Leon Hartwell
Ladies and gentlemen, I’m Leon Hartwell, and I’m a non resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a senior associate at LSE ideas. Before we start, I’d like to pay my respect to the families and friends of the over 40 Ukrainians who have died in Dnipro after Russia dropped a missile meant for sinking aircraft carriers on an apartment block. It’s yet another reminder that the Russia Ukraine war is real. It is ugly, and it has horrific consequences, including for innocent civilians. Today, our panel will focus on Beijing Moscow relations, which given the political and economic clout of China, some would argue plays no minor role in enabling Russia’s war in Ukraine. A mere 20 days before Russia’s February escalation of the war, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping signed a statement proclaiming that they were quote unquote, no limits to sino Russian cooperation, no forbidden zones. At the same time, China abstained in the UN Security Council resolution when other UN member states condemned Russia’s full scale military invasion of Russia. That is significant in light of the fact that China claims that non intervention is a central pillar of its foreign policy. Furthermore, China shiz away from using words like invasion or war when referring to the conflict. Then in September last year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, Putin praised the quote, balanced position of our Chinese friends regarding the Ukrainian crisis, unquote. She, for his part did not make a statement to support his Russian counterparts claims. Consequently, some analysts suggested that they were that there may be some friction between Russia and China. Still, about three weeks ago, Russia and China introduced or conducted weather, a joint military exercise in the East China Sea to in China’s words, further deepened cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. To discuss these issues, I’d like to welcome four very distinguished guests. Firstly, I’d like to welcome Dr. Bob Lowe, senior fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA. He’s a good friend of the Center. Welcome. Secondly, I’d like Secondly, I’d like to welcome Dr. Angela stent, Senior Advisor, the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies program at Georgetown University. She is also a non resident senior fellow at the foreign policies sorry, she’s also a non resident Senior fellow, and a four at the Foreign Policy Center on the United States in Europe at Brookings Institution. And thirdly, I’d like to welcome Professor Sergey Radchenko. He is the Wilson Schmitt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins University of Advanced International Studies. And last but not least, I’d like to welcome Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist in the China Studies Division at CNI, an adjunct senior research scholar and a professor of political science and law at Montclair State University. Welcome all four of you. A key question that I would like to all of the panelists to think about in relation to the questions that I will pose to you is the question of Cui bono who benefits from this China Russia relationship? And we’ll kick off this discussion by first turning to Bobo, if you could unmute yourself, please. Firstly, one year after Russia and China signed the No Limits partnership, what have we learned about the Russia China relationship? And what has changed since February 2022. Thank you, Bobo.
Bobo Lo
Thank you, Leon. And it’s a great pleasure to be on this panel with such distinguished panelists, and I’m looking forward to a really lively discussion. So what has changed what so what have we learnt what has Ain’t changed. Well, I think what the war in Ukraine has done is expose the limits of the so called No Limits friendship that you mentioned. It’s shown that Chinese and Russian interests are not the same. I think events have given the lie to claims that this is some kind of authoritarian Alliance or axis. We should have understood this even before Ukraine, but what it really has emphasized is that the sino Russian partnership is an unsentimental, great power relationship. And it’s based much more on strategic calculus than so called ideological like mindedness. The war has emphasized that China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, they do not contrary to conventional wisdom, operate as some kind of coordinated force in international politics, except perhaps in the UN Security Council. And in fact, their influence on each other is very limited. The war has also highlighted that China and Russia have fundamentally different attitudes towards global order. China aims to exploit the international system, Russia to destroy it. China is a revisionist power. Russia, is what I’d call an anoxic power. China has a vested interest in an order, albeit one that favors its interests and where the influence of the West is correspondingly reduced. But it still has a fundamental interest in order. Russia’s interest lies in global disorder, because anarchy is, in fact, a great level. I think the war has also accentuated the inequality of the relationship. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than it’s ever been in the history of the relationship. However, talk of Russia becoming a Chinese client state is premature at best. And it I think, underestimates the enduring strategic ambition and willfulness of the Putin elite. And I think it also presupposes, in my view, wrongly, that Beijing would wish to take on such a burden. Now, despite its all too obvious limits, the sino Russian partnership will continue to exist, regardless of personalities. Simply put the relationship the partnership is too important to both sides to be allowed to fail, especially as Beijing and especially as Beijing and Moscow have very few other options. And it is this mutual need. That gives the relationship and underlying resilience. I would add in this connection that Western efforts to split China and Russia are not only futile, they are counter productive. Now, I think the longer term prognosis for the relationship is actually quite poor. The biggest challenge for both sides will be the growing inequality between them. Over time, there will be fewer common interests. And I think key differences will open up as well, for example, in Eurasia, and the Arctic on energy transition, and perhaps most importantly, over their relative positions and influence in the international system. So I’ll just leave it there for the time being Leon.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Bobo. And I think you gave a really good overview of kind of the systemic issues that bring these two powers together. You briefly touched on the issue of personality. So I’m going to turn to Angela, to talk to talk to us about that a little bit, Angela, in authoritarian systems, the person at the top usually matters quite a lot to the point where and that’s also reflected in terms of foreign policy. Now, to what extent do you think that the Seiner sino Russian relationship depends on the personal relationship between Xi and Putin, and with this relationship, persist if Putin were to be ousted? Thank you.
