Executive Summary

• Despite initial predictions that sanctions would cripple it, Russia’s economy has shown unexpected resilience, with a modest contraction in 2022 followed by growth in 2023 and 2024. Nonetheless, sanctions and the war itself have forced Russia’s economic policymakers into a series of Faustian bargains, all of which are undermining midterm economic viability.
• Russia’s economic resilience has resulted from a combination of increased state spending, authoritarian “friend-shoring” of trade, and import substitution, which together have boosted consumption and investment, and kept capital in the country.
• The departure of more than 1,200 foreign companies, while reducing the options available to Russian consumers and damaging Russia’s image, has increased profits for Russian companies, bolstered demand for Russian-made goods, and given the regime a wellspring of capital to redistribute to politically loyal interests.
• Russia’s economic growth is heavily tied to military spending, with investments tilted toward war-related industries, import substitution, and infrastructure projects to facilitate trade with China. In the absence of defense spending, Russia’s economy would likely stagnate.
• Wartime production and import substitution have combined with a shrinking workforce to overheat the economy, with rising wages and reduced civilian capacity producing virtually uncontrollable consumer-price inflation, despite record-high interest rates.
• All of these factors exacerbate mid- and long-term risks, stemming from unsustainable growth, technological backwardness, and labor-force depletion. If (or when) the war in Ukraine ends — and even if it continues — Russia’s dependence on military spending, low-tech exports, and high inflation may lead to economic stagnation of the kind seen in the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
• Sanctions aimed at bringing Russia’s looming economic crisis forward should target capital, labor, and technology more effectively.

Have Sanctions Failed?

The day Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Western governments announced a set of what they saw as devastating economic sanctions.

“We will continue on a remorseless mission to squeeze Russia from the global economy piece by piece, day by day, and week by week,” then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson told parliament.¹

Likewise, President Joe Biden vowed that his administration would “stunt the ability to finance and grow the Russian military.”²

The economic consequences of the sanctions looked so devastating at the time that economists in Russia and abroad predicted unprecedented economic decline. The International Monetary Fund projected an 8.5 percent drop in Russian gross domestic product for 2022, followed by a 2.3 percent decline the following year.³ As the IMF was making its predictions, the Bank of Russia was lowering the base rate by an astonishing 300 basis points and bracing for a drop in GDP by as much as 10 percent in 2022, followed by a further 3 percent in 2023.

As it happened, all of those predictions were severely wide of the mark. Russia’s economy registered a modest 1.2 percent decline in 2022 and 3.6 percent growth in 2023, with growth in 2024 projected at 3.9 percent. The country is also enjoying a boom in real wages and internal investment not seen in almost 20 years.

Experts can debate how they got it so wrong, but surely it was at least in part a misjudgment of how robust Russia’s economy was, combined with the Western coalition's failure to sustain a global sanctions regime. The sanctions’ architects had to act without knowing how long the conflict would last and how willing Western politicians would be to cause pain to their own nations in order to punish Vladimir Putin.

There are two main fallacies about the Russian economic data. The first, primarily pushed by the Kremlin and profit-seeking businessmen and politicians, holds that the sanctions have failed to harm the Russian economy while impeding Western trade, and therefore should be jettisoned. The second, heard mainly from Ukrainian politicians and the staunchest supporters of the current sanctions regime, is that Russian data cannot be trusted, that the impact of the sanctions is much more significant, and that therefore they should be broadened and strengthened.

Neither of these views is correct. Despite Russia classifying a large chunk of its statistics, those that are available seem internally consistent and jibe with figures from Russia’s trading partners, anecdotal evidence, and non-economic data, such as China’s and India’s oil import data, salaries statistics aggregated by job-seeking services, and retail sales volumes.

On the other hand, the Russian economic boom is fueled by the nation’s mortgaged future, and the overheated and imbalanced war economy could stall out, as has happened to other warring countries.

Despite some well-grounded hope, earlier sanctions failed to prevent Putin from starting his war of choice. But then, sanctions have rarely, if ever, forced a change in policy in the short run.

The US and its allies imposed a limited batch of sanctions in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and organizing a separatist revolt in the Donbas. They aimed primarily at warning of more brutal consequences if Moscow did not change its policy.

When that warning failed to prevent the full-scale war of 2022, the sanctions morphed into economic warfare, aimed at causing long-lasting damage, increasing the cost of the war, slowing down postwar rearmament, and becoming a bargaining chip in any future negotiations. The current sanctions can still serve these purposes, with some significant adjustments based primarily on the sources of Russia’s seemingly paradoxically resilient economic growth.

