Executive Summary

  • Russia’s capacity to serve as a significant energy lifeline for China in a major conflict is fundamentally constrained by underdeveloped infrastructure and divergent long-term energy priorities, as Russia seeks new fossil fuel markets while China prioritizes green development and energy self-sufficiency.
  • China’s primary energy security vulnerability remains its profound reliance on vast seaborne imports, particularly those transiting critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca. 
  • Even in a severe crisis scenario, Russian overland energy supplies would extend China’s reserves for only a limited duration (e.g., 33 days for oil, 10 days for gas), which is insufficient to fully mitigate the substantial impact of disrupted maritime trade. 
  • Any “returning of the favor” from Russia to China is therefore more likely to manifest in other strategic or diplomatic forms, rather than a significant, sustained expansion of energy supply in a time of crisis. 

Oleg Karpovich of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts, “If one day a probability of a direct confrontation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appears, Russia clearly will not become a neutral participant of such events and will not forget about China’s helpful extended hand after the beginning of the [Special Military Operation].”1 This perception posits that Russia could serve as a vital economic and strategic partner, potentially alleviating the PRC’s vulnerabilities in a crisis. Given their geographic proximity and respective status as one of the world’s largest energy exporters and importers, one would assume that Russia could help the PRC maintain access to key energy supplies in a time of crisis. Energy is an area where the PRC is particularly susceptible to disruption in supply due to its reliance on oil and gas imported via seaborne trade. However, the reality of the energy dependencies between Russia and the PRC is complex and constrained. ​​Despite perceived strategic closeness, Russia’s capacity to be a significant energy lifeline for the PRC in a major conflict is fundamentally limited by underdeveloped infrastructure and divergent long-term energy priorities.

Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China February 4, 2022. Credit: Sputnik/Aleksey Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS
Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China, February 4, 2022. Credit: Sputnik/Aleksey Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

China’s Enduring Maritime Vulnerability and Strategic Energy Shifts 

China’s rapid economic growth has led to vast and continuously growing energy demand, which far exceeds its domestic production capacity. As of 2022, the PRC imported 74% of its oil and 35% of its natural gas. 2 This profound reliance on external energy sources creates a critical strategic vulnerability, primarily concerning its seaborne trade routes. 

The “Malacca Dilemma” vividly illustrates this vulnerability. 3 Roughly 60-70% of the PRC’s sea-based energy imports traverse the strategically vital Strait of Malacca per year. In 2022, China imported 508 million tons (or 10.2 billion barrels per day; b/d) of crude oil, comprising 74% of its total oil demand. 4 According to the US Energy Information Administration, 7.1 million b/d traversed the Strait of Malacca, roughly 69% of imports and 51% of total crude oil demand. 5 For natural gas, approximately 41% of imports transited the Strait of Malacca (16% of total demand). 6 The PRC has continuously fretted about US naval dominance in the region and its potential to blockade the PRC’s seaborne trade, and thus its energy supplies, in the event of a Sino-US confrontation, a concern heightened after the United States sailed an aircraft carrier off the shores of Fujian Province during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. 7

Photo: A very large oil tanker is being assisted by a tugboat as it berths at Yantai Port's 300,000-ton crude oil terminal in Yantai, Shandong Province, China, on April 25, 2024. Credit: Costfoto/NurPhoto
Photo: A very large oil tanker is being assisted by a tugboat as it berths at Yantai Port’s 300,000-ton crude oil terminal in Yantai, Shandong Province, China, on April 25, 2024. Credit: Costfoto/NurPhoto

In response to this existential threat, the PRC has actively pursued a multipronged strategy to enhance its energy security. Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded its power projection capabilities and stockpiled ballistic missiles to deter or counter naval blockades.8 Economically, China has diversified trade routes through land-based infrastructure via its Belt and Road Initiative, establishing alternative corridors to the Indian Ocean to circumvent the straits through Pakistan and Myanmar. It has also expanded its Eurasian energy infrastructure and announced an accelerated stockpiling of strategic fuels. 9

Though infrastructure for secure access to fossil fuels from Russia has expanded, China’s long-term energy strategy aims to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel imports altogether. While it remains heavily dependent on coal (a domestically abundant resource), the PRC is a global leader in investing in and deploying renewable energy sources, including wind, solar, hydro, and nuclear power, which accounted for 17.6% of its total energy supply in 2022.10 Its aggressive transition to electrical transportation further aims to decrease petroleum dependency. This commitment to green development represents a fundamental long-term shift away from imported hydrocarbons, driven by both environmental and energy security imperatives.

