Executive Summary

• Despite the challenge from China, Russia continues to wield influence in the region.
• Russia and China have a comprehensive strategic partnership based on a relationship that has developed over 30 years, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
• They are largely able to manage their relations within the region, in part via the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and partly due to their shared antipathy to Western norms. 
• This antipathy is shared by Central Asian states, although they also seek to diversify economic relations away from an overreliance on either Russia or China.
• There are no glaring disagreements between Russia and China, but the war in Ukraine highlights some pre-existing and some new challenges, including on issues of sovereignty. 

Sino-Russian relations have reached the point of a comprehensive strategic partnership. The relationship raises important questions regarding the nature of their cooperation in key areas — whether Russia is using the relationship to hedge against the United States, or whether it is more a question of mutual status exchange.¹ Both countries appear to be questioning the current international order, and their interactions in Central Asia partly raise the question of Russia’s own place in an order that is increasingly dominated by China. At the Beijing Olympics in February 2022, shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia and China declared a no limits partnership, one which was “superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War Era.” The declaration noted their joint opposition to NATO enlargement, describing it as U.S. hegemonism. They also vowed to oppose attempts to undermine security and stability in their “common adjacent regions.”² The common adjacent regions must surely have been referring to Central Asia. Both Russia and China agree broadly on the normative aspects of their interactions in the region, and in general have collaborated on security issues, including on the threat from fundamentalism and terrorism. On these, they can count on the support of the Central Asian regimes, whose leaders largely hold similar beliefs about human rights and democratization. Nevertheless, Central Asian states themselves continue to practice multi-vector policies to avoid an over-reliance on either Russia or China, in particular in the economic sphere. Russia has learned to accommodate China in Central Asia, reflecting its high economic dependence on China. In Central Asia, however, Russia remains the preeminent power and China does not yet challenge this preeminence in any overt way. 

Declining Russian Influence?

Since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the question of a decline in Russian influence has been raised regularly, but the picture is more nuanced. In terms of hard power influence, fears regarding Russia’s continued ability to provide security in the region have centered on its often poor military performance in Ukraine, which arguably has also damaged Russian authority in the region.

Central Asia’s importance to Russia is in large part due to its geopolitical position in the heart of Eurasia. As Russia seeks to maintain primacy in the post-Soviet space and since its decisive turn away from the West, the region has increased in significance. Russia has increasingly framed its identity in terms of Eurasia — this is evidenced in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, where Russia is described as a “unique country-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power.”³ On this basis, Russia claims Great Power status.

Different from earlier iterations of the concept, China and India, both members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are now singled out, and categorized as being on the Eurasian continent with Russia, rather than with the rest of Asia. This points to the enhanced significance of the Asian vector and of the Russia-led notion of “Greater Eurasia.” 

Russian fears regarding a loss of influence in the region were revealed in a report highlighted in the Financial Times that described Russia’s concerns that it would need to play the “long game” to keep Central Asian states in its orbit. ⁴ Despite its involvement in Ukraine, Russia is cognizant of the need to maintain or even increase diplomatic overtures to the Central Asian countries. Putin’s first foreign visits, in 2022 and 2023, were made to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Further evidence of the greater value Moscow attaches to ties with the region includes the establishment of a “Central Asia Plus” mechanism to bring together Russia and the five Central Asian states, holding the first summit in autumn 2022. 

Normative Considerations

Russia and China have long been cooperating within the SCO, which was established in 2001 as a result of confidence-building measures arising from border demarcation in Central Asia. For China, the SCO has been an important means of learning not only about Central Asia but also arguably about international relations, where China lacks experience. China has been the driving force behind the organization, which has at its heart a “compact” that calls on its members to fight the “three evils” of separatism, fundamentalism, and terrorism.

This has been one of the most cohesive aspects of cooperation in the region. Resistance to liberal norms and democratization is widespread among the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. Russia’s promotion of traditional values in opposition to Western universalist norms finds traction in the region. Central Asian leaders seek to retain power, and in this respect, they can count on Russian and Chinese support, given the centrality of regime security to both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. When former President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down, there was fear in the region of a domino effect across Central Asia.

