The use of AI-driven propaganda and deepfake technologies has significantly escalated the scale and sophistication of disinformation, posing unprecedented challenges from Russia and China for Western intelligence and democratic institutions. 

Executive Summary 

• While Russian and Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations may appear to affect only the soft power of the US and its allies, these actions have a fundamental impact on hard power and national security as well. Moscow and Beijing use different tools and pursue different goals, but both seek to undermine the domestic cohesion of Western societies. This, in turn, weakens the Western alliance system, ultimately diminishing US power and its ability to act globally. 
• China and Russia, while differing in style and intent, increasingly align in their FIMI efforts, aiming to weaken Western democracies, erode public trust, and promote multipolarity through shared anti-Western narratives and media amplification. 
• Both countries employ state-controlled media, cyber intrusions, content generated by artificial intelligence (AI), and social media influence campaigns — often reinforcing each other’s messages without formal coordination. This is done to manipulate public perception globally, particularly during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine. 
• Case studies reveal their growing presence and influence in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific. While evidence of direct coordination remains limited, their activities in discrediting democratic processes, especially around Taiwan and US elections, show alarming parallels. The use of local influencers amplifies their outreach and enhances their credibility with local audiences.
• Western openness and media freedom are being exploited, as FIMI actors thrive on creating polarization, undermining NATO and European Union (EU) cohesion, and exploiting societal fault lines.
• This paper urges robust countermeasures, including institutional capacity-building, international coordination (especially among the US, EU, and NATO), social media regulation, cybersecurity enhancements, public awareness campaigns, and revitalized support for independent media and vulnerable democracies.  

Introduction 

China and Russia’s cooperation in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) represents a growing challenge to the West. By aligning their narratives, leveraging state-controlled media, deploying sophisticated cyber strategies, and advocating for a new information order, the countries present a formidable challenge to democratic information ecosystems. While their strategies and priorities may differ, their shared goal of undermining Western influence ensures continued collaboration in this domain. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective countermeasures to safeguard the integrity of information spaces worldwide. 

This report examines the depth and effectiveness of the alleged cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, exploring the extent to which their cooperation leverages coordinated disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, and media strategies to influence global perceptions, challenge democratic institutions, and advance their geopolitical interests. Understanding the depth and implications of this cooperation is essential for policymakers and scholars aiming to safeguard democratic processes and maintain international stability (see a previous CEPA report on Russian and Chinese information operations during the COVID-19 pandemic). 

The European and American approaches to FIMI activities were originally similar, but in recent times they have begun to diverge. The US Department of State defines FIMI as a national security threat to the United States and its allies and partners. The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation states that authoritarian governments use such tools to influence social discourse, skew national and international debates, and undermine democratic institutions, and that it requires an international response.¹

According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), FIMI encompasses a spectrum of activities designed to manipulate information environments, including the dissemination of false narratives, cyber intrusions, and the strategic use of media to achieve political objectives. Both China and Russia have independently engaged in such operations; however, if they have indeed launched an elevated collaboration, it would signify a notable escalation in the realm of information warfare. EEAS has identified China’s information manipulation and interference activities as challenges that require attention, highlighting the need for increased situational awareness and understanding of these methods.² 

As the two definitions from the US and the EU show, the understanding of FIMI and the threats it poses are fundamentally the same on both sides of the Atlantic, offering Washington and its European allies a wide range of opportunities for coordination and cooperation on the matter. 

The implications of potential Sino-Russian cooperation in FIMI are profound. By exploiting the openness of democratic societies, the countries aim to undermine public trust in institutions, influence electoral processes, and weaken alliances such as NATO and the European Union (EU). The use of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), to generate and disseminate disinformation complicates detection and mitigation efforts, posing formidable challenges to policymakers and security agencies. The Foreign Policy Research Institute highlights the effectiveness of these information operations, emphasizing the necessity for the United States to leverage open-source intelligence and artificial intelligence to compete in the cognitive domain.³  

Addressing this evolving threat requires a comprehensive understanding of the strategies employed by China and Russia, as well as the development of robust countermeasures. This report delves into the nature of their cooperation in FIMI, examines specific case studies illustrating the global reach and impact of their operations, and assesses the threats posed to the United States and its allies. By analyzing these dynamics, the report aims to contribute to the formulation of effective strategies to safeguard democratic institutions and uphold the integrity of information in the digital age, should the US decide to maintain its role as a supporter of democracies in the world.  

