Executive Summary 

• Russia and China have been displaying increased military and security cooperation at the fringe of the Arctic, including through the organization of joint drills and overflights. It is not excluded that both countries will seek to organize a military exercise in the Russian Arctic in the coming months. 
• Beyond military cooperation, the disruption of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) and seabed warfare activities represents a form of nefarious relations that Russia and China might pursue in the Arctic. 
• The risk of disruption against CUI, and especially data cables, is real. The Arctic region is particularly vulnerable in this regard due to the existence of several chokepoints where subsea infrastructure lacks redundancy and resilience. 
• Despite increased circumpolar military links between Moscow and Beijing, bilateral relations in the Arctic can be equally defined by their limitations. Friction points affect the deepening military cooperation as well as other spheres in the bilateral relationship, especially about future Arctic governance.  

Russia and China have been displaying, at least on the surface, increased cooperation in the Arctic, and especially in the military security realm. This includes joint military drills at the fringe of the Arctic as well as a willingness to conduct subthreshold activities against critical undersea infrastructure. There are, however, many friction points that limit a deepening of the bilateral relationship in the Arctic. In the meantime, the US must now navigate a more complex regional security landscape fraught with geopolitical competition and mounting pressure from Russia and China. 

Arctic Military Security Cooperation  

Individually, Russia and China represent a threat to Arctic security. While Moscow has been increasing its military footprint in the region,​​ Beijing is seeking to expand its presence and reshape regional norms to its advantage.¹ The threat is compounded by the impact of climate change on circumpolar security: A more accessible Arctic will undeniably bring more human presence, and therefore an increased risk of accidents, incidents, and miscalculations that could lead to military escalation.²

Circumpolar military security is an area where Russian-Sino relations are a threat multiplier against US and NATO interests. Closer bilateral relations in Arctic security affairs have materialized through military posturing and demonstrations of joint presence and operations. In terms of posturing and showcasing collaboration, the Russian Federal Security Service Border Service (Coast Guard and Border Guard) and the Chinese Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in April 2023 to strengthen soft security cooperation in maritime law enforcement.³ Although not Arctic-specific, the document aims to fight illegal migration, smuggling, and fishing as well as combat terrorism. 

The MoU led to the organization of the first joint coast guard patrol and drill in the Russian Arctic in September 2024 with the presence of Chinese Coast Guard assets.⁴ Such an agreement could represent a blueprint for future cooperation in military affairs between the Russian Pacific Fleet and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  

Indeed, it is likely that the countries will seek to organize a military exercise in the Bering Sea and/or the Chukchi Sea in the near future. Such a drill would draw much international attention and represent a major symbolic win for both countries. It would not necessarily mean a genuine deepening of bilateral military relations in the Arctic but would signal that Beijing can deploy and sustain naval force in the region.⁵

What could follow in terms of the next steps toward greater military linkages is the signature of a joint servicing or resupplying agreement for Chinese assets navigating across the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation or joint missile defense in the Sea of Okhotsk and along the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories at the fringe of the Arctic as part of joint ballistic missile early warning systems.⁶

In the meantime, Moscow and Beijing have been displaying an Arctic partnership by organizing regular military exercises, patrols at sea and in the air, and aviation overflights. Since 2019, this has taken the form of joint aviation patrols and strategic bomber overflights over the East China Sea and Sea of Japan, close to the Japanese and South Korean air defense identification zones (ADIZs).⁷ Such patrols lead to regular air violations and air space incursions over Japan and South Korea.⁸ In July 2024, both countries completed their first joint strategic bomber patrol near the Alaskan ADIZ, although without violating US air space.⁹

China and Russia also conduct regular maritime drills and patrols close to Arctic waters in the North Pacific. Since 2021, the ​​Northern/Maritime Interaction exercise in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk has included joint air defense, missile strikes, and anti-submarine warfare, among other components.¹⁰ Russian and Chinese warships also patrol close to the Aleutian Islands, off the US exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea, during a highly visible yearly joint exercise focusing on naval coordination and anti-submarine warfare.¹¹ 

Such demonstrations of military cooperation in the Pacific Arctic also serve the purpose of contesting US theater missile deployments with Japan and South Korea (Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). For Russia, regular overflights also aim to contest disputed sovereignty claims over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. 

