Executive Summary  

• Although overall security coordination and military cooperation between China and Russia have strengthened in recent years, significant boundaries remain.  
• Beijing is concerned about Moscow’s use of nuclear coercion in the war in Ukraine. It reflects limits in the Sino-Russian alignment​,​ especially regarding ​​the role of nuclear weapons in state coercion.  
• China is currently modernizing and expanding its nuclear weapons program, causing debate on whether it aims to provide the Chinese leaders with the option to credibly threaten nuclear escalation. If so, that would mean an abandonment of China’s long-standing No-First-Use commitment.  
• ​​No ​substantial evidence suggest​s​ that Beijing is likely to replace non-nuclear capabilities with nuclear ones as its primary source of coercive leverage in conventional conflicts, similar to the Russian posture.  
• Rather than Russia’s assertive nuclear posture, the key driver influencing China​’​s nuclear posture is decisions taken in the US​ —​​ ​for example, the current plans of the Trump administration for an Iron Dome​–​like missile defense system.  
• Washington and Brussels should focus on conveying to Beijing that a continuous Chinese distancing from Russian nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine and a cautious Chinese approach to nuclear cooperation with Moscow will be met with reciprocal restraint. 

Introduction  

In May 2025, following the state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow, China and Russia issued a joint statement reaffirming their close security coordination and military cooperation. They specifically highlighted how their military cooperation holds “special significance, helping the two countries more forcefully defend sovereignty and national interests.” ¹ Despite such official celebrative declarations about lifting Sino-Russian military cooperation to a higher level, significant boundaries​ exist​. ² This is in particular the case regarding ​​the role of nuclear weapons in state coercion. Beijing maintains a critical stance toward Moscow​’​s nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine, and there is no substantial evidence to suggest that Beijing is likely to replace non-nuclear capabilities with nuclear ones as its primary source of coercive leverage in conventional conflicts, similar to the Russian posture. Continued and potentially even strengthened Sino-Russian security coordination and military cooperation is to be expected in the years to come, driven by a shared anti-US sentiment and common concerns about regime security. However, the key factor influencing China​’​s nuclear build-up and evolving nuclear posture is development in the US rather than the Russian nuclear posture.  

This paper assesses the degree to which China and Russia align on the role of nuclear weapons in state coercion and ​examines ​whether Moscow’s assertive nuclear posture ​and coercive use of nuclear threats ​in the war in Ukraine impact​s​ China’s nuclear posture. ​It outlines​ the evolving Sino-Russian military cooperation with a focus on the drivers and barriers to potential alignment on nuclear issues. The aim is not to draw firm conclusions, which is tricky due to the limited reliable information and the high degree of uncertainty currently in the international system. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate that there are limits to the self-proclaimed ​“​no-limits​”​ Sino-Russian partnership, and that while both China and Russia prioritize having a strong nuclear arsenal, they differ in how they seek to utilize it. While we should not have any illusions about our ability to break China and Russia apart, there are opportunities for us to influence how China​’​s nuclear posture evolves.  

The Restrained Sino-Russian Military Cooperation  

On February 4, 2022, Russia and China upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership without limits. ³ There is a broad consensus that the partnership has only further strengthened since the launch of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine later in February 2022. ⁴ Beijing​,​ careful to balance its various interests​,​ maintains that it is not a party to the war, instead holding a neutral position. This has not prevented a strengthening in security coordination and military cooperation between Russia and China. There has been an increase in joint military exercises and strengthened cooperation in the military industry, among other developments. ⁵ Judging from the most recent Sino-Russian summit in Moscow in May 2025, there appears to be more to come. ⁶ However, on nuclear weapons and nuclear escalation as part of state coercion, the Sino-Russian alignment​ has significant boundaries​. The Chinese President Xi Jinping has issued strong warnings to Russian President Vladimir Putin on several occasions. During Xi’s state visit to Moscow in March 2023, he directly warned Putin against using nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine, and the joint Sino-Russian statement from Xi’s visit correspondingly included a condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons, most likely at China’s behest. ⁷   