Domestic response and adaptation

Failing to reach a blitz victory over Ukraine and facing sanctions meant to exclude it from global trade and finances, Russia embarked on an economic war footing consisting of a government spending frenzy, trade friend-shoring, and production autarky, dubbed “import substitution.” With the benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising that these steps spurred growth, as they have for many countries at war.

As Adam Tooze showed in his seminal 2008 book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, Nazi Germany enjoyed real GDP growth of some 55 percent between 1933 and 1937, as the German economy developed a hothouse prosperity, supported by high government subsidies to sectors that tended to give the country its military power and economic independence from global markets. Tooze’s data shows how a tenfold increase in military production in the first years of the Nazi rearmament program came hand in hand with a threefold rise in private consumption.

Something similar happened in Russia as the war proceeded. Initially, the economy fell off a cliff. The stock market stopped trading, customers queued at banks to get dollars, and the authorities limited capital outflows. The collapse of imports and cross-border capital movements led to a ruble crash and a drop in energy exports.

But then the collapse in imports and a spike in global oil prices, combined with capital controls and high rates, pulled the ruble back up to prewar levels. At the same time, the Russian government adjusted its fiscal policy, which allowed it to increase spending, and eased restrictions on imports, restoring the flow of goods.

The West introduced sanctions against Russian oil exports at the end of 2022, which resulted in a substantial drop in the state’s oil revenue at the beginning of 2023. Then in February 2023, a tweak to the tax on oil exports restored the flow of tax revenues in the second half of 2023. By then, Russia had mostly adjusted to the new conditions, finding new ways of selling its oil, importing goods, and stimulating growth.

Effectively, there are three main drivers of Russia’s economic growth: the domestication of Western-owned businesses, a state-fueled boom in consumption and investment, and capital lock-in.

Exodus of foreigners

According to the Kyiv School of Economics and Yale’s Chief Executive Leadership Institute, more than 1,200 transnational companies either left Russia or suspended operations following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, of which 1,028 have gone completely.⁴ The automotive industry suffered the most, followed by suppliers of consumer, industrial, and investment goods and services. Finance, insurance, science and technology, auto repair, and trade also took significant hits.⁵ Some companies, including some household names from Europe and the US (e.g., Nestle, Mondelez, Heineken), are buying time and unwilling to sell their businesses for a fraction of the market price. Foreign companies that want to sell their assets and decamp with the proceeds must first get a reluctant Kremlin’s permission, and then they face a 60 percent discount off the market valuation and a 35 percent tax.

The mass departure, however, has opened up opportunities for Russian companies. In the first three months of 2024, profits more than doubled for companies in finance and insurance. Tourism services saw profits up an eye-watering 52 times, construction 41 times. In the 12-month period profits stagnated, though they were close to their highs.⁶

Although business taxes are still low compared with developed countries, the government captured extra revenue through ad-hoc windfall taxes in 2023 and a blanket tax hike in 2024. With both people and their money locked inside the country, supercharged domestic demand increases the taxes paid into the state coffers and keeps the dividend at home.

State spending fuels consumption

One key driver of economic growth has been state spending, to the benefit of the general public and businesses via state contracts, budget transfers, and social handouts.⁷

The fiscal boost and the needs of the army have increased demand for workers, while mass emigration in 2022 and a thinning inflow of migrants have reduced supply. The resulting sharp rise in salaries has boosted consumption and savings.

Salaries continue to rise, though the increases are slowing. In March 2024, they went up by 21.6 percent year-on-year in nominal terms and 12.9 percent in real terms. In July, those figures were 18 percent and 8.1 percent.⁸ The government forecasts a 9.4 percent annual rise in 2024. That pattern of rising living standards is expected to continue, even as it slows further. In its budget projections, the government expects real salaries to rise by 7 percent in 2025, 5.7 percent in 2026, and 4.1 percent in 2027, a far cry from the peaks in 2024 but still twice the rate than in a decade before the invasion.

Some words of caution on those figures, though. First, they are based on an optimistic outlook for oil prices and economic growth, which if missed would result in lower revenues and weaker government spending. Second, this outlook foresees inflation of 4 percent to 4.5 percent in 2025, which seems unlikely given the current rate of almost 9 percent. A slower rise, or even decline, in real incomes would create a social problem for the Kremlin, especially if it coincided with a consumer debt problem.