The Nature of Sino-Russian Cooperation in FIMI 

China and Russia have long viewed information as a strategic domain of warfare. While their approaches to information warfare have evolved independently, historical parallels exist. Russia’s information warfare tactics can be traced back to Soviet-era “active measures,” a set of covert strategies used to spread disinformation and influence foreign governments.⁴ The Soviet Union relied heavily on psychological operations, the use of front organizations, and media control to shape global narratives. These tactics continued after the Cold War and were refined with digital advancements, culminating in large-scale disinformation campaigns targeting Western democracies as part of a well-established toolkit of subthreshold, noncontact warfare activities. ((Pomerantsev, Peter. This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality. PublicAffairs, 2019.))

China, on the other hand, has developed a distinct approach through its doctrine of “public opinion warfare,” “legal warfare,” and “psychological warfare” — collectively known as the “Three Warfares.”⁵ Beijing’s information operations emphasize controlling domestic narratives while influencing foreign perceptions to align with its geopolitical objectives. Unlike Russia, which often engages in overtly disruptive campaigns, China’s strategy tends to be more subtle, focusing on long-term influence through economic leverage, state-controlled media, and the co-opting of foreign voices to push pro-China narratives. As the most recent EEAS report states, China’s main aim is to defend its international image and present its positive role in the world.⁶

Strategic Alignment in Information Warfare 

Although China and Russia initially pursued separate information warfare strategies, their shared adversarial stance toward the United States and its allies has brought about increasing cooperation in the domain of FIMI operations.⁷ China and Russia have found common ground in their strategic objectives regarding FIMI. Both states aim to challenge Western hegemony, weaken democratic institutions, and promote multipolarity by eroding trust in the US and allied governments. While their cooperation is not always explicit, they frequently amplify each other’s narratives, providing mutual reinforcement in the information space.⁸

This alignment is evident in their diplomatic cooperation in internet governance. Both nations advocate for “cyber sovereignty,” a model that promotes state control over digital spaces to counteract what they perceive as Western dominance.⁹ At international forums, such as those hosted by the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China and Russia push for regulations that would limit Western influence in the information sphere while legitimizing their own censorship and information control measures. 

Shared Anti-Western Narratives 

China and Russia regularly disseminate similar messages on key geopolitical issues, like the spread of COVID-19 or the war in Ukraine.¹⁰ Indeed, it is hard to tell whether these similarities are due to a proactive synchronization or mere coincidence, but their information campaigns often feature the following common themes: 

• Undermining US democracy: Both countries propagate narratives that depict the United States as a declining power plagued by internal divisions, racial injustice, and political corruption. 
• Discrediting NATO and Western alliances: Russia portrays NATO as an aggressive, expansionist force threatening global stability, while China echoes similar rhetoric in its Indo-Pacific discourse.
• Promoting multipolarity: Both states emphasize the idea that the world should move away from US unipolar dominance, promoting alternative governance models centered around Beijing and Moscow. 
• Framing the West as hypocritical: Chinese and Russian state media often highlight Western double standards on human rights, military interventions, and economic policies to erode the credibility of US and European foreign policies. Unfortunately, the West has indeed given legitimate reasons on several occasions to be justifiably accused of hypocrisy. Meanwhile, China has positioned itself in global strategic narratives as a benevolent actor that, in contrast to the West, claims to work in the interest of the Global South and to oppose a “Cold War mentality.” 

Use of State-Sponsored Media  

State-controlled media outlets (e.g., the China Global Television Network [CGTN], RT, Sputnik News, the Global Times) serve as critical instruments for Sino-Russian cooperation in information warfare. Russian channels like RT and Sputnik and Chinese outlets such as CGTN and the Global Times frequently republish and amplify each other’s content. These parallel activities extend their reach to global audiences, particularly in developing nations where alternative perspectives to Western media are sought.⁶ 

During geopolitical crises, this coordination becomes more apparent. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russian and Chinese media pushed narratives that questioned the effectiveness of Western vaccines while promoting their own.¹¹ Similarly, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Chinese media outlets echoed Russian claims about NATO’s provocations while avoiding direct condemnation of Russia’s actions.¹² It has to be emphasized, however, that there is no clear evidence on the active collusion of their media outlets, though their similar messaging is certainly more than a mere coincidence. 