The US is concerned about potential Sino-Russian nuclear cooperation. ⁸ However, although there has been increased collaboration between China and Russia in certain strategic military domains, such as missile defense and early warning systems, it is unlikely that extensive coordination and integration of their nuclear capabilities and operations will occur in the foreseeable future. This is due to several factors, including a lack of trust stemming from deep-seated historical grievances. ⁹ Beijing and Moscow ​also differ ​on the role that nuclear weapons play in state coercion, ​with​ China maintaining​​ a much more cautious approach. ¹⁰ Despite their alignment on geopolitical issues and common concerns about regime security, China and Russia proceed from different strategic cultures. ¹¹ They thus continue to pursue different strategies​ and hold diverse views ​on how to utilize the​ir​ strong nuclear arsenal​s​. ​There is c​onsiderable debate on whether China’s nuclear modernization and expansion aim to ​enable​ Beijing ​to​ credibly threaten with nuclear escalation, ​but no substantial evidence​ suggest​s​ that China is about to replace non-nuclear capabilities with nuclear ones as its primary source of coercive leverage​ in conventional conflicts​. That is, China is not, like Russia, likely to prioritize nuclear threats as part of its coercive toolbox and move away from its No-First-Use commitment.  

Sino-Russian alignment on nuclear weapons​ has significant limits​, ​but ​China is still likely closely following and assessing the effect of Russia’s assertive nuclear posture and coercive use of nuclear threats concerning the war in Ukraine. ¹² ​T​he key driver influencing China’s nuclear posture is, however, decisions taken in the US, for example, the current plans of the Trump administration for an Iron Dome​–​like missile defense system.  

The Russian and Chinese Nuclear Build-Up is Driven by Shared Perceptions of US Policy  

Both Moscow and Beijing see themselves as the victims of a US strategy of containment and as targets of Western interference more broadly. They perceive the US as their key adversary, and the urge to stand firm in the confrontation with the US is a key driver behind their strengthening strategic partnership, including their growing security coordination and military cooperation. The US is also the focus of nuclear build-up​ in both countries​. They ​share​ a focus on the development of US military capabilities that could undermine their capacity for nuclear deterrence – that is, threaten their second-strike capability. ¹³ This has recently been reflected in the joint statement resulting from ​Xi’s ​state visit to Russia in May 2025​. That statement sharply criticized​ US President Trump​’​s plan for an Iron Dome​–​like missile defense system designed to protect against any missile threats, including from “peer and near-peer adversaries.” ¹⁴ ​T​he statement further emphasized how a strengthened US missile defense system is deeply destabilizing and risks turning space into a battlefield. ¹ While the implications of a weaponization of space are likely concerning to both Russia and China, the more immediate worry about the threat to their nuclear deterrents is primarily driving their criticism, reflecting a long shared interest in the preservation of their nuclear deterrence against the US. ​T​he statement​ also urged​ the US ​to​ avoid seeking military superiority “at the expense of the security of other states.” Besides such concern, Russia and China also repeat​ed​ a long-held criticism of the deployment of US nuclear weapons systems outside their national territories and in the territories of other nuclear-weapon states, highlighting how it undermines regional stability and global security. ¹⁵  

While the most recent joint Sino-Russian statement demonstrates such a common desire to constrain the further growth and exercise of US nuclear deterrence, it does not reflect growing cooperation between the two on their nuclear programs. Sino-Russian military cooperation primarily focuses on conventional weapons, and, at least according to available evidence, there is no joint research and development in nuclear or other strategic offensive capabilities. ¹⁶ In the last decade, following the onset of the Ukraine war in 2014, there are signs that the military cooperation between Russia and China includes a range of issues related to nuclear weapons and strategic stability. It seems that Moscow has been willing to sell more advanced Russian capabilities to China as it has come under increased pressure in Ukraine, and its dependency on Beijing has grown. In 2014, Russia, for example, approved the sale of the S-400 air and missile defense system and the Su-35 fighter jets. Furthermore, in 2019, Putin revealed that Russia was assisting China in the construction of a missile attack early warning system. ¹⁷ It is difficult to assess the significance. Some argue that it marks a notable shift in the military cooperation between China and Russia. Others go further, arguing that it could conceivably also lead to the development of an integrated China-Russia missile defense system, although the two countries have stated no such intention. ¹⁸ It is also noteworthy that China and Russia conducted joint missile defense exercises in May 2016 and December 2017. ¹⁹ In these ​computer simulation ​exercises, the two countries employed their respective surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems, using long-range SAM systems like the Chinese HQ-9 and the Russian S-300/400 series, to establish a joint area for air and missile defense. ²⁰ Such exercises required the two sides to share some information in sensitive areas such as missile launches, warning systems, and ballistic missile defense, and to display their C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems. ²¹ It is also difficult to assess the significance of these exercises, and we should be careful not to exaggerate their importance. It is, for example, difficult to know, how well-conducted and integrated the excercises ​were​. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that Beijing is taking advantage of Russia’s growing reliance on China to gain access to Russian capabilities​,​ expertise​,​ and experience in this area. ²²   