Despite a double-digit interest rate, the volume of consumer lending remains higher than the prewar average. It doubled in the first quarter of 2024 and saw only minor cooling off, primarily due to the end of a state-subsidized mortgage program. Retail loans were up 1.4 percent in May year-on-year after a 2 percent rise in May and June, thanks to the central bank's cooling-down policy.⁹ Auto finance is growing, too: The average loan to buy a vehicle went up from 1.2m rubles ($11,400) to 1.4m rubles ($13,300) last year, as prices for Russian cars rose by 24 percent over the year and prices for foreign-made ones went up by 11 percent.

A new class of borrowers has emerged in Russia, as those with high incomes prefer to generate interest on savings (encouraged by rates of over 17 percent) while using cheaper credit to cover current expenditures. At the other end of the spectrum, “People who had poor credit ratings are suddenly creditworthy and are starting to take out bigger loans, even though interest rates are high,” German Gref, head of state-owned Sber, Russia’s biggest bank, said in a speech in June.¹⁰

According to the central bank, corporate borrowing also keeps growing (up 2.3 percent year-on-year in October 2024 after a 2.0 percent hike in September), although a record-high base rate of 21% and tightened regulations helped to slow down the pace to 0.8% in November. Developers are borrowing to fund housing construction, while transport and IT firms lead the way.

Capital lock-in and investment boom

For decades, the trade surplus generated by Russia’s exports of oil, gas, and other commodities was largely mitigated by a constant capital outflow. While the trade surplus persisted after 2022, capital is now trapped inside the country, thanks to Western sanctions and restrictions imposed by Moscow. The isolation of Russia’s banking system, Western enforcement of strict compliance requirements on funds originating in Russia, frozen accounts, and other wartime issues are forcing rich Russians to find ways of “parking” their money domestically.

According to the Frank RG consultancy, the number of Russians with capital over 100m rubles ($947,000) was up 50 percent by the end of 2023, and their total capital showed a record growth of 62 percent. These affluent Russians account for about 23 percent of their country’s financial capital. According to the central bank, cross-border transfers in 2023 were down 35 percent year-on-year, to 2.9 trillion rubles ($27.5 bn). This is a turnaround from the first year of the war in Ukraine, when capital flight, a stock-market collapse, and the withdrawal of capital into illiquid forms (gold, property, and businesses) drained the capital held by wealthy Russians by more than 20 percent, to 10.9 trillion rubles ($103.2 bn).¹¹ As international transfer fees rose, private funds faced stricter compliance, and some European Union banks refused to work with Russians, more Russian money ended up staying home and going to work within the domestic economy.

This lock-in of capital resulted not only in booming consumption but also in rising investment. Before the war, the Russian government was banging its head against the wall, trying to find a way to force businesses to stop sitting on financial reserves or paying gigantic dividends. But businesses complained that they would rather not invest because of a poor investment climate, state interference, and an unpredictable taxation policy.¹²

Now, deprived of the options to invest abroad and buoyed by subsidized loans and rising profits, businesses are eager to invest at home. Spending on new construction, higher-tech equipment, new kit, and the like in the first half of 2024 hit a 12-year high of 14.4 trillion rubles ($136.4 bn), up 10 percent from the previous year.⁸

Despite the central bank’s tight monetary policy and a labor shortage, investment has started to show signs of slowing, though still higher than in previous years. In 2023, the investment growth rate topped the GDP growth rate by a wider margin than at any point over the previous 15 years, according to the Moscow-based Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting.¹³ State and private demand are helping turbocharge Russia’s economy, while limits on capital outflow have juiced investment. In Russia, this link between the war in Ukraine and enormous opportunities and increased profits has fed the myth of a stable economy withstanding impotent sanctions.

The wrong kind of growth

Russia’s wartime economic growth, however, is financed by mortgaging the country’s future. Behind almost every positive indicator lurks a trap.

The main destinations for the country’s hitherto-unseen investment are import substitution, eastward infrastructure, and military production. Mechanical engineering, which includes manufacturing finished metal products (weapons), computers, optics and electronics, and electrical equipment, was one of the fastest-growing areas for investment in 2022 and 2023.¹⁴ None of that investment would support Russia’s long-term productivity growth.

