Federico Borsari
Hello, my name is Federico Borsari and welcome to CEPA State of the Alliance, a special series bringing together top leaders from Europe and North America to deliberate on the most pressing challenges facing allies and partners. Today, I’m particularly honored and thrilled to welcome the Director General of the European Union’s Military Staff, Lieutenant General Michiel van der Laan. Lieutenant General, welcome to CEPA.

Michiel van der Laan
Thank you very much.

Federico Borsari
So we have, we are amidst, you know, a very interesting phase in European security, but also, if we enlarge the perspective, also in the neighborhood of the European Union. And we have we have seen the return of large scale war on the European continent for the first time after Second World War. But we are also facing an increasingly complex security environment across the neighborhood of the European Union. And in this phase, we’re we know that the European Union is trying to become a more proactive global actor. And a to is also trying to build a more, let’s say capable military tool to do to deal with unexpected crisis, for instance, across its neighborhood. So there is a lot to delve into in this discussion. But let me start with the focus on on Ukraine. So we are more than two years now into Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. And could you tell us more about what the European Union has done so far to support Ukraine? What do you think are the priorities for the coming months?

Michiel van der Laan
Well, let me first start by saying that I think the European Union has done a lot, a lot since the war started. So there was unwavering support for Ukraine from the beginning. From a military point of view, we started to support them with training one half year ago, with the so called EU training mission, in which 24 or 27 member states participate. We have been training in these one half years about 55,000 soldiers already on European soil, mainly in Poland, Germany, but also in countries like Spain, Italy, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, etc. For the next month, we intend to do as much as possible based on the requirements coming from the Ukrainian general staff. So the training is go ongoing. The second thing is that we are doing is we are supporting them with equipment and ammunition. All member states are donating equipment, ammunition, or money to buy these things. And until now, we support them, it’s more than 20 billion raised of our money.

Federico Borsari
Well, that’s that sounds a lot. And it’s important to, to flag this aspect because, of course, there has been a lot of focus on the support coming from the US. But at the same time, it’s also worth noting how the European Union and how so many different countries have been able to, you know, come together and and increase and ramp up their efforts to provide, you know, what Ukraine needs to to win on the battlefield. But widening a bit our perspective, I would say that Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader set of of security threats that European Union is facing. And especially from across its southern neighbourhood, where the overlapping of conflicts, of poor governance, climate change as well. And socioeconomic problems is fueling, you know, a security crisis, which, you know, can be very dangerous for European countries and European Union as well. How does the European Union strategic campus address this new threat landscape? How does the European Union see this this, you know, new threat landscape and what can be done to, you know, to address the problems that are associated with it?

Michiel van der Laan
Yeah, well, let me first make a last remark on Ukraine. Because I think it’s important to see that the war in Ukraine is a physical, direct threat to the European Union. And that’s why Ukraine should and be supported as much as possible in order to win this war. So next to that, when we talk about the defense of the European territory, it’s a NATO task. So the EU is part of, most EU countries a part of NATO. And collective defense is and will always be a NATO task. So we’re very glad that we work together with US and Canada, and some other non EU partners in NATO. Now concerning the South, clearly, we see that there are so many developments that are worrying in the African countries. So we are more or less pushed out many Western countries, including US, from Niger, from Mali, from Burkina Faso, from from other countries. And this will cause problems for the future if we don’t act because what we will see is a mass migration coming towards Europe. Migration is not per se a problem. But what comes with migration is terrorism and criminalism. And that’s what we cannot can afford to get into the European soil. So we are thinking about an integrated approach to step up our efforts in Africa. And especially this approach will be that we will support them in a way that they asked for, instead of bringing them goods, like we did in the past. So we’re working hard on that one. But the reality at the moment is we lost ground. We lost ground in Mali, we lost ground in Burkina Faso, in Niger, and some other countries. At the same time, we’re doing very well in Mozambique, in Somalia, we’re starting up some new efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. The third threat we are facing is the the sea lines of communication. So the Houthis, who are targeting merchant shipping, merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and which prevents us using the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. And actually, as we speak, we are shoulder to shoulder operating with two operations. There is an American operation in that area. And there’s a European naval operation Aspides, which is protecting merchant shipping. Ver successful, until now. If we don’t do that, it will cost the European Union 200 to 300 million per day. So there is a clear economic interest also.

Federico Borsari
Oh, that’s that’s very interesting. And thanks for mentioning the Aspides mission, which I think it’s a, it’s crucial, and has been unprecedented in a way on how it has been able to, you know, bring together countries that have also different, let’s say, approaches to security and interest as well. But at the same time, under the European Union flag they’ve been able to, to deliver and to deploy in Red Sea area and to tackle the Houthi threat. Now, at the same time, I think it’s interesting also to notice the increased penetration of Russia in Africa especially, and can you can you comment, very briefly on that? What, what does the European Union think of these of this increasing Russian presence along its southern border?

