Executive Summary

• Trade cooperation between China and Russia has grown in tandem with anti-Russian sanctions and tensions with the West. A common border, economic compatibility, shared geopolitical perspectives and joint opposition to the US have encouraged bilateral relations.
• Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine Russia has been increasingly isolated economically, mainly due to Western sanctions, forcing it to rely heavily on China.
• The two countries have orchestrated unprecedented levels of coordination through trade in energy resources, electronics, chemicals, and transportation components.
• The relationship is unbalanced because Moscow is more dependent on Beijing than Beijing is on Moscow. A “reverse Nixon” strategy by the West — building relations with Russia to wean it off China — is unlikely to succeed because the economic ties are so important to both countries.
• Russia is becoming increasingly interconnected with China throughthe use of the Chinese Yuan. A significant sharing of national currencies between the two powers is reflective of their economic ties, and the use of services like China’s UnionPay cards has helped embed the Yuan in Russia’s economy.
• While Moscow and Beijing have deepened collaboration, Chinese investors have reduced engagement in Russia due to the risk of Western sanctions. Investment patterns show that while Russia and China are valuable to each other, their economic relationship is not fully unified.

Introduction

The China-Russia partnership has strengthened since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with their economic cooperation expanding steadily at a time of massive Western sanctions against Moscow. Unlike Russia’s deteriorating relationships elsewhere, its strategic alignment with Beijing remains close, and is built on more than a decade of deliberate economic and geopolitical rapprochement. The two countries’ synergy stems from naturally complementary economic systems, shared geoeconomic goals, and mistrust toward the West.

Russia’s economic and geopolitical dependency on China has increased as international alternatives diminished. Beijing clearly holds the upper hand in the growing relationship, yet both nations derive substantial benefits from the arrangement. Russia has gained a market for its energy resources and a vital source of consumer goods and technology, while China secures discounted access to Russian commodities and is a geopolitical partner for its opposition to the US-led international order.

A potential US strategy to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, by ending the Ukraine war and lifting some sanctions from Russia, underestimates the depth and multidimensional nature of the partnership. Economic interdependency is merely one pillar of a relationship built on years of strategic alignment, shared authoritarian governance models, and mutual distrust of the West, and these foundations will not easily crumble in the face of the Trump administration’s dealmaking. The two powers have committed to a long-term strategic partnership that transcends immediate geopolitical circumstances.

The Foundations of Sino-Russian Ties

Economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia has been on the rise for more than a decade. Both Beijing and Moscow’s tensions with the West set the scene for this cooperation and boosted it, but it also relied on the deeper foundations of a multi-dimensional rapprochement between the two countries.

The 4,200 km Russia-China border, a source of significant conflict dating back to the Tsarist expansion into territory controlled by the Qing dynasty in the second half of the 19^th century, has transformed into a stabilizing factor in bilateral relations. Military tensions over Damansky (Zhenbao) Island in 1969 underscored the strategic burden of an unresolved border dispute for both Moscow and Beijing. The resolution process began with military drawdowns and a revival of cross-border trade in the 1990s, culminating in a 2001 friendship treaty and a 2004 border agreement (fully implemented by 2008), which established a foundation for non-confrontational relations that the two nuclear powers consider essential to their security interests.

Russia and China’s economic compatibility (where China maintains an upper hand and Russia accepts the role of a junior partner) has evolved into a foundational element of their relationship, emerging gradually since the early 2000s when Beijing’s growing appetite for hydrocarbons encouraged cooperation. Initially, Russia’s attention remained focused westward, with China representing less than 10% of Russia’s trade between 1997 and 2007, but the 2008 global financial crisis marked a pivotal shift, as Russia’s economy contracted by 7.8% and China quickly rebounded to double-digit growth by 2010.

This economic divergence gave Beijing unprecedented leverage, which was highlighted when Russian energy giants Rosneft and Transneft, struggling to finance the East Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline, turned to China for support. The China Development Bank provided a $25 billion loan, but with strings attached, including a dedicated pipeline branch to China and a 20-year contract for an annual supply of 15 million tons of oil. Beijing later secured further discounts by threatening to withdraw financing. After Western sanctions were imposed in response to Moscow’s 2014 annexations of Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine, and particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, China followed the same pattern, becoming an irreplaceable trade partner for resource-rich but capital-poor Russia, with preferential access to its hydrocarbons, metals, and agricultural products at favorable terms.