Another contributor to Russia’s GDP growth is consumption, fueled by rising salaries, which in turn are the result of companies’ efforts to find and keep workers amid record-low unemployment and a severe workforce crisis.¹⁵

Salaries are increasing faster in Russia’s industrial regions on the Volga and in the Ural Mountains, home to many arms manufacturers, but the labor shortage affects all Russian regions and almost every industry.¹⁶ In a May 2024 report, the central bank noted “a significant shortage of highly qualified specialists and low-skilled workers alike” across Russia.¹⁷ The Labor Ministry predicts that by 2030, Russia will be short 2.4m workers.¹⁸

The labor scarcity is due not only to increased demand but also to dwindling supply. Even before the war, Russia’s workforce was shrinking due to natural demographic causes. Then mass emigration in 2022 deprived the labor market of about three-quarters of a million Russian and foreign workers, mostly in IT, finance, and management. Meanwhile, the Russian army is recruiting tens of thousands of working-age men. Absent another round of mobilization, the army must compete with other employers. Somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 workers join the army every month, about 0.5 percent of the total supply. As time passes, it becomes harder to recruit more men to fight, which means they have to be enticed by ever-higher salaries, sign-on payments, and other bonuses, hence the doubling of federal and the meteoric rise of regional sign-up bonuses in 2024.

Russia’s natural population decline traditionally has been offset by migrant labor, but migration in 2023 was at its lowest level since pandemic-hit 2020. Going forward, there could be even fewer newcomers, considering the tighter checks on migrants instituted in the wake of the March 2024 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, aggressive anti-migrant rhetoric from officials, new laws making it more difficult for workers to bring in their families, and prohibitions in several regions, including the Moscow region, on migrants working in retail, services, and other industries.¹⁹

Rising demand and declining supply have led to acute competition for labor, boosting salaries and feeding inflation, while technological sanctions have made it difficult for Russia to increase productivity significantly. Therefore, Russia is slowly entering a phase when further government spending contributes more to inflation than to economic growth.

As a result of these stresses, Russia’s economic growth is beginning to flag. Industrial production growth, which had been above 4 percent year-on-year since the second quarter of 2023, and hit 5.8 percent in May, slowed down to 3.7 percent in November after just a 1.1 percent in September the lowest level since March 2023. Declines were even noticeable in manufacturing, including the military-industrial complex, which reported an average growth of 8.0 percent in the first 11 months of 2024, down from 9.5 percent average growth in the first quarter of the year, The prohibitively high cost of credit and labor for non-military industries helps to shift.

 Despite the signs of cooling, though, the fundamental drivers of overheating — growing military production and an intense labor shortage — remain. In some sectors related to the military (for example, finished metal products and optics and computers), there is no sign of cooling. Inflation also remains high, threatening to drive Russia into stagflation in the midterm.

When the war stops

None of the causes of Russia’s economic imbalances will be ameliorated by an end to the fighting in Ukraine. In fact, some of them may be exacerbated.

In the first place, Russia has become addicted to military spending. Whether the war ends in a lasting peace or a fragile ceasefire, the country will have to rebuild its armed forces, which Russian army expert Dara Massicot estimates could take up to eight years. At present, thanks to the abundance of Soviet kit in storage, Russia’s consumption of military equipment can vastly outstrip the arrival of new equipment. Even without any ongoing fighting, military spending would need to remain high.²⁰

Historically, countries experience slowdowns and spikes of unemployment for a year or two after wars end, whether they are victorious or not. For example, the Allied nations after both world wars lacked enough jobs for demobilized soldiers and defense industry workers and sought to rein in spending and redirect resources toward civilian production. The Kremlin would try to avoid that type of slump by continuing to spend on military production, while a relatively low debt load allowed it to balance the budget slowly.

Of course, much would depend on how the war ends and whether the postwar Kremlin pursues accelerated military reconstruction amid a belligerent and revanchist policy, or chooses to rebuild a smaller army at a slower pace while trying to rebuild relations with the West. But whatever course it chooses, most of the sanctions, which hobble productivity growth, and the labor shortage will not go away overnight.

A protracted decline in oil prices would put more pressure on public finances. Given a rising level of economic austerity, capital movement restrictions, and sanctions-depressed imports, the government might struggle to balance the books by devaluing the ruble and cutting imports.

Russia’s economy may survive a year or two of hardships caused by moderately lower oil prices, a continuing decline in labor supply, the lingering effects of stiffened sanctions, and a continuation of fiscal stimuli, but it’s difficult to see how it continues to grow and keep the people fed if all these obstacles persist in the long term.

The labor market dislocation will remain unless Russia faces a severe contraction. A combination of the demographic trough, brain drain, and high demand from the defense industry and the army will pressure the market, forcing the Kremlin to choose between importing foreign workers at the risk of social discontent and a constant labor shortage.

The scarcity of labor could create another problem, as well. As the economy becomes less able to absorb more fiscal stimuli, real salary growth could slow, leading to possibly dangerous grumbling from those who had been the winners of the wartime economy. Meanwhile, the economy is unlikely to become more efficient.