This is in keeping with the widespread aversion to the contagion of so-called color revolutions. At the 2012 SCO summit, in the wake of the Arab Spring, China’s deputy foreign minister pledged that China’s “determination to maintain the peace and stability of Central Asia is steadfast. We will absolutely not allow the unrest that happened in West Asia and North Africa to happen in Central Asia.” ⁵ Russia’s view of color revolutions in its immediate neighborhood — Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Georgia’s Rose Revolution, all the way to the 2014 Euromaidan — is that these, as well as the Arab uprisings, were anything but spontaneous uprisings, but rather borne of orchestrated external machinations, specifically Western-orchestrated regime change. Russia saw itself, along with China, as shoring up and bolstering sovereignty against the forces that would try to precipitate regime change. So Russia positions itself very much as a protector of the status quo of sovereignty and stability, which aligns with China’s worldview. Each has echoed the other’s narratives on such revolutions.

China, along with Uzbekistan, joined Russia in framing the Kazakh protests of January 2022 as externally sponsored, in effect, another color revolution. While these protests were not specifically anti-China, some suggested that they also highlighted China’s paucity of intelligence-gathering abilities, which could affect Chinese interests in the region in the longer term.⁶ In autumn the same year, conflict broke out along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The SCO 2022 summit in September took place against this backdrop, and Xi Jinping took the opportunity at the summit to warn once again of the dangers of color revolutions and proposed support for law enforcement agencies across Central Asia.⁷ These normative issues thus feed directly into security concerns for China, which prizes stability above all.  

Regional Architecture

While the SCO has not developed into a vehicle for regional cooperation, the organization remains useful as a means of normative signaling. For China, the annual summits and ministerial meetings have become a way to reinforce the link between its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the region. China has also regularly described the SCO as a forum for inter-civilizational dialogue and a “community of shared future for humanity,” with Xi Jinping suggesting that it transcends “outdated concepts such as clash of civilizations, Cold War, and zero-sum mentality.”⁸ The organization has expanded its membership to include both India and Pakistan, and more recently, Iran and now Belarus. A number of other states are dialogue partners, including Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, and Kuwait. Russia began to take the SCO more seriously after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, partly because its diplomatic isolation necessitated a search for new partners. In essence, the SCO, like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and Russia’s courting of the Global South, has become a “useful forum for gathering support and countering Western claims of its international isolation.”⁹

Other SCO members, such as India, prefer not to use the forum for such purposes, given their relations with the United States and their preference for multi-alignment. At the September 2022 summit hosted by Uzbekistan, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev appeared to seek to depict the SCO differently, speaking of the importance of maintaining the nonaligned status of the organization, suggesting that such a dialogue “free from geopolitical rivalry, ideological contradictions and disputes is extremely in demand.” Mirziyoyev also drew attention to the more practical aspects of intrastate cooperation, such as trade, investment, and connectivity projects.¹⁰

At other times, the SCO has appeared to promote anti-Western norms, and both Russia and China have used the forum to criticize what they refer to as Western hegemonism. In 2023, China rolled out a new Global Civilization Initiative, alongside a Global Security Initiative and a Global Development Initiative. China has long talked about inter-civilizational dialogue as being at the heart of the SCO, and now this is harmonized with global thinking. While the SCO has often been dismissed as a mere talking shop, such talking shops can be used effectively to transmit and reaffirm ideas. In this sense, the Chinese-led SCO is relatively successful in representing another Chinese building block in the country’s regional and global architecture, which seeks to provide an alternative vision of world order. To some extent, it is also in dialogue with the BRICS. The SCO is in many respects part of an interlocking set of regional and global cooperation forums or platforms, and “the SCO preceded all of them, even serving as a model for their creation.”¹¹  

In this overall context of Chinese visions of international and regional order, Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) looks like an attempt to lock China into a great power condominium. While China tolerates Russia’s linkage of the BRI and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Chinese official documents make no mention of the GEP. In turn, Russian elite actors involved with the EAEU downplay the BRI as a “technical project,” or view it as a vehicle for Chinese domination.¹² As the prominent Russian think tank analyst Sergei Karaganov has warned, while China appears to be the “economic center” of Eurasia, this is viable, he says, only if China does not claim hegemonic status.”¹³ It appears that Russia has now accepted the reality of Chinese economic hegemony as Russian officials now regularly praise the BRI; for example, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov called it the creation of a “continent-wide architecture.”¹⁴

Soft Power?