Cyber and Social Media Strategies 

Russia has been a pioneer in the use of troll farms and bot networks to manipulate online discourse, particularly through entities like the Internet Research Agency.¹³ China has adopted similar tactics, using its own bot networks to promote state narratives while suppressing dissenting voices. Both nations deploy AI-generated content to create fabricated news stories, deepfake videos, and social media posts designed to distort reality.⁶ A potentially even more concerning development is that Russia has found a way to disseminate disinformation through Western AI chatbots. By flooding search results and web crawlers with its own narratives and falsehoods, it seeks to manipulate AI models rather than targeting human readers directly.¹⁴

Their cooperation in this field includes the following: 

• Mutual amplification: Chinese and Russian FIMI networks often amplify each other’s disinformation campaigns to increase their credibility and reach. 
• Targeted disinformation: Both countries deploy campaigns aimed at influencing elections in democratic nations, undermining support for Western-led institutions, and fueling polarization. 
• Leveraging alternative platforms: With Western social media platforms increasingly regulating state-sponsored propaganda, China and Russia have expanded their efforts on platforms like Telegram and WeChat and in localized networks in the Global South. 

Joint Diplomatic Efforts to Counter Western Influence in Media and Cyberspace 

China and Russia collaborate at diplomatic levels to counter Western influence in media and cyberspace. This is evident in initiatives such as the Sino-Russian “no-limits” partnership, which includes cooperation in internet governance and media narratives. They also hold bilateral forums on media cooperation, such as the China-Russia Media Forum, where they discuss cooperation strategies, though its effectiveness is limited. Fundamentally, both Russian and Chinese leaderships are motivated by great power considerations. Their top priority is preserving strategic independence, even when opposing the United States and its partners. While receiving rhetorical backing from another major power with similar views is beneficial, it is not essential, especially in the global information space, which lacks binding international rules. For the time being, both countries are capable of carrying out influence operations on their own.¹⁵

The Threat to the US and Its Allies  

The global geopolitical landscape has been increasingly shaped by the rise of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, particularly from competitors like China and Russia. These campaigns leverage the vast reach of modern communication technologies and social media to target democratic institutions, public trust, and international alliances, undermining the integrity of political systems and military stability. This chapter will examine the various ways in which Chinese and Russian FIMI present a growing threat to the United States and its allies, including through election interference, the destabilization of public trust in media, and the exploitation of emerging technologies such as AI-driven propaganda. 

Disrupting Democratic Processes 

One of the most significant threats posed by Chinese and Russian FIMI operations is their impact on democratic processes, particularly elections. Both China and Russia have been implicated in attempts to influence the political landscapes of various Western countries, notably the United States. The 2016 US presidential election remains a prime example, where Russian operatives used social media platforms to amplify divisive narratives, manipulate and polarize public opinion, and create distrust in the electoral process.¹⁶ While China’s efforts in this domain have been more covert, Beijing has also employed influence operations to affect elections in Europe and the US, Canada and Taiwan, promoting candidates who are perceived to be more favorable to Chinese interests.¹⁷

The objective behind these campaigns is clear: to sow discord within democracies, undermine the legitimacy of election outcomes, and erode public confidence in democratic institutions. Election interference is not a one-off tactic but part of a broader strategy to weaken the social fabric of these countries and increase the influence of adversarial powers on domestic and international politics. Once again, there is no clear evidence on the proactive collusion of China and Russia in these kinds of campaigns, but their similar global goals may independently lead them to similar actions. 

Destabilizing Public Trust in Media and Institutions 

A core component of both Russian and Chinese disinformation strategies is the destabilization of public trust in media and democratic institutions. Disinformation campaigns are designed to create confusion and mistrust, eroding confidence in the ability of traditional media outlets and governmental bodies to provide accurate information. The Russian government has been known to deploy extensive media manipulation tactics through state-controlled outlets like RT and Sputnik. These platforms promote narratives that challenge the credibility of Western media, casting doubt on objective reporting and aligning with narratives that serve Russian geopolitical goals. 

