve had this question a lot recently, the opponent has 5,000 nuclear weapons, we’ve never been in this position and humanity. So I understand that political leadership in the military leadership of our lines, saying, you know, where’s this balance? Because that opponent has 5,000 nukes. So we have to consider that in just a real politic matter. Ukraine is the fortress for our lines, and has been now for this whole fight. We need to continue to make sure they are the fortress for our lines. And I think they made steps in the right direction.
Catherine Sendak
To Scott’s point, I would welcome additional thoughts, you know, is the council going to be a real improvement in in how Ukraine approaches the alliance in terms of resources and leadership? And what other paths does Ukraine need to take up to this point in the run up to, you know, their current fight and the run up to the Washington summit next year?
Camille Grand
The council is the council is really a good news. It’s a bit underestimated, because it sounds a bit bureaucratic, like a bit of a, you know, consolation prize. But it’s much more than that. First of all, Ukraine is the only partner with the council. There used to be a NATO Russia Council, which has been downgraded since Crimea and frozen since 2002. But it is really something that is guaranteed to Ukrainians a seat at the table on equal footing, not by invitation, not with a random ally, saying, you know, not wrong, wrong timing, let’s delay this. And we have to have an agreement to call the council and all of that. So it’s really, really important and also, which is significant. That format normally trickles down to multiple to all the committee work at NATO. So it will enable Ukraine to be much more associated much more closely associated to this. And when I was chairing some of these committees, that it was always slightly annoying that if I wanted the Ukrainians in the room, I needed to find an agreed format and invite you know, 30 other countries to get the Ukrainians in the room. So from from that perspective, it’s really a game changer. In terms of the relationship with NATO. I would have liked that council to be tasked to look at the future membership, that would have been a good addition to the to the package. But it’s a significant element of the package. The second element, which is really meaningful, is the assistance package. And there I think in the run up to the summit, and during the summit, there were lots of very good announcement made by a number of countries. France came out with the delivery of crews besides the same family as the British stone shadow, it’s the friendship scalp, it’s more or less the same. Beside the Germans announced in the 700 million euro military assistance package, the US had released the cluster munition, which was a bit of a controversial decision with European allies, but is meaningful in the battlefield. The F 16 Training Club is really taking speed. And that’s that’s and you have a number of nations on board with this one, which make the delivery of the F 16. You know, the next logical step. So lots of good things there. So you can’t say that the Zelenskyy left Vilnius empty handed, you know, you got a lot on that. And the G7 package I sort of like I agree with Scott, it’s not security guarantees. I think it’s a bit misleading to call it this way. It’s a sort of security assistance, pretty robust package. What I see in it is a sort of commitment by the seven largest economies in the in the West. Some were up to say we’re going to be wearing for the long haul, if necessary, and we make that statement together. So all together, you have a pretty robust series of decisions. And then there’s this issue of the handling of the membership, which is, to me, could have done better in terms of language in terms of political messaging. And there there were clear reluctance on the part of both the Biden administration but also the Germans to say, you know, it’s a bit it’s a bit of a tough one. And granting the invitee status is really moving towards a membership at a fast track. And and it’s it’s a bit unchartered territory to decide that you grant membership to a country which is at war. What is what I’m expect to see in the coming weeks and months is more thinking about what those conditions are, both in terms of where do we expect from the Ukrainians and President Biden has been quite clear that he wants to reform he wants, further democratization of the armed forces, fighting the corruption and all of that. And the but there is also the dimension of okay, when is the moment right for Ukraine without creating a veto for Russia, this is sort of is asked from the Ukrainians to have a peace treaty in place with, of course, essentially Mr. Putin, you get to call the shots. But on the other end, reasonably expect that the situation on the frontline is standardized and that there is some sort of as of a settlement, which means that NATO commits to a country which is not on an open war with the moving borders.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. To your point and to Scott’s point. This is unchartered territory for the alliance. And thank you both for that, that layout of the critical, critical pieces for Ukraine, Scott, to follow up on internal NATO mechanisms that are coming out of this summit, the mentioning of regional plans. This has obviously been in the work for some time, relatively new for NATO to take a regional approach in terms of developing plans. You know, from your perspective, how will these plans strengthen NATO’s defense posture? And what challenges do you foresee in its implementation?