Angela Stent
Thank you for the question. And thank you to CEPA for inviting me to be on this distinguished panel. So I’ve been at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum a number of years ago, Xi Jinping and Putin were on the same stage and they extravagantly praised each other as being each other’s best friend. I think we can take that with a large grain of salt. But I do think that the personal relationship between these two authoritarian leaders has driven the relationship maybe a little bit faster than it would have been had there been different leaders in power? They do share a common set of grievances against the West against the United States. And I think that has cemented this relationship. And, you know, and they do I agree with Bobo, that they have different visions of what a post West international order which they both talk about with me. But they do want to overturn this order that we have. And they believe that both of their countries should have more agency in it. And they do want to move to a multipolar world, even though again, I agree with Bobo, Bobo that Russia is a disruptive power and anarchic power and, and China isn’t. So I think that this personal relationship has driven that has driven the relationship forward, we also have to ask ourselves, apparently, Putin did not tell his quote unquote, best friend, Xi Jinping on February the fourth of last year that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine. And one can only wonder how the Chinese have actually reacted to that. We were talking before we went on the air about an interesting article in the Financial Times, which one might disregard. But anyway, a number of Chinese officials spoke anonymously, criticizing what Russia was saying, saying that Vladimir Putin was crazy. And whatever the truth to that is, you can only look at the performance of the Russian military and what Russia is doing in Ukraine, quite a scant, this is not something I think that China itself would support. And it must raise major questions about the quality of the Russian military and even Putin’s own decision making. Now, if there were a different leader, and that’s part of your question, what would what would happen, one has to assume and again, this is very speculative, that if Putin were removed from the scene were to suddenly disappear, whoever would come in his place who would succeed him would probably share many of the views that Putin himself has, if that person was someone from the inner circle, and therefore, they would continue this pivot to Asia, that Putin has announced. And, and the relationship would would continue again, as Bobo says, there are concrete reasons, interests, why this relationship will continue. The one thing that would be a wild card, and it’s very hard to imagine now is if a leader were to come to power in Russia, that wanted to reassess whether Russia should put all of its eggs in the China basket, whether it should jettison 300 years of relations with Europe, and and focus purely on Asia, and rethink that and one try to improve ties with the Europeans with the United States. And that, of course, could signify a major change in the relationship. This is why from China’s point of view, Russia cannot lose this war. They don’t want a new leader to come into power that might reassess that. So that’s the only circumstance under which things could really change. But otherwise, I think one has to assume that whatever, and whoever succeeds Putin, for the time being anyway, would continue this relationship.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Angela, some, some some negative news that you share there. For the most part, but not completely unexpected. Let’s turn to surrogate please. I’m going to ask you a question that is fairly block broad about military cooperation, or since February last year, what changes have you observed with regards to China Russian military cooperation and in your response, you’re welcome to refer to anything from from military procurement to joint exercises. Please, Sergey.
Sergey Radchenko
Thank you, Leon, and thank you CEPA for having me on, alongside such distinguished experts on sino Russian relations. I do not see great strides in sino Russian military cooperation. What we have had this year is continuation of tendencies that have already developed in previous years, including, for example, holding of joint exercises, is that something you will know they have done that for a decade or more? The forum the ambition of this exercises has increased, but not this year. In fact, prior to the Russians and the Chinese have cooperated in holding naval exercises, including sometimes third powers like Iran, for example. They recently held exercises in the East China Sea, so I don’t see big chain Dangerous in this regard, nor do I see the sino Russian alignment, as I prefer to call it, and I’m probably Baba will agree with this and so will Angela. It’s not really an alliance, you know this alignment does not really have in the strongly expressed military component to it. Ie there is no common strategy, there is no scope for China getting involved in Russia side and fighting some kind of war nor if war were to break out, for example, in the Taiwan Strait would the Chinese expect that the Russians to get involved and help them out there, or with India, for example, or in Southeast Asia. So there are limits. In terms of the military aspects of this alliance. Sometimes you hear coals in some quarters in Russia, as well as in China for a more intense military relationship. But they generally come from the margins of the political bloap, so to speak, and it did not reflect the views of the leadership. I think China and Russia prefer to have this sort of freedom of action, strategic autonomy, so to speak, as what Baba was referring to, that is actually better deal than the sino Soviet alliance in the 1950s. That had a very strong military component, but that also constrained actors. So for example, when in 1959, China and India went to war, were had skirmishes along their border, the Soviets who were trying to have a good relationship with India proclaimed neutrality and real upset the Chinese who are saying, Oh, you’re a traitor. So you’re, you’re betraying your allies? Well, today, if China and India have skirmishes, the Russians can just say, oh, sorry, we’re, you know, we would like to express regret that this is happening, but we’re not going to support either side. And that will be just fine. So I hope this answers your question. I do not see major changes. I do not see any purchases of Chinese technology, and military technology. At the moment, there were rumors that the Chinese were going to supply some technology. And as far as we understand Jake’s element actually went to Rome and spoke to I believe it was going to chirp about this man giving you a warning to this effect. And in the end there, nothing came out of this right. The Russians are in the field in Ukraine fighting with Ukrainian sorry, with Iranian drones. And there has have also been rumors of provision of North Korean ammunition. But we haven’t seen or heard much on the Chinese front. I don’t expect this to change.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, sir. Guys, so so I’m going to ask Liz also a question related to that, because I also know that you follow military cooperation between Russia and China quite closely. So I’ll ask you a two legged question. I think, firstly, what are your observations on military cooperation? And and if there’s anything that you would like to add to what Sergey said, and secondly, since February last year, what changes have you observed in terms of economic cooperation? Thanks, Liz.
