Catherine Sendak
Good morning! Good afternoon! Good morning all! Hi there, hope you all can hear me. My name is Katie Sendak. I am the Director for the Transatlantic Defense and Security Team here at CEPA. Thank you so much for taking the time to join us this morning, in what we know is going to be a very, very busy week. Here we are, as as we said, week of the NATO summit, very much anticipated gathering and my last count of almost 40 heads of state here in Washington, DC this week discussing current and emerging security challenges for the Alliance, and what the future might hold, celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Alliance. We are so thrilled to be here today with four esteemed experts on all things NATO, European security, Western security. And we’re so excited for the conversation we’re going to have this conversation is going to focus on what can we expect from the summit? What can we not expect from the summit? Questions surrounding partnership with Ukraine and surrounding the threat from Russia, especially in light of this morning’s tragic news out of Kyiv. We are welcoming Sweden for the first time as a member at a NATO summit. We have a lot of internal NATO dynamics working including regional defense plans, defense spending, industrial base challenges. And we are really excited to have this conversation. Again, I am so thrilled to be joined by four esteemed experts in all of these issues. Let me just run through and introduce each one of them. And then we will open it up to questions. I welcome you all to either use the raise your hand function in Zoom, or copy and paste your question into the chat and we can make sure that we get to them. First and foremost I want to welcome a senior or excuse me Fellow for the Transatlantic Defense and Security Team here at CEPA Minna Alander. She’s also a Research Fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Minna, thank you so much for joining us. We have Nico Longa, who’s a Senior Fellow with CEPA, who also a Senior Fellow with the Munich Security Council Conference, excuse me, and served as the Chief of Staff at the German MOD. We have Lieutenant General retired Steph Twitty, who’s a Distinguished Fellow and member of our International Leadership Council here at CEPA, is also a contributor for MSNBC, and was the Deputy Commander of USEUCOM. So Steph, thank you so much for joining us. And finally, we have Kurt Volker, who is also a Distinguished Fellow for us here at CEPA, was a former US ambassador to NATO, and Special Representative for Ukraine negotiations. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us this morning. Again, welcome any and all questions about what to expect at the summit as we start this this week. But as moderator I will take a first hand at this and ask a question to all four of you to start us off. So we’re looking we’ll start broad, we’ll start strategic here. We’re looking at NATO. We’ve been around for 75 years, which you know, according to my math is one of the longest alliances in in human history. And we want to mark that we want to understand it but we also want to be forward looking in what NATO has to achieve in the next 75 years. But as we take a look at the alliance as a whole coming down to 32 members, which is so unbelievable. What do you all consider NATO’s greatest success up to this point the last 75 years, especially as we look forward, given the security threats that we face? And how do we approach those moving forward? How would you categorize NATO’s greatest success so far in the last 75 years? And Minna, why don’t I start with you?
Minna Ålander
Thank you so much, Katie. I would say that one of NATO’s biggest successes is, of course, that, first of all, NATO has effectively prevented wars between the allies, which sounds like a very low bar. But if we think about where we started at right after the Second World War, that is already quite something. So in that sense, the more members join NATO the better because that makes wars, at least between the allies, less likely. And of course, it is also a success that NATO has managed to reinvent itself after the Cold War, when the sort of initial purpose of the of the Alliance kind of changed. So and now there, there has been this immediate response sort of this going back to the roots process, as a reaction to to Russia’s war against Ukraine, starting already in 2014. So this flexibility is also one of NATO strengths .
Catherine Sendak
You know, thank you so much. Let me turn it over to Nico. Nico any thoughts?
Nico Lange
Very briefly, I believe the biggest achievement of NATO was and is that is providing a security shield to allow countries to develop democratically, peacefully, to have businesses running, to have people developing freely. And keeping that in mind, I think that’s the task for NATO also to go ahead to provide a security shield for people in Ukraine and Moldova and Georgia, and other places where they want to live free where they want to have a economic development. And unfortunately, it seems that especially my country, and to start very quickly, also the US at the moment is behaving very tactically when it comes to this very fundamental question. So it’s good to remind them of providing a security shield for good development.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Nico, I appreciate it. Steph, over to you.
Stephen Twitty
Yeah, thanks, Katie. It’s no question in my mind that when you take a look at the past 75 years, what NATO ushered in is peace, stability, prosperity. And we cannot forget about the shared values, which are so important. And you see it today, as we take a look at what NATO is trying to do to assist Ukraine, the shared values are so important. And it’s also important as we look at authoritarianism, and what is going on around the world today with China, North Korea, or Iran and Russia. And as the shared values are on display, as we hedge against the threat, and what we see and chatter and what we see in Russia today. So peace, stability, prosperity, and shared values.