Scott Kindsvater
I do think this is a big deal for the alliance. And we’ve been pushing on this and on that slow adaptation journey now, since you know, really 2014 or so. And it’s a huge transition. Really, this is the first time since the 80s, that we’ve linked to the alliances link threat, strategy, plans, forces, and now requirements beyond that, that’s why the 2% was so frictional, the US was telling nations to spend more. And my answer would have been if it was in their seat on what we don’t have plans, we don’t even know what we’re supposed to do. Do you want me to buy three more chips, two more of this, six more of that. Now we can’t right now you’re going to link all those national plans with regional plans and the AOR wide plan that’s going to allow the alliance to say we do need six more of those and five more of these and for more fighters corners, etc. And nations now can then start to spend that increased GDP and fill all the gaps in those plans. So this is a big deal, it’s going to drive more and increase political cohesion in the alliance. And the big four coming out of that are the plans the mobility sustainment the command and control and integrated air and missile defense all the way down from Finland to the Black Sea. So a big deal challenges you asked me about that. The force sustainment and we see this in Ukraine, the force sustainment the stocks, the mobilities piece is always always underestimated. So that will be hard for the Alliance, they’re going to have to really talk about retooling and building and more more infrastructure to do some of that, which helps reinforcement, of course, so that will be a challenge, then then the call for digitization of the command and control, we haven’t even had our command and control all links since the 80s. And to do this in the 21st century way is going to be a challenge and to link all those nations together where we can share all that classified information easily quickly and at the speed of war. So that’s going to be the other big challenge. And then we have to do this before Russia rebuilds, right? That’s the key that’s that, that think tanks like CEPA really need to pay attention to whatever happens with the Ukraine piece. We know Russia is going to rebuild, and they’re going to do it quickly. Lots of Intel analysts saying three years or so. So we need to get all this done the alliance and be prepared for that next fight sadly, with Russia or whatever they do to flex their muscles meaning to do that inside their turn radius to make sure we can protect the alliance particularly.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely, thank you, Scott. A quick follow up to you on on one of the points that you mentioned the mobility and infrastructure investment piece, which has been something that Europe in the United States and the Alliance have been talking about for years post 2014. And and Russia’s first incursion into Ukraine, did you get a sense in Vilnius that there’s a lot of support behind the real investment it’s going to take on that angle?
Scott Kindsvater
I do I absolutely do. They’ve been talking about this military mobility sustainment both the NATO and the EU for a while. And that’s great actually work that’s been happening there between those two big organizations. Now, it’s really time to put the money where the mouth is, and get this done. Right. So let’s let’s, let’s look at our bridges, let’s really start to think about reinforcement because the plans are there. Now. You have real requirements. And you can take from those real requirements, how to spend your money to fix military mobility sustainment. So the whole package is coming together. Now. I think that’s what everybody was waiting for.
Catherine Sendak
That’s great. Camille, to follow on to the the question I just posed to Scott, you know, the regional plans a big part of Madrid, there were such big tasks and objectives coming out of the Madrid summit last year on collective defense, increasing vital groups on the eastern flank high readiness forces, looking back to Madrid and to where we are now. Do you think Vilnius delivered on some of those Madrid commitments? And where may there be some gaps moving forward?
Camille Grand
I would argue we, you know, essentially secure delivered a lot because he prepared the plans and shape prepare the plans and the plans in the matrix side of the house, actually know that, you know, in Madrid was getting tasked to do stuff that were beyond the immediate emergency, and delivered. And now the political level has endorsed that decision. So so so that’s really, really important, because that’s, and now of course, the deed is in the implementation. And that’s going to take another few years, but we know where we’re heading. And we can connect to NATO defense planning cycle, with the plans with the need to digitalize the command and control with the need to focus on sustainment. So all these things are going to take a lot of energy. But now we are on a particular roadmap. And we can we can move forward at pace with the right level of political endorsement. So from that perspective, I think Vilnius did deliver, there will be an ongoing conversation on how much is enough, you know, on the eastern flank. What is interesting is, I think the debate between those who are sort of hoping for something which is pretty similar to the Cold War, posture of as many as possible on the on the border, which won’t happen, you know, they won’t you know, in Germany alone, there were 250,000 Americans, plus, you know, the French forces of Germany plus the British Army of the Rhine, plus Dutch and Belgian forces in the old days, that’s not the sort of thing that we’re going to see happening. So therefore, the important of sustainment of the ability to reinforce, have demonstrated the ability to move those 300,000, if necessary, in a crisis is really critical. And this is where we’re going to see a lot of training, exercising, things that, you know, might not make the headlines, but are going to demonstrate to ourselves, but also to the Russians that they have no chance. And that’s the whole point about the deterrence and defense posture is to make crystal clear that there are no soft spots on the eastern flank. And that there, it’s useless to even try it, anywhere.