Shared views on geopolitics and opposition to the US-led international order are further factors driving Russia and China together. Russian President Vladimir Putin had abandoned his initial pro-Western stance by 2004, as Western actions increasingly suggested Moscow would not be accepted as an equal partner. NATO enlargement, criticism of the Chechnya conflict, the Iraq invasion, and Western support for “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states, all contributed to Moscow’s disillusionment. Similarly, China grew frustrated with continued Western arms embargoes after the Tiananmen protests, persistent human rights criticisms, and Washington’s stated goal of increasing its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing and Moscow shared suspicions of Western promotion of democracy and supported the concept of a multipolar world order. Both countries advocated for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and resistance to what they viewed as American hegemony. Though their partnership remained more tactical than strategic for many years, this mutual sense of rejection by the West created a natural foundation for cooperation that deepened significantly after 2014.

Post-2014 Sanctions-Driven Economic Rapprochement

Despite the resolution of border disputes making 2004 a pivotal year in Sino-Russian relations, Moscow failed to develop a coherent China strategy for nearly another decade. This delay stemmed from several factors, including the Russian elite’s Euro-centric worldview and disinterest in Asia, and a geographic and cultural orientation to the West, where Russian oligarchs and corporations established their assets and sought business opportunities. Another important component was a collapse in Russia’s China-watching expertise after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving a shortage of informed analysis. Russia also saw an increase in casual sinophobia, particularly in response to demographic anxieties about sparsely populated Siberia, which borders China’s densely populated Northeastern provinces. While it is not captured in formal survey data, this trend has been evident in local media discourse and the social atmosphere in Russia’s Siberian and Far Eastern regions.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 triggered the worst rift in Russia-West relations since the Cold War, leading to sanctions on key sectors of the Russian economy. These exposed Russia’s economic vulnerability and its dependence on Western markets for hydrocarbon exports, capital, and technology, prompting the Kremlin to seek a strong alternative partner. China was the only viable candidate as the largest economy outside the Western sanctions coalition.

Moscow initiated an ambitious strategic reorientation toward China, anticipating that Beijing would become a significant purchaser of Russian hydrocarbons, replace Western sources of affordable financing, invest in Russian assets and infrastructure, and share essential technologies. Prior to full commitment, Moscow used a confidential interagency process to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of China policy.

This review concluded that, despite its increasing influence, China did not represent an immediate threat to Russian interests and, unlike the US, sought neither institutional nor ideological dominance or the imposition of political frameworks on Russia. Previous concerns, such as the “demographic threat” to Russia’s Far East, China’s military modernization, and competition in Central Asia, were reassessed and determined to be minimal and manageable risks.

In 2014, only a few months after the first Western sanctions were introduced, Russia secured a $400 billion gas supply contract with China. Putin visited Shanghai and the agreement, between Gazprom and CNPC, appeared to be a diplomatic victory for Moscow. It required the building of the “Power of Siberia” pipeline exclusively for Chinese markets. This situation mirrored Russia’s previous experience with the China-oriented branch of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline. Despite Gazprom’s efforts, Beijing declined to provide preferential financing for construction — a benefit it had previously extended to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The arrangement demonstrated China’s dominant position in the economic relationship and its implications became evident in 2021, when Gazprom disclosed it was selling gas to China at $150.20 per 1,000 cubic meters, the lowest rate for any of Beijing’s suppliers.¹

Despite the growing asymmetry in the relationship, between 2014 and 2022 the natural economic compatibility of Beijing and Moscow evolved into diversified cooperation. Bilateral trade volumes nearly doubled, increasing from $95.8 billion in 2014 to $190.2 billion in 2022.² China started to supply Russia with more high-end products, including advanced electronics and industrial equipment, while Moscow successfully solidified its position as a top supplier of oil, natural gas and LNG to Beijing as it faced a complex transition away from coal-based power.

Economic engagement between China and Russia did not increase in a straight line and remained subject to market dynamics and practical constraints. This was demonstrated in 2015, when oil price declines and the subsequent devaluation of the ruble resulted in a 28.6% percent fall in the value of China-Russia trade, despite the strengthening political relationship between the two countries.³

Contrary to the expectations of both Russia’s authorities and its major corporations, it did not emerge as a principal target for Chinese capital after 2014. Beijing’s outbound investments in Russia continued to represent only about 1% of China’s total foreign direct investments, as it failed to step in to fill the void left by Western investors.⁴ By 2016, Russia had adopted a more measured outlook over its economic ties with China, and Russian businesses no longer expected it to replace its European counterparts. Around 2019, Moscow began seeking alternative partnerships across Asia, particularly for projects of strategic significance like the Arctic LNG-2 energy development in the Russian Arctic region.⁵

Although China refrained from condemning Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and later Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese businesses have generally adhered to the sanctions against Russia. Despite the official discourse celebrating strong bilateral relations, many Chinese enterprises —particularly commercial banks and companies working in sensitive sectors — have substantial Western interests that prevent them from disregarding sanctions.⁶

Post-2022: Cooperation on Steroids

Trade

Russia-China trade saw annual growth of nearly 30% in both 2022, when it reached $190 billion, and 2023, when it hit $240.11 billion, but that growth slowed to just 1.9% in 2024. It was the first time in three years that Western sanctions showed a significant impact on the bilateral trade relationship.⁷ The 2024 total of $244.8bn was made up of $129.32 billion in exports from Russia to China and $115.49bn in the other direction.