Catherine Sendak
Wonderful. Thank you so much, Steph. I think we have Kurt Volker on, Kurt are you on the line yet? I just want to make sure. If not, we’ll turn to the next set of questions. So while we wait for Kurt to join as well, so he can weigh in on this question, let me turn to how you all highlighted some of this because I think each three of you, each of you highlighted a different aspect of NATO that needs to be highlighted in terms of flexibility, economic insecurity, strength, shared values. As you all look to, you know, having Sweden as the first the newest member to join the Alliance here at the first summit, huh let me ask the future question. How do we sustain those pieces? How do we sustain you know, shared values moving forward? Economic and security shield moving forward? How do we maintain that flexibility and even grow it over time? I think those are really important questions to ask, especially as we’re in the middle of such a dynamic security threat on the continent. Nico, can I start with you on this one?
Nico Lange
I think it’s very simple. Nothing is more successful than success. We have to win. And that winning means whoever tries to attack a member of the alliance will have to lose and that has to be clear. And uh winning means in the situation that we are now defending against the Russian war of aggression and deterring against further aggressive actions by Russia. I think that is the main task. I know that Ukraine is not a member of NATO. But that is exactly the gray zone Vladimir Putin tries to exploit. And not having him exploiting the gray zone and showing strength and resilience I think that is most important for NATO now. And the key question for Putin is not a few square kilometers in Ukraine here or there. The key question for him is to challenge the European security order. And that’s why our answer also has to be on the level of the European security order. And circling back to the upcoming NATO Summit, at the moment, I think what is on the table, from my point of view, is not sufficient when it comes to this question.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Nico. Yes. Steph, can I turn to you next?
Stephen Twitty
Sure. I’ll just highlight a couple of things here that I think’s important that we need to pull out of this question that you asked. To me is, in order to win, you have to plan, evolve, and prepare. And in NATO’s case here, we face a totally different threat than we faced 75 years ago. Heck, we face a totally different threat than we faced five years ago. And so it’s things like ballistic missile defense, long range fires, space based technology, cyber technology, disinformation and information war in the gray zone, how we deal with that. All of those things and complexities that we’re seeing out there today, we have to prepare ourselves as part of NATO, not only for it today, but the future, because we’re operating in the future now. And we’re seeing the way war is evolving, and how dynamic it is on the European continent, where Ukraine, and oh, by the way, you can turn and look at Hamas and Israel and see the same thing. And so all the multi domain threats that we face today, we must prepare for. NATO is moving in a great direction, but we have to move out pretty quickly, because war is unpredictable and you never know what we will face here.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Steph, and Minna over to you.
Minna Ålander
Thanks a lot. Two levels maybe to add to these very comments before me. One is I would like to continue with Steph was kind of getting into with this non conventional warfare. So the gray zone aggression and all the hybrid attacks that are happening by Russia, in Europe, at the moment, we are looking at a potential sort of like death by 1000 paper cuts situation here. So NATO needs to get better at figuring out what is where the thresholds are for its collective defense, how to how to improve the resilience of its members, and how to decrease the sort of hybrid flanks, I would say. Likke how to make sure that our adversaries are less able to use sort of like vulnerable points of our democratic and rule of law systems against us. And the second is then zooming out on the global level. While NATO is a transatlantic alliance, and mainly responsible for transatlantic security, it’s an important piece of a global security order where the US plays an absolutely important role, the key role actually, through this complex network of bilateral and multilateral security guarantees that it has created after the Second World War. So NATO also needs to be seen as part of this more global context.
Catherine Sendak
Great, thank you to all three of you. I think you give the dimensions of all the different aspects of NATO and what NATO is facing. So really appreciate it. We have our first question for from our from our zoom callers, Konrad, and I don’t want to mispronounce it from Faz. Faz, please over to you if you’d like to ask your question, or I’m happy to ask it as well.
Konrad Schuller
Yes, can you hear me?
Catherine Sendak
Yes, we can. Please go ahead.
Konrad Schuller
Excellent, thanks a lot. NATO has announced there is an expectation that NATO will offer Ukraine an air defense package now we have bad news about air rates today. And um, some fear that Ukraine is threatened to lose its air defense competitors by actually by by attrition. So what do you expect? And I ask the question to every single one of you might think he can answer what is needed in terms of air defense in three categories, basically, launchers, missiles, interceptors, fighter jets to intercept drones and cruise missiles. How much do we need? And do you expect that the air defense package that NATO is going to prepare and to offer is going to be enough to secure the the survival of Ukraine in the coming winter?
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much. Thank you so much for your question. Steph, can I start with you on this one?