Catherine Sendak
Yeah. Well, I want to follow up on that, because you know while we’re on this note of of soft spots. The Summit communique addressed some defense industrial base challenges that the alliance faces endorsing a defense production action plan. Do you think the allies are team themselves up for success on strengthening their defense industry is and where do you see NATO’s role moving forward? And in addressing these challenges, Camille?
Camille Grand
I think it’s more of a matter of coordination. You know, NATO doesn’t have many tools. I know from inside, I was in charge of that, you know, we don’t do industrial policy. You know, we don’t have we don’t pay for the ammunition contracts as NATO. So the what we what we can do is map this situation, which is what has been done in the run up to Vilnius work with the allies to enable them to buy jointly, if they if they prefer or if it’s a faster track and they are you know, from a US or even a French perspective, that is not critical. But if you’re talking to smaller or medium, small or medium allies for them, it really matters to make sure that they don’t fall at the end of the queue when they want to order ammunition to replenish their stocks. And this is where, you know, bit of coordination is really important. The second thing on this, which is is interesting is the coordination with the European Union. Because in a way the European Union is as more tools to perform on this front from that Eastern European side of the alliance. And that is going to be interesting to see how the two organizations work together on these things, to leverage the, you know, the money, the tools that are available in the EU environment, so that at least the EU member states and those that are closely associated with them, like no way can can really work on this to, to meet those shortfalls that have been well identified. The last thing I would say, and what struck me very much in the last year or so, is the fact that the challenges associated with the ramping up of ammunition production are across the board. You know, it’s not European specific, it’s not us specific. You know, every we have not been planning or organizing our defense industrial base to meet the challenge of this magnitude, you know, we were focused on on wars, which might have been demanding, but not necessarily with the same sort of needed output. So we are at a moment where we need to split, the Ukrainians rebuilt, the stocks that have been depleted and rebuilt and probably grow those stocks for the future. So it’s a bit of a old, again, a bit of a, I wouldn’t say long term, but a year in the next few years, we need a lot of focus on that. And we need to work very, very closely amongst allies to recognize that and one of the takeaways of the last few months is that the supply chains are very transatlantic. And that we need to sort of work together to make sure that we don’t do fratricide on access to raw material to particular components, microelectronics, energetics, explosives, you name it. So all of this is going to be a very interesting conversation, which will require a lot of discipline and focus, because it doesn’t suffice to throw money into problem you need to contract, you need to make sure that the industry capacity is there to address every bottleneck that you’ve identified. So that’s all of this is demanding, but I think we’re on a good track.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. There seems to be the will now we have to identify the way and hopefully as quickly as possible. So Scott, I wanted to turn to you. We’re going to pivot and no pun intended on this to the summit’s position and work on the alliances future cooperation with partners in the Indo Pacific. We saw four of the alliances partners from that region, join the alliance at the summit this week, and really interested in your thoughts on the alliances approach to the Indo Pacific and potential opportunities for cooperation.