Elizabeth Wishnick
I largely agree with what Sergey said I do see the partnership as an alignment rather than an alliance. And I think the whole No Limits partnership is a MISC understanding of the Chinese phrasing, which was meant to explain why an alliance was not needed. And so the idea was not to say there was no parameters to this partnership, but to say that we don’t have to define it as an alliance. So that comes from the Chinese terminology in discussing the partnership, but I would add on the military side that what we found, at least since 2016, is more coordinated coordination in terms of strategic dialogue. So we have the five years for strategic roadmaps, and one was just signed in the fall of 2021. For the next five years, we see regular strategic dialogues at a high level dialogues on Northeast Asian security. And it’s true that arm sales have declined as a factor in the military side of the partnership, but that’s because the Chinese defense capability is stronger and they don’t need to buy so many Russian systems. But prior to the Russian invasion, there was talk of more CO production for example, but we what we have seen is joint patrols, especially around Japan, which is complicated the Northeast Asian security environment and opened up some questions. I don’t know that China would expect Russia to act in a Taiwan scenario, but it does open the question of what Russia may or might, might or might not do. In such a scenario, but in terms of the economic piece, there we do see an increase in trade. China, Russia trade reached a record of 190 billion in 2022. But with severely imbalanced, Russia doubled its exports to China. And nearly a quarter of Russian trade is now with China. China, on the other hand, increased its imports from Russia by less than 10%. And Russia is still representing less than 3% of China’s trade. So China’s much more important as a market for Russia. But the same cannot be said, for China. The the the, the piece that’s interesting for China’s energy, so big sale on energy in Russia, so So China has been scooping up oil, gas, coal, and so on. And even before the Russian invasion, China was the biggest oil purchaser. But if you look at where Russian oil is going now, half of it goes to places other than Europe, when before the invasion, recordings of it went to Europe. So China is important as a buyer, China’s increased its purchases by more than 40%. But India is also interesting. India, purchased less than 1% of its oil from Russia before the war now, more than 20%. So that’s a huge change. For India. In terms of gas, you can’t just reroute gas from Europe to China, there are different structural pipelines. China has been benefiting from buying LNG, but China’s economy has been in the doldrums because of COVID. So one interesting fact is that China has been reselling some of that LNG to Europe. So LNG is not sanctioned. And so we do see some, some LNG that had been sold to China going back to Europe. But China, I think, is also a little anxious about being too dependent on Russia or indeed on any one supplier. So they have been negotiating with Turkmenistan about a fourth pipeline for gas. And so that would make the so called agreement on power of Siberia to which would run through Mongolia an unnecessary. China just signed a huge agreement with with Qatar on gas deliveries for 27 years. They have a good relationship with Saudi Arabia. So I think China is mindful that it doesn’t become too dependent on Russia. We do think more about Russian dependence on China. But China is very, also very concerned that it keeps its diversified economic portfolio.
Leon Hartwell
Well, maybe a good lesson from this Russia, Ukraine wars, I spread your eggs in different baskets right.
Elizabeth Wishnick
Now, one more appointment on economics, I would say that China has lost a lot from this war. Sometimes people think that China’s somehow the winner, that I think China lost in terms of its Belt and Road Initiative that has a big hole in it now, in Central Europe. its relations with Europe have deteriorated significantly. And so I don’t I don’t know that there’s a good scenario for for China unless Putin miraculously which seems unlikely. So I think China’s is, is not benefiting from this scenario. But for, for reasons. I would disagree with Bobo on this. I think that the the one of the main factors that keeps Russia and China together as the concern that in share about regime security, and that’s also a big, flashing red light for China right now as as Russia is in a debacle in Ukraine.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Liz. No, I’m glad that you disagree with Baba also, because we of course, want some dissenting views here. So that’s great. And thank you also for mentioning the the actual the interpretation of this meaning behind the the quote, unquote, near limits partnership, right. And I want to just for the benefit of an audience, remind them that Liz speaks both Mandarin and Russian. So she has a real keen, keen sense of of language and understanding the meaning behind it, which is very important. And often this, these issues of MIS translation, our understanding of these pivotal issues. Let’s go back to Bobo again, Bobo, the Belton Road initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative, for example, how that was also stifled by this war. Ukraine, of course, was kind of seen as part of, of this initiative also an important part some would argue, but how how has Ukraine’s successful counter offensive and other recent military successes affected the trajectory of the signer Russia relationship? And importantly, how do you think a win by Ukraine will affect the China Russia? Relationship? Thank you, Bobo.
