Sam Greene
Hello, everybody. Good morning to those of you joining us in Washington or elsewhere in the United States. Afternoon, good evening to those joining over here on this side of the Atlantic. My name is Sam Greene. I’m Director of the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis or CEPA, and it’s my distinct pleasure to welcome you to this on the record briefing on the upcoming elections and referenda in Moldova and Georgia. We are joined by an excellent panel of fellows and friends of CEPA today. So Irina Arabidze is a James S. Denton Fellow at CEPA and a visiting lecturer at Caucasus University inTbilisi, regular commentator, and policy analyst, you will have seen her work around. We have also with us Jason Bruder, Senior Fellow in the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA, lecturer at Columbia University and Georgetown University prior to that, Senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer and a State Department official with more than 20 years of experience working on US foreign policy in a particular focus on today’s part of the world. Denis Cenusa is an Associate Expert at the Eastern European Studies Center in Lithuania, as well as well as Program Director for European integration at the Expert Group in Moldova. And Ketavan Chichava is also a Fellow in our Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA, an Executive Director and Founder of the Tbilisi Center for Development and Democracy, among other civil society groups in, in Georgia. This is to remind and on the record briefing. We will, afterwards, provide a recording and a transcript. If you want to follow up on this, also be very happy to connect you with with any of today’s speakers. If you want to follow up on things in in more detail. I will get us started, but I will invite everybody in just a moment to chime in with, with questions. We have a reasonable number of people in the room today, not not too many, not too few. So when you do have questions, please feel free to use the raise hand function, get involved in the conversation directly, or else just to, to pop a question in the chat, and I will take them as, as I see them. But really going to start with the same question for, for everybody, which is simply, what are you, what are you watching for in in the elections? What are the potential scenarios and implications for, for outcomes and developments, both in the region and, and more broadly. And Denis, since you know, Moldova’s votes are only three days away on the 20th of October, I think I’ll start with you.

Denis Cenusa
Well, I’m happy to be part of this conversation. It’s a timely one, as you mentioned, we are very close to the election day. The same day will be also crucial for referendum that is about the change of the Constitution to introduce the European integration as a strategic objective of Moldova. Something similar was done in the, in the past by Georgia and Ukraine, so Moldova is trying to just to catch up in this regard. But what is more important is that Moldova is going to to vote for, for a president in a context of geopolitical tension in the region, and with a very specific to the country polarization that takes place and is exploited by, by the Russian, by the Russian side through proxies, as well as disinformation that is conducted straight from, from Moscow. So we have a very particular situation because obviously the clear front runner is the current incumbent president, Maia Sandu. But we also have two other candidates that are very close to to compete for, for the, for, for the second position in the runoff. So it’s, it’s unlikely to have a win from the first round, therefore, the focus will be on the second round. But at the moment, the, the main competitor, and the main, the main contender is, is still Maia Sandu. She is supported by by about 30% of the population, according to the latest survey, which was published today. And she is also backed by, by the Western, by the Western capitals, as well as large part of the civil society organizations and media institutions in Moldova. So in all, in all, we have a rather favorable situation for the incumbent than for the, for the rivals of Maia Sandu. But anyway, I expect that the elections will take place in a fair and, and correct manner, because it’s about legitimate elections, and if not, then we will be seeing a lot of repercussions for the, for the image of the elected President, as well as for the future elections that Moldova is going to face next year in in the summer, when we will have parliamentary elections, which are really the crucial ones, and Russia is going to try to influence them as much as it can.

Sam Greene
And, and the referendum, what’s your?

Denis Cenusa
Yes. Of course, the referendum is, is also very important. I already mentioned that is, is a way to somehow compensate for the years when Moldova was, was somehow oscillating between two vectors. The surveys are still showing a quite important, significant segment in the, in the population that is supporting Eurasian Economic Union, but more than 50% according, including to the, to the today’s survey is showing that the that the attention of the population, the sympathies are towards the European Union. What, what is interesting that if we see, if we look at the surveys, they show that up to 55% are supporting the EU vector as such. But when it comes to the referendum, then the support for, for the change of the constitution is below 50%, it’s about 48%. Which means that, that most likely the criticism towards the government, as well as the Russian disinformation has been efficiently used so that the population is not really willing to vote massively in favor of the referendum. So we still have two, three days until, until the day of elections under the referendum, and I believe that everyone will be focused on communication to the public in order to increase this, this quite worrying percentage that I mentioned.

Sam Greene
Thank you.

Kate, the view from Tbilisi.