Stephen Twitty
Sure. A couple of couple of things here is what you have to understand as this more than just about air defense. And you hear air defense spoken about a lot in the press and, and when Ukraine’s attacked, the first thing we think about is air defense. But there are multiple layers to protect Ukraine. Long range fires, you’ve heard me talk about that. Artillery fires, which are not air defense related, is is ground based artillery fires, what I’m talking about. Long, long range reconnaissance assets, to be able to find out where these launchers have been the these air defense weapons are being launched from. Very much needed in Ukraine. The ability to use counter drone technology to stop Russian drones from approaching into Ukraine is very much needed. And so there’s several other equipment that you use to layer in with your air defense equipment that you’re speaking of that will be extremely helpful, and not just air defense. Now, the problem you’re going to have as the same problem that most nations have. It is the defense industrial base not being able to keep up with not only the domestic air defense and other technologies that I just talked about, but now also supporting Ukraine in this effort. And as you know, there’s always a fine balance between your own personal defense and pasture and whether or not you’re going to send assets to Ukraine and so forth. So I’m sure that this will be talked about at the summit. How do you increase the industrial base capacity, be able to provide these assets and support Ukraine? But also how do you maintain your own individual country readiness? And so hopefully, I answered your question there.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Steph. Nico if I can turn to you. Anything you’d like to weigh in on this one?
Nico Lange
Yeah, I think what we have to admit here is that the air defense deliveries of systems and of effectors is coming late. More than 50% of Ukrainian power generation has already been damaged. Many attacks have been conducted, and especially the glide bombs, that Russia is using are a cheap method by Russia to create a lot of problems in the cities that are close to the frontlines and the border and also for the Ukrainian troops on the frontlines. That said, I think the situation is gradually improving. With more Patriot systems coming into Ukraine, from Germany from the US, from other partners, I hope that there will be discussion in Washington, DC, to get also more systems from countries such as Spain, Greece, some others who still could spare Patriot systems for Ukraine. But I think it’s also a positive step that the US decided that every new system that will be produced, and Stephen talked about the slowness or the low capacities of the defense industrial base for now, that all new systems produced will go to Ukraine and everybody else has to wait. And we need cheaper effectors against the cheap drone threats. So a better economy of air defense is something that is needed. This includes radars, radar systems, also not not produced in the amount that in the speed that would be needed to equip such a big country such as Ukraine very quickly. And there has been some encouraging effort led by the US but also I think joined by others to develop systems where you combine legacy launchers from post Soviet times from Ukraine with modern effectors, or with Hawk missiles or with other equipment that we still have. So I think this form of creativity to build those FrankenSAM systems, it shows some cost effective way to defend against the various threats that Russia is sending. But let’s be clear here. From an from an economic point of view, just defending without targeting the airfields, without targeting the bombers, without targeting the launch pads for the Ukraine for the Russian air attacks, is an uphill battle. At some point, I think we have to have a discussion to allow the Ukrainians to strike the airfields, to strike the launch pads, it’s much more effective and also economically more feasible than just to concentrate on air defense.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Nico. Minna, anything you want to weigh in on this?
Minna Ålander
Just to emphasize this point that like air defense is incredibly important to make sure that civilian life in Ukraine can continue and not even more people have to leave Ukraine because of this war. But on the other hand, this war won’t be won just with air defense. So it’s incredibly important to address these issues that both Steph and Nico already mentioned about actually, like kind of attacking Russia behind the front lines, so that it’s less able to hit Ukraine from there. So basically, our defense is a little bit like chemotherapy without trying to remove the tumor. So this is what we have to keep in mind.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Minna. Appreciate that. Let me turn to Ellen Nakashima from the Washington Post, Ellen?
Ellen, I think you’re unmuted, but can you hear me?
Maybe on your sound on your part. We can come back to you, Ellen, while we figure that out, no problem. While we while we do that, let’s turn it over to Bryant Harris from Defense News. Bryant, please.
Bryant Harris
Hi, thanks for thanks for doing this. So, you know, in certain countries, there’s some growing skepticism of the Alliance. I guess with regards to the French elections yesterday, for those of us who aren’t quite up to snuff with French politics, that, you know, obviously, people were expecting a far right victory, the Popular Front got the largest amount of seats. I was just wondering if you could talk a bit kind of about, you know, kind of where the Popular Front broadly tends to be on NATO. And I know a lot of it was strategic voting, but kind of with within the French public what that kind of portends for their views on the Alliance. Thank you.
Catherine Sendak
Thanks so much, Bryant. We don’t have any of our French fellows on the line, but I’m going to offer it up to our experts. Whoever would like to tackle that question read out from the French election and Nico, please.