Bobo Lo
Leon, great. Just before I answer that question, can I just pick up just very briefly on the question of whether China is a winner or loser from the war for the one of losers points. I actually think that this has been a very bad war for China. Yes, it’s true. I Russia is more dependent on China. But China has suffered considerable reputational damage with its most important partners in Europe. It’s seen a unified a relatively unified West, the US has got its leadership mojo back. The Transatlantic Ties are better than they’ve ever been a NATO and also US led alliances and relationships in the Indo Pacific have been strengthened. I mean, this has been a terrible war from Beijing’s perspective. And, of course, then there’s the economic damage that Liz referred to. So how have Ukraine’s military successes affected the direction of the relationship? Well, I think what they’ve done most of all, is that they’ve strengthened the case for maintaining the existing format of the sino Russian partnership, in other words, a flexible strategic partnership, rather than a binding political military alliance. Because after all, who wants to be bound by the excesses of pushings adventurism. And so there, that is actually one of the saving graces of the of the current form of the relationship. I think, also Russia struggles and China’s embarrassment. I’ve also reinforced the need for Beijing to strengthen to improve relations with the West and distance itself, not so much from Russia itself, but at least from Putin’s nuclear blackmail, because we should remember that as important as the strategic partnership is to Beijing, China’s integration in the international system, and global economy is even more significant. And this is where perhaps I would take issue with something that Angela said that China as well as Russia wants to overturn overturn the existing order. I don’t think it does. I think it needs the existing global order to function. Sure, it wants to exploit it. It wants to, quote unquote, reform it. But that is the only global order that’s available, there is no other the so called multipolar order, let’s face it is a fiction. Now let’s supposing we have a result in this war. Let’s say it’s a decisive Ukrainian win. It will not lead China to support Russia militarily. I mean, the Chinese would be most unhappy about this outcome. But they will still will not intervene to support Russia militarily, but nor will they abandon Putin or whoever succeeds him. Although Beijing does identify vested interest in regime stability, as Liz says, it’s one thing to to identify vested interest, it’s quite another to act on it and take big strategic and security risks. But what the interesting point for me is, what is how the Russians would react towards China in the event of a crushing defeat, because I think it could raise questions in Moscow, about the value of the sino Russian partnership. We’re already starting to read grumblings about this in the Russian press, and across various official type commentators. Now, I think your questions about the Ukraine success, we need to ask ourselves What if Russia wins? What if Putin somehow prevails in the end? Well, I think then that could be a real game changer for the relationship because China and Russia might then be encouraged to build a genuine special relationship involving closer and more active coordinate issue of their foreign policies, real military interoperability, and tighter economic complementarities.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you Bobo. bleak, bleak as always, um, I do like the dissent among among the panelists, so and I do encourage that. So thank you for that. Also, Angela, let’s go back to you. Another important part that we have to talk about when we’re thinking about triangular relations, or the relationship between China and the US and China and the EU, of course, when we’re thinking about the China Russia relationship, what how have you seen these relationships being affected? Since February last year?