Scott Kindsvater
Okay, great. Thanks, Katie. Yeah, absolutely. It’s funny, we keep talking about this pivot. But I think in 1899, the US Secretary of State, said the centre of the centre of our environment has now shifted to China in the Pacific. So we’ve been talking about that pivot for a long time. And then just a couple adds to the previous I like what Camille said there really do. I think that’s in order as we do all of this robust planning and in building our stocks, that standardization committee, which is the oldest committee in the alliance becomes really important as we look at interoperability be absolutely crucial. On the Indo Pacific piece, this Sec Gen, it’s great that he’s staying for another year, I think it’s going to help us through 2024 and some of the friction we may see in the election piece but and he’s driving this pretty hard. He knows that what happens in Europe impacts Asian what happens in Asia impacts Europe 1.3 billion euros a day is spent in Europe on Chinese goods. So it’s all like this global West piece that we’ve been hearing a lot about it we really are linked and all those values and our way of life. So we’re starting the baby steps of the Pacific and Euro nations becoming today a community right they one community, my personal perspective, I think we’re on the trend or the path and if we’re truly talking about a Russia threat and a China threat. First time we’ve had that Europe and Asia threat since the 1940s. I think in one to two years, what you’ll see is a strategic outline of common security. That will be the next step. And then in three to five years, I think you can really start to see true defense cooperation. That’s where we’re headed. We’re all linked together in this thing and all the nations that have liked that are like minded and have the war and defend our values. That’s for this. To me. That’s what the communique was starting to talk about. It’s put us on that path.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. And the communique did a lot to mention this moving throughout. And obviously the emerging cooperation agreement between Japan and NATO coming out of the summit. So it does seem the alliance’s is moving towards that direction. Well, before we turn to questions from our audience, and just as a reminder to all those listening, live and watching live, there should be a link on your screen. But if you if you would like to ask a question, please go to sli.do/CEPA, sli.do/CEPA. Excuse me to ask questions. And we look forward to digging into those. So finally, again, before we move on to questions from our audience, it would be wrong of me not to start predicting trying to have you all predict the future. Two day’s post Vilnius summit next year is another what we anticipate a historic NATO Summit taking place here in Washington for the 75th anniversary, and happening in a year of multiple elections. Hopefully, we will, we will be have some resolution in the current Russian invasion into Ukraine. From both of your perspectives, did the Vilnius summit position the alliance well, for the summit in Washington, and what do you think we can anticipate ahead of next year Summit? Camille, why don’t we start with you?
Camille Grand
What I would say is that, you know, Vilnius could have been just a photo op, display of unity and support for Ukraine, and not much substance to the many looked at it, when when it was initially planned on saying, okay, we’re going to the static rhythm of yearly summit is really necessary, Madrid delivered so much that it was, you know, with a new strategic concept with a lot of additional policy line with a very strong support for Ukraine with clear tasking, to the military leadership that some might have thought that it was, you know, that Vilnius was just to get the family photo, I think it ended up being much more than that. And the good news is on a number of issues, I think it did much more than kicking the can down the road to Washington, I was mentioning defense spending, I think the language is becoming much stronger. So it lays the ground as we’re going to mark the 10th anniversary of the defense investment pledge at NATO at the Washington summit. To say, Okay, we’re going to, we’re not going to have to renegotiate the whole notion of a 2%. For the anniversary, I mean, I think that the rules of the game have been set. And now it’s really going to be able to build the pressure for those who are lagging behind and to be able to be very committed and to sustain this level of effort beyond Washington. The second thing is about the, you know, the Indo Pacific conversation you were just having with Scott, I think it’s the essential points are there. There is wide recognition in Europe that China is a challenge. There are, let’s be honest, some nuances on how to approach this between Washington and its European allies or in some of its European allies. But I think that terms of the debate are in front of us. And I think there needs to be a much more honest conversation. And I say that also about the US side of saying what is expected from the European allies. Is it do more about your security? Because you will you become priority to and we can’t, you know, assign as many resources to the European theatre than we used to, or is it about, we need you to show the flag in the Indo Pacific. So we want European navies to be more present in the region. There is currently a French aircraft carrier in the region, the Brits send their own aircraft carrier, the Germans and the Dutch have been sending frigates. What does that mean? And does that need a NATO flag over it? You know, those are big political questions. And I think it’s so we have I think the summit has laid the ground for clean conversation in Washington. And finally, of course, Washington is going to be the 75th anniversary of the Latins. And it’s interesting to you know, if you look at the big landmark movement, you know, the 70th anniversary, it was all about managing President Trump and his complex relationship to NATO to put it gently. There was no big gathering in Washington and with the President there was no summit, per se in the US it took place in UK and there was there was a historical speech by the Secretary General in front of Congress. But it was. So now it’s going to be a big, big landmark event, I hope. And having attended the 75th Anniversary Summit in Washington, which was interesting, because it was taking place in the middle of Kosovo. So they they sort of didn’t want to show too much. You know, overflights and things like that in the middle of an air campaign. But ultimately, I think it’s going to be very important, because I think that any of those who had doubts about the value of NATO about the importance of NATO have been proven wrong. NATO is really front and central for European security. And the decisions of countries like Sweden and Finland to join all the requests for from Ukraine to join makes the point that NATO is more essential than ever, for European security for transatlantic security. And on the US side, I think there is also a sense that it’s good to have allies, and that it matters more. And I think that administration has been very clear on that. And that’s very positive.