Nico Lange
I was I was, very frankly, I was a little irritated by the relief that was spread throughout the media, especially in Europe, I understand that it’s good not to have an outright majority for Marine Le Pen’s party and not having her as a prime minister or some of her proxies. But if you look into what has what Melenchon has said, already during the presidential campaign, and what especially Melenchon and his people stand for, I think it contradicts many things that we are talking about in this call about NATO. It contradicts the approach towards Russian aggression against Ukraine into support for Ukraine. So it’s, it’s still, I would say, a negative development that we see in France. And even if that is not outright negative, because nobody has really a majority, not having a stable government in France, a president trying to govern with situated majorities. I think in such an important country such as France, is not really helping the domestic developments in NATO. But it’s an increasing tendency that many leading NATO members have very significant domestic policy issues, where the dividing lines in the domestic policy issues are dividing lines that also spill over into security affairs into NATO questions into uh the question of how to counteract Russia. It’s interesting that in other countries, if you look into just random example, if you look into Denmark, you also have many parties, but you have a broader consensus around central security policy issues. And the conflict lines are not around those questions.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you. Nico. Minna, Steph? Any thoughts from either of you on the the French elections? No. Okay, great. So I see Ellen you posted your question in the chat. I’m sorry that we’re having some some audio difficulties. But I’ll go ahead and ask your question. And welcome any follow up. So again, Ellen Nakashima from the Washington Post. What is your understanding of what the Joint Communique will say with respect to the irreversibility of NATO membership? And will that satisfy Ukraine? In particular to Nico, can you elaborate on what you think is missing? And how Germany and the US are, quote, “behaving very technically,” I think you said, when it comes to the fundamental questions of providing a security shield? Nico do you want to start and then I’ll turn to Mina and Steph?
Nico Lange
Well, I think there has been a discussion already last year at the Vilnius summit, where many members of the Alliance were ready to move forward with bringing Ukraine closer into NATO, with extending an invitation to start membership, membership, accession talks. It was the US and Germany back then uh not allowing this. I think we have a very similar situation now, where Germany and the US are not ready to extend the invitation to start membership accession talks. I’m afraid this will be perceived very positively in Moscow, it will be perceived as a success from the Kremlin point of view. And from a Ukrainian point of view, what I find especially problematic is this idea of building a bridge into NATO. Nobody wants to live on a bridge or under a bridge. But Ukraine has a history where many people told Ukraine for a long time that Ukraine should be the bridge between the West and Russia. So this whole bridge metaphor, I think, from a Ukrainian point of view, is something that is not acceptable. Ukraine wants to be part of the Euro Atlantic community. And it is fighting a war over it’s right to choose to be part of the Euro Atlantic community. And from this point of view, I think this tactical behavior of Germany and the US is not what is adequate to the situation that we are facing with this summit. And I’m criticizing the tactics of this because I do not understand what are we actually waiting for? What is it that we are trying to achieve by not making the strategic decision in favor of Ukraine? I’m, I cannot really find a convincing argument for that.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Nico. Minna. Any any thoughts on that question about the Communique?
Minna Ålander
Well, I suppose that the expectation is precisely they said it will be mostly focused on the technical steps taken to sort of proceed in Ukraine’s NATO integration step by step in the NATO Ukraine Council and so on. But as Nico said, without making this strategic level decision, and it’s problematic, because it effectively gives Russia a veto if the if the communication is basically that, that this is not on the table until this war ends, because then it incentivize Russia to do just keep the war going. And if we are thinking about how to disincentivize Russia from continuing this war, this is certainly not the way way to go. So it’s it can’t be seen as, as a satisfactory development, of course, from Ukrainian perspective, or from a European perspective, either to be honest, because that this is like a missed opportunity to try and use a deterrent sort of tool here. So I’m afraid that there has been already like quite a lot of expectation management done beforehand. And I’m, of course hoping that maybe there will be a positive surprise, but it looks very, very doubtful. I don’t think that there will be any big announcements on the on the and this is precisely the question that is where there’s no consensus as as of now, whether this kind of membership process or the accession process could be started before the war ends, the hot war ends or only after and this is a very contentious issue within the Alliance. Unfortunate.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Minna. Steph, any thoughts on this one?