Angela Stent
Okay, I will answer them in a minute. But now I want to disagree with something that Bobo just said, Um, yes, it’s been a bad wolf of China. If you look at the collective West, getting together and pushing back sanctioning Russia, but don’t forget that the global south and this that whose population is greater than the collective West, even though the GDP is smaller, the global south has essentially taken a very similar position to China on this war, they haven’t condemned Russia, they haven’t sanctioned Russia. And they like the Chinese largely support the Russian narrative that this war was provoked by NATO, that was using Ukraine as a means to attack Russia. I wouldn’t say that China is the leader of the Global South, because I think that would be an exaggeration, but at least its position is supported by the vast majority of countries in Latin America, in the Middle East, in Africa, and even India that we’ve already mentioned, which is a partner of the United States, and the quad, has taken the same view. So from that point of view, China still has a large number of countries in the world that agree with its position on this war. Now, we’ve already alluded to this, clearly, the war has really complicated the relationship between China and the collective West. And so I mean, it’s the United States, it’s the European Union, and don’t forget the Asian allies to Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, etc. Because it has been unwilling to to criticize Russia. And and even though it has not, as far as we know, supplied Russia with weapons, because it was a you meant someone mentioned Jake Sullivan, because it was warned on numerous occasions that if it did, that, it would face nature, Western sanctions against it, it still, you know, is repeat and and what it has also been unwilling to do is to assume the role of mediator, right. So a number of times, both people in the US and some European countries have suggested that the China because it does have a close relationship with Russia, but also does have relations with Ukraine was part of the Belt and Road Initiative, that it could act as a mediator in trying to end this war. But it is not willing to lift a finger as far as we know, to do that. I think the only time when the Chinese have listened to Western criticism of its position has been to admit and to indirectly criticize Russia, for the nuclear rhetoric, for the fact that Russia is threatening the world with the possible use of nuclear weapons. And China has said, both when Chancellor Scholz was in Beijing, and on other occasions, that, you know, the idea of a nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. But I think beyond that, it really hasn’t been willing to do any more. And therefore, you do see a deterioration, certainly in relations with the European Union countries. And with the United States, although the reasons for that are more than just the Russia Ukraine war, it clearly also has to do with Taiwan, and the impact of this war on what China might do there. So I think, in general, China has lost in terms of its unwillingness to take really take a stance on this war.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Angela. And thank you for raising those points also. Let’s move now up to Sergey, again. Earlier, we talked a little bit about changes or the lack of change that you’ve seen in terms of military cooperation between China and Russia, you kind of described it more as continuity, rather than any change. So I want to ask you, in terms of really impacting negatively on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, what would constitute a significant change in China, Russia and military relations? You know, would it be Chinese drones showing up on the battlefield or how do you look at this issue?
Sergey Radchenko
Right before I answer this, let me also We’ll go back to this broader question that you have alluded to referred to. And that is, what is China gaining from this or what is it’s losing from the from this conflict, I see China gaining more than it’s losing. And they the reason seems to me is obvious China’s relationship with the West relationship with the United States was already worsening for some time, before Russian invasion of Ukraine was worsening during the Trump administration. And that tendency continued. And indeed, one the Biden administration rolled in, it was on the premise that now was going to be our strategic competition between the United States and China. So it’s all focused on China and to show them etc, and also bring the Europeans around to make sure that they play along. And so then we have this development, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and which Russia serves as something of a lightning rod for Western anger, as it were, and China in this situation can operate with the constraints, certainly, but it also has certain benefits. Now, of course, going back to what Bobo was saying about the outcomes of this war, if Russia were to win the war in Ukraine, which seems very unlikely at the moment, seems very likely, but where could happen that I would agree with him that there will be some serious issues. For example, Russia will then come around and try to reassert its influence in Central Asia, which has been weakening in recent months. As countries like Kazakhstan, for example, steer their own independent course and try to kind of keep Russia in the distance. They will try to go in there and and there will be potential, I think, for contradictions with China in that area. But all of that is, is in the realm of fantasy, because Russia at the moment is losing the war in in Ukraine, and indeed, it’s facing internal domestic instability, worried to lose it entirely. Unless, of course, it resorts to nuclear weapons. And that’s a realm of great uncertainty. What would the Chinese do in the case of let’s say there’s a coup in Moscow or something like that? I would argue the Chinese would act very pragmatic list they always have. They always had well, there were periods may be under mounted on when sometimes, you know, you would not, you would not suspect China vaccine pragmatically. But, you know, if you go back, let’s say to the period of Soviet collapse, you would be surprised to think of China is wanting to preserve the Soviet Union. But actually they did that towards the end of Soviet, the Soviet Union. They weren’t there. Were really hoping that it would not fall apart. And when the coup happened in August 1991, did you know the Chinese ambassador actually reached out to the coop waters and saying the same Okay, let’s, let’s try to cooperate. And that of course, when the coup failed, they immediately recall the ambassador, you homea put a new person in and pragmatically embrace the new developments. So things were to change in Russia and Putin were to fall from grace or disappear, or fall out of the window, then I think the Chinese would pragmatically embrace the new situation. Now, with this, turning to your just question that you raised just now, what could China do to help Russia win the war in Ukraine, I don’t see being able to do anything other than of course, maintain and improve the economic relationship that allows Russia avoid American sanctions or Western sanctions what Russia clearly needs are chips doesn’t have chip production, and it needs those chips from China. And other technologies that could come by the way of China in the Chinese, of course, are reluctant for reasons of sanctions. We know the forcing American sanction policy, but we at the same time, we still see trade a going up, the numbers are going up and the and the Russians are being able to get some replacement technologies from China. One interesting case to watch is the recent spot or squabble between Russia and China or electric squabble in the production of their aircraft, they were supposedly developing and joint aircraft. And then it turned out recently, the Russians were about to pull out they were not happy with something they were not happy with the deal. So this is go this is very interesting. I don’t know if they actually have pulled out or maybe this whole thing is on the ice at the moment. But this was Russia’s big hope to replace Western technologies with something that originates with China or some kind of cooperation between China and Russia. This has not gone anywhere, as far as I can tell.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you. Thank you. Those are great points. And also especially in light of the sanctions issue that you mentioned. I think I read something that along the lines there or 919 1500 Chinese companies that popped up with you know, that established themselves in the first seven months of the of the February escalation there. listed Russia are on their trade licenses. So that of course, and the argument is that that there was established to try and circumvent some of those sanctions. So that still could potentially play an important role. But I’d love to hear what the rest of your, you know, your views are on that. But let’s first turn back to Liz, again, in the UK came up a number of times during this discussion already. And given the size of the of India’s economy, weapons purchases, and its willingness to buy energy from Russia. New Delhi is of course, also a vital partner for Moscow. Yet India’s biggest rival is, of course, China. So how does Beijing’s relationship with Moscow impact on on the Russia India relationship? And what would change those dynamics? And do you foresee India’s presidency of the G 20? having any effect on that relationship? Thank you, Liz.