Ketevan Chachava
First of all, thank you so much for organizing this, and thank you for the interest, and it’s great to be part of this panel. Of course, Georgia is in very important stage at this point, because we are facing elections, the parliamentary elections. This is the first time that Georgia is going to move on a fully proportional system that has been basically in pipeline for some time, and after the long term advocacy from the political parties and civic activists, we this is the first time we’re going to have a fully proportional elections with a 5% threshold. This sounds maybe a kind of specific detail, but in bigger picture, as you might know, elections in the end of the day is quite a technical thing, because the numbers are going to make the biggest difference. We know that over 85% of Georgians are pro EU integration. You know, this is also a part of the Georgian’s constitution, that Georgia and every institution has to do its best to become member of EU and NATO. Despite all of that, we have seen a very dramatic backsliding, especially for the next, last nine months, since Georgia has gained the candidacy status of EU. There’s a lot of questions around all of that, but let me just focus mainly on elections, as that’s the main question, I guess, now, until there’s less than 10 days. And basically, apart from the system change, which is the biggest reform that can happen when it comes to elections, that Georgia is going to be the first country implementing the three stage new technologies at the same time. So over 90% of Georgians are going to vote based with the new technologies. Apart from technical potential issues, there’s also issue of voters being prepared to vote with a new style, because the legislation became quite strict with every other mistake, possible mistake on the ballot papers, vote can be abolished. Additionally, what we feel is, despite the quite a low support towards the Georgian Dream, it’s still one of the, this is the most supported political party in the country, with around, depends on different data, but still around with like, 35% support. But we should keep in mind that it’s not about the general support, it’s about the number of voters who are going to turn out on election day, and from that, the number of votes which are going to be valid. Additionally, from those who are going to pass 5% threshold. We have over 19 parties who have submitted their lists, so it is a quite competitive elections. But the same time, when we talk about these details, why it’s important, because actually opposition has to do its best, and they are trying to do his best to ensure that they have majority in the parliament. This is going to be a very first time when Georgia actually can be facing quite a multi party democracy as an outcome of elections. Just a small qualification, because I have been in Washington, DC and Brussels for past few weeks, and everyone is really questioning how it’s even possible that Georgian Dream is so close to maybe even potentially winning majority, even despite every mistake they have made. Unfortunately, we have to realize that the massive misinformation, disinformation, as well as basically parallel realities that has been created via media or in social media, we have been seeing that the civil society and the parties we have all been kind of focused on fighting different fronts in a different stages. For example, the fighting of the so called “Russian law,” fighting with LGBTQI package that was recently adopted, really kind of going in coalition, the parties have spent a lot of resourcing building potential coalitions, having discussions. So at some point, what worries me is that I don’t know, and I hope that enough work has been done to really motivate the voters to come to vote. And, you know, voters are prepared, but still, for example, you know, taking into consideration that there’s 3.5 million voters in Georgia, and has registered, but basically the highest turnout we have ever had is in 2012 elections, which was basically 2.1 million voters turning up. So this is all details, but in reality, it can really make a big difference, because in the end of a game, basically, again, we have to be able to see the voters being interested, coming up, showing up, and again, making sure that there is Georgia’s European North Atlantic integration is supported as a follow up, and has now come up the 26 elections. October 26 elections.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Lots to pick up on there, and we will come back to some of those issues. I think those following US elections will also, you know, resonate with the idea of the importance of turnout. Irina, if I can, if I can, turn to you next. What are you tracking in the elections next Saturday.

Irina Arabidze
Well, from my point of view, what I’ve been very actively looking at has been the implications of the foreign agents law that was adopted, we saw over the summer period and caused widespread demonstrations in the streets of Tbilisi. So, what was very inoperative was how the government was planning to use the law to go after civil society, and what implications that could have prior to the elections. And as we’ve observed lately, the government has started registering CSOs in the database, but at the same time, they haven’t cracked down on the civil society, using this full course of law to find and really go after some of the major organizations in the country. However, what we’ve also observed is the government’s attempt to use different legislation in Georgia to try to find ways to punish the most active CSOs. Because we witnessed with Transparency International Georgia, that government has used the law and political associations to first label them as a political organization and then backtrack on their decision pretty quickly after they’ve made the announcement, probably calculating that the legitimacy of these elections is still something that they care about. So the implications of the foreign agents law is one thing that has bothered all of us during this past period, but also the broad approach towards civil society, because we saw a lot of harassment and threats against the civil society representatives previously. So any possible attacks or escalation in that regard was something that we were largely worried about. Up until now, CSOs are actively engaged and able to carry out their work which is, which is good and promising. At the same time, the Georgian Dream’s resort has been unchanged, and this war really has been painted as a choice between war and peace, with Georgian Dream using the worst care as a means to really mobilize their electorate to vote in their favor, and basically also the negative rhetoric of promising the electorate to abolish opposition and punish or all their rivals after they win the majority vote. And this negative rhetoric has permeated this elections all along, but then at the same time, what has been very interesting is watching dynamics around the charter of the President of Georgia, which has put in place a roadmap for the coming one year, if opposition garners enough votes to form government. And this charter is important because it unites all opposition parties among the, around the idea of promoting Western integration by putting in place all necessary reforms for the coming year and pledging that Georgia needs to hold another parliamentary elections in a year’s time after these reforms have been implemented. And so in that sense, it’s very important to see whether the opposition parties follow through by following the president and her pledge to announce the technical government ahead of elections as a way to cement political parties adherence to the charter that they’ve signed, but then also what’s going to happen after elections, if opposition wins, and whether disagreement around the technical government is actually going to take place.