Is China Learning from Russia’s Approach to Nuclear Coercion?  

China has approached the so-called limited-war dilemma very differently from the US and Russia, because Beijing does not rely on nuclear threats. ²³ Since the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s, which revealed China’s coercive leverage deficits as its conventional military capabilities were not sufficiently to present a credible strategic deterrent, the Chinese leaders have prioritized developing information-age weapons – offensive cyber operations, counter-space weapons, and precision conventional missiles – as key in its coercion. Fiona S. Cunningham terms this China’s strategic substitution approach, which has enabled China to compensate for its inadequate conventional military capabilities without resorting to nuclear threats. ²⁴ China’s nuclear doctrine states that China will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any circumstances, and China unconditionally commits itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. ²⁵ The recently published white paper on national security underlines this​ commitment​, stating that China is “always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.” ²⁶ Such a No-First-Use commitment is unique to China, and nuclear weapons have played only a limited role in China’s overall military strategy, as Chinese leaders have viewed nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring a nuclear attack or preventing nuclear blackmail and coercion. This means that, until recently, China has pursued a strategy of assured retaliation and developed a relatively small but survivable nuclear arsenal. China is estimated to have approximately 600 nuclear warheads, with around 100 being added per year to the stockpile since 2023, cf. figure 1. ²⁷  

​​China is seemingly also increasing the number of nuclear delivery platforms based on land, sea, and air, as well as the capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. ²⁸ The modernization and expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal since 2019 ​have​ led to a growing debate about whether China is deviating from its strategic substitution approach and its No-First-Use commitment, shifting to a more assertive nuclear posture in its quest for credible deterrence and coercive leverage in the intensifying rivalry with the US. ²⁹ In 2022, the US Department of Defense assessed that China is “implementing a launch-on-warning” posture. ³⁰ Likewise, US experts such as Austin Long suggest that, by 2030, China​’​s “force structure and posture will be similar to America’s and Russia’s in many ways.” ³¹ The implications of modernizing and expanding China’s nuclear arsenal are also debated among Chinese experts and scholars, raising the question of the lessons that these experts and scholars are drawing from Russia’s assertive nuclear posture and coercive use of nuclear threats in the war in Ukraine. ​​     ​​​ 

​​Some experts and scholars in the US are worried that China might emulate Russia’s nuclear threats to deter US involvement in the Taiwan conflict.³² Despite the official intense Chinese criticism of Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine, there is no question that Chinese experts and scholars have carefully watched Russia’s use of nuclear coercion. Several of them seem to have concluded that Russia’s assertive nuclear posture has made Washington more cautious in dealing with Moscow, and that Putin’s nuclear threats, supported by nuclear exercises, have made the US and NATO more cautious in their military support for Ukraine.³³ Such assessment of Russian success with the coercive use of nuclear threats has further fueled the debate among Chinese experts and scholars on whether China increasingly needs to emphasize the nuclear dimension in its strategic thinking on a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in order to deter the US from intervening. ​Chinese experts and scholars​, however, take China’s No-First-Use commitment very seriously. Their debate must therefore be viewed in the context of a broader discussion among Chinese experts and scholars on what constitutes China’s No-First-Use commitment. In this broader discussion, there appears to be some movement toward not viewing the threat of nuclear first use as a violation of China’s No-First-Use commitment as long as China does not actually initiate first use.³⁴ It reflects a kind of creative rethinking among Chinese experts and scholars that we have also seen regarding other traditional key principles in Chinese foreign and security policy, e.g., on the principle of non-intervention.³⁵ A rethinking of the No-First-Use commitment could pave the way for China to increasingly engage in explicit nuclear signaling tactics in the Taiwan Strait. However, Chinese experts and scholars ​have considerable confidence​ that China is capable of maintaining a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait at the conventional level​,​ and ​of ​achieving military success using conventional means.  