China has employed similar tactics, notably through state-run outlets like CGTN and the Global Times, which amplify Beijing’s political stances and frequently disseminate anti-Western narratives. By flooding the media with biased or misleading content, both Russia and China undermine the trust that citizens place in their institutions. This has far-reaching consequences, not only for individual nations but for the cohesion of international alliances like NATO and the EU, which depend on shared values of democracy, transparency, and a free press.⁶

Undermining NATO and EU Cohesion 

The cohesion of Western alliances, such as NATO and the European Union, has also been targeted by Chinese and Russian disinformation efforts. For Russia, disinformation campaigns have focused on exploiting existing fault lines within the EU and NATO, often highlighting disagreements over military spending, foreign policy, and refugee policies. These efforts aim to weaken the unity of these alliances and create divisions that adversaries can exploit to their advantage. For example, Russia has been known to propagate a strategic narrative about NATO’s intentions, such as presenting the alliance as an aggressive entity seeking to encircle Russia, furthering the idea of a Western “threat” to Russian sovereignty.¹⁸

China, meanwhile, has focused on creating discord in the EU by amplifying narratives that portray European countries as overly dependent on US foreign policy. These efforts are particularly evident in the discourse surrounding multipolarity, where Chinese communication promotes the notion that European countries should align with China rather than with the US, thus seeking to destabilize the transatlantic alliance.¹⁹ 

FIMI Threats in Military Conflicts 

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed the significant role that information warfare plays in modern military operations. Russian disinformation surrounding the Ukraine war illustrates how hybrid threats can extend beyond conventional military engagement to include the manipulation of public perception. From the outset of Russia’s 2022 invasion, Russian state media and social media platforms pushed a narrative that framed the war as a defensive action against NATO aggression, positioning Russia as the victim and portraying Ukrainian forces as Nazis or terrorists. This messaging has been instrumental in maintaining domestic support for the war and destabilizing international support for Ukraine.

Similarly, China has mirrored Russia’s approach by adopting a dual strategy of public denial and state-sponsored (social) media manipulation, framing the conflict in a manner that directly or indirectly supports Russian actions. By amplifying these messages in the global media, both Russia and China aim to undermine international unity and discredit efforts to support Ukraine.²⁰

Use of AI-Driven Propaganda and Deepfake Technology 

The rapid development of AI technologies has introduced new tools for disinformation, including deepfake technology and AI-generated propaganda. These technologies enable the creation of highly convincing fake videos and audio recordings that can be used to manipulate public opinion, spread false information, and incite political unrest. Russia has already demonstrated the potential of these technologies in its information warfare campaigns. For example, deepfake videos have been used to create fabricated statements from politicians, sow confusion, and create false narratives that undermine public trust in both government and media.²¹

China has also experimented with AI-driven content generation to craft tailored propaganda that can influence domestic and foreign audiences. The Chinese government has used AI technologies to automate the dissemination of pro-government messages, suppress dissent, and even fabricate content that portrays China’s global leadership as benevolent and unchallenged. The advent of AI in disinformation strategies represents a new frontier in information warfare, presenting substantial challenges for Western democracies. 

Challenges for Western Intelligence Agencies and Policymakers 

The increasing sophistication of information warfare presents significant challenges for Western intelligence agencies and policymakers. Traditional methods of countering disinformation — such as fact-checking, public communication campaigns, and diplomatic pressure — are insufficient to address the scale and complexity of modern information manipulation. The integration of AI, deepfakes, and coordinated influence campaigns across social media platforms has outpaced existing regulatory and intelligence frameworks — especially in smaller NATO member states. 

In response, Western governments have sought to develop tools for detecting and countering disinformation, including the establishment of dedicated units within intelligence agencies, increased cooperation with social media companies to identify and remove fake accounts, and initiatives aimed at strengthening the resilience of democratic institutions. However, the ongoing battle against FIMI requires an unprecedented level of international cooperation, transparency, and technological innovation to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes and military alliances. 