Sam Greene
Great. Again, lots to pick up on there. Jason, if I can turn to you, what are you tracking and what should Washington be paying attention to?

Jason Bruder
Thank you and thanks for the invite to be here. You know, I think Washington, insofar as Washington is tracking these elections, is interested in the same thing that people in Brussels or Moscow or anywhere else who follows the region is interested in. Because, in a sense, in both countries, the people who called the elections did so in a way that and at a time that very much framed them in terms of decision points on what, what the future direction of these two countries is going to be. Are they going to further their already significant efforts towards integrating with Western institutions? You know, Georgia’s gotten this invitation, but are they going to take it to the EU? Moldova seems, surprisingly, for those of us who’ve been following it over the years, surprisingly determined to proceed with the European future. But we’re going to find out how determined. And you know, obviously, President Sandu chose to have this election with the referendum, which obviously ties it to the question of geopolitical direction. But also it’s, it’s strange, but you know, Bidzina Ivanishvili, this powerful political figure in Georgia who was prime minister and founded the Georgia Dream party, really organized it. It was a broad coalition 10 years ago when he, or 12 years ago when he organized it, it’s gotten a little bit more narrow over the years. But you know, he is rarely in the public eye politically, he has not stayed in office. He is probably, quite honestly, the, the leader of the party, the ruling party, but, but he’s not often in the public eye, but he chose to be in this election, and he chose to come out and make some statements that were critical of the West and suggested skepticism of the path that Georgia has been on for well over 20 years now. So I’d say that it’s a simplistic way to look at these elections, but it’s an obvious way. And there’ll be a lot of people who are, have been committed to the progress of both of these countries in their, in their economic and political development, but in also in their accession to transatlantic institutions. So, yeah, so I’d imagine that a lot of people who’ve worked with them over the years are very curious to see what happens, from Washington.

Sam Greene
Okay. Denis, if I can come back to you, you mentioned, you know, the prospect of Russian intervention, both in, in these elections and in upcoming parliamentary elections next year. First of all, are we seeing evidence of that already? And second of all, how well prepared do you think the electoral system and Moldovan civil society are to resist that intervention?

Denis Cenusa
Well, that, I think it’s the most important question, because you you can see the US, you can see the EU adopting sanctions that are targeting those politicians that are considered to be Russian proxies. And we speak about, about the leadership of the Gagauzia autonomy, which is Russian speaking autonomy in the south of the country that is penetrated quite well by the networks created by Ilan Shor, who is a fugitive based in Moscow from where he is coordinating the activities conducted on the Moldovan soil. So we have this kind of network of different proxies, Russian proxies, that involve politicians mainly linked to to Shor. But also we have different other politicians that are either positioning themselves as, as pro-Russian or as moderate in terms of foreign policy. They speak about balanced foreign policy, multi multifactorial foreign policy, so they are also considered, deemed to be potential players that will benefit the restoration of good relations with the, with Russia. And on the other hand, we have what is less, less visible, but has a big impact, and that’s the disinformation which is, which is carried out through, through Telegram, mainly, but also through other means. Like, there are web pages which are amplifying the messages that are usually launched by Maria Zaharova and the Russian media in general. So there are sophisticated ways to try to convey the messages about, about this doubt that the European integration is the right choice, because European integration is criticized for not bringing the enough prosperity or not, not quickly enough prosperity to the population, as well as that, it is linked to NATO. So this kind of intermingling between the European integration and NATO as something which is, which is really scaring the Moldovans, who are oriented towards peace, and they don’t want to to hear anything about the NATO membership. So this is the way Russia is trying to exploit this fear, and in general, sentiments of fear are very much exploited at this point, taking into consideration that Moldovan population has been impoverished by the, by the recent crisis that the country went through, and the the lack of efficient government, which was, which should be also mentioned, because this is something for which Maia Sandu is paying somehow certain costs. The way, she’s linked very tightly to the, to the government, and she cannot really escape this link, will somehow be also exploited and used against her and against the current government by, before the parliamentary elections, but also now, when Moldovans have to choose either to re-elect Maia Sandu and somehow to ensure the continuity of the part that she created in the relationship with the EU, or to change the agenda and have a president that is in favor of a balanced foreign policy. Because the, the two competitors, the main competitors of Maia Sandu, both Renato Usatîi, is a former mayor of Bălți, the north of the country, as well as the former prosecutor general, Alexander Stoianoglo, who was dismissed by Maia Sandu, they both are promoting the balanced foreign policy towards the European Union and Russia.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Ketevan, similar question for you. You also mentioned disinformation. I know there’s a lot of effort that’s gone into strengthening resilience to disinformation in Georgia in, in recent years. Is there any indication that’s paying off in these elections?