Elizabeth Wishnick
That’s a great question. I’d want to step back for one moment to talk about the what a tighter military partnership would look like between China and Russia because this is relevant to your question, I think we would see joint operational planning between the two militaries. So now we have a lot of dialogue. But you don’t have any sense that the staffs of the militaries are engaging in cooperating in specific scenarios, not to mention Ukraine. Also, we might see an intervention requirements like the NATO Treaty has where China would be obligated to help Russia in a situation like Ukraine, we don’t see anything like that. But as, as panelists have said, it’s a much more flexible arrangement. And thus far, China and Russia have had different perspectives on various security conflicts and have not wanted to be tied in such a manner. And so that brings me to India. So it’s true that India has taken a middle road. Unlike China, India has been more vocal in criticizing a Putin saying that, you know, peace should be the goal. And Putin has acknowledged that publicly. But India has not retreated from its 75 year partnership with with Russia either, and has increased its its energy ties to Russia. And as important aspect of this, is it security, growing security concerns over China. And so, India has benefited from a close military operative relationship with Russia and providing top of the line military system sometimes more advanced than those provided to China, deep CO production, and so on. And even though India has been engaging with the US, in the security sphere has joined the quad, they have still maintained this relationship with Russia. But if the partnership between China and Russia would deepen this relationship with Russia might not be as important for India. So if Russia is seen as more beholden to China, then the security value of the partnership with Russia might be less for India, and they might be more interested in a deeper partnership with with other countries. I think Russia is hopeful that India as head of the G 20. And also the SCO this year would be beneficial for Russian interests. But I’m not so sure. I think India’s trying to stake out its own position. As Angela mentioned, there’s a issue of leadership of the global south in taking a different position. Although I would disagree slightly in terms of the Asian region, I think Southeast Asia has not been as supportive of the Russian viewpoint. and Southeast Asia is losing Russia’s ability to engage independently in Asia, that we had seen developing in the last few years prior to the Russian invasion. So I think in the Asia Pacific region or the Indo Pacific region, as the US likes to call it, we see we see a different situation where countries are more on edge about a possible China Russia deepening Partnership, which would adversely impact the regional security and we certainly see that in India.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you. Yeah. certainly during the my three years in Sydney I saw even India wanting to become more active in the quad, whereas previously it wasn’t. But Bobo might have more to say about that, too. But let’s turn to you again. In terms of China. How will domestic factors like COVID slower economic growth and changes in the CCP following the party congress, impact on Beijing’s relationship with Moscow? and Russia? Ukraine war?
Bobo Lo
Yeah, look, this is a really interesting question. Just before I try and answer it, just a quick response to Sergey’s remark about the US China relations already being in great difficulty before the war, Ukraine war. Now, of course, you’re right, Sergey. But I think the problem from Beijing’s perspective is that the war has actually not really distracted diverted attention away from China’s own activities in the western Pacific. In fact, it’s arguably done the opposite, because it’s reinforced that perception that China and Russia are this putative authoritarian Alliance, and that somehow China was complicit in the Russian invasion. Now, I don’t I think a lot of that is nonsense, but but in a sense, I think perceptions really do matter here. And I’m not sure that China has really had much of a free pass over the last year. Now, just coming back to domestic factors. Well, I think we should proceed from the premise that China’s future depends on the very international order that Russian aggression is threatening. So continued economic growth and the regime stability that depends on that economic growth needs, reliable global supply chains, and ready access to market sources and technology. The point is, without these, there is no China dream, there’s no rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation. Now the shock to the global economy from the war has compounded China’s already huge domestic challenges. And so this has made the case for mending or at least stabilizing relations with the West compelling, which is why Xi Jinping has tried recently to soften China’s external image on this point. Look, I take Angela’s point that the global south absolutely do take do have a very, very similar attitude to Beijing, to the war. But really, it’s not the global South, much as China likes to think of itself as the leader of that rather amorphous body. It’s not the global south that matters most to policy makers in Beijing. It’s the influence what it sees as the most influential players in the world. And those are the United States and the leading European powers and Japan. And that’s the problem really. It’s it’s, it’s had an alienating effect, the war and in and really what they what China needs to do, is to try and mend bridges with those countries. Because the global south is all very well, it’s actually in Beijing, it’s the West that truly matters. Now, having said that, Xi Jinping is going to try and soft is trying to soften China’s external image, we shouldn’t get our hopes up too much. We shouldn’t have any illusions here. China’s strategic goals remain unchanged. She is not about to throw Putin under the bus. Russia remains China’s only real strategic partner and an important geopolitical counterweight to the United States. And also Beijing well understands that even a weakened or defeated Russia remains a formidable disruptive power. And so keeping it on side for Beijing is a strategic imperative, especially with all that’s going on, on the domestic front in China.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Bobo. Very insightful. Angela, you heard what Bobo said. And maybe you would have some disagreement with some of these statements. But he mentioned that in Beijing. It’s the West that matters. The US and the EU are China’s largest economic partners. All There are ways in which the US and EU can more effectively leverage their economic weight to pull China away from from Russia. What would be your policy recommendations on that question?