Overall, Russia still wields considerable residual soft power in the region due to long-standing economic linkages, as well as the fact that a key source of news remains Russian language news media, including social media and the internet. Polls in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2022 and 2023 showed that 27% of Kazakhs surveyed in 2022 believed Russia was responsible for the situation in Ukraine, while only 14% of Kyrgyz did. Interestingly, 36% of Kyrgyz blamed Ukraine for the war, with only 19% of Kazakhs seeing Ukraine as responsible.¹⁵

However, there is also growing anti-Chinese sentiment among ordinary Central Asians, often focused on dissatisfaction with working conditions at Chinese companies based in the region.¹⁶ Surveys in Central Asian states show that Central Asian views of China fluctuate considerably, depending on specific circumstances and events, such as the employment practices of Chinese companies (whether they parachute in Chinese workers or use indigenous labor, for example) or companies’ involvement in corrupt business practices linked to Central Asian elites. Thus, in Kazakhstan, an initially high favorability towards China in 2017 dropped to 50% in autumn 2021. In Kyrgyzstan, a high favorability, albeit from a lower base of 63.5%, dropped to around 30% in 2021. Turkmenistan maintained a high favorability score regarding China between 2017 and 2021. Comparing the scores for Russia shows that in Kyrgyzstan, favorability toward Russia was consistently higher than in Kazakhstan. Overall, Russia generally showed higher favorability scores than China, although this has declined over time everywhere, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan.¹⁷

Russia’s Economic Influence

An important dimension of Russian soft power comes in the form of economic influence, including the large numbers of Central Asians who still travel to Russia for work. The Russian foreign ministry has ruled out imposing a visa regime, indicating the continuing importance to the Russian economy of migrant labor.¹⁸ Analysis of trends in 2023 indicates that trends in migration were unaffected by the war on the whole.¹⁹ Surveys and focus groups show, however, that there has been widespread concern among Central Asians regarding relatives working in Russia since 2022, in particular since Russia began sending Central Asians with dual citizenship to the battle front. Further, some Kazakhs have expressed fears that Kazakhstan might be next in line to be invaded by Russia, with such fears at their highest in November 2022, but decreasing by spring 2023.¹⁵ The attack on Crocus City Hall in 2024 by four Tajik men has, however, severely impacted the lives of Central Asian workers in Russia, with severe crackdowns by Russian police. Nevertheless, these conditions appear not to have deterred Tajiks from travelling to Russia for work, as Tajik remittances even increased in 2024 by 27%.²⁰

Russia’s economic sway in the region is in long-term decline. However, the sanctions regime imposed on Russia has increased the economic value of Central Asia to Russia. Trade with the region is important to offset Western sanctions, and some Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, are used to bypass sanctions, including for re-export to Russia from China.

Russia is taking advantage of the EAEU Customs Union by using Central Asian states as a loophole. This helps Russia in its war against Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan imports from China for onward export to Russia, spare parts and trucks that can be used at the front, including the value of products increasing from $300 million in 2021 to $3.1 billion in 2023. In the case of Kazakhstan, imports of vehicles doubled in 2023 compared with those in 2021.²¹ Further, ball bearings, used for rail cars but also essential for tank manufacture, are being exported to Kyrgyzstan by China and are then re-exported to Russia. In one example, Kyrgyzstan’s imports of ball bearings surged by 1,562% in 2023 compared with 2021.²² Russian trade with Central Asia reached around $44 billion in 2023, around one-third of Central Asian trade volume.²³

There has been an increase in Russian energy links with Central Asia since 2022, in part due to deteriorating energy infrastructure in Central Asian countries. Fuel shortages have at times led to social unrest — for example, the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan was due to a rise in car fuel prices. Other examples include Russia doubling gas supplies to Uzbekistan and Russia increasing its supply of petroleum products to Central Asia (for instance, Tajikistan received petroleum products at a preferential rate, and is exporting electricity to Kyrgyzstan). 