Ketevan Chachava
Well, that’s actually a very good question. And unfortunately, hearing our partners from Moldova, there’s a lot of similar messages going around. But in Georgian case, what I can say, and as Irina has mentioned, the peace message has been extremely powerful when it comes from the Georgian Dream. This is actually, as you might know, that 20% of Georgia is occupied. Basically, Russian troops are standing from, literally from Tbilisi, less than an hour away. And especially now, when the war in Ukraine has been so close to Georgia, as well as all the developments in the, in the region, of course, the message of peace has been a very powerful, unfortunately, I have to be honest, I don’t think the opposition has addressed that message very clearly in their campaigns. And in that context, it’s also one more thing to keep in mind that every political party in Georgia, I guess, except the so called conservative line of the clearly pro-Russian politicians who hold less than 3% support at this, based on different data, everybody has been promising Europe to Georgian voters. And I think this has been a quite confusing as well. Because again, I think it’s not quite clear, no, you know, promising EU would not be very clear, because it’s not depending only on Georgian side, and not in opposition or in for the government, but still very broad messaging that has been coming around, apart from existing disinformation, and unfortunately, the rhetorics against the West that we have been hearing, which has been a huge surprise for, for Georgians, because usually, that be previously, it would be coming from different sources, but this time, it has been coming from very high officials. Questioning, really the true friendship, or questioning really, if West is interested in peace in Georgia and so on. So all of those messages, apart with additional disinformation and misinformation as well as, as I’ve mentioned, this parallel realities which come from very polarized as well as partisan media that exists in Georgia, I think this has really created a very difficult situation. Because, if you even ask a Georgian Dream voter in the region, they believe, if they will vote for Georgian Dream, they actually vote for Georgia’s European future, because that’s actually a promise of the Georgian Dream. Their official motto is peace, peace, the dignity, and prosperity with Europe. So even their posters are with EU flag on. And as you might remember, the Georgian Dream has their own other messages as well, that this is a government that brought Georgia’s association agreement, this is a government who brought visa liberalization, and this is a government who brought the candidacy status just lately. So being honest, and, you know, trying to really assess the truth in the eyes and look at truth in the eyes, you know, for people, the majority of Georgians are not, you know, experts on international relations, right, like following all those discussions. You know, this is something that they see, that they feel, and peace, and especially in our region, is very tangible thing. Again, you know, we have seen the war, even my generation has, so it’s not even a the previous generations have to remember something. We remember 2008, we remember the, how horrible war can be. So again, I think this has been something that, apart from propaganda and the messaging, also the campaigning, has been a very, not very specific maybe in that context. So yes, there are challenges, indeed in that sense. And yeah, I would love to add later on, maybe about the Russian law, because the, the Russian style law, as well as, as Irina mentioned, the Georgian Dream, has kind of stopped implementing it. So again, for the wider public, it feels more like, oh, it’s nothing really happening anymore. But they actually promised that they will be back to it and implementing it after the elections and today, actually, just few years ago, a few minutes ago, the Georgian civil society, 120 organizations, as well as 16 media and four individual cases have been submitted to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. So today, it was already sent in because, as you might be following the development of this law, the Constitutional Court, unfortunately did not stop. [unintelligible] made a decision to stop the implementation of the legislation. So, yeah, I’m sure we’ll be back.

Sam Greene
I am certain we’ll come back to the to the foreign agents law. Irina, though, sticking with this topic of disinformation. I mean, for the moment, from your perspective, is the disinformation challenge in these elections in Georgia more an internal one or an external one? And regardless of where it’s coming from, is it, I mean, how would you rate the level of resistance and resilience to disinformation in Georgia?

Irina Arabidze
I’d say it’s generated very much internally by the ruling party, considering that their entire messaging rests on scaring the electorate that if change happens, that change comes with bullets and tanks. While, if the status quo remains, the peace is maintained and in the long run they promised the electorate that Georgian rule will be able to turn the tide around and get European and American partnership back. So the authority is generated domestically, but what I think has been contributing to the ambiguity towards making the electorate think twice, saying an average voter who might be thinking, well, I want Georgia to be moving towards Europe, but then at the same time, I’m looking at the development in Ukraine, and this is not something that I want to see unfold in Georgia, so maybe I vote for Georgia Dream. And as they’re saying, they’ll be able to get Georgia to NATO, to EU in 2030, there has to be a very clear [unintelligible] sorry, coming from the Western side, both the European Union and the United States, that draws a red line and outlines what are the conditions and how, under the circumstances where Georgian dream continues with the policies that they have put in place, if there is no chance that Georgia is making amends with either the EU or, or the US more broadly. So I think that’s where the sort of countering this disinformation has been lacking on a, on a leadership level. And this concerns both European leaders, but also on, on a higher leadership level in the United States and Georgia has not really been on the radar. So for, for Georgian voters, it matters way more when they hear these things from from the top leaders and decision makers that they know by name and recognize and can trust. So, so in that sense, I would, I would make a distinction between, yes, Georgian Dream is generating this disinformation locally, but refuting this information, this disinformation would be much more effective if we had, yes, strict and clear cut, but, a very clear resource from the EU and US side that would basically draw a red line that would be clear for an average voter.