While ​Chinese experts and scholars do debate ​the lessons of Russian nuclear coercion in the war in Ukraine for China, their focus remains primarily on the implications of developments in US nuclear posture, such as the current plans of the Trump administration for an Iron Dome​–​like missile defense system seen as potentially undermining China’s second-strike capability via-a-vis the US. That is, ​     ​developments in the US nuclear posture​, ​rather than developments in the Russian nuclear posture, ​​ ​     ​have prompted China to reevaluate the adequacy of its nuclear arsenal and doctrine. Therefore, whether China is moving away from its No-First-Use commitment is more influenced by what the US does rather than what Russia does. It is more likely that China will shift to a first use policy if Chinese leaders lose confidence in the ability of the above-mentioned strategic substitution approach relying on information-age weapons – offensive cyber operations, counter-space weapons, and precision conventional missiles –  to provide adequate and credible coercive leverage.³⁶  

Conclusion  

Continued and potentially even strengthened Sino-Russian security coordination and military cooperation is to be expected in the years to come, driven by a shared anti-US sentiment and common concerns about regime security. However, the prospects of integrating Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities or extensive Chinese-Russian coordination of nuclear employment and planning should be viewed as low-probability in Washington and Brussels. There is no strong alignment between Beijing and Moscow on nuclear issues, specifically when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in state coercion. Beijing maintains a much more cautious stance compared to Russia. Moscow’s assertive nuclear posture and coercive use of nuclear threats in the war in Ukraine are followed and discussed in China. However, so far, no substantial evidence suggest​s​ that it has had a significant influence on China’s nuclear posture.  

While a three-way nuclear dynamic is evolving between the US, Russia, and China, the China-US axis plays a more significant role than the China-Russia axis in influencing China’s nuclear posture. Beijing’s stance is contingent, first and foremost, on how China perceives the threats from the US ​​and the US’s Indo-Pacific alliances as well as the NATO alliance, which is generally viewed in China ​     ​as a tool for the US to exert pressure, contain China, and maintain the US’s global dominance. ³⁷ It is therefore important how Washington and Brussels approach Beijing. They should focus on conveying to Beijing that a continuous Chinese distancing from Russian nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine and a cautious Chinese approach to nuclear cooperation with Moscow will be met with reciprocal restraint, e.g., concerning the US exercises and deployments in the Indo-Pacific as well as on the question on the involvement of the NATO alliance in the region.  

Beijing’s and Moscow’s differing risk calculations and perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons present both challenges and opportunities. While Beijing ​is unlikely to​ enter arms control negotiations until it achieves closer parity with the US, areas for profitable dialogue​ exist​. Beijing has several times emphasized that a nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought.”³⁸ Washington and Brussels should take China up on this and urge Beijing to demonstrate greater transparency around the purpose and goals of its nuclear buildup. A US nuclear buildup and plans for a strengthened US missile defense are unlikely to yield such results. ​L​ittle evidence suggest​s​ that an increase in the US nuclear arsenal would deter China. Instead, Beijing is likely to perceive such an expansion as evidence of plans for nuclear war-fighting, not deterrence.³⁹ US President Trump‘s plan for an Iron Dome​–​​ ​like missile defense system ​therefore risks​ exacerbat​ing​ Beijing’s sense of leverage deficits and, consequently, discourag​ing​ the prospect of any dialogue, making it more challenging to engage China in nuclear arms control.  

About the Author

Camilla T. N. Sorensen is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy and War Studies at the Royal Danish Defense College. In her research, she focused on Chinese security policy and military affairs, China-Russia security and military relations, Arctic security, as well as Indo-Pacific security.  

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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