Further, several Central Asian states remain highly dependent on coal, and Russia has stepped in as a provider. For example, Russia is constructing a coal-fired thermal power plant in Kazakhstan.²⁴ There are also renewable energy projects afoot in the region, some sponsored by China and others also sponsored by Russia’s Rosatom, which is expanding beyond the nuclear sector, but they will take years to come to fruition.²⁵ In the meantime, as Tatiana Mitrova notes, Russia is happy to step in as the energy supplier in the short term.²⁶ Central Asian states are benefiting from Russia’s policy of reducing energy prices in the region. Many Central Asian states lack energy infrastructure, such as Uzbekistan, which, despite being a major exporter of gas (including to China), now lacks sufficient gas for domestic purposes. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been buying gas from Russia at a discount, both for domestic use (Uzbekistan) but also to bolster their exports to China.²⁷ An agreement between Uzbekistan and Russia’s Gazprom will bring 2.8 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan.²⁸ In the case of Uzbekistan, investigations have revealed that these gas agreements are based on close links between Russian and Uzbek businesspeople concluding insider deals — another way that Russia maintains influence there.²⁹

The ailing energy giant Gazprom, attempting to compensate for the loss of European markets, has been using old Soviet pipeline networks in the region: These pipelines originally brought gas from Central Asia to Russia, but now operate in reverse. ³⁰ In 2025, Gazprom even proposed to China that it export gas to Russia from Kazakhstan using the existing pipeline network. Unfortunately for Gazprom, China rejected the plan as unviable, while Central Asian countries that had been buying cheap Russian gas, as mentioned above, are now seeking ways to diversify their supplies. ³¹   

An increasingly important role is played by rail networks, which represent a crucial dimension of China’s BRI ambitions. For a long time, most rail routes from China to Europe went through Russia. Russia used this as a bargaining chip with China, and this factor also helped create a pro-China lobby in Russia. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, Moscow’s rail transit monopoly has been broken. Trade had already moved from the Trans-Siberian route to the so-called Middle Corridor, i.e., through Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, due to Beijing rerouting exports from Russia. Uzbekistan is a key country in these plans. There had long been discussion regarding a rail transit route between Uzbekistan and China via Kyrgyzstan. Now, a route linking China and the European Union (EU) transits Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, thus completely bypassing Russia.³²

Tensions have arisen in the past due to Beijing’s attempts to pursue economic cooperation with some Central Asian states by using the SCO. As Russian analyst Andrei Kortunov put it, China was using the organization as a “cover” for economic activity.³³ China’s project is not an explicit challenge to Russia, but arguably China’s vision is more about prioritizing economics while Russia’s approach is more political. Overall, however, Russian support and accommodation of China in Central Asia have helped Beijing achieve economic goals. China rolled out the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia in 2013. By 2023, trade between China and Central Asia reached $89.4 billion.³⁴ Kazakhstan is Beijing’s biggest economic partner in the region, with trade reaching $43.8 billion by the end of 2024.³⁵ Uzbekistan has upgraded its ties with China to an “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership, aiming to boost trade from $14 billion to $20 billion.³⁶ Chinese investments in Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector, including in wind and solar farms, highlight Beijing’s focus on green energy (in contrast with Russia).³⁷ Infrastructure development remains a key cornerstone of China’s engagement in Central Asia. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is a flagship project designed to provide China with a direct access route into the region, reducing dependence on Russian transit networks, though competing with Kazakhstan’s rail network.³⁸

China surpassed Russia as the main trading partner for the region in 2023. ³⁹ Nevertheless, Russia still wields considerable economic heft and uses its energy network along with strategic discounting tactics to maintain influence. As Annette Bohr of Chatham House notes, China’s increasing economic presence means that Russia will therefore  “double down on the ties that still bind Central Asia to its former colonial metropolis, such as pipelines, railways and elite relationships.” ⁴⁰

Security Concerns

When the Soviet Union collapsed, China not only feared a spillover of liberal democratic ideas into its western regions but also was concerned lest Central Asia succumb to pan-Turkic nationalism or militant Islam. Chinese fears stemmed from fears relating to pthe otential for instability in the Xinjiang region (which borders Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan)  due to potential separatist terrorism by  Uyghurs, whose kin also live in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. With the emergence of the Taliban, Beijing began to see a clear link among Islamic fundamentalism there, the aspirations of Xinjiang separatists, and Islamists in former Soviet Central Asia.