Angela Stent
Well, first of all, this is a relationship of interdependence. You know, it’s not all in China’s benefit. I mean, the US and the European countries also need that trade. I mean, just think about it. When Chancellor Schultz was in Berlin, I already alluded to that meeting, you know, more deals was signed, Germany, you know, is wants to intensify its economic relationship with China, including China, owning part of the port of Hamburg. So, so we should not forget this. This is a an interdependent relationship. So in a sense, the West has already had some leverage there. China, as we said, has not supplied weapons, to Russia. And also it has largely abided by the sanctions. It has not taken actions, as far as we know, to contravene those, because it has a much greater economic stake in its relationship with the West than it does with Russia. So I think that what has worked has been the threat of sanctioning China, if it did that. I mean, the US has been explicit about this, that we’re China to supply weapons, then then there would be major sanctions against it. So I think I don’t know whether there’s much more that the West can do. Maybe Maybe my colleagues have other ideas in order to try and influence what China’s position is. Because they the West also needs China economically.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Angela. Yes, so interdependence. Yes, we have to remember that we are all interdependent. But But yes, I would love to hear if any of the panelists has something else to add to that. Later on. Let’s go back to Sergey again. Earlier, the issue of nuclear weapons came up nuclear war. Now Russia has done a lot of saber rattling with regards to using nuclear weapons to achieve its goals in Ukraine. How important is China’s objection to the use of nuclear weapons in restraining Russia? And and more importantly, how would Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine affect the quote unquote, no limits partnership? Thank you.
Sergey Radchenko
Thanks, Leon. That’s very pretty straightforward question. China has no leverage whatsoever. With Russia in terms of using nuclear weapons. Russia may or may not use nuclear weapons when people say, Oh, we should just be dismissive of this. I’m not so dismissive. And that is because we simply don’t know what Putin might do if he feels that his regime faces existential existential danger, if he feels that he has no other choice, but to resort to nuclear weapons, especially that in Ukraine, there is no effective deterrence against this, we do not have mad, mutual assured destruction like we had in relation or we have in relation between Russia and the United States, or Ukraine cannot retaliate. And American promise to retaliate conventionally is frankly, not credible. And so this creates, in my mind, some risks, it’s not clear how high of Russia eventually opt in to choose either tactical nuclear weapons, well, hopefully just tactical nuclear weapons. I do not see nuclear Armageddon coming, because there will be quite a few escalate escalatory steps before it actually comes to a third world war, that we had feared so much since you know, the Cuban Missile Crisis. What will China what would China’s cautious position do for Russia? Nothing? Absolutely nothing? Because when it comes to this dangerous moment, Putin is not going to look around, say, oh, you know, but what does my very good friend Xi Jinping, think about it? Because he’ll be in the you know, he’ll be if he does that this is the final final final step is the person who’s on the verge absolutely on the brink of about to fall over. So I think that China’s leverage is very limited when people think that, you know, fantasize about China having great leverage about with Russia, then I like to point them to China and North Korea. China has limited leverage, even with North Korea, they can never get the North Koreans to do anything for them. And you would think that China would have overwhelming leverage with North Korea. Well, how much less with Russia? So in those on this actual I find myself in, in agreement with Bobo because I think he also highlighted that point about strategic autonomy.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you. So I’m gonna turn to Liz, if you have any, anything to say on this last question, please feel free to add your two cents also. But I have another question for you also, you wrote a book about mending fences and Moscow’s China policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin. What are the major differences between Putin’s approach to China versus that of his predecessors? Thank you.