Sam Greene
Thank you. I’m going to open it up to the floor for questions in a moment, so please do get your hands ready or post questions to the chat. But before I do that, Jason, Irina said, I think, probably rightly, that Georgia hasn’t really been on the on the radar for senior leadership in Washington. Nonetheless, you know, the Biden administration has prioritized, you know, supporting its friends and partners around the world in the fight against disinformation, particularly foreign and malign influence and information manipulation. Is it doing enough in the cases of Georgia and Moldova?

Jason Bruder
Well, you know, listening to my colleagues and my own statements, I’d have to say that the word that most associates, I associate with this conversation would be ambiguity. I mean, obviously the Russians are trying to generate ambiguity, politicians try to generate ambiguity to capture as many voters as they can. It’s, it’s very tough to get clarity and, and that’s why disinformation is such a challenge. Now in Georgia, you have a special challenge insofar as, you know, the United States government has been very critical of this foreign agents law and some of the policy, some of the recent policies of Georgia Dream and, and they’re running in the election. So, you know, I think, I think the ambassador’s walking a fine line there. On the other hand, in the Moldovan election, you know, there was, there was a hearing on the hill, I think it was a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee hearing in June, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe, Smith, described a sort of threefold strategy of support for Moldova at this point. He described it as the three lines of effort. One, very high level engagement to show support, and Secretary Blinken visited earlier this year and announced some major assistance. The second thing that he spoke about was new and varied forms of assistance to address some of the concerns, but I think one of those was to address disinformation. And the third was the use of sanctions and visa restrictions against individuals and organizations that attempt to undermine Moldovan democracy. You know, obviously, you know, the State Department, the US government, can provide assistance to, to the governments so that they can police their own elections. But, you know, it gets complicated diplomatically.

Sam Greene
Thanks for that. Again, opening it up to questions for, from the, from the floor. So please do use the raise hand function here in zoom or post a, post a question to the chat. While you’re doing that, and looking on the list, I know there are people in this room who have questions, so please, please do get please, do get involved. But while you’re, while you’re doing that, Denis, I might, I might come back to you. Is there an opportunity, I know you’ve been looking at this regionally through your work in, in Lithuania and around the region. Are there opportunities for, you know, Moldova, Georgia and their other partners in in Eastern Europe to work together to to counter these challenges of disinformation, or are governments essentially on their own to deal with this?

Denis Cenusa
Your question contains the answer you are, you are correctlypointing to what is happening at the, at the moment. We have networks of investigative journalists who are working together. I know projects that involve Ukrainian and Moldovan as well as Romanian journalists. I myself have been with, together with the Expert Group and the think tank in Lithuania, we’re implementing project that was focused on countering the disinformation as well as training the journalists and have creating platforms for them to meet with with experts from the EU member states. So I think that many things are being done, but what is missing probably we are doing certain things too late. So we had to start this work long time ago, and now we would try to really do as much as we can in a very short amount of time, which creates a lot of saturation in the public, because at the moment, there is a lot of information that is provided to the public, but you know, you cannot really teach a person to ride the bike in one hour. So I think that the education and the critical thinking that should take place and should be also taken care of by the government, as well as the civil society organizations was not done properly and consistently over the years. And now we really see all this misses, and most likely, we had to learn these lessons for the, for the next elections that I mentioned about the parliamentary elections in summer of 2025.

Sam Greene
Great. Thank you. Questions are coming in so, Lucy, let me turn, turn to you first if you want to unmute yourself and ask your question.

Lucy Papachristou
Hi. Can you hear me okay?

Sam Greene
Yes.

Lucy Papachristou
Great. Hi, I’m Lucy Papachristou, I work at Reuters. I had a question about Georgia. And so thank you both for speaking so well about it. I think, and others have said, sort of, in regards to Georgia’s sorry to Georgian Dream’s rhetoric around EU integration, that Georgian Dream thinks basically that they can have their cake and eat it too, right? That they can pursue these quite illiberal policies such as the foreign agent law, as you’ve already talked about, while at the same time espousing a desire to join the EU and even progress further down that integration path. Do you think that that’s a fair assessment? And if so, what message do you think the West could send to Georgia to show that that’s perhaps not the case, so that they can’t have their cake and eat it too. Is that personal sanctions on Ivanishvili, for example? And sort of a part B of that question is, how could those strategies such as personal sanctions on Ivanishvili, how could they backfire if Georgian Dream does win a majority? How could Ivanishvili or Georgian Dream in general, sort of drag Georgia even farther away from from the west. And what are maybe some concrete examples of what that would look like? Thank you.