Map showing how gas and oil-rich Russia is linked to European energy markets through a series of critical pipelines, the biggest flowing through Ukraine.
Map: Showing how gas and oil-rich Russia is linked to European energy markets through a series of critical pipelines, the biggest flowing through Ukraine. Credit: Reuters

The Constrained Reality of Sino-Russian Energy Infrastructure 

Despite Russia being a major energy exporter and China a major importer, their energy relationship is characterized by significant infrastructural and historical limitations. For decades, Russia’s energy infrastructure was primarily oriented toward Western markets, neglecting substantial development of direct linkages with China. Only two direct oil and gas pipelines exist between them, reaching full capacity only recently, in 2024. The lack of permanent infrastructure is supplemented by imports via rail, truck, and tanker to a marginal extent. 

Natural Gas: Russia has rapidly increased its natural gas supply to China since 2019, becoming the PRC’s largest single supplier. By 2023, Russia accounted for 13.5% of China’s total gas imports (33% of pipeline gas and 11% of liquefied natural gas [LNG] imports).11 This growth is largely due to the Power of Siberia pipeline, which began operations in 2019 and reached its contractual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/year) in December 2024, alongside redirected LNG exports.12 However, the potential for further significant expansion is limited. Negotiations for the ambitious Power of Siberia II (western route) have stalled, largely due to China’s reluctance to rapidly increase its dependence on Russian pipeline gas.13 China’s strategy appears to be one of maintaining a dominant position in its gas relationship with Russia, leveraging Russia’s geopolitical isolation while simultaneously expanding gas supplies from other sources like Central Asia and boosting domestic output.14 The competitive challenge posed by China’s rapidly growing, low-cost renewable energy sector also dampens the demand for large-scale, new gas imports. Even with projected expansions, Russia’s contribution remains a fraction of China’s overall energy demand. 

Photo: A Gazprom Neft filling station is seen in Moscow. A subsidiary of Gazprom, Gazprom Neft is the third largest oil producer in Russia. According to Russian media reports, employees of Russian state oil and gas-producing corporations were informally prohibited from traveling abroad in December 2022. Recent reports indicate that rules on foreign travel for the above-mentioned employees were recently laxed to include 14 friendly countries including China, Turkey, India, Qatar, Serbia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, and the CIS states. Credit: Photo by Vlad Karkov / SOPA Images/Sipa USA
Photo: A Gazprom Neft filling station is seen in Moscow. Credit: Photo by Vlad Karkov / SOPA Images/Sipa USA

Crude Oil: Russian crude oil supplies to China have grown more gradually, though trade in refined petroleum products surged after 2022 due to sanctions from the European Union. While Russia was China’s largest single country supplier of crude oil in 2023 (17.9% of total imports), the primary artery remains the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline spur, with a capacity of 700,000 b/d, supplemented by tanker shipments from Russia’s Pacific port of Kozmino and some via Kazakhstan.15 However, about half (48%)of China’s crude oil imports originated from Middle Eastern countries in 2023.16 China’s purchases of discounted Russian crude have increased, but this has not fundamentally altered its reliance on Middle Eastern suppliers.17 The growth of crude oil trade between Russia and China is bottlenecked by the existing pipeline capacities and the output limits of Russia’s Pacific ports. Furthermore, China’s tapering demand growth for oil due to its shift toward renewables reduces the likelihood of substantial new pipeline infrastructure. 

