Executive Summary:
The announcement that the United States is considering placing Ballistic Missile Defense installations in Romania and Bulgaria has again strained U.S.-Russian relations. In response, Moscow has threatened to impede completion of the renegotiated START Treaty. The fresh tension could herald the beginning of the end of Washington’s “reset” policy with Russia.
Romanian President Traian Băsescu announced on February 4 that his country’s Supreme Defense Council had approved plans to participate in the next generation of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and host land-based interceptors on Romanian territory by 2015. Within days, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borissov stated that Sofia is set to begin negotiations with the United States about hosting elements of the shield.
The good news is that the Obama Administration’s plans for missile defense are moving forward. The bad news is that relations between Washington and Moscow are again heating up over the issue.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed “concern” over the announcement and demanded “clarification,” while Russian Envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin anticipated a “rather serious regional problem” or “political conflict” and hinted the situation could endanger U.S.-Russian cooperation. Most recently, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov implied that placing BMD installations in Romania and Bulgaria could impede the completion of the START treaty.
Missile Defense in Romania and Bulgaria now presents the first geopolitical test for the United States in Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Ukrainian elections.
The Black Sea Gambit: Back Door Reassurance
In September 2009, when the Obama Administration reversed earlier land-based BMD plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, Central European allies expressed their anxiety over the United States’ perceived willingness to engage in horse-trading over allied security needs to further its “reset” policy with Russia. Their concern was not unfounded.
While the United States has been focused on problems in the Middle East and Central Asia, Russia has significantly expanded its geopolitical influence in just over a year. Territorial gains in the 2008 South Ossetia War; U.S. benchmarking on NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine and Third Site BMD in the face of Russian pressure; and the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine have all arguably enhanced Moscow’s position on Europe’s eastern periphery at the expense of NATO.
A muted U.S. response to these events sent a disconcerting message to Central Europe concerning Washington’s willingness to stand by its allies in the face of what they perceive to be a potentially aggressive revisionist power. Minimal net gains with Russia over sanctions on Iran and aid in Afghanistan, however, seem to have led the United States to question the underlying assumptions behind the “reset.”
Washington now needs to demonstrate it can maintain a meaningful degree of influence on the ground in Central Europe in a post-Georgia and post-Ukraine era. The decision to place BMD installations in Romania and Bulgaria, in parallel with deploying a Patriot missile battery in Morag, Poland; long overdue NATO Contingency Planning for the Baltic States; and upcoming military exercises in Latvia send a message of U.S. commitment to allied security. As Romania and Bulgaria already host U.S. lily pad bases, choosing these allies for missile defense installations conforms to logic, as the medium-range design of the missile system benefits from a closer geographic proximity to Iran. Seriously pursuing the next generation of BMD further offers a form of “back-door” reassurance to Poland and the Baltic States, demonstrating the United States is willing to pursue its interests in the region even if it strains the “reset.”
End of the Reset?
How Russia will respond remains unclear. Already, Moscow has threatened that missile defense on the Black Sea could endanger the completion of the START follow-on treaty. Russian officials originally suggested that the United States place the Bush-era BMD installations in Romania and Bulgaria in lieu of Poland and the Czech Republic. If Moscow draws a line in the sand now, it may complicate prospects for a constructive partnership with Washington.
For the United States the stakes are high. Should the Obama Administration move forward with discussions about placing BMD installations in the two Balkan States only to back down in the face of Russian threats to scuttle START, U.S. credibility in Central Europe would suffer.
Pursuing BMD in Romania and Bulgaria may be the first indication that the United States is no longer willing to count on Russia and the “reset” policy. The opportunity to broaden bilateral relations with two reliable but often overlooked NATO allies and restore Central European confidence in Washington is too valuable to pass up. Iran is increasingly hostile; the clock is ticking. Russia may yet cooperate in response to pressure, but only if the United States stands firm, even at the expense of the START treaty.
While the installations await approval in the Romanian Parliament and further negotiations with Bulgaria, the Obama Administration should rally support for the project in Congress. | 
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