Russia and China have tended to have similar security concerns in the region; notably, they have sought to stem the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region and have also opposed any pro-Western initiatives. After the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, while Russia initially tolerated US bases, eventually, both Russian and Chinese discourses converged.

Despite this convergence, cooperation between Russia and China on security issues remains very limited. While Russia and China conduct military exercises under the auspices of the SCO, there is no evidence of any concrete cooperation on security. China prefers to conduct security dialogue on a bilateral basis and has set up a regional mechanism with the states of Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, holding regular meetings.⁴¹ China has conducted a number of exercises with the national armies of Central Asia and launched “cooperation 2019” among the countries’ paramilitaries. Central Asian states and Russia tended in the past to play up the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, while China has been more pragmatic, advocating for engagement with the de facto Taliban government. However, it appears now that there is convergence on this more pragmatic Chinese approach, with Russia removing the Taliban from its list of designated terrorist groupings and Central Asian states actively seeking cooperation.⁴²

China needs stability in Central Asia to realize its plans for the BRI, with this region being a key part of the Silk Road. Russia responded by announcing the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which seeks to position Russia as an equal to China by harmonizing Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI. However, Chinese acquiescence to this plan is widely seen as a ploy to assuage Russian fears of Chinese dominance. ⁴³ China will seek to protect its economic assets, particularly given its fears regarding terrorism in Xinjiang and Central Asia. It has already signed various bilateral agreements with Central Asian states, started using private security companies in the region, and helped Tajikistan set up patrols near the border with Afghanistan. ⁴⁴ Several Central Asian states, in particular Tajikistan, have expressed interest in China’s “Safe City” projects, which involve the installation of surveillance cameras. ⁴⁵

While previously Russia and China had well-delineated roles in Central Asia — with Russia emphasizing political and security aspects, while China pursued economic cooperation — China is showing signs of both becoming a more political actor and being more proactive in the security arena. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 placed in question Russia’s role as a regional security provider while its military remains fully engaged in Ukraine. Nevertheless, China is not ready to take on the role of a security provider. While China has some small-scale units protecting its Central Asian borders, Russia’s presence there still far outstrips China’s. Nevertheless, anti-China protests in some Central Asian states, notably Kyrgyzstan, have prompted Beijing to deploy private security companies (note: in some countries, such as Kazakhstan, foreign security companies are prohibited).⁴⁶ Central Asian states are not yet capable of providing for their own security. At the same time, Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted its dependence on Russia, and some of the states are bolstering their military capabilities as a result. 

In January 2022, just before Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, the “winter” revolution in Kazakhstan was put down by Russia with troops from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), although the Russian troops withdrew after completing the operation. This was the first time that the organization activated its military provisions. On previous occasions — in 2010 during protests in Kyrgyzstan and in 2020 during Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan — the CSTO had failed to act, despite requests for it to intervene. ⁴⁷ In the case of Kazakhstan in 2022, however, Moscow depicted the uprising as the work of outside forces, a narrative echoed by China. ⁴⁸ The intervention demonstrated that Russia remained Central Asia’s main security actor. It also highlighted the fear among Central Asian leaders, as well as China and Russia, that so-called color revolutions would spread to them. 

Russia portrayed the conflict along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in autumn 2022 as the work of the West, in other words, another color revolution. Despite pleas from the Kyrgyz leader for CSTO intervention, however, no action was taken, irrespective of the fact that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are CSTO members. ⁴⁹ Russia — preoccupied with the war in Ukraine — clearly did not want to repeat its intervention in Kazakhstan. While Russia still regularly played up fears of color revolutions, the war in Ukraine is reducing its ability to deal with other threats. For example, the Crocus Hall attack was evidence, some believe, of Moscow’s decreased attention on terrorist threats, while overstating the threat of color revolutions. ⁵⁰ Russia’s withdrawal of support from long-standing ally Armenia resulted in the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia’s subsequent exit from the CSTO. Nevertheless, for a number of Central Asian states with small militaries, such as Tajikistan, the CSTO continues to represent at least a theoretical promise of support should a similar situation arise within the country as it did in Kazakhstan. Members also benefit from discounted military equipment, as well as training. ⁵¹

At the SCO summit in September 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping allegedly told Putin that he had “concerns” about the war’s progress. This was a reminder that China needs a secure and stable environment in Central Asia for the BRI project to be successful, and it had been partly relying on Russia to provide this. The two have overlapping security concerns in Central Asia, but there is limited cooperation on security in the region. 