Michiel van der Laan
Of course, not good. I mean, we see more Wagner presence, we see more Africa cold presence, which both is Russian. But we also see more Chinese presence, presence from Iran and some other countries. So there are more and more actors active in Africa. And I mentioned already immigration, but it also means that when we are not present there that will be more difficult to have access to raw materials. That’s also why those other actors are in place at the moment. European Union doesn’t like it. We didn’t find the answer yet how to cope with it. Because when we talk about training missions, for example, we have difficulties with training people—realizing that perhaps at the same time, a few weeks after, they will operate together with Wagner. So that’s why we stopped operational training in some countries. And for the future, we need to think about how to make sure that they choose for us instead of for Wagner.

Federico Borsari
Now, that’s, that’s a great, that’s a great point. And, of course, the increased penetration of Russia has been, you know, ongoing for a while now. And it’s certainly becoming problematic from from a security standpoint, but also for the stability of the of that area in those countries themselves. But building upon what you just outlined, European Union is trying to become more proactive right in across the globe, and especially across along its its borders. And the establishment of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity and capacity, which should should have a projected strength of up to 5000 soldiers by 2025, becomes I think, very important, you know, uh tool to deal with this these kinds of threats and crises. Could you tell us more about the capabilities that the this Rapid Deployment Capacity should have to be effective?

Michiel van der Laan
Well, of course, depends on the circumstances and the task that the Rapid Deployment Capacity would get once to be deployed. The core of the Rapid Deployment Capacity is the so called European Battle Group, which consists about 1,500 soldiers, mainly infantry, combat service combat service support. And the idea is to add modules to that based on the requirements, so additional infantry, air assets, perhaps naval assets, so it should be a flexible force that has a high reaction potential.

Federico Borsari
Now, that’s, that’s interesting, because we have seen also how it’s becoming more and more necessary to have a rather rapidly deployable mechanism and then tool from a military standpoint to deal with the unexpected crisis. And certainly there are threats now emerging that will, could at least, become more more problematic in the coming years, and could threaten interest of European countries. So that’s that’s an important, let’s say, engagement and commitment that European Union is doing on the military level. If if you could expand a bit more on some of the challenges that these Rapid Deployment Capacity face, what do you think are the most relevant one for the European Union?

Michiel van der Laan
Well, I think the most challenging part will be that we establish a force that is truly interoperable. So we’re working on ideas how to develop such a Rapid Deployment Capacity? How many countries should be involved or member states? Should we work with fast with fixed groupings? Or so interoperability is a key word. And secondly, strategic enablement. So we need strategic transport, we need intelligence assets, etc, etc. Now, it’s looking good, we’re working hard on this. And member states, we’ll have to make it available, because we don’t own it. But for sure, from the beginning of next year, we will be FOC with a Rapid Deployment Capacity, ready to act.

Federico Borsari
That’s, that’s great. That’s great news. And I think it’s important to stress this, when we discuss, you know, how the European Union is, is doing and working hard to, to become more proactive. And you’ve, you’ve already mentioned, very, very, a very important tool. But at the same time, we also know that at the present at the present stage, European countries are struggling also to increase the investments into the defense sector, even though there has been a lot of a lot of efforts to to do that, especially since the since the fullscale Ukraine invasion two years ago. But there are still a lot of challenges when it comes to, for instance, the industrial capacity, and, and also the production of equipment, and at the same time also finding, you know, a common approach to to defense across Europe. How is your team working on on these issues? For instance, when it comes to the increase of, you know, ammunition production, and how do you think European countries can can improve on this on this aspect?

Michiel van der Laan
Now, my team is not per se directly working on this. We are supported. As you perhaps know, in the European Union, we have the EDA, the European Defence Agency, and they’re responsible and working on enhancing procurement, improving interoperability, international coordination, etc, etc. What we do is we bring forward the requirements, so requirements concerning weapon systems, interoperability, CIS, etc.

Federico Borsari
Okay, how have European countries responded to the to the requirements, let’s say, request of your team, have you find have you found difficulties or, or more receptive?

Michiel van der Laan
No, I think everybody knows that we need to do something. We need to improve. We need to be faster, stronger, more interoperable, but outcomes to work through dt. And of course, to gain something, every member state needs to have some pain. So you have you give up something and you gain something, you gain something. And so it’s all about national industry. It’s about national interests. It’s about at the end of the day, it’s about people losing their work or getting more work. So we’ll find ways there but but for sure, it will not be easy.

Federico Borsari
That’s that’s, that’s very interesting. Thank you. And to arrive at the final part of our conversation, in one month, we will have an historical and people summit, NATO Summit here in Washington. And and why complex, if you NATO cooperation, remains a key remains key for transatlantic security and stability. How can you best harmonize its cooperation with with NATO? And how can, you know, avoid friction and duplications of a 14 in the military realm, according to you?

Michiel van der Laan
I think solution is very easy. There is a clear priority concerning collective defense for NATO. European countries and EU countries should procure those things that are identified by the NDPP, the NATO Defense Planning Process, because these shortfalls, once procured, will serve both NATO and the EU. There is no competition from my point of view. We will be responsible for capacity building operations for securing, for example, lines of communications, that for collective defense, it will be NATO. It is NATO will be NATO for the future also.

Federico Borsari
Now that’s that’s, that’s perfect, then, thanks so much for for, you know, coming to CEPA and for giving us a glimpse of what the European Union is doing in the security space and the military space as well. Thank you so much again.

Michiel van der Laan
Thank you very much.

Federico Borsari
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