Parallel Patterns in Chinese and Russian FIMI Operations: A Case Study Approach 

How China Echoed Russian Disinformation About the Ukraine Conflict 

China has strategically refrained from explicitly supporting Russia’s military actions while simultaneously legitimizing Moscow’s justifications for the war. Studies have shown that Chinese state-affiliated media, including Xinhua, CGTN, and the Global Times, have echoed key Russian disinformation themes, such as the claim that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russia into war.²² Additionally, China has avoided framing Russia as an aggressor, instead characterizing the conflict as a “crisis” and urging for a diplomatic resolution without assigning blame. 

Research has also identified instances where Chinese media have propagated unverified claims originating from Russian sources. For example, the narrative that US-funded biological laboratories in Ukraine posed a security threat to Russia was widely circulated in Chinese media despite being debunked by independent fact-checkers.²³ This selective alignment with Russian talking points suggests a strategic effort by China to balance its geopolitical interests while undermining Western narratives about the war. 

Furthermore, content analysis of Chinese-language reports on Ukraine reveals a pattern of selective reporting, where Western military aid to Kyiv is portrayed as escalating the conflict while Russia’s responsibility is downplayed or omitted. By crafting a media environment that minimizes Russia’s responsibility for the war, China effectively shapes public perception in favor of Moscow, especially among audiences in the Global South where Chinese media have significant reach.²⁴

China’s information support for Russia extends beyond traditional media to digital platforms, where coordinated campaigns have sought to undermine NATO and Western support for Ukraine. A research project has documented Chinese government–linked accounts amplifying anti-NATO rhetoric on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter). As the conflict progresses, China’s role in shaping information narratives is expected to grow in significance, particularly in swaying public opinion in nonaligned countries of the Global South.²⁵

US Election Interference 

​Foreign interference in US elections has evolved into a multifaceted challenge, with state actors employing sophisticated tactics to influence electoral outcomes and public opinion. Notably, Russia and China have been implicated in various operations during the 2016 and 2020 elections, and concerns persist about their activities in subsequent electoral cycles.​ 

Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election marked a significant escalation in foreign disinformation campaigns. The Russian government orchestrated a comprehensive strategy that included cyberattacks, dissemination of false information, and exploitation of social media platforms to sow discord among the American populace. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that Russia’s tactics were expansive, involving not just cyberattacks but also disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing voter perceptions and exacerbating societal divisions.²⁶

In the 2024 election cycle, Russia adapted its strategies, employing more sophisticated disinformation techniques. Analyses revealed that Russian operatives used artificial intelligence to generate and spread misleading narratives, aiming to undermine public trust in the electoral process and influence voter behavior.²⁷

China’s approach to election interference has primarily focused on cyber operations and influence campaigns targeting downballot races rather than the presidential election.²⁸ Reports indicate that Chinese operatives have engaged in cyber espionage, including hacking attempts aimed at political figures and organizations. For instance, in the lead-up to the 2024 elections, hackers linked to China reportedly targeted devices associated with members of the Donald Trump family and aides from the Joe Biden–Kamala Harris administration, seeking to gather sensitive information.²⁹

Beyond cyberattacks, China has leveraged social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and manipulate public opinion. A notable example is the “Spamouflage” operation, wherein Chinese-controlled accounts masqueraded as US users to spread divisive content and disinformation ahead of the 2024 elections.³⁰ 

While Russia and China have individually conducted influence operations, there is evidence suggesting the existence of cooperation between them on social media platforms aimed at amplifying their respective agendas. Russia Today and China’s CCTV held a joint roundtable in 2023 where the parties discussed the role of the media in strengthening the multipolar world. The two sides have been running an app, called China-Russia Headlines, since 2017 that provides various news content on Russia and China.³¹ Another interesting example was when Russia’s Gazprom and the CCTV signed a memorandum of cooperation to “jointly promote technological innovation in the media sector,” which includes AI tools and was praised by the deputy minister of propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.³² These networks often employ coordinated tactics to spread disinformation and disseminate propaganda.³³