Low-Intensity Warfare Against Critical Undersea Infrastructure 

Beyond military cooperation, the disruption of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) and seabed warfare activities represents another form of nefarious relations that Russia and China might further in the Arctic. Both countries have a clear interest in disrupting CUI — such as fiber optic data cables and energy pipelines — as part of continued subthreshold operations against Western interests.¹²

Both countries now have a track record of disruptive behavior against CUI, especially in the Baltic Sea area. In December 2024, the Russian oil tanker Eagle S was accused of damaging several CUI assets, including the Estlink 2 power line between Finland and Estonia.¹³ In November 2024, a Chinese vessel was investigated for potentially sabotaging underwater data cables in the Baltic Sea.¹⁴

The Balticconnector incident in October 2023 in the Baltic Sea was an eye-opening event demonstrating close relations between Russia and China in low-intensity warfare activities against CUI. The Balticconnector gas pipeline and several fiber optic cables running between Estonia, Finland, and Sweden were sabotaged by human-made activity. The police investigation attributed the blatant anchoring damage to the Chinese container carrier ​​NewNew Polar Bear.¹⁵ 

Incidentally, the NewNew Polar Bear quickly fled the Baltic Sea and was given express transit permission and escort across Russia’s Northern Sea Route.¹⁶ The Balticconnector sabotage undoubtedly showed signs of collusion between Russia and China in CUI disruption, as least with respect to intelligence gathering and seabed mapping.¹⁷ 

Cooperation in CUI mapping, intelligence gathering, and disruption could be easily replicated in Arctic waters for several reasons. First, Beijing and Moscow have a strong incentive to pursue such activities as they represent a low-cost, high-impact asymmetric enabler against US and NATO interests, especially in case of regional escalation.¹⁸

Second, the Arctic region is particularly vulnerable to CUI disruptions due to the existence of several chokepoints where subsea infrastructure lacks redundancy and resilience. A particularly critical chokepoint for US homeland security is across the Bering Strait. In shallower coastal waters, Russia and China could be tempted to conduct CUI disruption operations as part of subthreshold warfare activities.¹⁹

Finally, both countries possess the necessary assets to conduct intelligence gathering and sabotage operations against CUI. Russia has dedicated military assets and structures conducting seabed warfare operations during peacetime.²⁰ Together, Moscow and Beijing heavily rely on the existence of a “shadow fleet” of civilian vessels that can conduct intelligence gathering and sabotage activities.²¹ 

Most, if not all, Chinese and Russian civilian vessels (e.g., fishing trawlers, supply vessels, transport and container ships, research platforms) transiting through Baltic or Arctic waters should be considered able to conduct dual-use operations on the surface, underwater, and on the seabed. For civilian assets, it is relatively easy to hide data-gathering instruments and embed military crew onboard. On top of CUI disruption, the shadow fleet monitors regional naval activities, tracks subsurface movements, and gathers data for military submarine purposes.  

Friction Points and Limitations 

Despite an increasingly visible display of circumpolar military links, bilateral relations in the Arctic can be equally defined by the existence of friction points and limitations.²² Indeed, Russia remains unwilling to see greater PLAN presence — and certainly not beyond Moscow’s terms. China has therefore been cautious to avoid deploying military assets in the region without Russian consent. The Kremlin still portrays itself as the gatekeeper to China’s access to Arctic waters and a direct Chinese presence would undoubtedly antagonize Russia (or at least step on Moscow’s sensitivities).  

However, China’s approach to the Arctic remains fundamentally dual use and geared toward military applications, not least for domain awareness and intelligence gathering.²³ This situation makes Russia suspicious of Beijing’s projected intentions, as exemplified by the “Mitko case” in 2020 when Valery Mitko, ​​a professor at St. Petersburg’s Arctic Academy of Sciences, was arrested and charged with “high treason” for providing classified intelligence pertaining to submarine hydroacoustics to China.²⁴

On top of existing limitations, there are clear redlines that Beijing knows not to cross in terms of military inroads in the Arctic — from independently conducting military operations in the region to deploying Arctic-enabled military technology without Russia’s prior knowledge.⁵  

The existence of friction points in the military realm is compounded by similar limits in terms of wider Arctic governance. Indeed, Beijing’s “near-Arctic” status was received with pause and distrust in Moscow — not least for fear of the precedent it could create.²⁵ Russia remains steadfast in its interpretation of the Arctic as an exclusive club of circumpolar nations, geographically speaking.  

Further tension in the relationship could potentially lead to a “strategic culture clash,” especially if China becomes more active in shaping future Arctic governance and continues pushing for its vision of a first come, first served “global commons” tailored to Chinese economic interests.²⁶ Frictions also extend to navigational rights, resource exploitation, and infrastructure, among others.²²

Ultimately, both countries are voluntarily choosing to ignore existing friction points, for fear that addressing them would sour the relationship in the Arctic. However, the situation does not bode well for the future and will likely preclude further cooperation.  

About the Author

Mathieu Boulègue is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Mathieu is a freelance researcher and consultant in international conflict and security affairs, with a focus on the Former Soviet Union. In his research, he focuses on Russian foreign policy and military affairs, Ukraine, Russia-NATO relations and Transatlantic security, and Russia-China defense and security relations, as well as military-security issues in the Arctic. 

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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