Sam Greene
Thank you, Irina. Do you want to take that first?

Irina Arabidze
Sure. So first of all, I guess Georgian Dream had the experience of Georgian Dream of dealing with the West has been that they’ve tried to have their cake and eat it too, and for quite a few occasions, they have gotten away with it. So and up until now, in relations with the West, they’ve made promises that they haven’t fulfilled, they’ve entered agreements with the European Union that they later dropped and backtracked, but they still found on the other side willingness to cooperate. So in that sense, looking back now, holding those red lines and maintaining those red lines on the Western Front had been, would have been useful. But right now, considering that experience, I would say that up until recently, Georgian Dream might have had an illusion that there was a possibility to win these elections and continue with business as usual. But judging from the rhetoric coming from the West and some of the steps that have been taken already, because we’ve seen first wave of sanctions, both visa bans, but also financial action, sanctions from the US side, they can tell that getting back to business as usual would not be immediate. But because those reactions from the Western side have targeted mainly the lowest echelons of the Georgian Dream or, or haven’t really targeted the core of the regime who perpetuates their rule,there is still this window of opportunity or hope that as long as they remain in power, considering Georgia’s strategic value, there will be a path back. So, so, and this is something that has been very actively peddled to the electorate as well. And as Jason mentioned, the word ambiguity, that is something that has been shrouding the entire Georgian Dream campaign, that there is a path back, and Georgians can choose both peace and European integration if they stick with GD. So definitely, sanction is one instrument that the West can use against the regime in these circumstances, and a lot also depends on how the development after this elections are going to unfold, the steps that Georgian dream will take, and how the West will will respond to those. So and definitely, you have to, if you want the regime to to change behavior, you have to hold hostage what they value. So, so in that regard, definitely, this regime stands on the core that perpetuated, including its leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who has a lot to lose if he loses access to Western funds, and if he loses access to the finances. So in that regard, this is a very strong and important tool that the West has, that they’ve been holding back from wielding, considering that there is still hope, at least in the sense on the Western side, is that there still might be room to probably talk or negotiate. But these [unintelligible], and I believe that judge, based on the actions of the Georgian Dream, all foreign policy toolbox has to be employed.

Sam Greene
Okay, Ketevan do you want to add anything to that?

Ketevan Chachava
Yeah, I would love to shortly. Thank you, Lucy for the question. And you know, I think when it comes to having a cake and eat it, I think the what Georgian Dream is trying to keep as a message at this time, which I think also part of the Georgians believe, is that, with all the developments, now is the most important time to ensure that we remain in peace. You know, the war in Ukraine will be over soon. They also underline that they wish, they hope, that Ukraine will win and this will be over soon. And when it’s over, then we can all refresh the relationship and go back to the normal. Additionally to that, I think for the West, it’s really important to keep in mind that, there are actually five things that I think is extremely important to make clear for the, as an outcome of the results of the elections and how things will go farther. Because again, as I’ve said, I think there is a lack of really clear steps, also from every side, let’s be honest. Again, promising Europe and promising that everything will be okay is usually not very tangible. There are five things that I mentioned. One is absolutely most important is the free, fair, and transparent elections and the legitimacy of the outcomes. The second component, I would say, the abolishing the Russian law and stopping all this kind of interference and interrogation of free media, civil society, etc. Third would be abolishing the 18 Amendments and the package of so called the family value dish, LGBTQI, the laws. The third, or maybe moving up even more importantly, stopping the anti-Western rhetorics, because again, we want, the fact is, when the disinformation comes from the unknown sources, it usually has a less impact. But I’m worried that actually, it has been very intense, and the rhetoric that we have been hearing can actually harm in the longer run. And the fifth, I believe, is extremely important to show the very concrete plan and vision of going back to implementation of the Nine Steps of the Georgia’s EU integration plan. I mean, it sounds, there’s that, there has been actions apart from the words. And I think this is extremely important also to if anyone wants to keep in the normal relationship or have a cake and have have it, there has to be a very concrete actions and follow ups. If business should go, I’m sure it because we’re getting back to the normal is going to be a very longer, longer trip. But I think it is very important to keep that in mind. And unfortunately, I have been hearing, you know, rounds and questions about, like, the stopping visa liberalization, etc, for Georgians, and I think it’s extremely important to keep in mind, and I think the punishing the Georgian people I’m going to I think it’s going to have a reverse reaction. So I would really reconsider, like, maybe addressing the persons, or, you know, discussing different the means, but also same time, you know, ensuring that we don’t go in the path, that we cannot go back. And I think this is something that has West been playing at this point, and the same time again, keeping in mind that, you know, burning the bridges is very easy, the building the bridges takes a longer time. So that’s something that we have been worried about. And just to underline, actually, from the, from the message box, actually it has been very widely spread for last few months that actually, eventually it’s already under the section, and we can see that on the numbers, it has not really reacted. But I can say what really hurts the wider public, it was that the so called Hold on, on many programs that has been funded from the US and EU. And I know, and I have been kind of addressed from a lot of people who know that I am very openly pro-Western and pro-EU, pro-NATO person in Georgia that, like stopping the support for the Georgian army has become a very sensitive matter, and it has become really translated into a number of messages that I don’t think is really a good for the, for the long term kind of cooperation. Thank you.

