During the 21st century, national security and prosperity depend on a society’s ability to secure and control essential connectivity flows. Such flows are both physical and digital. They ensure access to high-added-value goods such as advanced semiconductors and strategic raw materials. They also include essential products of low value including food and energy. As China weaponizes these flows of information, goods, and critical materials, the incoming European Union (EU) and US administrations must, despite their differences, find common ground to protect sea lines of communication, explore alternative trade routes, and counter China’s influence in the Global South.
Today, key trade flows are often disrupted. Houthi rebels and Somali pirates wreak havoc in the Red Sea, responsible for 13% of global seabound trade, halving the number of ships transiting through the area in 2023. When the Ever Given cargo ship ran aground in the Suez Canal, it held up $9.6 billion in trade each day.
Energy flows are particularly vulnerable. Europe cut imports of Russian gas through the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022. The Ukraine war slashed trade in food commodities. Wheat prices and food-related export restrictions soared. The Indonesian 2022 palm oil ban and India’s imposition of 2023 rice export duties triggered widespread fears of a global food crisis.
Risks include those not just related to physical products, but also digital ones. The 2017 NotPetya cyber virus caused roughly $10 billion in losses, while Russia’s SolarWinds attack penetrated the US Justice, State, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce Departments. Malicious cyberattacks cost the world no less than $945 billion per annum, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Although the West faces threats from multiple directions, China presents the biggest danger. Both the US and Europe are vulnerable to its coercive statecraft. Over the last four decades, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has dominated infrastructure investments in Africa, the region with a disproportionate share of strategic mineral reserves. Beijing builds rail, roads, and ports in Tanzania. Chinese companies own the majority of Congolese copper and cobalt mines.
China is now repeating this strategy in South America. Many South American countries trade more with China than they do with the US. For example, Brazilian, Chilean, and Argentinian lithium is shipped in bulk to China to be processed on China’s mainland.
China has already exploited this leverage. In 2023, Beijing imposed export restrictions on germanium, gallium, and graphite as well as on rare earth mineral processing technology, hurting a wide range of industries, including clean-energy and high-tech-defense-equipment firms in the US and Europe.
To combat the Chinese threat, the US and EU need to secure and diversify their own supply chains. Unfortunately, they are currently failing to work together.
Although the EU’s Global Gateway responds to the China-led Belt and Road, it shies away from directly challenging Chinese dominance. Rather, it speaks of setting up high-capacity networks, the ethical use of technology, data protection cooperation, and fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure. The European Parliament resolution regarding EU-Asian connectivity, adopted in 2021, features similar multilateral priorities. The European Commission, while imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and pushing to remove Huawei and other Chinese vendors from its telecommunication networks, continues to avoid outright threats of decoupling in favor of “de-risking.”
The US, in contrast, explicitly works to maintain dominance in information technology. The 2020 “National Strategy to Secure 5G” aims to “enhance US leadership” in advanced wireless technologies. Similarly, the Inflation Reduction Act and the 2022 export controls on semiconductors restrict flows deemed to be harmful for future US tech dominance in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines, as well as most advanced chipmaking technologies.
US protectionism risks alienating the United States’ closest partners. The US has imposed extraterritorial sanctions on technology exports from Europe to China and is subsidizing domestic electric vehicle production while discriminating against European cars.
In Europe, US policies cause resentment, encouraging tit-for-tat measures. The European Commission has created policy mechanisms aimed at bolstering Europe’s ability to “deter and respond to economic coercion” not just from adversaries but also from allies. These dynamics are counterproductive. The US and Europe must stop this negative spiral and find common ground. To that end, new administrations on either side of the Atlantic need to pursue the following policy recommendations:
- Protect sea lines: The US and Europe should strengthen existing initiatives to enhance maritime security, the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Prosperity Guardian, and the European Maritime Awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Europe and the US should explore additional projects. A flagship project would be the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. The project aims to connect India and Europe while bypassing the Suez Canal and the long Cape route, instead crossing from Saudi Arabia through Jordan toward the Israeli port of Haifa. While the corridor would never be able to fully supplant the existing shipping routes, it would provide an avenue to secure and diversify the supply chain.
For Europe, the completion of this overland corridor would increase connectivity with the Middle East and India, important future trading partners. For the US, it would strengthen links among some of its most important allies in the region (the EU, Saudi Arabia, and India) while reducing the burden on the US Navy to police important naval chokepoints.
- Counter China in the Global South: The US and Europe should repel China’s growing infrastructural dominance in Africa, Central Asia, and South America. Flagship projects, including the construction of the new Lobito Corridor train connection in Africa, are essential to securing the flow of critical minerals. The US Blue Dot Network and the EU’s Global Gateway both emphasize the quality aspect of infrastructure investments to help boost long-term development in Africa.
Although transatlantic infrastructure initiatives are increasing, China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to dwarf Western lending commitments. The US and the EU should join forces under the umbrella of a “Free Road Initiative.” Funding could be sourced from the World Bank and other international institutions.
- Salvage the US-EU Trade and Technology Council: Although the transatlantic group has unlocked investment in digital infrastructure, it needs to be revamped to align standards. Standardization promotes interoperability of connectivity technologies, creates economies of scale, and reduces reliance on Chinese technologies. Examples include 5G and sixth-generation (6G) networks, early warning systems, and power cables.
- Deepen NATO cooperation: The US and Europe should leverage NATO to strengthen cooperation on connectivity. The 21st century poses new challenges for collective security. NATO’s Article 2 allows for economic cooperation to bolster transatlantic security. Scope exists for cooperation on vital security technologies such as microchips, artificial intelligence, and 5G and 6G telephone networks. These technologies require high capital investment and advanced expertise. Aligning standards and goals will lower costs and increase effectiveness. The alliance should put more emphasis on an “economic NATO.”
Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized the need to secure access to critical raw materials for the defense and semiconductor industries. A transatlantic approach could also be taken to energy. The Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, followed by the recent cutting of internet cables in the Baltic, raised new questions about the safety of the nascent undersea power cables in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. NATO’s Joint Force Command already tracks important air and sea routes and monitors inward investment in NATO members. Common standards and information sharing could help tackle cybercrime and information warfare.
As President Donald Trump moves back to the White House, the global situation is dire. A large-scale war rages on the European continent perpetrated by a revisionist and nuclear-armed Russia. In the Middle East, both allies, such as Israel, and adversaries, such as Iran, have spurred US demands to cease hostilities. Elsewhere, middle powers from Brazil and India to Indonesia have declined to follow US policies and priorities across different policy dossiers.
China’s assertiveness in the economic, political, and security realms has continued apace. In such a world, it is best to leverage your friendships to protect vital security interests. After all, the competition is with China, not with Europe.
Dr. Tim Sweijs is the director of research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Ron Stoop is a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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