Elizabeth Wishnick
Before I get to the to the that question, I’ll just say on the nuclear point, China has a no first use policy, the only thing they could do in that situation is vote against Russia in the UN. But I think that’s a very meager response to such a, you know, calamitous development. So I would agree that, that China has very little leverage in this, although I think that is really China’s bottom line on Ukraine and the nuclear use issue. And I think she has made that clear to Putin, as its bottom line. So in my earlier book, I did look at at how domestic factors impacted Moscow’s relations with Beijing. And my argument was that parallel domestic trajectories improved lead to the reconciliation between the two countries. And so if we were to compare the Putin period with the Yeltsin period, for example, the early Yeltsin period, the first couple of years, Yeltsin was much more pro West, there was a lot more instability in the country, and and there was even some outreach by some in Moscow to Taiwan. And so China was, was engaging, but a little more concerned. And when Yeltsin shifted towards more nationalistic positions later, in the decade, the relationship between China and Russia began to improve, because this was a time when China was under pressure due to the Tiananmen crackdown. But you had regional elections for governors in Russia at that time. So you had a lot of anti Chinese rhetoric in eastern Russia, for example, you have a lot of corruption and instability, and that wasn’t so great for the economic piece of the relationship. By the time Putin comes around, they have certain commonalities. So I would say that this this bromance that we talked about between Putin and Xi is perhaps overstated, but they do share certain things like a belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a disaster for, for communism. And so Putin or for and for put components point of view for Russia, and the Soviet Union, they share that and that’s my point about regime security. I think they both came away from that development, saying that the the most important thing is to maintain the the political authority of whatever regime that they’re leading. So they share that also, I think Putin’s close ties to the energy sector have facilitated the energy relationship with with China, which has been so important, economical, economically to them. And of course, the true strategic context where you have increasing pressures felt by both by the West, and the the idea that that they provide some strategic respite for one another. So I do think that there are certain common features under Putin that have facilitated this partnership.
Leon Hartwell
Thanks, as those are great points. We are starting to run out of time. So I would like to ask each of our panelists to very briefly just give your final thoughts in about 30 seconds, 40 seconds or less. Thank you, Bobo. Let’s start with you.
Bobo Lo
You’re muted. Yeah. Final thoughts? Well, the E, China Russia relationship is increasingly asymmetrical, which is a polite way of calling it unequal. It this inequality is going to be a long term problem. But in the meantime, the relationship is simply too important to both sides. Know what the Chinese approach is going to be, is to keep as many balls in the air as possible. So the fact that it’s reaching out to Europe, for example, and even to Joe Biden, doesn’t mean that it’s about to dump on Putin. It’s important to remember that, but what it is going to do is it’s in a way that Ukraine war has removed any last illusions, either about Putin is reliability or Russia strength. And and it’s confirmed that this is this is a relationship that’s very important that still useful, but it’s still a relationship with an international delinquent. And and therefore, you need the most flexible kind of arrangement possible. You need strategic diversity, you need energy diversity, you need economic diversity, but most of all, you need a range of strategic partners. You can’t just put your eggs in the Russia as sino Russian partnership basket.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Bobo. Very briefly, also, Angela.
Angela Stent
Yeah, I’ll be very brief. Very short. Russia and China are not natural partners. And so the question of how the Russian society how the Russian people view this kind of switch toward China, Europe is a natural partner for Russia, and has been for hundreds of years. And therefore, I think one of the limitations, you know, whatever the leadership is doing, is that it’s going to be very difficult for Russian society to accept that their destiny lies in closer ties with China, as opposed to closer ties to Europe.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Angela. And thanks for being very sing. I’m sorry, go.
Sergey Radchenko
So I will just say that, you know, with Russia and China or Russian Chinese relations, I think that this relationship is to to to misquote, but I think it’s Churchill is never as as strong as as we fear and never as weak as would hope. The relationship will continue no doubt. But what I would echo what, what Angela was also saying just now, what I will say is that it is in Russia’s interest to understand that it has lost a lot of leverage with China by shutting itself off from the West, I think what’s the time they will realize that and move away from that position in order to play the West against China, which is, which would be in Russian national interests? I think it is in Russia’s national interest also to have a good relationship with China. In the long term. The question is counted.
Leon Hartwell
That’s excellent. Liz. Final thoughts?
Elizabeth Wishnick
I didn’t say that the Russian word. Can you hear me? Yes. Okay. The Russian war has had unpredictable consequences, that that will affect the partnership going forward. For example, North Korea, which we mentioned only briefly, there’s some concern that Russia’s positions on nuclear use could embolden North Korea. And and so how will China respond in such a situation? Sergei mentioned that, that China has not been able to restrain North Korea so so now we can have a worse situation where we have a nuclear use in Europe and the nuclear use in Asia. So I think there are a lot of wildcards that have been revealed in this war that neither China nor Russia will be able to control.
Leon Hartwell
Thank you, Liz. Yeah, thank you for a lot of great thoughtful comments from all of our panelists and contributions. I’d like to thank Bobo, Angela, Sergey and Elizabeth for for contributing on this very insightful panel on Russia, Ukraine, Australia, Russia, China relations, your audience. Thank you also for tuning in. And please follow our website www.cepa.org For more information about future events, and take care everyone.