Influence Operations in Africa and Latin America  

China and Russia have strategically expanded their influence in Africa and Latin America through their media outreach and disinformation campaigns, aiming to amplify their geopolitical agendas and challenge Western narratives.​ Both nations have invested heavily in media operations targeting African and Latin American audiences. In Africa, Chinese content-sharing platforms have gained traction, prompting Russia to propose joint initiatives, reflecting China’s leadership in media infrastructure. This collaboration signifies a convergence of strategies to extend influence across the continent.³⁴ 

In Africa, disinformation campaigns have surged, with instances of foreign interference influencing electoral processes. For example, Russia has been accused of planning to interfere in the Central African Republic’s elections, aiming to suppress political opposition and spread disinformation. Such activities highlight the use of disinformation to manipulate political outcomes.³⁵

In Latin America, Russian authorities are especially concentrated on collaborations in Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its embassies, and regional governments engage closely in disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives. The Russian government–funded online platforms RT and Sputnik are essential in spreading pro-Kremlin narratives. Some Latin American media sources disseminate storylines that align with Russian aims, likely attributable to historical anti-US sentiment rather than explicit endorsement of the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Beijing aims to suggest a wholly benign motive behind its worldwide influence activities. The Chinese Communist Party uses its Spanish-language media source, Xinhua Español, and CGTN to engage viewers in Latin America, alongside diplomatic platforms such as the China-CELAC Forum (China–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum). The Forum is a cornerstone of China’s endeavors to shape elite perspectives in the region. In nations where the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating its influence operations, Chinese diplomatic staff often engage with local news media and are active on social platforms, disseminating Chinese cultural content occasionally accompanied by deceptive narratives regarding the nation’s human rights record and other subjects.³⁶ For instance, Venezuela’s TeleSUR is a state-funded pan-Latin American television network supported primarily by the government of Venezuela, with contributions from the governments of Nicaragua and Cuba. It exemplifies a reciprocal media vassalage dynamic: It benefits from Russia and China while concurrently acting as a benefactor to smaller allied states (Nicaragua, Cuba, and others), establishing a complex ecology of mutual dependency. This concept establishes a patron-client hierarchy of shared narratives among media channels throughout Latin America that amplifies Russian and Chinese messaging and discredits the US and the West as “imperialist” forces.³⁷ It is noteworthy that the same media outlet began sharing pro-Iranian, pro-Hamas, and anti-Israel propaganda immediately after the Hamas attack in October 2023, suggesting broader global FIMI cooperation among authoritarian powers.³⁸

Meanwhile, Chinese and Russian efforts seem to run their separate ways, with actual cooperation not evidenced so far. 

Taiwan Narrative Manipulation 

China and Russia have increased their efforts to shape narratives in the Asia Pacific region, focusing on Taiwan, employing disinformation campaigns, and engaging in cyber warfare to advance their geopolitical interests.​ Once again, while their goals and tools are similar, there is no clear evidence of their actual collaboration.  

Russia has consistently endorsed China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan. In November 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed this stance, describing China as an ally and supporting Beijing’s position on Taiwan. He emphasized that deepening Sino-Russian cooperation poses no threat to other countries.³⁹ ​Taiwanese officials have expressed concern over this alignment. In May 2024, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu stated that Russia and China are mutually assisting each other in expanding their territorial ambitions, highlighting the need for democracies to counter such authoritarian advances. Both nations have engaged in disinformation efforts to undermine pro-democracy movements across Asia. China, in particular, has intensified its campaigns to erode trust in democratic institutions. In January 2025, Taiwan reported a 60% increase in false or biased information disseminated by China, totaling over 2.16 million instances. These efforts have primarily targeted platforms like Facebook, X (and historically Twitter), and TikTok, using fake accounts and AI-generated content to manipulate public opinion.⁴⁰

About the Author

Tamás Matura is a Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

He is the Founder of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, EU-China relations, and the cooperation between China and Central Europe. Dr. Matura started his career as a research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. He used to serve as an adviser on China to the Minister of National Economy, as an editor of the China Strategy of Hungary, and as an author of the BRICS Strategy of Hungary. Right now, he is an Assistant Professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest, a lecturer at ESSCA School of Management Angers-Paris-Budapest-Shanghai, and a founding member of the European Think Tank Network on China.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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