Russia remains technologically backward and dependent on high-tech imports. Even with massive fiscal stimuli, it has yet to produce technologies fit for a competitive export market beyond arms and nuclear energy, with the former already sanctioned and the latter on the brink of being so. Russia is not a substantial player in any of the cutting-edge technologies, from artificial intelligence to biotechnology.

The country even struggles to reach previous technological frontiers, having to import microchips, aviation, machinery, shipbuilding, etc. As the defense industry sucks up the lion's share of state investment; after an initial spike due to the closure of investment opportunities abroad, private investment is stifled now by high inflation, lack of competitiveness, and autarky; and the sanctions limit access to modern technologies, it would be difficult for Russia to make a technological breakthrough in productivity similar to that of the 1930s or the 2000s. The 2025 budget, which sacrifices spending on science, education, and health in favor of defense, illustrates the problem.

The demographic trough, the declining quality of university education and severed ties with international schools, and a brain drain exacerbate the problem. The technological gap will likely widen, with Russia increasingly relying on outdated Chinese imports and reverse engineering.

In short, 40 years after the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule, Moscow is facing a redux of the problems he and his predecessors encountered. The military will dominate the Russian economy for years to come. Even after some agreement is reached in the current war, the Kremlin will need to rebuild military stocks, keep up with the arms race, and retrain the army. The military-industrial complex will continue to suck investment, people, and capacities from civilian sectors.

A highly centralized economy and a fear of public discontent would prevent creative destruction, hemorrhaging funds for less productive regions and facilities. In addition, unless oil revenue skyrockets, the government will lack the money to support its current growth model. With foreign capital markets walled off, the only sources are private savings and/or inflation.

Recalibrating sanctions for midterm impact

The state of the Russian economy and the Kremlin's strategic goals dictate the need for increased economic pressure. It would not be accurate to say that the sanctions did not work. While they have failed to prevent Russia’s aggression and to change Russia’s political course since 2022, they have helped to distort the country’s growth, possibly planting the seed for another 1980s Soviet-style crisis.

To deter the Kremlin, the West should revisit the sanctions plan and hit the Russian economy where it’s most vulnerable. The economic war has three main thrusts: capital, labor, and technology.

• Capital
  It’s too late to reverse the capital influx of 2022 and 2023, but the West should try to decrease Russia’s capital surplus in the future. 
  • Capital markets should remain closed to the Russian state and Russian companies as long as the Kremlin continues its belligerent policy toward the West. Limits on low-tech consumer exports to Russia should be eased amid further reductions in Russian commodity imports to the West. This would facilitate capital outflow while keeping competitive pressure on the country’s domestic industry. It would also create an asymmetry in Russian exports, as it would widen the trade surplus with China, India, and other non-Western importers of Russian oil. Restrictions on capital movements out of Russia should be eased. Russians should be encouraged rather than prevented from moving their money westward.
  • The lifting of sanctions against affluent Russians should be on the table, under clearly defined conditions. There should be a strict and transparent way off the sanctions list, which includes vocal disassociation from the Kremlin and possible movement of at least some assets from Russia.
• Labor
  • Emigration from Russia should be encouraged rather than discouraged, as it is today. Lawmakers and institutions should take steps to accelerate the brain drain from Russia, for instance by issuing more one-way student and work visas, mitigated by further limits on tourist visits.
  • Pressure should be put on the Central Asian countries to discourage their citizens from seeking employment in Russia and sending remittances. Here pressure on financial institutions in countries that enable cross-border transactions might help, combined with investment and aid programs.
• Technology
  • Sanctions control should be aimed primarily at dual-use and high-tech export and re-export. Companies that continue production in Russia should be encouraged to leave but not prevented from exporting low-tech products. Exporting canned cola to Russia is fine, but producing it in the country is not.
  • Sanctions on the export to Russia of technologies and materials involved in the production of oil, liquid natural gas, fertilizer, agricultural products, etc., should be further stiffened, including secondary sanctions and those on its “shadow fleet.”

Barriers to Russian scientists’ and engineers' collaboration with Western universities and research centers should be strengthened but lifted in individual emigration cases.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, for her invaluable discussions during the preparation of the paper.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

About the Author

Alexander Kolyandr is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Alexander covered and analyzed Russian policy and economy as a strategist at Credit Suisse Bank in London and Moscow. Before that, he was Chief Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal in Moscow, a commodities reporter for the Dow Jones Newswires in London, and a Russian business and economy reporter for BBC World/Russian Service. A British and Ukrainian citizen, he graduated in Mathematics from Kharkiv State University and studied towards a PhD at Universite Paris VII. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine.

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