Constraints: Nonaligned Interests 

Beyond the existing infrastructural limitations, the fundamental divergence in long-term energy priorities between Russia and China acts as a significant constraint on the potential for a deeper energy partnership. Russia’s strategic interest, particularly since Western sanctions, has been to pivot its energy exports from Europe to new markets, with China being the most prominent. This manifests in a strong desire from Moscow to accelerate pipeline projects like Power of Siberia II and secure long-term, high-volume contracts. Controversies surrounding investment into these new constructions, particularly the pricing mechanisms for gas, often reflect Russia’s urgency versus China’s strategic patience and negotiating leverage (though there are new signs of urgency to diversify away from energy sources in the Middle East with the most recent conflicts between ​​Israel and Iran). 18 China, aware of Russia’s limited alternative buyers, has consistently pushed for favorable pricing, leading to protracted negotiations and delays in key projects. 19  

Conversely, China’s energy strategy is increasingly driven by a dual imperative: securing diverse and resilient supply chains in the short to medium term; and making a profound, long-term commitment to green development and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals agenda.20 While still a major emitter, China has become the world’s largest investor in renewable energy infrastructure, including solar, wind, and electric vehicles. This commitment is not merely rhetorical; it is a strategic economic and environmental objective that shapes its energy future. As a result, China’s demand growth for fossil fuels, particularly for new, large-scale import infrastructure like Power of Siberia II, is dampened by its aggressive domestic build-out of renewable energy capacity and electrification initiatives. 

This creates a fundamental misalignment of interests. Russia seeks new, large, and stable markets for its hydrocarbons, ideally locked into long-term contracts. China, however, is increasingly focused on achieving energy self-sufficiency, diversifying away from volatile fossil fuel markets, and transitioning toward a low-carbon economy. Russia, heavily reliant on fossil fuel exports, cannot credibly commit to a strategy of reducing supplies as a means of aiding China’s green transition, as such a move would undermine its own economic stability. This divergence in strategic priorities — Russia’s need for new fossil fuel markets versus China’s ambition for green and self-sufficient energy — fundamentally limits the depth and nature of their energy interdependence, preventing Russia from becoming the indispensable energy lifeline some narratives might suggest.  

Quantifying Russia’s Contribution in a Crisis 

To demonstrate the actual importance of Russian energy imports to the PRC during a crisis, the most relevant scenario would be a potential conflict with the United States in the Western Pacific around the Taiwan Strait. In the event of a PRC attempt to change the status quo by force, the PRC may face a sudden blockade of the Strait of Malacca. Concurrently, escalating geopolitical tensions could lead key energy-exporting countries aligned with the United States — such as Australia — to suspend shipments of natural gas and other energy commodities to the PRC. 

Photo: YANTAI, CHINA - APRIL 26, 2023 - An LNG tank is hoisted at the construction site of an LNG receiving station in the Xigang area of Yantai Port, Shandong Province, China, April 26, 2023. On April 26, 2023, the five 200,000 cubic meter storage tanks of the Xigang Area liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal project at Yantai Port in Shandong Province were completed, marking the transfer of the construction phase of the storage tanks from civil construction to installation. The LNG receiving station project is a key implementation project of the National Implementation Plan for the Construction of Liquefied Natural Gas Storage and Transportation System in the Bohai Rim Region. Upon completion, it will provide energy security for Shandong, Bohai Rim and even North China in a sustainable and stable manner, and enhance regional peak regulation, gas storage and winter supply protection capabilities. Credit: Photo by CFOTO/Sipa USA
Photo: YANTAI, CHINA – APRIL 26, 2023 – An LNG tank is hoisted at the construction site of an LNG receiving station in the Xigang area of Yantai Port, Shandong Province, China, April 26, 2023. Credit: Photo by CFOTO/Sipa USA

With access to maritime supplies severely curtailed, the PRC would have to turn to alternative sources to maintain energy security. In this context, Russia would emerge as the most critical remaining supplier. Energy imports via pipelines from Russia could continue uninterrupted, and shipments of Russian LNG and oil transported overland or from non-blockaded ports could offer a lifeline. 

