It’s all over bar the shouting, or in Brussels-speak, the coalition building. About 350 million people from the European Union’s (EU) 27 member states returned 720 MEPs. The result? Not quite as devastating as the pundits might have you believe — yes, the far-right made gains, but the pro-European center parties did not snap under the pressure.
Now that the smoke has cleared following the four-day voting marathon from 6-9 June, moderate parties will ultimately retain a slim but workable majority within the European Parliament.
That’s not to understate the dramatics or the stakes. This was an electoral war and France suffered a serious collateral explosion immediately after the vote. Here the far-right gains were strong and significant, causing President Emmanuele Macron to call a snap election. France needed not only “a clear majority” argued Macron, but citizens “choosing to write history, not be driven by it.” The risks here are high for the vote on June 30 and July 7; high for France, for Europe, and for Ukraine.
So what about the populist wave? There were signs of this, for sure. Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and the Netherlands were always going to be critical areas.
But here the problems really begin, because a non-traditional and populist right — be it termed far-, extreme- hard- or some other qualifier) is not a unified bloc. In a sense, this is a statement of the obvious; a Europe encompassing 27 members from the High North to the shores of the Mediterranean is extraordinarily varied. It’s also an acknowledgment that journalistic language has failed to keep pace with events on the ground — far-right politics came in one or two varieties in 2004, but now offer as many as Baskin-Robbins.
So while Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy romped home with almost 30% of the vote, this will be greeted with little joy by the far more extreme Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which was booted out of its European Parliament grouping following remarks about the SS from one of its leading members.
In truth, the non-traditional, populist right is deeply split on numerous issues, not least support for Ukraine. While Meloni is a sold Atlanticist and supporter of Ukraine, the AfD is not, while Marine Le Pen’s National Rally denies Russophilia while hedging that “peace” is the only solution for Ukraine. The parties of the populist right are broadly anti-immigration, although their practical answers to rising migration are elusive (as Meloni has admitted.)
Austria’s pro-Russian far-right Freedom Party topped the polls with 25.4%, beating out both the Social Democrats and the center-right People’s Party, but not by much; but in Slovakia, the moderate Progressive Slovakia inched ahead the governing Smer party of Robert Fico, recently the target of an assassination attempt. Andrej Babiš, billionaire leader of the Ano party, came first in the Czech Republic, and is a member of the liberal Renew grouping in the European Parliament, though his populist values seem to embrace a deep Euroscepticism.
Germany’s AfD managed to outpoll the individual parties of the governing coalition but with 16% of the vote were far behind the mainstream right-wing CDU/CSU opposition who took 30% of the vote. Geert Wilders’ Dutch far-right PVV was edged into second by the Left-Green alliance, while Orbán’s Hungarian Fidesz registered its worst result since joining the EU 20 years ago. It still won 44%, but is visibly rattled by the emergence of the Tisza party of the charismatic former Fidesz insider, Péter Magyar, whose weeks-old grouping took 30%. (Once again, it’s worth noting that while Magyar describes himself as a centrist, he’s no friend of aid to Ukraine or of Brussels.)
Far-right seats were few and far between in many other countries, although there remains an appreciable number of far-right independents.
The upshot is that the center held, thanks to returns in Poland and Spain, whilst center-left groups dominated the vote share in Sweden, Romania, and Malta. Taken together, the EPP group and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), alongside the Greens, and the centrist Renew group, lay claim to roughly 64% of the new parliament chamber, with 462 of the 720 seats. This is certainly a fall from the 69% vote share last time, but it’s wrong to think the extremes have triumphed.
Not only did the right-of-center EPP outperform expectations, remaining the largest party with 189 seats, it had already declared the more radical Identity and Democracy (ID) group beyond the pale, noting its pro-Russian preferences. Even so, the EPP and its flagbearer, Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, have their work cut out to secure the German politician’s re-election for a second five-year term. It may be that the EPP will work with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) which includes Meloni’s MEPs.
But while the center ground has held and Von der Leyen may succeed in winning re-election in the fall, major rifts will remain because the wellsprings of populist discontent are incredibly wide-ranging.
The future dividing line may fall between those populist groups determined to remain either defiantly outside the EU system, or to work pragmatically from within it.
Those on the outside, like Le Pen, remain more radical figures, despite softening their tone. She no longer makes ardent calls for a “Frexit”, or ending the Euro currency, but her RN party advocates severe immigration cuts and France-first approaches to procurement, including defense, and is keen on radical approaches to economics and politics.
On the other side of the divide are those like Meloni, who has of late operated as moderate, generally issue-specific Eurosceptics within the EU ecosystem, touting herself as “‘bridge-builders’ between the mainstream right and the EU’s nationalist Eurosceptic forces” including Hungary’s Orbán.
Meloni’s Brothers of Italy however – like many other populist right-wing — “carry the DNA of decidedly undemocratic regimes” and ought not to be underestimated in this regard, as the Financial Times warned on June 5.
Generally, far-right views coalesce around preferences for a strong, sometimes interventionist state, working to defend traditional, received values, themselves perceived to be at the mercy of a range of outsiders. While views here can fluctuate depending on a given national community, what has moved at break-neck speed is the rise of support from mainstream voters, moving populist and even far-right groups from the political fringes to a decidedly more central political location. The two most “tappable” European demographics in this respect include middle-class voters, and young people, with agricultural workers a close third.
The European Parliament does not dictate foreign policy or defense (or indeed enlargement), but it is absolutely key “in crafting legislation, shaping political debates and allocating financial resources,” and can influence funding decisions, as well as much relating to support for Ukraine. However, the great majority of parties in the new parliament remain solidly aligned with centrist and socialist viewpoints on continuing to support Ukraine. Only the Dutch PVV and Le Pen’s RN oppose this stance. Ukrainian observers will be closely following these events, but they will certainly not be panicking.
The results show a reasonably robust political center, with the far-left and Greens the prime casualties, as well as a shifting of deck chairs within the right-leaning parties themselves. This suggests that the EPP can guarantee the future of the EU project, but it will need to do so in concert with the ECR. It will need to be mindful of far-right demands, which are less about the overt overthrow of the EU or one-time EU-exits like Brexit but “remain-based” Euroscepticism, “wanting to change the project from within and move it in a more sovereigntist direction.”
Professor Amelia Hadfield is Head of the Department of Politics, Founding Director of Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Associate Vice President of External Engagement at the University of Surrey.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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