Sam Greene
Okay. Thank you. Denis, we’ve got a question from Andy Heil at RFE/RL.Really, if I can paraphrase it, focusing on not just the Election Day, which has dominated our conversation today, but the election night, right? So what happens once people have have voted, the potential for unrest? He noted that, you know, just today, there have been detentions of alleged destabilization actors. Do you, he asked, do you think the immediate, the risk of immediate unrest on election night are high, and do they vary depending on whether this turns out to be a one or a two round presidential vote?

Denis Cenusa
Well, yeah, I was just reading the same news while I was listening to our Georgian colleagues. There have been investigations on different ways through which Russia tries to destabilize, but we know for sure that for them, it’s important to, to capitalize on this doubts about the legitimacy of the elections. So because, you know, not, not too many polling stations were open in, in Russia, for instance, we have the representatives, alleged representatives of the Russian, of the Moldovan diaspora in Russia that has been petitioning against the this low number of polling stations. Then we had orchestrated protests taking place in the capitals of the EU member states, such as Paris or Belgium or Brussels, against the, against the way the ruling party is organizing the election. So we see different ways through which the Russian, the Russian proxies, try to really undermine the trust in the outcome of the elections. I don’t think that we can see destabilizations after the elections, just because the police has been so consistently following what the position is doing, so they are uncovering different, different networks. I believe that the, there is a high control over the, over this processes that is being carried out by the police, as well as by the intelligence, with the support of the external partners, including Ukraine. Ukraine has been critical in providing the Moldovan intelligence with different information about the Russian interferences in Moldova. So in my view, the likelihood is rather moderate to low than, something which will showcase on, on Sunday in the evening or on Monday in the morning.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Again, please post more questions to the, to the chat, or raise your hand. But while you’re doing that again, let me turn that, a version of that question to Ketevan and to Irina. The doubts have been raised, not only as to how people in Georgia will vote and how the votes will be counted, but also you know, to what extent, you know, Georgian dream government might agree to leave office if it does, in fact lose. Is this something that, that we should be concerned about?

Irina Arabidze
Okay, yeah, I guess I can keep up. [unintelligible] this election, both the, the way I see is that both the outcome of this elections and the decisions of the Georgian Dream are going to depend on the numbers. The turnout will decide this elections, because we know by looking at the numbers from previous elections, both parliamentary and local governance elections, that only the Georgia Dream has won with only 100,000 votes. Which means that, considering the latest developments, including the adoption of the Russian law and including the discontent that has been spreading throughout the country, the oppositionally minded electorate is larger than the GD support base. But, we, what is unknown is how much of this oppositionally minded or disenchanted electorate will be motivated enough to get up and vote on the October 26. And largely speaking, if all of those who are unhappy will get out and vote, we will have a really wide margin between the oppositional vote and the Georgian Dream vote. If that margin is really large, Georgian Dream will find it extremely difficult to argue otherwise and not accept the results that that we see. But on the contrary, if the result is too close, they have a room of maneuver. They because they the entire decision making process in the Central Election Commission is skewed towards towards Georgia Dream, and they can use tactics that will support the outcome that they want to show. So this is why it will be extremely difficult for them to argue that they’ve succeeded if there’s a 10% divergence between their support and the opposition support. So for me, their rule of maneuver shrinks with the larger these divergences.