Stephen Twitty
I’ll just say I don’t envision or foresee any positive announcements regarding Ukraine and accession into NATO. I think what we’ll hear more about is pushing them towards, as we’ve heard in previous increase in language, prior training, increase in equipment, the modernization of the Ukrainian military, the equip increasing joint exercises in the future, those things of that nature. And how do you sustain the fight and modernize that modernize them at the same time? I think those are the type things we’ll hear. But I don’t think we’re hearing anything about accession.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Steph. Appreciate that. So let me turn to Nick Childs, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Nick, I’ll go ahead and ask your question, if you’re okay with that. So how much of a frictional issue for NATO? Is it that most NATO members see Russia as the most critical challenge, while NATO’s biggest member is focused mostly on China? Minna and Steph hinted at this. If it is an issue, does NATO need to adjust to focus more on China? And how much of a challenge will that be for some NATO members? Steph, do you want me to turn to you first on this one?
Stephen Twitty
Well, as you know, I spent 40 years in the military there, Katie. And so I see the world as intertwined now, where it’s not a focus here and a focus there. I think as you take a look at the threats today, particularly space, cyber, the gray zone things that were talked about, and the alliances that are being made, particularly with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran. You have to be able not only to just focus on the Russian threat, but you have to focus globally. And I think you’re going to see that at the summit as well, I’m pretty sure they’re going to talk about the Indo Pacific. I think most people know, 40% of European trade goes right through the South China Sea. And that could be a threat to Europe, just as well as it could be a threat to you to the United States. And so we have to transition from this mindset of just Russia, Russia, Russia, when it comes to NATO and Europe. We have to take a look at how the world is intertwined and how the threats that Europe face today are the same threats that the United States face as well. And we have to figure out how do we collectively deal with Russia, but also deal with the other threats that are out there. China, Iran, North Korea, violent extremist groups, they’re all impact Europe just like they’ll impact the United States.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you Steph. And they all are working together.
Stephen Twitty
Exactly.
Catherine Sendak
It’s a highlight to make as well. Minna, any anything you’d like to add?
Minna Ålander
Well, that’s precisely the thing that like these things are connected. The Russian threat is maybe the most visible one to us right now. But, and there are, of course, economic incentives for a lot of especially European political leaders, to sort of like turn a blind eye to the challenges that China poses as well. And this is not like geographically limited to the Indo Pacific, or China’s direct vicinity. As I mentioned, this is this this war is not anymore, only about Ukraine, or only about Russia, it has developed this more global systemic level impact. It is challenging the whole Western led rules based world order. And and this is something that will come back to bite us in Europe as well. China, is China’s interest in keeping this war going. I don’t think that there are there’s any, like lack of clarity in how China’s position has also unfortunately developed not favorably to us in the past two years, over the course of this war. Also how Iran and North Korea are fully openly cooperating and supporting, supporting Russia. So this is not only a US issue with China, and we see Chinese activity in Europe too, in the hybrid sphere in different ways. There are varying levels of awareness of this so far. Unfortunately, the Chinese are very good at playing by our rules, but nevertheless against us, so it is harder to win. See the patterns here in Europe. But this is something that we urgently need to get better at. And this will be an increasingly important topic. And I think there will be also more political willingness to call a spade a spade in the future. But we still are on the way there let’s say.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much Minna. And I would just highlight I’m sure you all are tracking I saw on the news this morning, China’s participating in a military exercise in Belarus. And so to highlight the fact that they are there and on the continent, not in just a purely economic position, I think is demonstrated through through that news coming through. Nico, I don’t know if you have any, any thoughts on this question? No. Okay, wonderful. So as we move on, again, please raise your hand or put it in the chat. If you have a question. I really wanted to ask our experts about the emerging larger NATO mission for Ukraine that we’re anticipating coming out as a as a final decision out of the summit this week, we understand that NATO will be taking on a big role, bigger role, excuse me in logistics, training, exercise, hopefully coordination and industrial base issues. Knowing full well, we’ve already spoken about the fact that you know, membership is not going to be on the table at the summit. I would love each of your thoughts on what this means for for the assistance to Ukraine for the support to Ukraine. Is this going to be a big difference maker, in terms of all of the different aspects of support to Ukraine? And and do we see it going to have a tangible benefit to the Ukrainians on the battlefield? Perhaps Nico, I can start with you on this one.