Despite Russia’s growing economic isolation and the slower growth in 2024, Moscow and Beijing set new trade records in each of the three years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This expansion aligned with the trajectory of Russia-China relations since 2014 but represented a dramatic acceleration of the existing patterns. China cemented its position as Russia’s dominant trading partner, one for which Moscow has few alternatives, and Moscow’s dependency was particularly apparent in Russia’s energy exports and imports of advanced technological equipment.

The composition of Russia-China trade remained largely unchanged after 2022. Russia continued to export energy resources to China, while China supplied Russia with electronics, chemicals, consumer goods, and transportation components. China now represents approximately 30% of Russia’s exports, a proportion that has held steady for two years, and Russia climbed to seventh place among China’s trading partners in 2024, up from 13th place in 2020. China has been Russia’s number one trading partner since 2014, with its share of Russia’s foreign trade increasing from 11.3% in 2014 to 33.8% in 2024.⁸

Oil and gas have grown more significant in Russia’s exports to China, now making up about 75% of the total compared to a pre-2022 average of 60-65%, with China demonstrating its willingness to buy Russian energy resources when financially beneficial, regardless of any price cap mechanisms. In 2024, China’s purchases of discounted Russian oil reached an all-time high, even as overall trade growth between the countries slowed.⁹

For economically-isolated Russia, which faced an exodus of Western corporations after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese suppliers have emerged as the main replacement for Western goods. The extent of this substitution differs across sectors, with the automotive industry, formerly dominated by Western brands, demonstrating the most significant transformation. China now provides approximately 90% of Russia’s imported new passenger vehicles.¹⁰ Chinese household appliances brands (like Haier, Midea, Xiaomi) are also becoming increasingly popular in Russia and account for 30-40% of all sales. Haier’s subsidiary in Russia doubled its revenues in 2023 and the company says the increase in its share of the Russian market was connected to the withdrawal of key Western competitors.¹¹

Despite the overall growth in bilateral trade, Western sanctions against Russia started to impact China’s exports to Russia for the first time in 2024. After Antony Blinken’s visit to China, reportedly aimed at warning Beijing against sanctions evasion and weapons exports to Russia, China’s exports to Russia dropped by 16% in March 2024 and continued to decline in April.¹² By the end of 2024, the year-on-year growth rate of Russia-China trade was 1.9% — the slowest increase in the four post-pandemic years.  

Even Russian businesses not under sanctions began reporting that major Chinese financial institutions, including ICBC, Bank of China and China CITIC Bank, had ceased processing RMB-denominated transactions originating from Russia.¹³ After this decline, Russia’s exports to China in dollar terms were twice China’s exports to Russia — the first such imbalance since Q1-Q2 2022. However, by June 2024, prominent Russian media outlets reported that several smaller regional Chinese banks had resumed working with Russian partners. This followed an established pattern of using regional banks for transactions with heavily sanctioned countries, and recalls a similar approach used for China-Iran trade through the Bank of Kunlun.¹⁴

Currencies

There was an extraordinary rise in the yuan’s significance in the Russian economy in 2022 as China became Russia’s virtually irreplaceable trading partner. Russian officials framed this as a success in their efforts to increase settlements in national currencies, an initiative Moscow and Beijing have promoted since 2014. In September 2022 Putin told the Eastern Economic Forum that China was paying for gas equally in yuan and rubles, and the share of national currencies in Russia-China trade had grown to 27.5% in 2022’s first quarter. By December 2023, nearly one-third of Russian foreign trade was conducted in yuan.¹⁵

The increased presence of the Chinese currency in Russia is evident even to regular citizens. In 2024 alone, Russians boosted their RMB savings by 1.5 times.¹⁶ According to data from Banki.ru, approximately 20 Russian banks, including institutions like Dom. RF and VTB, now offer yuan deposits to their customers, up from 12 in 2023.¹⁷ After Visa and Mastercard’s departure made Russian bank cards unusable abroad, the Chinese UnionPay system became an appealing alternative. At least 11 Russian banks, including Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, and Russian Standard, now offer these cards. However, despite growing adoption, UnionPay cards issued by Russian banks have faced significant operational problems when used outside Russia.