China shows no signs of taking over from Russia as a security provider in the region, and the two are unlikely to clash, but the Central Asian states are increasingly looking to diversify foreign and trade policies away from both Moscow and Beijing. China’s meeting with Central Asian leaders in Beijing in 2023 — without Russia — signaled that China may be taking advantage of Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. Xi Jinping pointedly spoke of the need for a “stable Central Asia. The sovereignty, security, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries must be upheld.”⁵²  

Despite fears that Russia’s ability to provide security would be sharply curtailed due to the war in Ukraine, Russia is stepping up military cooperation with some Central Asian states. After a cooling of ties between Kyrgyzstan and Moscow, due to Russia’s apparent support for Tajikistan in the border clashes, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov cancelled joint military drills with the CSTO. However, Putin and Japarov agreed in autumn 2023 to further develop Russian military facilities and that Russia would help strengthen its armed forces.⁵³  

Sovereignty Issues

One area where Russia and China, as well as other SCO members, arguably diverge is on the issue of sovereignty. When Russia recognized the declarations of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 (after Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence the same year), China did not follow suit, nor did the Central Asian states. In 2014, while not explicitly condemning it, China signaled disapproval regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea. China has not recognized Russia’s annexation of the Donetsk People’s Republic or the Luhansk People’s Republic, nor has Kazakhstan or any other Central Asian state.⁵⁴ Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev warned in 2024 that further escalation of the war would lead to “irreparable consequences” and affirmed the Kazakh people’s “genuine sympathy” for Ukraine’s “distinctive culture and its people.” Tokayev also suggested that the Chinese peace plan “deserved support.”⁵⁵ Moreover, China has sought to reassure Kazakhstan of its support for its territorial integrity, a pointed nod to potential Russian designs on northern Kazakhstan (which is home to a significant Russian minority).⁵⁶

Conclusion

Overall, Russia needs to maintain primacy in Central Asia to legitimize its claims to Great Power status. For Russia, great powers maintain spheres of influence, of which the former Soviet space, including Central Asia, is part. Russia seeks to maintain this sphere through the Greater Eurasian Partnership, stretching from Europe to Asia, necessitating maintaining a foothold in the region. However, while Russia still maintains a foothold, China, as well as other actors such as India, Iran, and Turkey, also view themselves as stakeholders in the region. China, in particular, is challenging Russia’s previously dominant role, and the two now compete economically. However, for now, Russia and China coexist based on shared values and ideas about the world, including on civilizationist ideologies, values, and ideas that largely align with the worldviews of Central Asian countries. Russia’s idea of itself as a Eurasian civilization seeks to position itself alongside China’s Global Civilization Initiative, although in both cases, increasing nationalist narratives at the domestic level have the potential to clash. Given the shared goals in terms of security in the region, while in the longer term China is challenging Russia’s economic influence, Russia still holds several levers of influence, including elite-to-elite relationships with Central Asian governmental actors, which are based on long-standing networks. These will be hard to break and provide obstacles for external actors such as the EU. So far, neither the United States nor the EU seriously impinges on either Russian or Chinese interests here. Still, the states of Central Asia are pursuing multi-vector foreign policies with states other than Russia and China, the recent Central Asia-EU summit being a case in point. They will continue to pursue multi-vector policies and practice “strategic silence” on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a means of self-preservation.⁵⁷ This does not mean that they will be able to disengage from cooperation with Moscow and Beijing, but it does mean that there are opportunities to diversify.

Natasha Kuhrt is a senior lecturer in International Peace & Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interests include a regional focus on Russian foreign and security policies, particularly in Asia, as well as international law, intervention & peacekeeping. In 2010, she founded the British International Studies Association Working Group on Russian & Eurasian Security, which is still thriving. She has published widely on Russian foreign policy in Asia, as well as on issues of international law and intervention. More recent publications include a paper on Russia-China relations that fed into the NATO Anniversary Summit in 2024, and an article on Russian and Chinese approaches to UN Peacekeeping. She is currently working on two co-authored volumes, one on Russian foreign policy and the other on Russia-China relations.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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