Nico Lange
Um, first of all, I believe at least partly, this is an attempt to give a replacement for the decisions that are not taken at this NATO summit. And I think that’s something that needs to be said and also criticized. Still, I believe that from the very beginning, there could have been a role for NATO and being being a clearinghouse for military assistance to Ukraine. Because the logistical nightmare for the Ukrainians is something nobody on our side would be capable of capable of dealing with. And with the war going on, I think it’s even more difficult for the Ukrainians to handle all the different types of weapons systems, ammunitions, and maintenance and repair and the logistic attached to it. I would hope that bringing this under a NATO umbrella it’s not just putting a new label on the Ramstein format. I hope it brings in new quality when it comes to maintenance and repair, bringing maintenance and repair closer to the frontlines, helping the Ukraine’s with making the Ukrainians making logistics easier. Maybe also with packaging the military resistance between the partners in a way that it will be easier for Ukraine to absorb them, and to bring them into their armed forces. But this includes difficult questions that need to be addressed. It’s the question of whether you bring contractors to Ukraine for maintenance and repair. It’s the question whether you will have elements of forward logistics that might include personnel from NATO countries. It includes the question whether to produce directly in Ukraine for Ukraine together with Ukrainian companies. If it’s moving into that direction, I think that will be a significant step forward. But I do not have all answers to those questions yet. We have to see what the decisions really are and how they are implemented. What I like is the idea of a joint analysis and training center in Poland. I think that has been part of a discussion before Vilnius, I think it’s good that it’s finally happening because this aspect of NATO forces learning from Ukrainians, from Ukraine’s war experience, I think that is for the modern modernization and for the capability of NATO forces is a very important aspect.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Nico. Steph, I’m going to turn to you on that question. But also, as Nico just mentioned, you know, NATO personnel on the ground, troops on the ground, obviously, France and some others have been discussing this, but we’d love your thoughts on that larger NATO mission. That’s that’s going to come out of this summit that we anticipate.
Stephen Twitty
Yeah, I think there’s three areas that I think is badly needed and NATO is finally stepping up to the plate here and that they’re looking at sending a senior NATO rep the key that will be the be the conduit now between Ukraine and NATO. And so as you know, the conduit has really been, you know, several leaders going to Ukraine, figuring out what Ukraine needs. Now they have a consistent NATO body there, that will be able to interlock between Ukraine leaders, as well as NATO, and really provide the face to face contact that’s so badly needed there. So I applaud that. The second thing that I applaud is this new NATO joint logistics and equipment center, that they’re looking at standing up in Wiesbaden, having having served there, and understanding that the US largely ran that particular facility with minimal support from NATO. And it was hard to really for the United States to really figure out what the other NATO countries could provide alone there at United States European Command. And now with the stand up of this, we’ll be able now to communicate, coordinate, synchronize, and quickly move logistics into Ukraine. So I applaud that. And then you mentioned in this Training Center, there in Poland. This the third one that I think is badly needed, the lesson learned process will be enduring when it comes to the the future defense against Russia. And I think many of our NATO countries will learn from this particular facility. So those are the three areas that I see are worth value. And I’m glad that we’re moving forward.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much Steph, Minna, your thoughts on this?
Minna Ålander
I would like to maybe bring an additional issue to this, which is the EU and how European NATO members could potentially more effectively utilize or move resources through the EU. This is unfortunately as of now blocked, because there’s disagreement on the idea of common borrowing from financial markets for the sake of defendants, not right now related necessarily to the Ukraine, but but more generally, and, and this is, of course, a huge issue with European allies given that there are uncertainties about the future of US military aid to Ukraine, and how hard it potentially will be if there will be a next significant package to get that through the US political system. So this is an important issue. And also in general, like I would really welcome seeing some clear language on progress in EU NATO cooperation, because there is a lot of potential there on the European continent. The EU can have a lot of useful tools that NATO doesn’t have in terms of its regulation, power, and other things, financial means and so on. So this really needs to be improved, and the differences between the organizations need to be overcome.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Mina, I’m going to stick with you for one minute more and change purviews looking towards Ukraine. But now looking north, mentioned at the front, you know, Sweden Sweden’s first summit as a full fledged NATO member. What what are we looking at in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in terms of security challenges? What do you anticipate coming from the summit on any of those issues that you all are looking at from that perspective?
Minna Ålander
Well, right now we are witnessing significant ramping up of the hybrid activity. It includes GPS jamming, instrumentalized migration at borders, maritime border sort of reassessment processes, a critical infrastructure, or threats to critical infrastructure. We have seen gas pipelines and data cables being caught or damaged or blown up in the in the Baltic Sea, and also other northern borders. We are seeing sort of like this increasingly aggressive testing of the Svalbard status, this very northernmost part of Norway, which is technically Article Five territory, but with the Russian colony there. So there’s a lot of this gray zone activity going on. And this is something that needs to be addressed much more effectively. In Europe, we need first of all, like, do take baby steps like read better situational awareness to even see the patterns what’s happening where and why, and exchange best practices and even information to begin with. On the other hand, within NATO, there is a contentious issue what comes to the Baltic Sea command and control arrangements as the result of amendments to the NATO accession because the current command structure doesn’t quite work in the new situation where we have all the Nordics and Baltics and the whole situation sort of united in the Alliance and where you have this huge potential to, to make things work pretty seamlessly, but but there will be questions of like, organizational questions about this. And this has been politicized to an extent as well, between the commands in the US don’t offer one in Virginia and one in Brunssum in the Netherlands. So there are like these kind of more maybe organizational questions that remain. And then of course, like one major issue is the exercising and implementation of the regional defense plans. NATO is now bringing back, for the first time since the Cold War, regional defense plans in Europe. And making sure that these plans actually work is of course essential, I mean, existential to especially the flank countries. And here, it’s been a huge relief. I cannot like stress this enough to us in Finland, that Sweden also is now a full member and attending its first summit, because now this work can really get going like it was not possible as long as Sweden was in that waiting room.