Russian banks are not only offering UnionPay cards but also working to substitute the international SWIFT payment system with China’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). By mid-2022, 23 Russian banks had joined this mechanism, including major institutions like VTB, Otkritie, and Moscow Credit Bank, Banki.ru reported. However, CIPS doesn’t function as a complete SWIFT replacement and operates solely for yuan-based transactions, which remain under the supervision of Chinese financial regulators.¹⁸

Though Russian officials tout successful settlements in national currencies, the reality shows a one-sided expansion of the yuan’s importance in Russia. By late 2022, Russia had become the fourth largest global center for Chinese currency trading, despite not ranking in the top 15 in April the same year. This trend can be seen in Moscow Stock Exchange transactions, where the yuan’s proportion rose from just 3% in 2022 to 54% in May 2024.¹⁹ After the Moscow Stock Exchange was targeted by US sanctions in summer 2024, the proportion of transactions conducted in Chinese currency reached 99.8%. And by September 2024 the Russian market hit a yuan liquidity crisis as interest rates for ruble borrowing increased to 20%. The yuan shortage was reported to have been resolved by early 2025, but the currency’s availability is still inadequate to meet the demand for yuan-denominated loans for Russian businesses, according to Russian officials.²⁰

Investment

Despite the boom in trade cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in 2022, other economic ties have not shown such impressive results. For example, major Chinese investments in Russia ceased in 2022, according to the American Enterprise Institute database, which tracks Chinese company investments worldwide.

The collapse of investment suggests Chinese companies have exhausted their willingness to engage with the Russian market in the face of the growing risk of sanctions. During the first rounds of anti-Russian sanctions in 2014, Chinese investors still backed energy projects in Russia, including the Silk Road Fund buying a 9.9% stake in Novatek’s Yamal LNG project in 2015. Novatek also managed to secure loans from Chinese banks for the development of its flagship Arctic project.

At least one major investment project in Russia — a gas processing plant being developed by Sibur and Chinese Sinopec — was frozen due to sanctions in March 2022. Chinese investment in the plant, which was scheduled to begin operations in 2024, was expected to amount to approximately $500m. Reuters reported that Sinopec backtracked because Gennady Timchenko is a minority shareholder in Sibur. Timchenko had been under US sanctions since 2014, but was only added to the UK and EU sanctions lists in 2022.

At the same time, Russian companies began making significant investments in China. Rusal, Russia’s biggest aluminum producer, acquired a 30% stake in Chinese alumina manufacturer Hebei Wenfeng New Materials for $267m in 2023. As one of the Russian metals companies most severely affected by the Ukraine conflict, Rusal lost access to approximately 40% of its supplies of alumina, a vital component in aluminum production, after the outbreak of hostilities. Australia prohibited alumina exports to Russia, and the company had to shut down its alumina refinery in the Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv. In 2024, Russian Nornickel announced plans for a potential joint venture with a Chinese partner to transfer copper production from Russia to China. The specific details of this joint venture have not yet been disclosed, but Nornickel’s CEO Vladimir Potanin said he expects to receive clarity from the unidentified Chinese partners, reported to be China Copper, by summer 2025.²¹

Conclusion

Russia-China economic cooperation over the past decade has developed under the twin pressures of anti-Russian sanctions and deteriorating US-China relations. In many respects, the reality and constraints of this economic partnership have not met Moscow’s expectations. Nevertheless, the overall direction of the multifaceted relationship is continuing toward stronger cooperation based on common strategic objectives. Russia has clearly become the junior partner, primarily due to its limited economic alternatives. At the same time, it has emerged as an important testing ground for Chinese industrial and technology companies. After the first wave of anti-Russian sanctions, Chinese contractors took over from their European counterparts on the Yamal LNG project, for example, gaining an opportunity to test their equipment in the harsh conditions of the Russian Arctic. The Russian market is also becoming valuable for many Chinese consumer goods manufacturers. Given Moscow’s enthusiasm for promoting de-dollarization of international payments, Russia is also developing into a significant experimental arena for yuan internationalization, which has been Beijing’s goal for more than a decade.²²

As the Trump administration discusses a “reverse Nixon” strategy to separate China and Russia, it risks underestimating the depth and mutual benefit of the economic partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Nixon’s successful effort to pull China away from the Soviet Union in the 1970s worked because the Sino-Soviet split, over border disputes and tensions regarding leadership of the communist world, were already in progress. In the 2020s Moscow and Beijing are experiencing the closest period in their bilateral history, which neither side would want to abandon, regardless of the incentives or punitive measures Washington might present to them.

About the Author

Natalia Chabarovskaya is a Senior Analyst at an international think tank and is an expert on Russia and China. Their name has been changed due to concerns for personal safety.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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