However, the PRC’s energy consumption is vast, and there is limited capacity to backfill demand at peacetime levels. The PRC consumes 1.03 bcm/day of natural gas, and 14 million b/d of crude oil.10 Its energy demand far outstrips what any single country can provide. It is extremely vulnerable to disruptions in energy supplies and has built vast reserves to mitigate risk. While PRC reserves are not publicly disclosed, Vortexa estimated the PRC’s strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) levels at 290 million barrels in 2023.21 The National Energy Administration aims to bring storage of natural gas to 13% of annual consumption by the end of 2025 (55-60 bcm).22  

Based on back-of-the-envelope estimates, Russian energy supplies offer only marginal relief: 

  • Russian oil supplies could extend China’s SPR by an additional 33 days. 
  • Russian gas supplies could extend China’s natural gas reserves by an additional 10 days. 

(Estimated by comparing scenarios with and without Russian energy supplies in the event of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca and coordinated energy embargo by US allies. See Tables ‘Chinese Oil Reserve Durability Under Various Scenarios’ and ‘Chinese Gas Reserve Durability Under Various Scenarios‘ for details.) 

While an 18% share of oil imports is not insignificant, particularly if seaborne access is severely curtailed, Russia simply does not possess the infrastructural capacity or the volume to fully backfill the immense deficit created by a comprehensive maritime blockade. The economic functions of the PRC would be severely limited, even with wartime adjustments to consumption, if its primary seaborne energy lifelines were cut. 

Photo: A Russian specialist checks pressure at Russian gas monopoly Gazprom gas storage facility near the town of Kasimov 330 km (198 miles) south of [Moscow], January 27, 2006. [Russia will restart deliveries of gas to Georgia on Saturday, a week after two blasts cut the pipeline linking the neighbours, but consumers will not feel the benefit for some time, Interfax news agency reported on Friday. Credit: Reuters
Photo: A Russian specialist checks pressure at Russian gas monopoly Gazprom gas storage facility near the town of Kasimov 330 km (198 miles) south of [Moscow], January 27, 2006. Credit: Reuters

Conclusion: Strategic Implications for the Indo-Pacific 

The perception that a deepening energy partnership could enable Russia to significantly return the favor by bolstering China’s energy security in a major confrontation is not aligned with the realities of their energy interdependencies. While Russia’s energy supplies to China have grown in absolute terms, their potential for expansion is severely constrained by underdeveloped infrastructure and divergent long-term energy priorities. Russia’s capacity to increase supply is inelastic, and the likelihood of significant new pipeline or port infrastructure being rapidly developed to fundamentally alter this dynamic is low. 

For the United States and its allies, this analysis demonstrates that China’s primary energy security vulnerabilities remain centered on its reliance on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca. While Russian overland energy supplies can extend China’s reserves, potentially buying additional critical days depending on the nature and duration of a conflict, these supplies are not sufficient to fully mitigate the profound impact of disruptions to China’s vast seaborne energy trade. Russia simply cannot serve as a comprehensive substitute for China’s massive maritime energy imports. 

Moreover, the probability of substantially impacting Russian supplies to the PRC is limited, as China provides a vital economic lifeline for Russia through energy purchases amid Western sanctions. Any attempts to curtail these flows from outside would likely be unilateral, given Europe’s disinterest in resuming reliance on Russian energy. The true picture of energy interdependencies between Russia and China is complex; Russia’s role as an energy lifeline for China in a crisis is fundamentally constrained by inelastic supply and infrastructural realities, meaning it cannot substantially reshape China’s overall energy security landscape. Instead, any return of the favor from Russia to China is more likely to manifest in other strategic or diplomatic forms rather than a significant, sustained expansion of energy supply in a time of crisis. 

About the Author

Jack Herndon is a strategic analyst and program manager who focuses on policy and strategy related to the People’s Republic of China. His work involves designing frameworks and advising on strategic approaches to track and counter foreign influence. He holds a Masters of Arts in International Relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and his expertise is rooted in his experience at the International Republican Institute and the Economist Intelligence Unit, where he conducted policy analysis and advised on strategic initiatives in Europe and Asia.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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