Catherine Sendak
Minna thank you so much for that perspective. So helpful. Nico, I wanted to turn to you. We’ve talked a lot about Ukraine, its role within NATO, its partnership with NATO. You know, we’ve seen some very incremental advances of Russian forces on the front. I would love your perspective on the status of the battlefield in Ukraine and its impact on the summit, if at all, and how we look at it over the course of the rest of the year, in terms of how the alliance is going to approach is this going is this new mission with NATO is is NATO’s new work on these issues? Is it going to impact the battlefield from your vision and and is the current status of the war impacting the summit?
Nico Lange
I think the main impact of the war for the summit and maybe for the weeks and months to come, is the damage to the Ukrainian power generation and the living conditions in Ukrainian cities. Because this is a Russian campaign to force people to leave the places where they live, and to generate more refugees into European Union countries. And the situation I think it’s very difficult already. Now, if you project this into fall and winter, living in high rise buildings without electricity for many hours per day. It’s very difficult and of course, Ukrainian economy after the first downturn when the war started, Ukrainian economy was positive was able to grow last year. But now, with the power generation being taken out, to have a sustainable way forward for the Ukrainian economy seems to be the biggest, single most important element for the for the months and weeks to come. On the front lines themselves, I think Ukraine was able to counter the attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast, when Russia used the self imposed restrictions by Western partners of Ukraine to hide behind the border to amass troops behind the border. And then to move into Ukraine. There’s restrictions now have been lifted. They should have been lifted much earlier, but they are lifted now. And this attack, I think, has been not only coming to a halt, it’s creating a very difficult situation for Russia in that area. But because of Ukraine needing to pull reserves into Kharkiv Oblast, I think we see a difficult situation at some frontline elements. In Donbas, especially in the city of Chasiv Yar, but also in direction of Pokrov where Russia keeps pushing and slowly but steadily is making progress. And where the Ukrainian units, because of the personnel by the late mobilization not flowing in and not being replaced by Fresh units, the Ukrainian units really have problems in delaying the Russian battle. So that I think for the next months and weeks that will be a very critical factor how far Russia can advance, how long the high ground at Chasiv Yar can be held from the Ukrainians and if the calculation that Russia has to pay for every advance in Donbas with very high losses in equipment and personnel, if that is still working. The last element on the frontlines that I find important important to mention is Ukraine is still able to put pressure on Crimea with long range fire, such as ATACMS with Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles from partners. And this is I think, the best chance Ukraine has to continue pressuring Crimea. Maybe to create problems for Russian logistics and to control the western part of the Black Sea area, not only for Ukrainian experts, but also in a military way. But I think for this year, I do not expect big changes. I expect a continuation of what I just described in this different elements of the frontline. And unfortunately, I do not see for the foreseeable future that Ukraine has enough capability to start more bigger, or more strategic counter attacks neither in the South nor the East.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, really helpful context. And Steph, let me turn to you. And then we’ll do a final round of any final thoughts that are that our experts have. Steph welcome you to weigh in on anything that we’ve talked about so far. But I really wanted to ask you, you know, there have been questions about US leadership within the Alliance. And I’m wondering your thoughts on how big a role do you think that’s going to take in the summit discussions? And what perhaps you would say, to the Alliance, who wants to have those discussions about the status of US leadership going forward in the Alliance?