Catherine Sendak
Great, thank you, Scott, to to Camille’s point, you know, laying out expectations for allies next year. You know, again, from the Washington summit, what what do you foresee the plan to be moving forward and to anticipation of next year Summit?
Scott Kindsvater
I agree with Camille on that Vilnius did kick the can 2024. I think that’s a great sign. And, you know, I think there’s acknowledgement across the West. And I would say the global West here that the we have to do 2.0 things right to turn defend in Europe, determined defend in in Asia Pacific. And the US can’t do 2.0 things all by itself. So friends and allies and partners are absolutely crucial. We have to divvy up tasks and do what we’re good at. And I think that will continue through 2024 and NATO, NATO because of that NATO has huge relevance. I will I’m a good military retired officer, I won’t protect any politics here. Camille can dive into that, that world and chat about it, I’ll stay away from the but there’s a lot of elections, like you said, coming up in 2024. So as a citizen, I think the thing that happens in free societies is all those disagreements are in full light for the world to see whether it’s in France or the US or wherever. So we’ll see all of those disagreements up full step centerstage. And that may allow Putin and Xi Jinping to exploit some of those, that’s as a citizen, I’m a little nervous about those, as they watch that play out, they can do some, some, you know, goofing around and exploitation stuff. Although what we’ve seen since 2008, for both Putin and Xi Jinping is they continue to do things. And I would call those stupid strategic things that solidify the West against them. So it’s been a trend since 2008. I don’t see that trend ending anytime soon. That will continue to solidify the West politically and militarily. And I think that’s what what I would envision not 2024 and beyond unless some huge thing changes. Where those two countries aren’t being coercive or completely six year old misbehave, children like Putin is sometimes. So that’s, that’s my perspective on how we move forward.
Catherine Sendak
Yeah, Camille did you have a follow up comment?
Camille Grand
Yeah, just a very quick one. I think that’s why Ukraine is so decisive. You know, if we, if we miss it on Ukraine, we end up with some wishy washy things under which Putin can claim victory, we are setting the path towards more problems in the future. So being successful in Ukraine, having a Ukraine that can choose its own security path that can regain the sovereignty over over its entire territory is really, really critical. So from that perspective, because we can see that Xi Jinping is already learning from teachings mistake in a way and that teaching got everything he didn’t want, you know, he he was complaining about NATO coming closer to its to Russia’s border. Now. He added, you know, 700 miles of border with Finland. That was wasn’t there. And honestly, the things on the Swedes were very happy to be close partners with NATO before Putin started threatening them and, and started the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians, if you look back at, you know, 2008 there was no fear majority amongst the Ukrainian people until 2014, and the illegal annexation of Crimea, and now he’s created a Ukraine society that 91% wants to join NATO. So they the other, you know, they create their own strategic blunders, but also because we react rather well, and we send the right messages. So that’s why we will to stay on track on these issues.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely showing that strength. So now it’s time to turn to audience questions. And since we ended our conversation so far on the summit next year in Washington, we have a great question from one of our watchers, Alejandro Lara, who wanted to know since everyone will be gathering in DC next year, do you see a role for Latin America and the Caribbean, on contributing to the summit next year in Washington? Would either of you like to take that one? Camille, go ahead.
Camille Grand
I can take that. I mean, there has been a bit of an ongoing conversation over the years, whether there was NATO was a bit of an alliance of democracy and whether some Latin American countries, were going to come closer to NATO, which has been the case for some of them. Colombia, for instance, has moved, has been doing some stuff with NATO. Obviously, there have been lots of domestic dynamics in Latin America that I don’t really believe that any country really aspires to join NATO per se. There was this rather strange conversation in the Trump years about Bolsonaro in Brazil, wanting to come closer, I guess what we could see is more partnership rather than membership in that region. The the key is really about where does Latin America. You know, it’s more part of the broader competition? And how do we engage the global south, I don’t like that word, I haven’t found a better expression. But a lot of these countries are in Latin America are very important. And we need to find ways to engage them in the broader policy conversation. And in some instances in the military being to make sure that we don’t pave the way for them to sort of feel more comfortable in this sort of, I wouldn’t call it alignment, but non alignment, when they look at at what Russia is doing in Ukraine, which is really goes against every un principle that they’re supposed to stand for.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. And that competition space is heavy in Latin America, in the Caribbean, as you noted, Scott, we have one for you. As a former retired general, and with your roles that you had at NATO, do you think that NATO could be doing more to support Ukraine and help deter further Russian aggression?