Ketevan Chachava
Yeah, I fully agree with Irina that turnout is going to decide everything. And apart from the turnout, I think what is important to keep in mind is that the Georgian Dream’s rhetoric for the official pre-election period has been calling everyone in every opposition party, NGOs, domestic, everyone, United, UNM flank. Why was that done? Because if we take numbers into account, the Georgian Dream has won elections since 2012, not only by the support they have, but also by the number of voters who willalways come out and vote against UNM. So basically, the very concrete, really no, very concrete example of that is last parliamentary with the presidential elections, when in the first round, Salome Zourabichvili and the UNM candidate, they both had around 650-600,000 votes. And on the second round, when the GD united all the forces saying this is clearly UNM coming back, the Georgian Dream got Salome Zourabichvili at that point, with the support of the Georgian dream, they got 1.1 million votes, and the opposition only managed to increase its support with 150,000 votes. Why I’m saying this? Because I think the Georgian Dream have been a very clear at who they address with their message books in pre-election period. So they have been very specifically addressing the ruler areas, they have been very specifically addressing certain fears that exist in the pre-election period. To your question about the violence or potential outcomes of the elections, I think it’s a positive thing that we are having the elections with the new technologies. And as you know, there are going to be two parallel results, which means there’s going to be one result that are going to come up from the electronic like machine, and then the same time on every polling station, they will be have to recount the protocols basically by hand as well. That means that there’s going to be basically double check, because this was actually a sort of recommendation from OECD and other also domestic observers, because this was the first time we were implementing the new technologies. So I guess on the same time we, the biggest problem could cause if there is a difference between the numbers that will come up from the electronic machine and the numbers of the hand count. That would be maybe something that could actually cause trouble. Additionally, I think it’s going to be, there’s a quite a high mobilization; we have thousands of domestic observers, we have thousands of political party representatives and media representatives at the polling stations. The number of polling stations have decreased because the number of voters who can vote have increased. So there’s going to be even higher mobilization. So actually, knowing the Georgian experience is, of course, the most important and tangible time will be when the closing of the polling stations and the counting will start. As well as, you know, when there are going to be first numbers coming in. I agree with Irina that I think the most important thing will be to see the difference between the numbers. But I also have to share my thoughts that actually, in the last parliamentary results, the Georgian Dream did not have 80 parliamentarians, they had only 80 parliamentarians. They did not have a 90 that they needed for a number of decisions. Well, unfortunately, they have always been able to find that 10 votes in the parliament from the opposition side. So what I feel can happen is that if Georgian Dream will get around whatever number they will have, and they’re not reaching the quota of 76, but they’re reaching maybe 70 or 69 or whatever number, I’m sure they’re going to be trying to find individual members who will join them and will be able to increase up to 76. And additionally to that, there’s also parties who are willing to build a co, coalition with the Georgian Dream if they will enter the parliament. For example, Girchi, who has, you know, quite high support. So that’s all to keep in mind. You know, I really hope that actually, the Georgia will also be able to proceed in a peaceful manner with the, with the outcomes.

Sam Greene
Thank you.

Jason, I’m going to give you the last question. I think, you know, we’re hearing the various things that could happen on and after Election Day. These are uncertain elections. Um, from Washington’s perspective, if, you know, the opposition in Georgia is not successful, if the opposition in Moldova is successful, what are the options then, for US policy?

Jason Bruder
Well, you know, these are both strategic countries in their own ways, but part of what makes them so extraordinarily attractive and strategic for members of Congress and people around Washington is, is, is their commitment to democracy. So I think we really enter terra incognita on the Georgian side, if, if there’s a perception that the election was unusually unfair. I mean, there were a lot of questions about the ones in 2020 and 2021. I think, I think there’d be if, I mean, the Congress responded very strongly, the administration responded strongly to the foreign agent lawand were quite outspoken about it, and, of course, as my, as my colleagues mentioned earlier, there was this suspension of assistance, which was a surprise me, frankly. So I don’t know, you know, I mean, I think it’s, it’s unclear, and then you have a situation here where we’re about to have an election and, and we’ll have another government in a few short months. Whether or not former President Trump or Vice President Harris wins will have a determinative effect on going forward. So, yeah, I’m afraid I too have a, have a rather ambiguous answer, except to say that the commitment to these two countries in Washington is pretty extraordinary for their size and distance from the United States. I mean, you know, I looked it up this morning just because I was curious, but I think the the Moldova Caucus in the House has eight members, which is quite a lot, actually, and, and the Georgia one has 11. And, you know, there’s always legislation in almost every session of Congress on these countries. There’s legislation before this Congress right now that could be taken up if the members of Congress felt motivated to weigh in on on developments in either country.

Sam Greene
Okay, we’re going to have to leave it there, but that does not need to be the end of the conversation. Please do get in touch with, with me, with my colleagues here at CEPA, including Sarah, I will hand things off to in a moment if you’d like to follow up on any of this. Before I do that, thanks again for being with us. Please join me in thanking Denis, Jason, Ketevan, and Irina. Sarah over to you.

Sarah Krajewski
Thanks, Sam. Thank you to our speakers for today and for all of your questions. A recording and rough auto generated transcript is going to be sent out in the hours following this call. If you have any other requests or want to speak to any of our speakers or any of our other experts at CEPA, email press@cepa.org and I will get back to you with their contacts. But thanks so much for joining, everyone and enjoy the rest of your day.