Stephen Twitty
Yeah, I appreciate the question. A couple of things here. I don’t think we talk about the three things that I’m going to talk about enough. And I don’t think, here at America really, really understand what I’m getting ready to say here. And it is important, I think, for Americans to understand is what NATO offers the United States, is strategic depth, a security blanket. So the uh, and that’s a strategic depth and security blanket looks like this. And so for the past 40 something years that I served in the military, we fought wars away from the United States. And we fought wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, Bosnia, Kosovo, you name it. And most people did not know this, the way we were able to fight those wars is through our base and rights in Europe, through our air routes, that the Europeans allowed us to use, on and on and on. And so having the strategic depth in Europe to allow us to maintain peace and stability here in the United States, is very important. And it gives us an opportunity to defend far away from the United States, and hit our adversaries before they can hit us. And that’s a critical part to this NATO alliance that I think is very important to the United States. The second thing is because we have spent 75 years in NATO, and led over 75 years in NATO, it has provided us the United States as well as Europe economic prosperity. You take a look, we talked about the military industrial base, whether it be Raytheon, Northrop, Lockheed, on and on and on. They have relationships with the Europeans, the the contracts with the Europeans. And so the flow and economic prosperity that we’ve been able to gain by our membership in NATO is so important. And then the third thing that you heard me talk about is this authoritarianism. We’ve been able to hedge with our NATO allies and our other Western partners against Russia, Iran, China and North Korea as an alliance, not just us alone. The United States do not intend to fight alone. We should not ever fight alone. And that’s where our allies come in. And that’s why NATO is so important to United States. So hopefully I wrapped those three up there where, at least in my mind, I think where NATO is so critical to the US.
Catherine Sendak
Steph, thank you. I think that that perfectly encapsulates it. So let me do a quick round robin before we close out with our with our experts for any final thoughts you have in anticipation of the summit starting uh later this week. And let us start with Nico, and then we’ll we’ll go around. Nico you have any final thoughts?
Nico Lange
Well, I think I think you’ve sensed already that I’m skeptical about the summit. I think it’s good to have NATO for 75 years. But we are in a situation where we do not really have too many reasons to celebrate. So I hope there will be at least a little progress made it to face the challenges. And I mean, we are talking here while Russia attacked a children’s hospital, where children with cancer are treated in Ukraine, with air attacks, and with a direct missile hit. So I think we all have to ask ourselves, are we really doing what is necessary at the moment? And how can we how can we step up? That’s, I think, the spirit that we need at this summit.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Nico. Steph, any thoughts? Any final thoughts?
Stephen Twitty
Hey, I would just say that from a NATO perspective, and there’s some right here, we we turn from talking about winning, whenever for for Ukraine to talking about survival. And I really do think we need to change our mindset and get back into the winning mode. Winning means supplying the Ukrainians with all the equipment they need to fight, win, and also main supply them, you know, I know, many countries are tight. But if we want this war to end, and it be successful, you got to open up your pocketbooks as well. And so I would, I would be happy to see goals towards how we’re going to win this fight. So we can get on and kick Russia out of Ukraine and move on with life here.
Catherine Sendak
Absolutely. Thank you. And last but not least, Minna.
Minna Ålander
Thank you, Katie. Well, I would first of all stress this the same point that we need to start thinking about whether the escalation risk assessment is correct here for these restrictions that the West has kept in place. Obviously, there was no knowing exactly how this all will play out. But now we have data from two years plus. And we are seeing that the sort of big Armageddon type of like Third World War nuclear escalation has so far not resulted from any sort of assumed crossings of red lines. And I think we need to ask ourselves, are we with this incremental strategy, actually, enabling a sort of like, more diffuse, vertical as a horizontal escalation? We already have a war in the Middle East at the same time, we see this increasing openness with which North Korea, Iran, Russia, China are teaming up and potentially others, like in the world, outside of the West, Global South, and so on, are looking at where this is going. Is the West able to keep it, keep a say on on things? And then maybe what comes to the alliance itself. The big countries really need to get their act together. Small countries in Europe are really stepping up. The Nordics, Baltics, many also Eastern and like Central European countries are stepping up, but we need to get sort of Germany, France, UK and the US out of these various stages of like, internal disarray that are affecting the support for Ukraine and and like they’re affecting our ability to rise to the challenges that are posed right now on the global level that we’ve talked about today.
Catherine Sendak
Minna, thank you so much. Let me thank our panelists today. Steph, Nico, Minna, thank you so much for taking the time. Well, wonderful discussion. Before I turn it to my colleague, Sarah, for some logistics, I want to thank you all for joining us. Please stay tuned. We’re going to have a post summit call on Friday. So we hope you can join us then, to hear what we anticipated and whether or not it actually came to fruition. But with that, thank you so much. Let me turn it over to Sarah for last comments, and over to you.
Sarah Krajewski
Hi, everyone. Thank you so much for joining and for your questions. Yes, as Katie previewed. We’ll be having another wrap up call on Friday. There’ll be a recording and a rough auto generated transcript available following this briefing and following the one on Friday. So I’ll be sure to be in touch with that. If you have any questions for any of our panelists or you wish to speak with any of CEPA’s experts, feel free to get in touch press@cepa.org and I’ll direct your questions. Thanks so much guys.