Scott Kindsvater
I think you could probably generically answer that, yes, we could always do more. You know, we we know that Ukraine is a fortress for the alliance and Ukraine has protected the alliance. You know, there’s there’s foundations that are crucial in war that are always the same and have been forever, you know, the will of the people. The key to good leadership, control of the air, more use of that you always consume more things and you think you’re going to consume and combined arms, and we’re helping them with all four of those are remaining members of the alliance are doing it each have their own way. And this, this whole discussion that comes in at the very strategic level is what is that exact strategy? Is it Ukraine win or Ukraine not lose? Katie you and I’ve had this discussion several times. And we have to strike that right balance, because that adversary does have 5,000 nuclear weapons, and I thought Camille discussed that very well, a couple questions ago. So could we do more, I’m sure there’s something else we can do. The one thing that I always like to think about is get on a 40 mile radar scope, right? We’re talking about this near term fight. But let’s talk about out there post conflict. We really, really, really have to be ready for this, whatever this Marshall Plan is, we have to rebuild Ukraine quickly, effectively. Get there, make sure they are rebuilt to be the fortress again, for Europe, and then within seconds, do that and bring them into the Alliance. That’s what I think the focus should be is what does this look like after so right away, bam, they’re in the Alliance. They have extended deterrence protection, the best security guarantee there is. And now we’re off and running. Because now you’ve got Finland, Sweden, in the north. And then you have Ukraine down there in the south. And we really are moving forward on defending and deterring Russia in the 21st century. So great question, and I’m pretty optimistic moving forward.
Catherine Sendak
That’s great that the road is laid out the path is the path is identified. That’s fantastic. I had one final question for Camille before we before we wrap up and putting your French hat on Camille. Why is France more supportive of Ukraine’s NATO membership than the Germans or perhaps the US at this point, does this represent a change in the French position?
Camille Grand
Well, President Macron did change his decision. And you know, the key moment from that was the speech in Bratislava, early June, late May, in which he laid down his vision for for Europe and moved much closer to the views of many central Europeans on that. The reason behind it is really an assessment of the situation, you know, the very notion of we’re going to have to negotiate and deal with Russia. Or we might have a war we have. So so the the notion that appeasement could deliver, which might have been true in 2008, and at least was a reasonable thing to look at, is no longer in the cards in many different ways. The second thing is also an assessment that, and Macron tried really hard to engage Putin in the early months of the war, that he there is there was no room for a negotiation with him. And he knows that firsthand. So he has that direct experience of trying hard, and not getting much, or anything to be to be frank. So that that really plays a role. And thirdly, I think there is a sense that, and he’s been very clear, even yesterday, again, in his Bastille Day speech to the Armed Forces made also clear that we are at a moment where we need a strong European pillar and NATO and we need to invest into this, we need to be fully interoperable. So there is a military understanding of the relevance of NATO, which let’s be honest, was not you know, for the past decade or so the main for our for military issues for the French, which were very committed to Africa to the Sahel, and always so NATO as a bit of a second priority. Now, it’s it’s really, that’s really, really clear to our military and our political leadership that NATO is front and central in many different ways. So that explains that shift. And also, possibly a, which was publicly expressed the readiness to move faster on Ukraine membership or readiness to also take steps in terms of weapon delivery that we don’t necessarily see in Germany or the US for that matter. But so that’s, that’s, it’s an it’s an it’s indeed a very interesting shift.
Catherine Sendak
Yes. Well, Camille, thank you so much. I want to take this opportunity to thank our panelists Scott. Camille, thank you so much for joining us this morning. Thank you to everyone online who has joined us. Thank you for tuning into the conversation on the implications from the Vilnius Summit. Please be sure to visit cepa.org and follow CEPA social media accounts to stay up to date on the latest analysis and events. Thank you.
